LaborHistory, Vol. 41, No. 4, 2001

PermanentReplacements and the Breakdown of the “Social Accord”in Calera, Alabama, 1974–1999

TIMOTHYJ. MINCHIN*

In thesummer of 1994, 150 workersat acementplant in Calera, Alabama, abandoned amonth-long strike after Blue Circle CementCompany permanently replaced more than three-quartersof them. The company’s tacticsdeeply alienated its experienced workforce.Tyrone Perkins,who had more than 18 years ofseniority at theCalera plant, summedup how the experience of being replaced had transformedthe attitude ofworkers to the company: “ Beforethe strike, the men stuck together, people did more than they wereexpected by thecompany todo. You’ d give that little extra tomake your jobbetter or tohelp eachother out.That doesn’t happen nowand it won’t never happen again.”1 In the1980s and1990s, employers facedwith strikesincreasingly resortedto hiring replacement workers.This strategy representeda sharp departurefrom earlier re- sponsesto strike activity, achange that labor leaderstraced to the anti-union political climate createdby PresidentReagan’ s dismissal ofstriking air trafŽc controllers in 1981.2 Managementin thepost-PATCO era met unionshead on andhired permanent replacementsin aseriesof high-proŽ le strikes,including bitter disputesat Greyhound

*Iam gratefulto all those who helped mewhen IvisitedCalera, particularly Bobby Watts, JesseBurns, and Robert Wade. Thestaff of the Shelby County Libraryin Columbiana werealso agreathelp. Iwould also liketo thank the staffof PACE international union forall theirassistance, particularly KeithRomig. Theresearch for this articlewas supported by grantsfrom the CarnegieTrust for the Universitiesof Scotland and the School ofHistory at the Universityof St. Andrews.I would also liketo thank Bob Zieger and the anonymous LaborHistory readersfor their helpful comments about this article. 1TyronePerkins, interview with author on July 15,1999 in Calera, Alabama; “Roberta Hourly Employees—Ages and Yearsof Service,” Oct. 11,1993, untitled folder, Local 50537 Papers, held at Local 50537Union Hall, Calera, Alabama, hereinaftercited as Local50537 Papers. 2Theair trafŽ c controllersbelonged to the ProfessionalAir TrafŽ c ControllersOrganization (PATCO). For detailsof the PATCO strike,see Herbert R. Northrup and Amie D.Thornton, The FederalGovernment asEmployer: The FederalLabor Relations Authority andthe PATCOChallenge (Pennsylvania, PA: Industrial ResearchUnit, Wharton School ofFinance and Commerce,University of Pennsylvania, 1988);Arthur B.Shostak and David Skocik, The AirControllers’ Controversy: Lessons fromthe PATCOStrike (New York: Human SciencesPress, 1986). For acontemporaryview that the PATCO strikeencouraged the hiring ofpermanent replacements,see Eileen Boris and NelsonLichtenstein, eds., MajorProblems in the History ofAmerican Workers (Lexington,MA: D.C.Heath, 1991),598– 600. For historians’views that Reagan’s treatmentof the PATCO strikeencouraged employers to hirepermanent replacements,see, for example, Robert H.Zieger, American Workers,American Unions (2nd ed.) (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UniversityPress, 1994), 198; William C.Berman, America’s Right Turn fromNixon to Bush (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UniversityPress, 1994), 98. Robert Reich, Secretaryof Labor duringthe ŽrstClinton administration, also linked the increasedhiring of permanent replacementsto the PATCO dispute. See also U.S. Congress,House Committee on Educationand Labor, Legislative Hearing on HR5 , 103 Cong., 1Sess. (Washington, DC: 1993),16– 17.

ISSN0023-656Xprint/ ISSN1469-9702online/ 01/040371–26 Ó 2001Taylor & Francis Ltd onbehalfof The Tamiment Institute DOI: 10.1080/00236560120085101 372 T.J.Minchin

BusCompany in 1990 andat Caterpillar Tractor Corporation in 1992. 3 The hiring of permanentreplacements was a departurefrom thetemporary substitutesthat manage- menthad traditionally turnedto during labor disputesbefore the 1980s. Unlike temporary replacements,who left at theend of a strike,permanent replacements were assuredof strikers’jobs. After the strike, the law gave strikers recall rights ontheir old jobs,but only if replacementsleft them. 4 Aswasthe case in Calera, in moststrikes where permanent replacements were hired, unionswere soundly defeated. The AFL–CIO indeedclaimed that thetactic was inherently unfair andlaunched a major legislative campaign in thelate 1980s to prohibit companiesfrom hiring permanentreplacements. 5 Permanent replacement has proved tobe one of themost contentious issues in recentU.S. history andhas attracted aconsiderableamount of attention from policy makers,with at least nineseparate congressionalhearings devotedto the issue between 1988 and1995. 6 While scholarshave examined theproblems facedby organized labor in the1980s and1990s, therehave beenfew studies of labor relations in thecement industry. 7 Despitethe recent growth ofSouthern labor history, cementworkers in theregion have

3“TheStrikers Strike out: From PaperMills to Football Fields, WorkersFind They’re Replaceable,” U.S.News andWorld Report ,Oct. 26,1987, 41– 42; Zieger, American Workers,American Unions , 198–200. 4Employers’right to hirepermanent replacementsoriginated in the MacKayRadio v. National Labor Relations Board Supreme Court decisionof 1938. The decision, while orderingthat severalworkers be reinstatedin this particularinstance, volunteered language in its decisionthat it is not an unfairlabor practiceto permanently replacestriking workers. Prior to the 1980s,however, the useof permanent replacementswas veryrare and was mainly limited to smallercompanies not susceptibleto widespread public pressure.The position ofunions was slightly strengthenedin the late1960s when the National Labor Relations Board ruledin the Laidlaw casethat economicstrikers who arepermanently replacedare, after the endof the dispute, entitledto reinstatementwhen openingsoccur among the newworkforce. The Paperworker ,April 1991,1; Boris and Lichtenstein,598– 599; Philip Matterato CorporateCampaign, Nov. 14,1988, “ ReplacementWorkers,” Ž le,United Paperworkers’ International Union (UPIU) Papers, held at the Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical, and EnergyWorkers’ International Union headquarters in Nashville, Tennessee,hereinafter cited as UPIUPapers. In1999, the UPIUmerged with the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers’International Union to formthe Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical, and EnergyWorkers’ International Union (PACE). 5For detailsof this campaign, and the strikeswhich producedit, seeMartin Halpern, “Arkansas and the Defeatof Labor LawReform in 1978and 1994,” ArkansasHistorical Quarterly ,57(1998), 99–133; “Stop Scabs, UnionLeaders Demand in Washington,” The Paperworker ,April 1989,12– 13; “ IUD LegislativeConference: Enact the CongressionalProhibition on StrikerReplacements,” The Paperworker , April 1991,10– 11; “ Scab Ban LegislationHigh on the Agenda,” The Paperworker ,April 1994,11. 6U.S. Congress,Senate, Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Prohibiting Discrimination against Economic Strikers ,Hearings,102 Cong., 1Sess. (Washington, D.C.: 1991),1; U.S. Congress,House, Committee on Educationand Labor, Hearings on HR5,The StrikerReplacement Bill ,Hearings,102 Cong., 1Sess. (Washington, DC: 1991),2. 7Scholars have writtena greatdeal about the reasonsfor the declineof organized labor in the 1980s and 1990s.See, for example, MichaelGoldŽ eld, The Decline ofOrganized Labor in the United States (Chicago, IL:Universityof Chicago Press,1987); Kim Moody, An Injury to All:The Decline ofAmerican Unionism (NewYork: Verso,1988); Thomas Geoghegan, WhichSide Are You On?Trying to Be forLabor When it’s Flat on its Back (NewYork: Farrar,Straus, and Giroux,1991); David Brody, “Labor’s Crisis in HistoricalPerspective,” in GeorgeStrauss, Daniel G.Gallagherand Jack Fiorito, eds., The State ofthe Unions (Madison, WI:IndustrialRelations ResearchAssociation, 1991),277– 311; Taylor E.Dark, “Debating Decline:The 1995 Race for the AFL–CIO Presidency,” LaborHistory ,40(1999), 323–343. Cementworkers have not beentotally neglectedby historians. For aŽneaccount of the labor and social history ofthe cementindustry community ofIlasco, Missouri, see Gregg Andrews, City ofDust: ACement Companyin the Landof Tom Sawyer (Columbia, MO:Universityof Missouri Press, 1996). A goodoverview oflabor relationsin the cementindustry isprovided by HerbertR. Northrup, “From UnionHegemony to UnionDisintegration: Collective Bargaining in Cementand RelatedIndustries,” Journal ofLabor Research,10(1989), 337–376. PermanentReplacements and theBreakdown of “ SocialAccord” 373 beenlargely overlooked. 8 The history ofthe Calera local unionepitomizes howlabor relations becameincreasingly adversarial in the1980s and1990s, breaking therelatively amicable andstable collective bargaining relationship ofthe pre-Reagan era. Alarge numberof scholars have argued that a“social accord”or “social compact”existed betweenorganized labor andthe corporate community in thedecades following theend ofWorld War II. Underthis accord,companies agreed toprovide high wagesand good beneŽts while unionsoffered labor peacein return. 9 The experienceof Calera, andof thecement industry as a whole,highlights theway that this accordbroke downin the 1980s, ascompanies became increasingly aggressive anddemanded major concessions from unions,a pattern that wasrepeated in many other industries. 10 In Calera, relations turnedhostile in 1982, whenthe mill wasbought by theUK-owned Blue Circle CementCompany. Indeed, the Calera story reected the broader problems that many U.S.workersfaced in the1980s and1990s asmultinational companiessought to exact concessionsfrom them. 11

8Thelast two decadeshave witnessedthe emergenceof a sophisticated body ofhistorical scholarship on Southern workers.For an overviewof this scholarship, seeRobert H.Zieger,ed., OrganizedLabor in the Twentieth-century South (Knoxville,TN: Universityof Tennessee Press, 1991); Robert H.Zieger,ed., Southern Laborin Transition, 1940–1995 (Knoxville,TN: Universityof Tennessee Press, 1997). Much of this scholarship has concentratedon the textileindustry, the South’s largest.See, for example, Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, James Leloudis,Robert Korstad,Mary Murphy, LuAnn Jonesand Christopher B. Daly, Like aFamily:The Making ofa Southern Cotton MillWorld (Chapel Hill, NC: Universityof North Carolina Press, 1987);Gary M. Fink, The Fulton Bag andCotton MillsStrike of1914– 1915: Espionage, LaborCon ict, and New South Industrial Relations (Ithaca, NY: ILRPress,1993); David L.Carlton, Milland Town in South Carolina,1880– 1920 (Baton Rouge,LA: Universityof Louisiana Press,1982); James A.Hodges, New Deal LaborPolicy andthe Southern Cotton Textile Industry, 1933–1941 (Knoxville,TN: Universityof Tennessee Press,1986); Douglas Flamming, Creating the ModernSouth: Millhandsand Managers in Dalton, Georgia, 1884–1984 (Chapel Hill, NC: Universityof North Carolina Press,1992); Daniel J.Clark, LikeNight and Day:Unionization in aSouthern MillTown (Chapel Hill, NC: Universityof North Carolina Press,1997); Bryant Simon, AFabricof Defeat: The Politics ofSouth CarolinaMillhands in State andNation (Chapel Hill, NC: Universityof North Carolina Press,1998); Timothy J.Minchin, Hiring the BlackWorker: The Racial Integration ofthe Southern Textile Industry, 1960–1980 (Chapel Hill, NC: Universityof North Carolina Press,1999). The best overview of much ofthe literatureon Southern textileworkers is Robert H.Zieger, “TextileWorkers and Historians,”in Zieger,ed., OrganizedLabor ,35–59. Other important workson Southern workersinclude Barbara S.GrifŽth, The Crisisof American Labor:Operation Dixie andthe Defeat of the CIO (Philadelphia, PA: TempleUniversity Press, 1988); Judith Stein, Running Steel, Running America:Racial andEconomic Policies from1945 to the Present (Chapel Hill, NC: Universityof North Carolina Press,1998). 9Accountsthat have spoken ofa post-World WarII socialaccord include Samuel Bowles, David M. Gordonand Thomas E.Weisskopf, Beyond the Wasteland:A Democratic Alternative to Economic Decline (GardenCity, NY: Anchor Press,1984); Jack Metzgar,“ Plant Shutdowns and WorkerResponse: The Caseof Johnstown, PA,” Socialist Review ,53(1980), 9–49; A. H.Raskin, “Labor: AMovementin Search ofa Mission,”in Seymour MartinLipset, ed., Unions in Transition (San Francisco,CA: Institutefor Contemporary Studies, 1986),3– 38; William Serrin, The Companyand the Union (NewYork: AlfredA. Knopf, 1973);Bruce Nissen, “APost-WorldWar II ‘Social Accord?,’” in BruceNissen, ed., U.S. Labor Relations, 1945–1989: Accommodation andCon ict (NewYork: GarlandPublishing, 1990),173– 208; Julius Getman, The Betrayal ofLocal 14:Paperworkers, Politics, andPermanent Replacements (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UniversityPress, 1998). For an overviewof the useof these terms, see Nissen, “APost-WorldWar II ‘Social Accord?,’” 173–174. 10GoldŽ eld, The Decline ofOrganized Labor in the United States ,46–48; Charles Craypo, “TheDecline in UnionBargaining Power,” in Nissen, ed., U.S.Labor Relations ,12–27; Northrup, “From Union Hegemony.” 11TheCalera story invites particular analogies with the lockout ofworkers at A.E.Staley Company in Decatur,Illinois, in 1994–1995. Staley was ownedby the UKsugarmanufacturer Tate and Lyle,which lockedout the Decaturworkers for over 20 months, inspiringa major union campaign in response.For asummary ofthe Staley lockout and otherstruggles against multinational corporations, see“ TheSpecial ProjectsDepartment Report to the UPIUInternationalExecutive Board,” Feb. 1995,Papers of the United Paperworkers’International Union’ s Southern RegionalOfŽ ce, held at PACE RegionalOfŽ ce, Mobile, Alabama, hereinaftercited as UPIU—Mobile Papers. 374 T.J.Minchin

FIGS. 1 AND 2. BlueCircle CementPlant, Calera, Alabama, 1999.

Although scholarsare beginning toexplore strikeswhere permanent replacements werehired, much remains tobe learned about these disputes, particularly howand why certain workersbecame “ scabs.”12 In Calera, however,replacement workerswere

12Thehiring of permanent replacementsin the 1980sand 1990shas beenwritten about agreatdeal froman industrial relationsperspective. These works tend to be quantitative in natureand offerlittle insight into the motives ofreplacement workers. They do, however,effectively document companies’ increased willingnessto hirepermanent replacementsafter 1981 and the divisive responsethat thesetactics produce. Important worksinclude: John W.Budd, “Canadian StrikeReplacement Legislation and Collective Bargaining:Lessons for the UnitedStates,” Industrial Relations ,April 1996,245– 260; Roger D. Staton, “Hiringof Replacement Workers: An Insidious Weapon againstLabor orManagement’ s LastBargaining Chip,” LaborLaw Journal ,Jan. 1994,25– 32; Cynthia L.Gramm, “Empirical Evidenceon Political ArgumentsRelating to ReplacementWorker Legislation,” LaborLaw Journal ,Aug. 1991,491– 495; Harry PermanentReplacements and theBreakdown of “ SocialAccord” 375 unusuallywilling todescribe their motives for crossingthe line in 1994, partly because mostof them becamemembers ofthe union after thestrike. Although replacement workersled the successful efforts to decertify the union in September1996, lessthan 2years later, onMarch 27, 1998, Calera workersvoted by amargin of92– 48 to recertify thelocal. The 1998 votewas especially notable becauseonly 65 ofthe workforceof 150 wereformer strikers,meaning that thosewho were hired during the strike provided themargin ofvictory. Indeed,by 1998 former strikers had deliberately recruitedthose who had takentheir jobsless than 4years earlier. Asinternational union representative Emory Barnetteput it, what occurredin Calera represented“ anamazing story ofpeople putting asideold animosities tounite for thecommon good.” 13 Relatively fewhistorians have studiedlabor relations in thecement industry, partly becausethe industry is capital-intensive andhas neveremployed large numbersof workers.In the1970s and1980s, moreover, increasing mechanization andautomation further reducedthe size of the workforce. In 1987, theU.S. cementindustry only employed 21,300 workersand the average plant had little more than 100 workers. 14 Cementmanufacture begins whenrock ingredientsare crushed,ground, and then burntin akiln. The pellets or “clinkers”which are producedfrom this operation are cookedand then mixed with gypsum andground into cement. As the cement industry utilizes minedor quarried raw materials, thejobs involve operating heavy equipment andhave traditionally beenperformed by male workers. 15 In October 1993, for example, 156 ofthe 160 workersat theCalera mill weremen. 16 BetweenWorld War IIandthe advent of the Reagan era, thevast majority ofcement workerswere unionized. Chartered in 1939, theUnited Cement, Lime, and Gypsum Workers International Union(CLGWU) made steady progress in organizing workers during andafter World War II. By 1950, over 90% ofthe plants in theindustry were organized, arate ofunionization that wasmaintained until theearly 1980s. 17 Increased overseascompetition helpedto change this pattern.Like many U.S.industries,prior to the1970s thecement industry faced little foreign competition.Lack of overseas competition allowed companiesto absorb higher labor costsand grant generouswages andfringe beneŽts. In the1970s and1980s, however,the amount of cementimported intothe U.S. increasedsteadily, from 4.8 million tonsin 1972 to17.3 million 15 years later. By1987, indeed,imports accountedfor more than 19% oftotal U.S.consump-

—footnote continued R.Stang and Julie E.Patterson,“ Labor LawReform: AManagementPerspective,” LaborLaw Journal , September 1994,565– 579; John F.Schnell and Cynthia L.Gramm, “TheEmpirical Relations between Employers’Striker Replacement Strategies and StrikeDuration,” Industrial andLabor Relations Review , January 1994,189– 206. James B.Atleson, Values andAssumptions in American LaborLaw (Amherst, MA: Universityof Massachusetts Press, 1983), 19– 34, provides agoodoverview of the MacKay case and its labor law implications. Severalscholars have exploredstrike breaking, particularly in earliereras. See, in particular, Clark, LikeNight andDay ,168–198; Liston Pope, Millhandsand Preachers: A Study ofGastonia (NewHaven, CT: Yale UniversityPress, 1942); Rick Fantasia, Cultures ofSolidarity: Consciousness, Action, andContemporary American Workers (Berkeley,CA: Universityof California Press,1988), esp. 180–225; Hall et al., Likea Family , 345–349. 13“BlueCircle Local Makes Strong Recovery from 1994 Dispute at CementPlant,” The PaceSetter , July/August1999, 1; “Votesfrom Replacement Workers Key to Re-certifyingUnion,” The Paperworker , May 1998, 4. 14Northrup, “From UnionHegemony,” 339, 340. 15Northrup, “From UnionHegemony,” 338. 16Northrup, “From UnionHegemony,” 338; “ Roberta HourlyEmployees— Ages and Yearsof Service,” October11, 1993, untitled folder, Local 50537 Papers. 17Northrup, “From UnionHegemony,” 342. 376 T.J.Minchin tion.As was the case in other industries,cement companies began toseek concessions from unionsbecause they claimed that thenew competitive climate nolonger justiŽed high wagesand costly fringe beneŽts. 18 Incorporated in 1887, thesmall townof Calera is locatedaround 30 miles southof Birmingham. The townis locatedat theheart ofthe lime-producing sectionof Alabama andits namederives from theSpanish wordfor “limestone.”19 In 1949, theRoberta cementplant wasbuilt justoutside Calera andwas subsequently owned by avariety of U.S.cementcompanies until BlueCircle purchasedit in 1982. 20 In 1994, BlueCircle wasthe parent company ofabout 300 subsidiaries,whose two core businesses were heavy building materials suchas cement, and home products such as heating and bathroom equipment.The company is oneof six giants in theglobal cementmarket, with other leading players including theGerman-owned Heidelberger Zementand the Italian group Italcementi. In the1980s, thesesix companies,Ž ve ofwhich were European,bought upmuch of the stagnant U.S.cementindustry. Heidelberger Zement,for example, becamean important player after purchasing LeHigh Cement,a major U.S.producer based in theLeHigh Valley ofPennsylvania. By theearly 1980s, foreign ownerscontrolled around 50% ofthe U.S. cementindustry’ s tonnage.In 1992, BlueCircle itself had plants all over theworld and employed more than 22,000 workers.In thesame year, thecompany had aturnover of£ 1.4 billion. Although a global company,Blue Circle’ s mostimportant market wasin theUK, for thecompany generated50% ofits sales there. 21 Prior toBlue Circle’ s purchaseof the Roberta plant in 1982, themill wasoperated by theU.S.-owned Martin Marietta company.The plant ran ona non-unionbasis until March 1974, whenthe CLGWU successfully organized it. 22 Workers recalled that their primary reasonfor organizing theunion was to improve wagesand beneŽ ts, especially asthe Calera plant had notreceived as generous beneŽ ts as union plants. 23 As a company which already ownedseveral unionizedcement plants, Martin Marietta quickly recognizedthe union at Calera. The local unionestablished a particularly close bargaining relationship with workersat aunionizedMartin Marietta plant in Atlanta. In the1970s, unionleaders negotiated a commoncontract for thetwo plants, a practice that continuedwhen Blue Circle tookcontrol of both mills. The Calera plant, however, wasconsiderably larger than theAtlanta facility, employing almost twiceas many workers.Union leaders also regarded thelocal unionin Calera asconsiderably stronger than theone in Atlanta. 24 Prior tothe 1980s, theCLGWU wasa small butpowerful union that usedmanage- ment’s fear ofstrikesto win high wages,good beneŽ ts, and protective workrules for its

18Northrup, “From UnionHegemony,” 340; Richard Northrip, interviewwith author on Aug. 5, 1999 (phone interview). 19“Welcometo Calera, Al.,”lea et published by the CaleraChamber ofCommerce, copy in author’s possession; Barbara BakerRoberts, Early History ofCalera, Alabama (Montevallo, AL: TimesPrinting Company, 1977),23– 26. 201997Alabama Manufacturers Register (Evanston, IL:Manufacturers’News, 1997), 210; Alabama Manufacturing Directory, 1997–98 (Montgomery,AL: Alabama Centerfor Commerce, 1998), 214. 21“BlueCircle Industries,” Mar. 22, 1994, “ Local50537,” folder, UPIU Papers (Communications Department), 2–3; Northrup, “From UnionHegemony,” 341, 360. 22V.W.Thompson to J.C. Andrews,March 22, 1974, “ UCLGWU,”Ž le,Local 50537 Papers. 23GeneHoneycutt, interview with author on Aug. 3, 1999in Calera, Alabama; Bobby Watts, interview with author on July 15,1999 in Calera, Alabama. 24StarrC. Galloway to Richard A.Northrip, April 18,1975, “ UCLGWU,”Ž le,Local 50537 Papers; Donald Langham, interviewwith author on Aug. 4, 1999in Mobile, Alabama. PermanentReplacements and theBreakdown of “ SocialAccord” 377 members.25 Atthe center of the CLGWU’ s powerwas its ability tosecure pattern bargaining, whichwas Ž rmly establishedin theindustry following anation-widestrike in 1957. Pattern bargaining ledto the establishment ofstandard beneŽ ts across the industry,including premium pay for Sundaywork, generous overtime pay, andcom- pensationfor any workersrequired towork outside their classiŽcation. 26 CLGWU leaderstook great pride in their union’s recordof successful collective bargaining. 27 “Wehad oneof the best labor agreementsin thecountry,” declared Richard Northrip, aformer secretary-treasurer andpresident of the CLGWU. “The beneŽts and the working conditionsgranted by that labor agreement really weresecond to none… the cementworker wasright upthere at thetop.” 28 In the1980s, anera ofgeneral uniondecline, the fortunes of the CLGWU changed dramatically. In 1984, pattern bargaining wasbroken up after LeHigh Cement,one of thethree largest cementcompanies at that time, refusedto follow asettlementreached by another large producer.After bargaining toimpasse, LeHigh imposeda concession- ary contractthat slashedwages and beneŽ ts. In May 1984, theCLGWU called strikes at nineLeHigh plants butthese were quickly called off,as the workers feared being permanently replaced. 29 The fear ofLeHigh workerswas in uenced by amajor 1980 strike at Flintoke CementCompany, in whichthe company had permanently replaced strikers andthen decertiŽ ed the CLGWU. 30 Richard Northrip recalled thedramatic change in theunion’ s fortunes,as companies, emboldened by their ability tohire replacements,simply refusedto agree topattern bargaining any more:“ They justtook theposition that they wouldnot reach agreement.They in essencetried toforce us into strike situationsand having outsidereplacements ready tomove in theminute that the local wenton strike. The cementindustry was interested in breaking theunion and not having contracts.It becameobvious that wedidnot have thestrength to force the issue andforce pattern bargaining.”31 Facing aseriousloss of both bargaining powerand membership, theCLGWU began tolook for amerger partner, andeventually, in 1984, joinedforces with theInter- national Brotherhood ofBoilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, Forgers, and Helpers(IBB). 32 The merger proved tobe short-lived. The cementlocals quickly becamedissatisŽ ed with therepresentation they receivedwithin theIBB, adeclining unionthat wasexperiencing an internal struggle for control.In 1987, many CLGWU locals,including thosein Calera andAtlanta, broke with theIBB andformed their own union,the Independent Workers ofNorth America (IWNA). Four years later, following talks betweenthe two organizations, theIWNA wasabsorbed by theUnited Paper- workers’International Union(UPIU). Although theIWNA becamepart oftheUPIU

25Northrup, “From UnionHegemony,” 337– 376. A briefhistory ofthe CLGWUis contained in the Oct. 1978issue of Voice,the CLGWU’s ofŽcial publication. 26“TheBig Cement Strike,” Voice,Oct. 1978,13. For the successfuloperation ofpattern bargaining in the cementindustry, see,for example, “CollectiveBargaining Review,” Voice,Oct. 1965,1; “March—A Month to be Remembered,” Voice,May 1971,3; “Wagesand BeneŽts Negotiated in Cement ‘Substantial,’” Voice,May 1978,3. 27Articles in Voice,the ofŽcial CLGWU publication, frequentlycelebrated the union’s recordof winning wagesand beneŽt improvements forits members. See,for example, “Beforethe Union, the Employers Ruled LikeDespots,” Voice,May 1977,3. 28Richard Northrip, interviewwith author on Aug. 5, 1999(phone interview). 29Northrup, “From UnionHegemony,” 366– 367. 30Northrup, “From UnionHegemony,” 361– 363. 31Richard Northrip, interviewwith author on Aug. 5, 1999(phone interview). 32Northrup, “From UnionHegemony,” 360, 368– 369. 378 T.J.Minchin withoutthe larger unionchanging its name,cement locals weremuch more satisŽed with therepresentation they receivedwithin thepaperworkers’ organization. 33 Eventsin Calera mirrored thoseon the national level. In the1970s, thelocal union wasstrong andsuccessful, working constructivelywith Martin Marietta. Although membership wasvoluntary, closeto 100% ofworkers consistently belonged to the local. Through pattern bargaining, Calera workersquickly securedthe beneŽ ts that were standardin cementcontracts at thetime, including generousovertime pay anda transferclause that compensatedthem for any workperformed outside their classiŽcation. 34 Workers describedthe union’ s relationship with Martin Marietta as “very good”and “ great.”Bobby Watts,who started working at themill justbefore the local unionwas organized, recalled: “WhenI Žrstwent there, after theunion was voted in,we had goodworking relations,we had agoodcontract.” 35 Calera workerswere also very active in usingthe grievance procedureto exercise their poweron the shop oor andprotect their jobsecurity. Demands for transferpay werethe most common cause ofgrievances. 36 Manyof these grievances weresuccessful. In thesummer of 1978, for example, R.L.Godfreysecured 4 hours’transfer pay becausehe claimed that hehad beenasked to perform workthat had “nothing todo with” his ownclassiŽ cation. 37 Manyof the grievances reected a moodof conŽ dence that wastotally lacking by the 1980s. In 1976, for example, agroup ofworkers declared, in atypical grievance, that “management shouldbutt out of union business.” 38 Following BlueCircle’ s purchaseof theplant in 1982, however,con ict betweenthe twosides increased as the company repeatedly demandedconcessions at thebargaining table. In 1984, BlueCircle pushedfor theabolition ofthe transfer clause, meaning that workerscould be asked to perform other jobswithout receiving extra pay. The transfer clausewas a particularly valued part ofthe contract and workers opposed its deletion, working withouta contractfor over 3years asa result.In 1988, acontractwas Ž nally signedafter what unionrepresentative Doug McNeescalled a“long struggle.”The two sidesonly reachedagreement, indeed, after ashortand unexpected strike helpedto bring Blue Circle back tothe bargaining table. 39 Seniorworkers at theRoberta plant felt that BlueCircle adopteda hostile approach

33Northrup, “From UnionHegemony,” 370– 371; Richard Northrip, interviewwith author on Aug. 5, 1999(phone interview);“ UPIUHistorysince 1984,” document supplied by PACE, copy in author’s possession; DougMcNees, interview with author on Aug. 2, 1999in Calera, Alabama. 34“MartinMarietta Joint Conference,”Jan. 24,1975, “ UCLGWU,”Ž le,Local 50537 Papers. 35LutherCarter, interview with author on July 15,1999 in Calera, Alabama; Bobby Watts, interview with author on July 15,1999, in Calera, Alabama; TyronePerkins, interview with author on July 15,1999 in Calera, Alabama; JesseBurns, interviewwith author on July 16,1999 in Calera, Alabama; Gene Honeycutt,interview with author on Aug. 3,1999in Calera, Alabama. 36InJune 1979,for example, workersBobby E.Hopper and J.C.LittletonŽ leda typical grievance:“ We requestthat transferpremium be paid when workis performedout ofone’ s classiŽcation. SpeciŽcally when labor tools arebeing used by employeesthat arenot labors.”Grievance 122– 79, June 18,1979, “1979–1980 Grievance,” folder, Local 50537 Papers. For examplesof other, similar grievances,see Grievance112– 79 and Grievance123– 79, both in “1979–1980 Grievance,” folder, Local 50537 Papers. 37Grievance82– 78, Aug. 8, 1978,“ 76–98– 78,” folder, Local 50537 Papers. For the importance of transferpay as awhole, seeC. A.Millerto John Patterson,Oct. 27,1978, “ 76–98– 78,” folder, Local 50537 Papers; C.A.Millerto John Patterson,Dec. 21, 1977, “ Unionand ManagementAgreements,” folder, Local50537 Papers. 38Grievance173– 76, Mar. 5, 1976,“ Grievance169– 76 thru. 191–276,” folder, Local 50537 Papers. 39MichaelTomberlin, “WorkersWalk offTheir Jobs at Calera,” ShelbyCounty Reporter ,Aug. 10,1994, A1, A3; E.F.Muehlbergerto All UnionEmployees, July 9, 1984,“ LocalUnion Number 537and Blue CircleInc., Roberta, Alabama, 1984Contract Negotiations,” folder, Local 50537 Papers. Quotation from D.E.McNeesto Fellow UnionMembers, Aug. 10,1988, “ IWNA 1988–89,” folder, Local 50537 Papers. PermanentReplacements and theBreakdown of “ SocialAccord” 379

FIG.3. Membersof Local 50537 picturedshortly after thesigning ofa newcontract in May 1999. From left toright, Randall Clecker,Local President Bobby Watts, International RepresentativeDoug McNees,Danny Firth, andButch Porter. that forcedthem tosteadily surrenderthe pay andbeneŽ ts they had built upunder Martin Marietta. In commonwith many ofhis coworkers,Luther Carter, who began working at themill in 1975, felt that therewere clear differencesin theway that thetwo companiestreated their workers:“ Ever sinceBlue Circle tookover theRoberta plant, it seemslike we’ve beengoing downhill asfar asbeneŽ ts and pay …They [Martin Marietta] seemedto care more about theemployees than they didthe plant …My personal feeling nowthey [Blue Circle] care more about theplant than they dothe peoplethat built theplant andwork there … Ifeellike that’s my plant aswell as theirs.”40 UnderBlue Circle, it wasmanagement whoadopted a militant tone,repeat- edly denying grievances by telling theunion that: “The Company retains theright to exclusively controlthe plant andits operations; the direction, scheduling and running ofthe working forces.”41 Mostworkers felt that Blue Circle neveraccepted the union andwas determined to drive it outof the plant. LikeRobert Wade,who had worked at theplant since1973, many argued that amajor conict wasinevitable. “Ireally believe,”stated Wade, “ that if wehadn’t have goneon strike whenwe did,that it would have beenthree years downthe road orwhatever,because I justbelieve it wascoming. Ibelieve that thecompany had it in their mind that they weregoing toforce us to go onstrike, whether it wasat that dateor whetherit wasat alater date.”42 Blue Circle’s continueddemands for concessionsdid eventually producean open andsustained con ict with workersin its twoSouthern plants. When the two sides startedbargaining in thespring of1994, health care and exible working quickly

40LutherCarter, interview with author on July 15,1999 in Calera, Alabama. 41John F.Hertzogto DougMcNees, Mar. 21, 1988, “ 1988–89 Grievances,” folder, Local 50537 Papers; DougMcNees, interview with author on Aug. 2, 1999in Calera, Alabama. 42Robert Wade, interviewwith author on July 22,1999 in Calera, Alabama. As GeneHoneycutt, another workerwho rememberedthe MartinMarietta days, recalled,“ Insteadof trying to workwith the men, work with the union, reacha happy medium, they didn’t tryat all, they just choseto not evenhonor the union, not have any respectfor the union at all.”Gene Honeycutt, interviewwith author on Aug. 3,1999in Calera, Alabama. 380 T.J.Minchin emergedas major sticking points.Beneath these issues, workers believed that the company wantedto break theunion, a fear compoundedby theway that BlueCircle managers interviewedmany replacement workersand offered them jobswell beforethe strike actually occurred.The company’s proposals tochange thehealth care provisions ofthe contract ultimately provoked thecon ict. Blue Circle claimed that rising health care costsforced them todemand a signiŽcant increase in employee contributions,with many hourly workersbeing askedto pay threetimes their currentcontribution. Blue Circle presidentJohn Summerbell portrayed thecompany’ s proposals asa way of managing thesecosts: “ Weare notasking theworkers to accept a reductionin thelevels ofcoverage, butsimply that they acceptmanaged health care,which has beenproven tobe effectivein containing theserapidly increasing costs.Managed health care is the norm today for U.S.workers who have health care beneŽts.” 43 It wasBlue Circle’s proposal toterminate insurancecoverage for retireesthat really inamed the union. The company wantedto end this provision after May 1, 1997. It also proposedthat workershired after May 1, 1994 wouldonly have insuranceupon retirement if they bore thefull costof it. The company argued that “thevast majority ofAmerican workers”did not receive health insuranceafter retirement.Local 50537 members reactedstrongly tothesechanges, feeling that BlueCircle shouldnot jeopar- dizethe health care ofretired workerswho had given many years ofdedicated service tothe company. “ Alot ofpeople felt that if they doit tothem,” recalled former striker JesseBurns, “ eventually they’re going todo it tous later onso we might aswell get this thing onand try toshow them this isnot right, wedon’ t agree with this.So that was themain issuewas the insurance for theretired worker.”44 BlueCircle assertedthat another causeof the strike wasunion opposition to the increased“ exibility”in workrules which had beena continualsource of grievances ever sincethe company had bought theplant. The unionclaimed, however,that thecompany wouldcontinue to abuse  exibility in order toeliminate jobsand drive downwages. Blue Circle executivesagain argued that their proposals were“ commonin American indus- try”and asserted that theunion wanted to continue “ outmodedrestrictions” on exibility. JohnSummerbell indeedportrayed theCalera workersas a backward-looking group that fearedwork rule changes.In aletter writtenduring thestrike, he claimed that workershad walkedout “ becausea change wasseen as a threat rather than abeneŽt.” 45 Although citing clashesover health care and exibility asimportant issues,union members insistedthat theunderlying causeof the strike wasthe company’ s desireto break theunion. Most argued that thecompany plannedthe strike, citing theadvance hiring ofreplacement workersas evidence. 46 The local unionsthemselves facilitated the company’s preparations bytaking apublic strike votewell beforethey actually walked

43John Summerbell to VictorE. Thorpe, Sept. 12,1994, “ Local50502,” folder, UPIU Papers (Communications Department). 44JesseBurns, interviewwith author on July 16,1999 in Calera, Alabama. Localunion ofŽcer Keilan GoreconŽ rmed that cancellingretirees’ insurance was the main causeof the strikewhen he wrote:“ The Unionand company areapart on anumber ofitems, the most important ofwhich isretiree insurance.” KeilanGore to Wayne E.Glenn,May 16,1994, “ NegotiationMaterial,” folder, Local 50537 Papers. 45John Summerbell to JenniferPate, Aug. 29,1994, “ Unconditional Return,”folder, Local 50537 Papers; Douglas E.McNeesto MarkBrooks, Sept. 20,1994, “ BlueCircle— General,” folder, UPIU Papers(Special ProjectsDepartment); KeilanGore and ElmerSmith to Wayne E.Glenn,May 16,1994, “NegotiationMaterial,” folder, Local 50537 Papers. 46TyronePerkins, for example, typically assertedthat: “They planned this whole thing. They wanted us to goout on strike.We wereforced out.” Tyrone Perkins, interview with author on July 15,1999 in Calera, Alabama. PermanentReplacements and theBreakdown of “ SocialAccord” 381 out.On May 16, 1994, more than 93% ofunion members in Atlanta andCalera voted toauthorize acoordinatedwalkout, refusing to accept the major concessionsthat Blue Circle demanded. 47 Unionleaders asserted that theCalera workerswere the driving forcebehind this voteand that theoutnumbered Atlanta group wentalong with them asan expression of support. 48 Although mostCalera workerswere aware that they couldbe replaced, they still tookthe risk ofwalking outon August 3, 1994. Calera workerswere in uenced by a2-day strike in 1988 that had caught BlueCircle by surpriseand forced them tonegotiate acontract. 49 Six years later, many believed that striking wouldproduce similar results.“ Wereally thought that we’d go onstrike,” recalled Robert Wade,“ andwithin afewdays we thought we’d beback in there negotiating andwe’ d get it settledbecause in thepast wehad doneit beforeand that day they’d negotiate butthey didn’t doit this time.”50 Unionleaders insisted that the key tothe success of the 1988 strike had beenthat it had caught thecompany by surprise,forcing them tonegotiate. In 1994, by contrast,the workers’ strike votegave thecompany almost 3monthsto make preparations for awalkout,including interview- ing extra workersin advance.Local union leaders themselves admitted in retrospect that they shouldhave kept their strike votea secret. 51 Evenbefore the strike had begun,Blue Circle warnedall ofits employeesthat it was preparing tohire permanentreplacements. 52 The company indeedinterviewed a large numberof job applicants well in advanceof thedispute, claiming that it was“ forced” toseek new workers in order tofulŽ ll customercommitments. 53 Executivesargued that if it allowed theplant tobeidle, it wouldlead to“ thedestruction of our reputation as adependablesupplier.” Management stressed that they operatedin a“very competitive market”and that failing tooperate theplant would“ createundue hardship for our customersand cause possible layoffs among hundredsof construction workers in the SoutheasternU.S.” 54 In thecourse of thestrike, Blue Circle hired 118 permanentreplacements at Calera andaround 85 at Atlanta. Mostof the Calera replacementswere recruited through the BirminghamNews andother area papers.In Atlanta, thesize of the labor market, combinedwith thefact that thecompany wasonly trying toŽ ll asmall numberof jobs, helpedmanagers toquickly replace theentire workforce. The factthat thejobs were high-paying also attracted replacement workersin Calera andAtlanta. In both loca- tions,the vast majority ofreplacements started work in theŽ rst weekof the walkout, although thecompany didcontinue hiring until theunion called offthe strike on September4, 1994. The company soughtto maintain theracial balance ofthe struck workforce.In Calera, for example, where29% ofworkerswere African-American, Blue

47KeilanGore to Wayne E.Glenn,May 16,1994, “ NegotiationMaterial,” folder, Local 50537 Papers. 48Donald Langham, interviewwith author on Aug. 4,1999in Mobile, Alabama. 49“Talks EndBlue Circle Strike,” ShelbyCounty Reporter ,July 20,1988, A5. 50Robert Wade, interviewwith author on July 22,1999 in Calera, Alabama; LutherCarter; interview with author on July 15,1999, in Calera, Alabama. 51DougMcNees, interview with author on Aug. 2, 1999in Calera, Alabama; Bobby Watts, interview with author on July 15,1999 in Calera, Alabama. 52Letterto BlueCircle Cement employees, July 29,1994, “ NegotiationMaterial,” folder, Local 50537 Papers. 53Thomas P.Marnellto fellowemployees, Aug. 3,1994,“ Unconditional Return,”folder, Local 50537 Papers. 54John Summerbell to JenniferPate, Aug. 29,1994, “ Unconditional Return,”folder, Local 50537 Papers; John Summerbell to VictorE. Thorpe, Sept. 12,1994, and G.P.B.Mutterto Allan Black, Sept. 21,1994, both in “Local50502,” folder, UPIU Papers (Communications Department). 382 T.J.Minchin

Circle hired 38 blacks and79 whitesduring thestrike. There isno evidence,however, that this slight increasein theproportion ofblack workerswas the result of a deliberate policy; instead,it appears that thecompany simply hired whoeverwas available. 55 By 1994, thepermanent replacement ofstrikers wasa commontactic, yet evenunion sourceswere surprised by thespeed with whichthe Blue Circle strikers werereplaced. 56 As the ShelbyCounty Reporter noted,on the Ž rstday ofthe strike all BlueCircle workers receivedletters notifying them that they werebeing permanently replaced. 57 Workers werebluntly informedthat: “In order for theCompany tocontinue production, this is toadvise youthat youare being permanently replaced.”Blue Circle encouragedstrikers to“ make anunconditional return to work.” 58 Despitereceiving theseletters, few union members didreturn to work in either location.Only fourLocal 50537 members,claiming that they couldnot afford tolose their jobs,crossed the picket line during thestrike. In aletter ofresignation writtento theunion, for example, Orbins Campbell claimed that hewas returning towork because“ Ihave Žve children totake care ofand need a JOB.”59 The Calera workers heldout partly becausethey receiveda considerableamount of community support.A numberof restaurants and other businessesin Montevallo andCalera donatedfood andmoney to Local 50537. Several churches,including Shelby Baptist Association, also madesimilar gifts. 60 Mostof the replacement workershired at theRoberta plant wereattracted by the high wagesand generous beneŽ ts available, with theaverage wage being around$15 an hour.Roderick Harry, for example, wasworking in alower-paid jobat theUniversity ofAlabama in Birmingham whenAlando McDonald, a childhoodfriend who was one ofthe Ž rst replacement workershired, told him about thejobs at BlueCircle. A slim African-American man,Harry was25 years oldwhen he was hired during thestrike. Afterserving in theairforce until 1992, hehad workedin asuccessionof low-paid jobs andwas attracted by theamount of money he could make at thecement plant. “Basically it wasthe money when I Žrstcame in here,”he recalled. “ I’djustgot outof theairforce andjust working jobs,just in andout, just jobs, not really nofuture, and theopportunity came …it wasjust an opportunity for me tomake money,because whenthey interviewedme they saidit wasa strike situation,we need you to workseven days,twelve hours a day toget everything going …soIwasjust going totake achance andmake goodmoney.” 61 Other replacement workersalso stressedtheir economicmotives. On August 23,

55Adetailedbreakdown ofreplacement workers’ names, race,and dateof hire was supplied to the union duringthe strike.See “ BlueCircle Inc. Hourly Employee Alpha Listing,”May 9,1995,“ Labor Board Material1995,” folder, Local 50537 Papers. Detailsof the company’s hiringof replacements was also provided in John Summerbell to JenniferPate, Aug. 29,1994, “ Unconditional Return,”folder, Local 50537Papers. 56As The Paperworker notedafter the strike,“ The1994 strike was notable evenin the sad annals of corporateuse of ‘ permanent replacements’for how quickly the threatwas issued.”“ Votesfrom ReplacementWorkers Key to Re-certifyingUnion,” The Paperworker ,May 1998,4. 57MichaelTomberlin, “WorkersWalk offTheir Jobs at Calera,” ShelbyCounty Reporter ,Aug. 10,1994, A1, A3, quotation on both pages. 58Thomas P.Marnellto Jimmy Baugus, Aug. 5,1994,“ BlueCircle— General,” folder, UPIU Papers (Special ProjectsDepartment). 59Orbins Campbell to Bobby Watts, Aug. 13,1994, “ Resignationsfrom Local and Court Material/Labor Board,”folder, Local 50537 Papers. 60“Plant StrikeStretches into SecondMonth,” ShelbyCounty Reporter ,Aug. 31,1994, A1, A5. 61RoderickHarry, interview with author on Aug. 3,1999in Calera, Alabama. PermanentReplacements and theBreakdown of “ SocialAccord” 383

1994, AndyLackey, a heavy-equipment operator from thenearby townof Alabaster, tooka jobat Blue Circle becauseof the wages and beneŽ ts available. Lackeywas also attracted bycompany assurancesthat his newjob was permanent: “ I’dalways heard the pay andbeneŽ ts were very good.When I washired on,I wastold then that, what most ofus weretold was that theunion had walkedout, was told that if they left they would losetheir jobs,that wewere not coming in toŽ ll in until they got things straightened out.We had permanentjobs as long aswe did what wewere told todo, did our job. The only way wecould lose them wasto quit or beŽ red.”Lackey added that ashe already had asecurejob at ametal company,he would not have applied toBlue Circle if thejob was only temporary. 62 Manyof the replacements hired at Calera had workedduring strikesbefore. In the summerof 1993, in particular, many werehired aspermanent replacements during a strike at theNational Standardcompany in thenearby townof Columbiana. Yetin May 1994, theseworkers found themselves out of a jobwhen National Standard permanently closedthe wire plant. 63 Thirty-six-year-old J.V.“Butch”Porter wasone ofa group ofreplacement workerswho went to work at Blue Circle shortly after losing his jobat National Standard.A towering man whohad workedas a boiler maker mechanicall over theU.S., Porter recalled that BlueCircle recruiteda large contingent ofNational Standardworkers: “ They intervieweda bunchof us. They interviewedus Žrst becausethey knewwe’ d go acrossthe picket line,were used to it.” Like other replacements,Porter wasattracted bythehigh wageson offerat BlueCircle, which he describedas far betterthan at mostother plants in thearea. Healso, however, stressed his desperateneed for ajob:“ Ididn’t like it but,like Isaid,I had aback injury andI had topay my bills, soIhad tohave ajob,that’ s all therewas to it. National Standard wasthe Ž rststrike Iever wentacross and this is thesecond and I pray thelast that I crossed.”64 While mostof the replacement workerswere local, afewwere drawn from further aŽeld. Johnny Williams, for example, had workedall his life asa heavy-equipment operator in Tampa, Florida. At53, hewas one of the oldest replacement workers.He stumbledon the job at BlueCircle while traveling through Alabama. “Ninety-threewas abad year for me,”he recalled. “ Iquit my job,got adivorce,and wound up with two kidsand we hit theroad, and we stoppedin Alabama. Wecame toAlabama, we’d been toother placesbut we stopped in Alabama andthey said,‘ Dad,let’ s stay here.’I had comedown to Blue Circle putting applications in andthen they had called me soI comedown and got thejob and they wereon strike.” 65 Mostreplacement workersstressed that they had neverbelonged to a unionbefore applying toBlue Circle. Several claimed that they had receivedlittle educationabout organized labor anddid not fully understandthe consequences of their actions.Johnny Williams, for example, recalled that “noneof ushad ever beenin aunion,”adding that hehad “neverthought about unionsuntil Igot here.”Roderick Harry also assertedthat heknew little about unionswhen he was Ž rst hired.“ Ilearnedabout strikesand everything at school,”he acknowledged, “ butI really didn’t knoweverything until Igot

62Andy Lackey,interview with author on July 22,1999 in Calera, Alabama. 63For coverageof the National Standard strike,see “ UnionMembers Question Treatment,” Shelby County Reporter ,June 9, 1993,A4; “Employee Speaks,” ShelbyCounty Reporter ,July 7, 1994,A4; “OfŽcials BeginPlant ClosureProcedures,” ShelbyCounty Reporter ,April 13,1994, A1. 64J.V.“Butch”Porter, interview with author on July 22,1999 in Calera, Alabama; R ´ e´sume´ofButch Porter,Mar. 19, 1998, copy in author’s possession. 65Johnny Williams, interviewwith author on July 17,1999 in Calera, Alabama. 384 T.J.Minchin downhere that day …Iwasjust going totake achanceand make goodmoney, whatever.I didn’t think, Ididn’t know.I didn’t knowAlabama wasa right towork state.I meanI learneda lot.I didn’t evenknow what aright towork state meant becauseI’ dneverbeen in that situation,I didn’t know.”66 Manyreplacement workerswent for interviewsat BlueCircle beforethe strike began. Several recalled that they wereinterviewed in asuitethat Blue Circle had rentedat the local Ramada Innand were promised jobsin theevent of a strike.As ButchPorter put it, “Three monthsprior tothe strike, I wasinterviewed and if they wenton strike Ihad ajob,that’ s all therewas to it.” 67 Former strikers claimed repeatedly that thosehired werenot well qualiŽed and that BlueCircle’ s main concernwas to hire areplacement workforcein order tobreak theunion. Replacement workers themselves admit that the qualiŽcations of those hired werepoor. Roderick Harry, for example, statedthat “ninetypercent of thepeople that came in theredidn’ t knowanything about thecement industry.”The company carried outvery fewchecks when hiring newworkers. “ They really didn’t screenthe employees,” he explained. “They werejust hiring abody.So youhad alot ofpeoplewith alcoholism, drugs,a lot ofpeople laying out.Some people justup andquit. Any kind of scenario you can think ofbecausethey didn’t screenthe employees.”68 Replacementworkers also sharedstrikers’ feeling that thecompany was primarily interestedin breaking theunion rather than securinga well-qualiŽed work- force.Johnny Williams wentas far asto say: “ That’s all they worried about wasto break theunion and we weretold that, that they wantedto break theunion, they donotwant theunion here, they neverhave, andthat wasto break theunion. That’ s why they let them get away with everything, wecould do no wrong, whatever wewanted.” 69 In theearly stagesof the strike, replacement workersentered the plant in full-size vansfurnished by thecompany. Workers drove to a designatedparking area in the nearby townof Jemison and then traveled in thevans into the plant. After2 weeks, however,many replacement workersstarted to enter the plant in their owncars. In the secondweek of the strike, the picket line,which had beenrelatively peaceful,became more violent asstrikers andtheir supportersthrew rocks at replacements’cars. In some casesstrikers followedreplacement workersand Ž stŽ ghts broke out.Long-serving unionpresident Bobby Wattsadmitted that thelocal unionleadership struggled to controltheir members:“ Wehad acoupleof days of rock-throwing …afewpeople got whippedon the side that nobodyknew about andI really don’t knowwho all didthis butI doknow that it wasa fewŽ stŽghts …Basically wetried tokeepthings ascalm aspossible but it got outof handa little bit.”70 Complaining that strikers wereengaged in “outrageousand illegal conduct,”Blue Circle wassuccessful in obtaining an injunctionagainst theunion. Issued on August 17, 1994, theinjunction limited the unionto four pickets and prohibited them from coming within 10 yards oftheplant’ s

66RoderickHarry, interview with author on Aug. 3,1999in Calera, Alabama. 67J.V.“Butch”Porter, interview with author on July 22,1999 in Calera, Alabama. 68RoderickHarry, interview with author on Aug. 3, 1999in Calera, Alabama. Johnny Williams was similarly candid about the company’s lackof selection checks during the hiringprocess: “ Idid no physical, no eyeexam, no drugs,no nothing, wentto workMonday morning… They weren’t doingno background check,no nothing on you.”Johnny Williams, interviewwith author on July 17,1999 in Calera, Alabama. 69Johnny Williams, interviewwith author on July 17,1999 in Calera, Alabama. 70Bobby Watts, interviewwith author on July 15,1999 in Calera, Alabama. MichaelTomberlin, “Plant StrikeStretches into SecondMonth,” ShelbyCounty Reporter ,Aug. 31,1994, A1, A5. Theviolence that occurredin the last weekof the strikeis clearlydetailed in avideoof the strikethat Local50537 members compiled. Acopy ofthis videois in the author’s possession. PermanentReplacements and theBreakdown of “ SocialAccord” 385 entrance.Strikers werealso barred from engaging in avariety ofother intimidating tacticsthat thecompany had complained about,including throwing missiles,making threatening or harassing phonecalls, andusing mirrors to ash light in theeyes of replacement workersas they droveaway from theplant. 71 Replacementworkers themselves remembered being very scaredwhen they crossed thepicket line,especially whenthey werein their owncars and pickets started to throw rocks.“ WhenI wasin thevan Ifelt kindof safe but, man, coming in my car Iwas afraid, real scared,scared to death,” admitted RoderickHarry. “This oneSaturday whenthey wasall outthere, man, it scaredme to death, when I wason night-shift.”72 Other replacement workersreacted to the threat ofviolence by arming themselves.“ I carried an automatic weaponwith me,”recalled ButchPorter. “Iwasheavily armed becauseI wascoming towork and I wasgoing home.If youwere going totry todo me physical harm, well youknow, that’ s therules you make andI canplay by your rules too.That’ s theframe ofmind Iwasin andI wasn’t theonly one,but it wasintense. At onetime wecame outand there was a lot ofpeople outthere, there was probably seventy-Žve toahundredpeople out there and as we came downwe turnedto the right, everybody did,and they werestoning us, throwing rocksat us,one guy got injured.”73 Giventhe presence of gunson both sides,many in Calera expressedrelief that thestrike didnot result in any seriousinjuries or deaths. 74 OnSeptember 4, 1994, strikers votedunanimously to call offthe walkout. Although fewunion members had returnedto work in either location,the hiring ofthe replace- mentworkers led the local unionsto abandon their protest. 75 The futureof both local unionsnow lay in thebalance, especially asmany BlueCircle replacement workerswere keento become involved in decertiŽcation campaigns. In Calera, strikers whoreturned tothe plant insistedthat BlueCircle wastreating them unfairly andwas practicing favoritism towardthe replacements. Most felt that thecompany wasdeliberately favoring thereplacements because they wantedto ensure that they woulddecertify the union.Scores of grievances wereŽ ledby unionmembers, highlighting thepoor relations that existedbetween the company andthe union. 76 In May 1996, for example, 32 unionworkers Ž leda jointgrievance in which they accusedthe company oftrying to“ break theunion.” 77 The strike left many workersfeeling extremely angry andbitter towardsBlue Circle. Unionworkers resented the way that thecompany had replaced experiencedand

71Complaint, Aug. 14,1994, Blue Circle Cement v.United Paperworkers’International Union , quotation on 4; Temporary RestrainingOrder, Aug. 17,1994, Blue Circle Cement v.United Paperworkers’International Union,3–4, caseŽ lesheld at Shelby County CircuitCourt in Columbiana, Alabama (caseno: CV94–499); MichaelTomberlin, “Plant StrikeStretches into SecondMonth,” ShelbyCounty Reporter ,Aug. 31,1994, A1. 72RoderickHarry, interview with author on Aug. 3,1999in Calera, Alabama. 73J.V.“Butch”Porter, interview with author on July 22,1999 in Calera, Alabama. 74Bobby Watts, interviewwith author on July 15,1999 in Calera, Alabama; DougMcNees, interview with author on Aug. 2,1999in Calera, Alabama. 75“CaleraUnion Members Return to Workbut Questionsover Contract Remain,” ShelbyCounty Reporter,Sept. 7,1994,A7. 76InJuly 1996,for example, LutherCarter complained that replacementworkers were being allowed morevacations than union workers:“ This company electedto bend its Rulesfor replacement workers and treatUnion employees different.” Grievance 40– 96, July 29,1996, Bobby Watts Žles,Local 50537 Papers. For otherexamples of similar grievances,see “ Third Step Meeting,”Mar. 16, 1995, “ Third Step Letters, 1995,”folder, Local 50537 Papers. 77Grievance26– 96, May 28,1996, Bobby Watts Žles,Local 50537 Papers. 386 T.J.Minchin dedicatedpersonnel with what they regarded aspoorly trained,inferior workers.At the time ofthe 1994 dispute,the Calera workerswere indeed an experiencedgroup. The average worker was45.3 years old andhad nearly 19 years ofservice with the company.78 Theseexperienced workers insisted that although they had lostthe strike, thecompany also paid aprice.Around 30 ofthe most experienced workers, for example, tookearly retirement packages rather than returnto the mill after thedispute. Other unionmembers returnedgradually asvacancies occurred, although many waited several years tobe recalled.Most did wait for thechance to return because they found it impossible toŽ ndother jobsin thearea that paid aswell asBlue Circle. When they didreturn, however, former strikers insistedthat they had lostall respectfor the company.“ Sincethe company has hired replacement workers,”explained Bobby Watts,“ I’dsay ninetypercent of the people don’t have any trustin BlueCircle at all. They don’t believe nothing they say.They knowthat they tried toreplace them.They knowthat they weredoing agoodjob in theplant.” 79 JesseBurns, who had workedat theplant since1975, illustrated well thealienation that previously loyal workersfelt whenthey returnedafter thestrike. Burns, an amiable African-American man,recalled being consumedwith bitternesswhen he was recalled: “WhenI Žrstcame back,I applauded every time therewas a big mess-upout there. I meanI hatedthe place. I wasashamed totell anybody that Iworkedfor Blue Circle. It waskind of like adisgrace …Wewas like family. Youwork with guys twenty, twenty-Žve, thirty years,and you know him, heknow you. We thought that plant was ours.That wasour plant andit wasbeing destroyedand taken away from us,and that wasterrible. BlueCircle let usknow, ‘ it ain’t your plant,’they let usknow, but we thought it was.”Burns added that evenafter 5years,workers would no longer try to help thecompany tomake theplant runas well aspossible; “ Youdo your joband you doit thebest way youcan, you try tomake relations better,but as far aslike going out ona limb totry tomake it like it oncewas, it’ s going tobe a long time.”80 Burns’feelings typify thoseheld by many former strikers. 81 Doug McNees,the local union’s long-serving international representative,explained howthe strike had perma- nentlychanged the attitude of workers to the company: “ The oldguys, they built the plant, hell it’s their plant. That wastheir attitude.That’ s what thecompany doesn’t understandand what they lost.They lostthat. Youknow a guy outthere, been there twenty-Žve, thirty years,he don’ t evenknow how valuable heis. He couldhear amotor going bad or abearing going bad,or whatever,and stop it beforeit happens.Today, if they hear adamnmotor tear up,they justlaugh. Insteadof going totell somebody, they justlaugh. That’s their way ofgetting even.They can’t whip them.They can’t strike them.They can’t donothing, but they canget even,and they will.”82 From thevery beginning ofthe Blue Circle dispute,UPIU leaders had beenkeen to warnthe Blue Circle workersof the dangers of striking. 83 By 1994, theinternational unionfollowed the working assumptionthat, asone staffer put it, “virtually all companieswould replace permanently if given thechance.” 84 Having losta seriesof

78“Roberta HourlyEmployees— Ages and Yearsof Service,” Oct. 11,1993, untitled folder, Local 50537 Papers. 79Bobby Watts, interviewwith author on July 15,1999 in Calera, Alabama. 80JesseBurns, interviewwith author on July 16,1999 in Calera, Alabama. 81TyronePerkins, interview with author on July 15,1999 in Calera, Alabama. 82DougMcNees, interview with author on Aug. 2, 1999in Calera, Alabama. 83Wayne E.Glennto Donald L.Langham, Sept. 6, 1994,“ Lettersfrom International Pertaining to Strike,”Local 50537 Papers. 84KeithRomig, interviewwith author on Aug. 13,1999 in Nashville, Tennessee. PermanentReplacements and theBreakdown of “ SocialAccord” 387 bitter strikesbecause companies hired replacements,the UPIU sought to dissuade local unionmembers from walking out,encouraging them toinstead use in-plant strategies asa way ofŽ ghting concessionarybargaining. In 1988, for example, theinternational unionset up a Special ProjectsDepartment toassist workers in exerting pressureon companieswithout striking. 85 Usingstrategies that it had developedagainst other multinational employers, theSpecial ProjectsDepartment began tosolicit support against BlueCircle from unionsacross the world. By highlighting thecompany’ s tactics in Calera andAtlanta, theinternational unionaimed tobring pressureagainst the cementmaker that wouldlead them tosign acontract.The Special ProjectsDepart- mentdistributed thousands of letters and  iers that informedunions of the Blue Circle strike andthe company’ s effortsto hire permanentreplacements. The UPIUworked closely with theInternational Federation ofChemical, Energy,and General Workers’ Unions(ICEF), which representedmore than 15 million energy andprocess industry workersin over 100 countries. 86 With ICEFencouragement,unions from countriesas varied asTrinidad, Turkey, Zimbabwe,and the UK sentletters of protest to Blue Circle management. 87 Several U.S.unionsalso registered their supportfor Local 50537. In October 1994, for example, KennethL. Coss,the president of the United Rubber,Cork, Linoleum, and Plastic Workers ofAmerica, strongly criticized Blue Circle’s tactics.“ Hiring replacement workers,”he wrote, “ is oneof the most reprehen- sible actionsan employer cantake. It istantamount to union-busting behavior. It is behavior beneaththe dignity ofone of theglobal giants in thecement industry.” 88 The International Brotherhood ofTeamsters also gave strong supportto the Calera work- ers.89 Between1994 and1996, Blue Circle cementwas used to construct the Olympic village in Atlanta in preparation for the1996 games. The UPIUused this Olympic connectionas a major part ofits drive toexert outsidepressure on the company. Widely distributedunion  iers asked:“ Doesthe Atlanta Olympic Committeeintend to have theOlympic Village, asymbol ofbrotherhood throughout theworld, built with concrete suppliedby BlueCircle, a company that treats its ownworkers like somany replaceable machine parts?”90 The UPIUalso adopteda slogan,“ BlueRing ontheOlympic Flag:

85For the settingup ofthe Special ProjectsDepartment, seeProceedings of the Fifth Constitutional Convention ofthe UnitedPaperworkers’ International Union, Sept. 28–Oct. 2,1992,88– 89. 86VictorE. Thorpe, ICEFgeneral secretary, for example, wroteBlue Circle president John Summerbell in Aug. 1994to protestagainst BlueCircle’ s “strike-breaking”in the U.S. VictorE. Thorpe to John Summerbell, Aug. 26,1994, “ BlueCircle— General,” folder, UPIU Papers(Special ProjectsDepart- ment). 87Inatypical letter,for example, ErrolK. McLeod,president of Trinidad’ s OilŽelds Workers’ Trade Union, wroteBlue Circle’ s John Summerbell: “Westrongly condemn the attitude and behaviour ofyour Company BlueCircle in its refusalto meetand bargain with the Unionand also to reinstatethe workers whom you unceremoniouslydismissed. Wecall on your management to reinstatethe workersand meet with the Unionin negotiationsas to bringabout asatisfactorysettlement of the issuesinvolved.” Errol K.McLeodto John Summerbell, Oct. 10,1994. For examplesof other letters, see Adnan Ozcanand Bayram Yilirm to KeithOrrell-Jones, Sept. 12,1994, R. E.Makuwaza to John Summerbell, Sept. 9,1994; LenMcCluskey to A.Johnson, Sept. 21,1994, all in “Lettersfrom International Union Pertaining to Strike,”folder, Local 50537 Papers. 88KennethL. Coss to John Summerbell, Oct. 12,1994, “ Lettersfrom International Union Pertaining to Strike,”folder, Local 50537 Papers. 89John Wayne Garrettto Don Scott, Sept. 19,1994, “ Lettersfrom International Union Pertaining to Strike,”folder, Local 50537 Papers. 90“You Can’t Build Brotherhood on Injustice,”Aug. 1994,UPIU ierin “Lettersfrom International UnionPertaining to Strike,”folder, Local 50537 Papers. 388 T.J.Minchin

Yes.Blue Circle in theOlympic Village: No,”which waswidely publicized within the labor movement. 91 Asa resultof these efforts, many unionleaders from aroundthe worldwrote Olympic dignitaries toprotest against theuse of Blue Circle cementby the International Olympic Committee(IOC). In September1994, ICEFgeneral secretary Vic Thorpe summedup themood of this correspondencein aletter toIOC president JuanAntonio Samaranch. “The Olympic Gamesare all about fairnessand humanity,” hedeclared. “ BlueCircle is justabout the opposite.” 92 Manyother unionleaders wrote similar letters. 93 Despitethis widespreadsupport, there is little evidencethat theUPIU’ s efforts pushedBlue Circle tochange its bargaining position.For its part, theOlympic movementshowed little concernabout the company’ s tacticsduring thestrike and continuedto buy Blue Circle cement.The Atlanta Committeefor theOlympic Games (ACOG)responded to union letters by arguing that theconstruction of the Olympic village wasmanaged by theBoard ofRegents, an agency ofthe state of Georgia, and notby them.The ACOGalso claimed that it wasnot anti-union, arguing that many unionmembers wereworking onthe construction of the Olympic village. 94 The union interpretedthis responseas a “rather lame excuse.”95 UPIUleaders themselves admit- tedthat they wereunable to inuence Blue Circle tosubstantially modify its bargaining position.Keith Romig, astafferin theUPIU’ s Special ProjectsDepartment who workedon the campaign, acknowledgedthat theunion’ s tactics“ didnot move Blue Circle very far …Blue Circle’s bargaining positionduring thestrike andthe period immediately following didnot change visibly …in this case,we weren’ t able tomove thecompany’ s management asfar aswe would have liked.”Romig addedthat the Olympic committee neveracknowledged any public effectof the UPIU’ s campaign and continuedto do business with BlueCircle. 96 By thetime ofthe Atlanta Olympics, indeed,Blue Circle seemedto have prevailed in its battle with theunion. In May 1995, thelocal unionwas conclusively decertiŽ ed in Atlanta. In Calera, agroup ofunionactivists wereable todelay thevote, but Local 50537 waseventually decertiŽed in September1996 after alengthy campaign launched

91“WrongBlue Circle,”  ierdated 1994 in “Local50502,” folder. UPIU Papers (Communications Department). 92VicThorpe to Juan Antonio Samaranch, Sept. 7,1994,“ Lettersfrom International Union Pertaining to Strike,”folder, Local 50537 Papers. 93Allan Black, anational ofŽcer of a UnitedKingdom union (the GMB), forexample, wroteIOC presidentJuan Antonio Samaranch to protestthe factthat the Olympic villagewas beingconstructed by cementsupplied by acompany that had “dismissed members ofthe UnitedPaperworkers” International Unionfor taking strikeaction.” Allan Black to Juan Antonio Samaranch, Oct. 4, 1994,“ Lettersfrom InternationalUnion Pertaining to Strike,”folder, Local 50537 Papers. For otherletters from unions to the Olympic movement protestingthe useof Blue Circle cement, see, for example, Adnan Ozcanand Bayram Yilirm toJuan Antonio Samaranch, Sept. 12,1994, Kenneth L. Coss to Juan Antonio Samaranch, Oct. 12,1994, “ Lettersfrom International Union Pertaining to Strike,”folder, Local 50537 Papers. 94Shirley C.Franklin to Allan Black, Oct. 19,1994, “ Lettersfrom International Union Pertaining to Strike,”folder, Local 50537 Papers; William J.Mossto Robert E.Wages,Oct. 4, 1994,“ BlueCircle Cement, Atlanta, Georgia,”folder, UPIU— Mobile Papers. 95TheSpecial ProjectsDepartment was verydisappointed with this response,feeling that the ACOG couldhave exertedpressure on the GeorgiaBoard ofRegents if it had wantedto. As MarkBrooks noted: “This isa ratherlame excusefor ACOG’ s inaction, sinceACOG obviously has some inuence with the GeorgiaBoard ofRegents to encouragethe Board to stop usingscab-made cementin the construction ofthe Olympic village.”Mark Brooks to Jyrki Raina et al.,Oct. 12,1994, “ BlueCircle Cement, Atlanta, Georgia,”folder, UPIU— Mobile Papers. 96KeithRomig, interviewwith author on Aug. 13,1999 in Nashville, Tennessee. PermanentReplacements and theBreakdown of “ SocialAccord” 389 by replacement workers. 97 AsAlabama wasa right towork state, the replacement workerswere not members ofthe local andhad little contactwith unionmembers after theending of the strike. Local union members complained that BlueCircle was deliberately practicing favoritism towardsthe replacements in order toencourage them tostay in theplant. They also assertedthat thecompany wastrying todelay therecall ofunion members whohad losttheir jobsin thestrike. As close to 100% ofworkers had traditionally belongedto the union before the strike, Blue Circle wasanxious tokeep theseworkers out of the plant until after thedecertiŽ cation vote.The company was certainly successfulin its efforts;when the decertiŽ cation votetook place, replacement workersstill madeup the overwhelming majority ofBlue Circle workers. 98 Despitethe decertiŽ cation, a coregroup offormer strikers refusedto accept defeat andset about thetask ofreorganizing. Evenafter September1996, whenthe union no longer had bargaining rights, former strikers continuedto meet on a monthly basis. Between20 and30 former unionmembers attendedthese meetings and discussed their hopesof getting their local unionreorganized. 99 Localunion leaders Bobby Wattsand JesseBurns were particularly important Žguresin Žghting for theunion’ s survival. Born in 1943, Wattshad workedat theplant since1974 andwas well respectedas an honest anddedicated local unionleader. Jesse Burns had workedin themill almost aslong as Wattsbut was 12 years younger.Both Burnsand Watts realized early onthat former strikers andreplacement workershad tounite in order tosecure the reorganization of thelocal union.Watts, in particular, befriendedreplacement workersand they in turn began toturn to him. 100 This willingnessto approach replacement workerswas unusual. In mostcases where permanentreplacements were hired, former strikers maintained strongfeelings of hatred andanger towardsreplacement workerswhen they returnedto the mill, hindering futureorganizing efforts.In the1980s, aseriesof UPIU local unionswere decertiŽed after strikers werepermanently replaced.Although theunion tried to reorganize theselocals, the hiring ofreplacement workerswas usually extremely divisive.101 In November 1988, for example, UPIUvice-president Donald Langham describedpermanent replacement asa tactic that “destroyslivelihoods, dividescom- munitiesand tears families apart.”102 AtBlue Circle’s Atlanta plant, theunion was

97DecertiŽcation information drawnfrom “ Defenseand Information Department, LegalDivision, February 1998Board Report,”Feb. 23,1998, UPIU— Mobile Papers. 98Bobby Watts, interviewwith author on July 15,1999 in Calera, Alabama. 99Minutesof meetings of Sept. 25,1996, Oct. 10,1996, Oct. 24,1996, Nov. 7, 1996,Nov. 21,1996, Dec.5, 1996,Dec. 19, 1996, Jan. 2, 1997,Jan. 16,1997, Jan. 30,1997, Feb. 13,1997, Mar. 13, 1997, all in Local50537 Papers. 100“Roberta HourlyEmployees— Ages and Yearsof Service,” Oct. 11,1993, untitled folder, Local 50537Papers. 101Thelargest strike in the paper industry wherepermanent replacementswere hired was the 1987–1988 dispute at InternationalPaper Company (IP), which resultedin 2200strikers being replaced and three largeUPIU local unions beingdecertiŽ ed. In the 1987–1988 IP strike,the main strikelocation was in Jay, Maine,where over 1000 people wereinvolved. Sincethe strike,the UPIUhas carriedon acampaign to regainbargaining rights, but theseefforts failed in representationelections held in August1995 and again in May 1998.Hatreds from the strikehad proved impossible to overcome.For detailsof the effortsto reorganizein Jay, seeGetman, The Betrayal ofLocal 14 ,200;Alan Morse,“ IPWorkersVote No,” Lewiston Sun Journal,Aug. 19,1995; Richard Thomas, interviewwith author on July 3,1998in Satsuma, Alabama. 102“Locked-outWorkers in MobileReturn to Jobs after19 Months,” The Paperworker ,Nov. 1988,6. Similarly, in April 1990UPIU president Wayne Glennclaimed that the useof permanent replacements caused“ alifetimeof strife to solid working-classcommunities.” “Scab Ban CentralTheme at RegionTen Confab,” The Paperworker ,April 1990,13. 390 T.J.Minchin unableto reorganize thelocal, partly becausereplaced strikers refusedto even talk to thosewho had takentheir jobs.There wereother differencesbetween Calera and Atlanta that madeit easier toreorganize theunion in theAlabama town.In Atlanta, BlueCircle had replaced theentire workforce, thus wiping outunion sentiment more completely than in Calera. The sizeof the labor market in Atlanta also ensuredthat mostreplaced strikers wereable toŽ ndcomparable jobseven before the strike wasover. Mosttherefore waived their recall rights, anoption that wasnot as attractive in Calera, wherefew local employers paid aswell asBlue Circle. 103 The change in thecompany’ s attitudefollowing thedecertiŽ cation ofthe union was crucial in causingreplacement workersto become more favorable tothe union. Once theunion had beenvoted out, the company unilaterally changedarrangements for vacation rules,shifts, and premium pay. Manyreplacement workerswere also worried by theway that BlueCircle contractedout an increasing numberof jobs. In January 1998, arumor that thecompany wasconsidering contracting outnumerous jobs in the quarry causedsome replacements to seek help from local unionleaders. 104 “When I Ž rst wentdown there you couldn’ t eventalk union,”recalled quarry worker RoderickHarry. “Butwhen we decerted, they startedcontracting outthe jobs and all them guys got upset… Soall thoseguys votedfor theunion because they wasupset.” 105 Manyreplacement workersrecalled vividly thesharp change in thecompany’ s attitudeafter thedecertiŽ cation ofLocal 50537. “They didso much to try toget the unionout,” explained AndyLackey, “ andwhen they did,they werelike Dr Jekyll and MrHyde.I meanthey wentfrom ‘Hey,how are youdoing?’ to ‘ Who theheck are you?’ andthat’ s justthe way they did.They made acompleteturnaround.” 106 Union representative Doug McNeesfelt this change ofattitude was vital in explaining the union’s re-emergencein Calera: “The mistake thecompany madewas once it went non-union,they thought they had it. Soall thosethings that they wantedto do to people that they couldn’t before,you knew the replacement peoplethat werenot coming towork and all that kindof stuff, they putthe hammer downon them.‘ We’re non-unionnow, we’ ve got it made,right?’ ” 107 This change in thecompany’ s attitudebegan toalienate replacement workers.In December1996, animportant breakthrough occurredwhen Johnny Williams contacted Bobby Wattsand asked if hecould join the union. Williams actedas he did because he wasdisillusioned with thecompany’ s conductafter thedecertiŽ cation ofthe local and also concernedthat BlueCircle wasallowing poorly qualiŽed replacements to jeopar- dizethe safety of the plant. Williams, whohad always beenone of the most outspoken replacements,clearly recalled themoment when he joined the union: “ Iwentdown and joinedthe union. I wasthe Ž rst oneto join it, andit wasthe things that I’dseen,all thethings that I’ve heard outthere, all thelies …Ididn’t knowif they’d let me jointhe unionor not,I really didn’t. When I seeneverything that Idid,I wentto Bobby …I justtold it like it was,that I’dlike tojoin the union. I knowyou don’ t have much respectfor thereplacement workersbut I wantto join the union. I wantto bepart of

103Donald Langham, interviewwith author on Aug. 4,1999in Mobile, Alabama. Langham stressed that Calerahad always beena strongerunion location than Atlanta. Healso explainedthat it was much easierfor replaced strikers to Žnd otherjobs in Atlanta than it was in Calera. This meant that in Atlanta the union lackeda base fromwhich to reorganize. 104“Votesfrom Replacement Workers Key to Re-certifyingUnion,” The Paperworker ,May 1998,4. 105RoderickHarry, interview with author on Aug. 3, 1999in Calera, Alabama. 106Andy Lackey,interview with author on July 22,1999 in Calera, Alabama. 107DougMcNees, interview with author on Aug. 2, 1999in Calera, Alabama. PermanentReplacements and theBreakdown of “ SocialAccord” 391 it. Iseea lot ofthese things that’s wrong outhere and somebody has got tostop it. I’ll help, I’ll bepart ofit, soI joinedthe union. I came downto the union hall that day. Mostof them wouldspeak, most of them werepretty nice.There weresome that would notspeak. There are someout there today that doesn’t speak,but I don’t hold it against them.”108 Following Williams’lead, other replacement workersalso began toapproach the union.Before Local 50537 wasdecertiŽ ed, both replacementsand former strikers felt that BlueCircle had notenforced disciplinary rulesagainst replacement workers. Anxiousnot to losetheir votes,the company refusedto reprimand replacement workers for unexplainedabsences and other violations. 109 Oncethe local wasdecertiŽ ed, however,the company began totake aharder line.One of the Ž rstreplacement workers toreceive awrittenwarning wasButch Porter. Porter wasdeeply hurt by therepri- mand,because he had workedhard for thecompany andhad beenone of the leaders ofthe decertiŽ cation effort.A man ofconsiderable drive andenergy, he decided to dedicatehis servicesto thelocal: “Iwentinto Bobby Watts’ofŽ ce … Ipulled outmy check-book.I paid my uniondues and initiation feesright then.I told MrWattsthat Ihad ajobto do for BlueCircle, they hired meto do a job,I donemy job.I wasone ofthe top threeor fourpeople who was out there campaigning, walking up,talking to people onbehalf ofBlue Circle,to decertify the union, and we got it decertiŽed … I had ajobto do they hired me for butwhat has beendone to me today waslike spitting in my face.I tookthat extremely personal,and from that day onhe can consider me his right hand.He don’ t have totell menothing twice.”110 The recruitmentof Williams andPorter tothe local unionwas important because both menwere in uential andenergetic replacement workerswho were to act as emissariesbetween the union and the replacements. Local 50537’ s leadership did indeeduse Porter andWilliams toorganize replacementsand were successful in getting many tocommit themselvesto the union. 111 The willingnessof replacements to join the union would have meant little, however, if former strikers had beenunwilling toaccept them intothe organization. Once replacement workersbegan toapproach theunion, former strikers faceda difŽcult personal decisionabout whetherto accept them. The unequivocalexample ofWatts andBurns was crucial here;they adoptedthe view that if replacement workerswanted tojoin the union, members shouldwelcome them andcompletely acceptthem. As Bobby Wattsput it, “Oncethey sign thecard, they’ re notreplacements any more, they’re union.That’ s theonly way wecanlook at it.”112 Manyformer strikers,however, foundit very hard toeven consider being in thesame organization asthose who had replaced them justa fewyears earlier. Gradually, however,the barriers betweenthe two groups began tocome down. Personal contactclearly helped.Many replacements,

108Johnny Williams, interviewwith author on July 17,1999 in Calera, Alabama. 109For detailsof union complaints that replacementworkers were not disciplinedequally, see“ Third Step Meeting,”Mar. 16, 1995, “ Third Step Letters,1995,” folder, Local 50537 Papers. Bobby Watts also feltthat afterthe strike:“ Thereplacement workers, they would getanything they wanted. The company would buy them anything they wanted, tryto just keepthem paciŽed, and the union people, they was tryingto discourageus so that wewould quit.”Bobby Watts, interviewwith author on July 15, 1999in Calera, Alabama. 110Butch Porter,interview with author on July 22,1999 in Calera, Alabama. 111“Votesfrom Replacement Workers Key to Re-certifyingUnion,” The Paperworker ,May 1998,4. 112Watts, quoted in “BlueCircle Local Makes Strong Recovery from 1994 Dispute at CementPlant,” The PaceSetter ,July/Aug. 1999,1. 392 T.J.Minchin uponjoining theunion, described openly their reasonsfor breaking thestrike in 1994 andthus gained understandingfrom former strikers. 113 Former strikers’determination toput aside negative feelingsand forgive thereplacements was central tothe union’ s recovery. Calera wasa strong Christian community andmany workersclaimed that their faith had helpedthem toforgive thereplacement workersand welcome them into theunion. Both Bobby Wattsand Jesse Burns were keen Christians andurged their members toforgive thereplacements. Doug McNees,the international unionrepresen- tative whohad beenservicing theCalera local since1981, believed that workers’faith helpedto explain their ability toreorganize after the1994 strike:“ The people that go tothis unionhall are thesame people on Sunday that are in thechurches and support thechurches, and there’ s apart ofthem that knowsthey have toforgive, andonce they canget past that Žrsthatred, most of them can… youcan only hate solong …religion, that’s thebig part oftheir lives, andthat part teachesforgiveness.” 114 Support from theinternational unionwas also important in helping theunion to reorganize. Recognizing that many Calera workerswere determined to see their local reorganized, UPIUrepresentatives concentrated attention on the Alabama town,en- couraging workersto try toreorganize. Doug McNeesplayed aparticularly important role in organizing thereplacement workers.A tall, forthright man,he assured the replacement workersthat they werewelcome in theunion. “ BeforeI signedthem up,” herecalled, “ Imetwith abunchof them andthey said,‘ We’re afraid that y’all will hold it against us.’I toldthem, ‘ theonly thing Icansay is what youdid I don’t like. Iwish youhadn’ t, but if yousign aunioncard, I’ mgoing towash you in theblood. I’ mgoing tojudge you from this day forward andwhat youdid, you made one mistake in your life,’and that’ s sortof how I look at it. I’mjudging them onwhat they donow.” 115 Other international unionleaders worked on encouraging former strikers tounite with thereplacements for thecommon good. Emory Barnette,a representative based in central Alabama, regularly addressedlocal unionmeetings and pressed home the messagethat theunion could only bereorganized with thereplacement workers’votes, amessagethat wasunpopular at Žrst:“ Itoldthem that wehad toface the fact that they werethere, they outnumberedus and if wewere to become viable again wehad to acceptthem. We had toquit calling them ‘scabs.’We had totell them that wedon’ t like what they didbut it’ s over anddone with. If they will jointhe union and become agoodunion person, from that day forward that’s what they are, aunionbrother or sister.”Barnette, a charismatic Žgure,recalled that although hereceived a “goodbit of

113Robert Wade, forexample, rememberedthat: “It’s still difŽcult to this day but you’ve got to tryto do right, and some ofthem has comeup and they’ve told us why they did it. Itdoesn’t make melike it but at leastthey had the courageto comeup and tellus and tellus they’re sorry.” Robert Wade, interview with author on July 22,1999 in Calera, Alabama. JesseBurns, who himself admitted that it had beenvery difŽcult to acceptthe replacements,cited personal contactas crucial:“ Ifyou’ d oftold meŽ veyears ago that Iwould be recruitingreplacements to make union people out ofthem I’dofsaid, ‘There’s no way. Thereain’ t no way I’ddo that’… Ididn’t likeit but Iknewin orderfor the union to survive, wehad to do it …I’vebecome real good friends with some ofthem, alot ofthem, becausethey seeour point of viewand some ofthem arebecoming real good union people. Alot ofthem didn’t know anything about aunion. Oncewe got them and told them how aunion issupposed to work, they’ve helped us awhole lot, awhole lot, and some ofthem told methe storiesthat they had, the reasonthat they crossedover, and some ofthem werepretty sad. Iwouldn’t want to be in that position. Wouldn’t make mewant to cross overa picket-linebut, likeI said, in duetime all wounds do heal and you move on.”Jesse Burns, interview with author on July 16,1999 in Calera, Alabama. 114DougMcNees, interview with author on Aug. 2, 1999in Calera, Alabama. 115DougMcNees, interview with author on Aug. 2, 1999in Calera, Alabama. PermanentReplacements and theBreakdown of “ SocialAccord” 393

ak”from somemembers at Žrst,he was ultimately successfulin winningthe workers over.116 Mostunion members foundit very hard toaccept the replacement workersbut understoodthat Local50537 couldnot be reorganized withouttheir votes.Many were especially keento see the local unionreorganized sothat it couldnegotiate torecall former strikers tothe mill. Aslate asMarch 1999, for example, 10 former strikers were still waiting tobe recalled andthe union pressed hard for their return. 117 Robert Wade, for example, summedup how many unionmembers had acceptedreplacements out of necessity:“ No-onedidn’ t agree with it, butBobby toldus, said, ‘ Listen,it’ s got tobe this way,’and for themost part that is why weget along like wedo. We didit tosave ourunion and our men that wasout on the road …Wesaidwe will dowhatever it takes toget ourmen back towork and that’ s what it took… It’s ahard pill toswallow but you’ve got todo it.” 118 Wade’s commentshighlight thedifŽ cult personal challenge that accepting replace- mentworkers represented to many former strikers.Most workers, however, accepted that they had nochoiceif they wantedto see the union reorganized. “In asenseyou’ re going against everything youstood for,” acknowledged Gene Honeycutt, “ butthen again you’ve got tosay, ‘ dowewantthis unionor dowe want to take achanceon losing theunion?’ because the numbers wasn’ t outthere unless we got somemore members, andthat’ s really what it boiled downto, and we opted to go with thenew members, whichwas the replacement workers.”119 Manyworkers took great pleasureand pride in thereorganization ofthe local unionand felt that this proved that thedecision to accept replacementshad beenright. JesseBurns, like many others,recalled theexhilaration of winningthe 1998 election:“ That last election,oh Tim Iwishyou could have been there,it wasgood, man, it wasgood.” 120 Replacementworkers themselves paid creditto the way that former strikers had welcomedthem intothe union. Johnny Williams, whobecame an active unionmember, recognizedthe difŽ cult adjustment that former strikers had made toaccept him and other replacements:“ I’ve got toadmit that ninetypercent of the union has beenterriŽ c, they’ve beenterriŽ c. They have acceptedthe replacement workersand they’ ve really came along way with it. ImeanI’ ll comeup here now, laugh, jokewith them,I feel like I’mpart ofthem. A lot ofus do. So we make upa big part ofthe union now.” 121 Oncethe election had beenwon, however, union leaders recognized that they still faceda difŽcult struggle towin a contract.Both international andlocal unionleaders realized that although alot ofreplacement workershad votedfor theunion, many still didnot feel welcome in theorganization. Unionleaders made the brave decisionto ask RoderickHarry toserve on the bargaining committee asa way ofshowing the replacement workersthat theunion really had their interestsat heart. Harry, for his

116Emory Barnette,interview with author on Aug. 4, 1999in Thomasville, Alabama. Barnette’s efforts to convincethe Caleraworkers of the necessityof accepting replacements are also detailedin the local union minutes. See,for example, minutes ofMar. 19, 1998 local union meeting,Local 50537 Papers. 117Emory Barnetteto Donald L.Langham, Mar.8, 1999,Emory Barnetteto Donald L.Langham, n.d., correspondencein author’s possession. 118Robert Wade, interviewwith author on July 22,1999 in Calera, Alabama. 119GeneHoneycutt, interview with author on Aug. 3, 1999in Calera, Alabama. 120JesseBurns, interviewwith author on July 16,1999 in Calera, Alabama. Robert Wadesimilarly recalledthat: “Oh yesman wecame up herewhen wefound out, wewere whooping and holleringand jumping up and down in this building.”Robert Wade, interviewwith author on July 22,1999 in Calera, Alabama. 121Johnny Williams, interviewwith author on July 17,1999 in Calera, Alabama. 394 T.J.Minchin part, acceptedand enjoyed the experience. 122 Unionleaders felt that this move,while unpopular with some,was crucial in making thereplacement workersreally trustthe unionbecause it disprovedtheir fear that theunion would, according toEmory Barnette,“ negotiate them outthe gate.” 123 Although they presenteda unitedfront against thecompany, Local 50537 members still foundit difŽcult to secure a contractfrom BlueCircle. Emory Barnette,who led theUPIU’ s negotiating team,asserted that thecompany had a“very arrogant”attitude andwas reluctant to reach an agreement. 124 “The Company,”he wrote, “ isnot interestedin sitting downand negotiating afair andequitable labor agreement for its employees.”125 Although acontractwas eventually reachedafter 15 monthsof negotia- tions,union leaders admitted that it wasnot as strong asthey wouldhave liked, asserting that theunion had touse the agreement asa building block.Under the contract,in fact,workers surrendered Sunday premium pay andmoved towards a team-basedagreement that wasnot popular with all ofthe rank andŽ le.Union representativesdid, however, secure all thebasic conditionsthey neededfor thelocal tofunction effectively, including company recognition ofthe union, the right to arbitration andmediation, and the automatic check-offof union dues. In addition, workersmaintained thesame comprehensive group health insuranceplan that they had at thetime ofthe strike, Ž ghting offcompany demandsfor increasedcontributions. Crucially, retired workerswere also coveredby thesame plan asactive workers.The unionalso ensuredthat by thetime thecontract was signed, the 10 permanently replaced strikers whowere still awaiting recall tothe mill had beengiven theoppor- tunity toreturn. 126 With thecontract in hand,moreover, local unionleaders continued towork on signing upthose replacements who had notjoined the union. They made steadyprogress, and by March 2000 almost 80% ofworkers had signedunion cards. 127 The BlueCircle strike highlighted several central themesof contemporary labor– management relations. Likemany workersin the1980s and1990s, theBlue Circle workersfought touphold beneŽ ts rather than toseek a wage increase.At thetime of thewalkout, indeed, the Alabama AFL–CIO estimatedthat around90% ofstrikes in theU.S. werecaused by clashesover beneŽts rather than wages. 128 The health care issuethat precipitated theBlue Circle strike has also beena sourceof increased labor–management conict in recentyears. 129 At thetime ofthe Blue Circle strike,

122Bobby Watts, interviewwith author on July 15,1999 in Calera, Alabama. 123As Barnetterecalled, “ Westepped on some toes,Tim, Idon’t mind tellingyou, when weput Roderick on the negotiatingcommittee. Wefought that. Thereplacement workers, after we had organizedthem, werestill veryuncomfortable with us, and wefought and wefelt that it would be arealgood idea if we couldtake one of them and put oneof them on the committee, not necessarilyfor the input, no otherreason than they couldbe thereto seethat ouraim isnot to undercutthem orto costthem theirjob. That was theirone main concern,that wewould negotiatethem out the gateand ourpeople back, and Ithink they wereable to seethat that was not ourintent.” Emory Barnette,interview with author on Aug. 4, 1999 in Thomasville, Alabama. 124Emory Barnette,interview with author on Aug. 4, 1999in Thomasville, Alabama. 125Emory Barnetteto Donald L.Langham, July 15,1998, correspondence given to author by Emory Barnette(copy in author’s possession). 126Emory Barnetteto Donald L.Langham, Mar.8, 1999and “Agreementbetween Blue Circle, Inc., Roberta Plant and PACE InternationalUnion Local No. 3–0537,” correspondence given to author by Emory Barnette(in author’s possession); Bobby Watts, interviewwith author on July 15,1999 in Calera, Alabama; DougMcNees, interview with author on Aug. 2, 1999in Calera, Alabama. 127Bobby Watts, phone conversationwith author, Mar.25, 2000. 128Statistic citedby anewsreport on the strike,Calera Strike Video (copy in author’s possession). 129BlueCircle’ s top managersthemselves claimed during the strikethat conict over health carecosts was aproblem that “shouts at us fromevery day’ s newspaper.”John Summerbell to JenniferPate, Aug. 29,1994, “ Unconditional Return,”folder, Local 50537 Papers. PermanentReplacements and theBreakdown of “ SocialAccord” 395 indeed,the issue of health care reform dominatedpolicy debate,and companies’ demandsthat workershad topay an increasedproportion ofhealth care costsprecipi- tatedmany labor disputes. 130 For unionleaders, the Blue Circle strike wasa classic example ofcontemporary strikes.As Jim Albright, thepresident of the Alabama AFL–CIO, wrote during thedispute, “ The company,like many today is attempting to destroythe union by demandingcut-backs in Health Careand other contractprovi- sions.”131 The BlueCircle strike also highlighted theincreasing conict that occurredbetween U.S.unionsand foreign-owned companies in the1980s and1990s. U.S.unionleaders becamefrustrated by theway that Europeancompanies, in particular, seemedto take amore anti-unionposition in theU.S. than in Europe.UK ofŽcials from theGMB unionindeed reported that they had a“generally goodrelationship” with Blue Circle. 132 UPIUleaders argued that this disparity wasrelated tothe weakness of U.S. labor laws. “Really what happens,”commented UPIU vice-president Donald Langham, “isthey treat theunions in theUK completely differentthan they dothe unions in North America. They take advantage ofthe labor laws,that’ s what they do.They fully take advantage ofthepermanent replacements or anything elsethat they canget by with.”133 For theUPIU, only amajor reform oflabor law couldhave preventedBlue Circle’ s harsh treatment ofits unionizedworkers in Calera andAtlanta, tacticsthat the company repeatedin its other U.S.locations. 134 BlueCircle workersthemselves found it difŽcult to understand why thecompany couldrecognize unionsin theUK butnot in theU.S. “ If you’ve got agoodworking relationship andthey are union,why can’t youhave it here?”asked Luther Carter. “ What’s always going tobe a mystery tome is howthe same company cango from onecountry to the next and take abig turnaround andtreat people differently.”135 The Calera story also highlighted other,wider themes. Since 1981, oneof the main methodsthat companieshave usedto break the“ social accord”between labor and management hasbeen the hiring ofpermanent replacements. 136 In thelast twodecades, companieshave increasingly provoked strikesto use them asa weaponagainst unions. Workers have oftencomplained that companieshave forcedthem tostrike in order to hire replacementsand decertify the union. While unionshave certainly sufferedfrom this corporate attack, studiesare beginning toshow that, asin Calera, companieshave

130“Health Security:It’ s about OurJobs,” The Paperworker ,June 1994,16; “ ThePresident’ s Report,” The Paperworker ,May 1994,2; “RegionTen Confab Backs Push forNational Health Care,” The Paperworker ,April 1994,10. For otherstrikes caused by health careissues, see “ Health CareCuts Spur BriefJames RiverWalkout,” The Paperworker ,Aug. 1992,3; “James RiverStrike Ends with National Health CareTalk,” The Paperworker ,Sept. 1992,5. 131James Albright to all localsin Jeffersonand Shelby County, Aug. 9, 1994,“ BlueCircle Cement, Atlanta, Georgia,”folder, UPIU— Mobile Papers. 132Allan Black to Donald Langham, April 24,1998, “ BlueCircle Cement Case Number 10-RM-836,” folder,UPIU— Mobile Papers. 133Donald Langham, interviewwith author on Aug. 4, 1999in Mobile, Alabama. UPIUrepresentative DougMcNees expressed similar viewsto Langham, assertingthat: “They’re doingthings to Americans they can’t evendo at home. Lawsdon’ t allow them to …So they comeover here and takeadvantage of everythingthey can.”Doug McNees, interview with author on Aug. 2,1999in Calera, Alabama. 134Allan Black to Donald Langham, April 24,1998, “ BlueCircle Cement Case Number 10-RM-836,” folder,UPIU— Mobile Papers. 135LutherCarter, interview with author on July 15,1999 in Calera, Alabama. 136Philip Matterato CorporateCampaign, Nov. 14,1988, “ ReplacementWorkers,” Ž le,UPIU Papers; “Fact Sheeton HR1383,a Bill to Limit the Useof Permanent Replacements,” n.d., “Striker Replacement,”folder, UPIU Papers. 396 T.J.Minchin also losta great deal whenthey have alienated experiencedand dedicated workers. In thesummer of 1999, oneBlue Circle worker reected on the price that thecompany wasstill paying asa resultof thestrike: “ Iknowthey’ re in businessto make moneybut if you’ve got ahappy employee,you’ re going tomake more moneybecause he’ s going togive ahundredand ten percent instead of ninety-eight orahundred.And I don’t see that outthere.” 137

137LutherCarter, interview with author on July 15,1999 in Calera, Alabama. For otherstudies that have reachedsimilar conclusions,see Getman, The Betrayal ofLocal 14 ,esp. 216–220; Timothy J.Minchin, “TornApart: PermanentReplacements and the CrossettStrike of 1985,” ArkansasHistorical Quarterly , 59(2000), 30–58; Adrienne Eaton and Jill Kriesky,“ CollectiveBargaining in the PaperIndustry: Developments since1979,” in Paula Voos, ed., ContemporaryCollective Bargaining in the PrivateSector (Madison, WI: IndustrialRelations ResearchAssociation, 1994),51– 52.