CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY VIS-A-VIS GREAT BRITAIN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE FAR EAST, 1937 - 1941 by GREGORY ALLAN JOHNSON B.A., The University of British Columbia, 1979 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in ' THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of History We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (jz) Gregory Allan Johnson, 1982 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of The University of British Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 Date E-6 (3/81) Abstract The central theme of this study is the plight of the small power entrapped in a power struggle between large powers. In this case it is Canada enmeshed in a three way struggle that included Britain and the United States on the one hand and Japan on the other. The aim is to demonstrate that Far Eastern events played a significant role in the formulation and conduct of Canadian diplomacy between 1937-1941. An attempt is made to approach the subject by utilizing a contextual analysis instead of the traditional textual 'centralist' approach. The study prinicpally focuses on two important issues that have so far not been fully explained by Canadian historians. The first is the Canadian government's decision to give the West Coast of Canada defence priority status over all other areas from 1937-1939. The second is the matter of Prime Minister Mackenzie King's growing suspicion of the United States and its intentions in Canada. Canadian historians generally explain the government's decision to grant the Pacific Coast defence priority status in one of two ways. First, historians take the view that since no Japanese attack upon Canada ever occurred the government's decision was made as a result of political pressure and war hysteria from the West. The second argument usually shows that the government was entirely justified in providing for the contingency of such an attack, even if it never materialized. This study attempts to demonstrate that many leading government officials, including the Prime Minister, feared that such an attack was possible and that in the period after 1939 there is some evidence to show that their fears may have been founded. Nevertheless, it would appear that the overriding concern was not whether Japan would attack, but what the United ii States would do in the event of an all-out Pacific war. It would seem that the government believed the United States might use the threat of a Japanese attack on North America as a pretext to justify its expansionist aims in Canada and especially in Northwest Canada. This is precisely what did happen in the aftermath to Pearl Harbour and the government sought to offset the growing American presence in the Canadian Northwest by stationing still more troops on the West Coast. Mackenzie King's concern over the question of Pacific Coast defence is intimately tied to his growing suspicion of American intentions in Canada. Canadian historians have tended to brush aside the Prime Minister's fears as examples of 'irrational paranoia'. This study attempts to show that these fears were far more than examples of paranoia. United States policy in the Far East was expansionist, imperialistic and directed towards the establishment of a Pax Americana in the Far East. This massive growth in American power took place against a background of a rapidly declining Britain. Moreover, Washington's failure to define the purposes for which that power was to be used soon led Mackenzie King to believe that the aim of American foreign policy was to hasten the decline of Britain and to take over Canada. This study is not an attempt to 'defend' Mackenzie King and his government; rather, it is an attempt to cast new light on a critical period in Canadian history from a different perspective. iii Table of Contents Abstract ii Table of Contents iv Acknowledgments v Introduction The Far East as a Factor in Canadian Foreign Policy, 1937 - 1941 1 Chapter One The Setting, Canada, Britain, the United States and the Far East to 1937 18 Chapter Two The 'Atlantic Triangle' and the Opening of the 'undeclared' Sino-Japanese War, 1937 - 1939 38 Chapter Three Canada and the Road to Pearl Harbour: 'Waiting for F.D.R.', 1939 - 1941 69 Chapter Four Aftermath and, Conclusion. Mackenzie King's Pacific Dilemma 97 Notes to Introduction 114 Notes to Chapter One 118 Notes to Chapter Two 124 Notes to Chapter Three 132 Notes to Chapter Four 138 Bibliography 142 iv Acknowledgments I would first like to express my deepest gratitude to Professor J.S. Conway. He gave generously of his time, expressed a great deal of interest in the development of this study and, I might add, extended his patience on more than one occasion. I am also grateful to him for having introduced me to the work of Christopher Thorne and for suggesting the research topic at a time when I was swimming in uncharted seas. His cordial friendship and invaluable guidance over the years will always be treasured. To Professor John Foster and Dr. Dianne Newell I am also indebted. They too gave freely of their valuable time, offered a great deal of criticism and support in the early stages of the project. I would like to express sincere thanks to Dr. George Oshiro and Mr. Alan Mason. Dr. Oshiro spent many hours discussing and criticizing my views. His insight into Far Eastern affairs saved me from considerable embarrassment. Mr. Mason provided me with a copy of his own research paper and he directed my attention to several important documents that I would otherwise have missed. A special thanks goes to Mrs. Beverley Ersoy for typing the final draft. Without her assistance the work might not have been completed. Finally, to you Gayle - for being the most understanding companion, for putting up with the late nights, the long hours of solitude and especially for your encouragement when it was needed most. All of the views expressed here, of course, are my own and any errors that remain are my own responsibility. v Introduction: The Far East as a Factor in Canadian Foreign Policy, 1937 - 1941 History, it seems, reserves one of its harshest lessons for small powers that become trapped in power struggles between large powers. In the ensuing catastrophe the small power, tragically enmeshed in circumstances over which it has little control, has to wage a clever diplomatic battle to protect its very existence as a nation or suffer drastic consequences. This is a study of one such small power, Canada, and its foreign policy vis-a-vis Britain, the United States and Japan. The period is from the opening of the 'undeclared' Sino-Japanese war in July 1937 to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941. The focus will be primarily on the Canadian response to the Far Eastern policies of Britain and the United States. The Far East is a greatly neglected factor in- pre-World War Two Canadian diplomatic history. Canadian historians have devoted so much time to the study of the impact of European events upon Canadian diplomacy that the influence of Far Eastern events has been largely overlooked. The aim here is to demonstrate that Far Eastern events, and especially the tension that occurred in Anglo-American relations regarding that part of the world, played a significant role in the formulation and conduct of Canadian foreign policy. Similarly, it is to the Far East and the interaction of British and American policies and aims there as a whole that we have to look in order to gain a broader understanding of what Canadian policy makers were trying to accomplish. Canadian statesmen were confronted with the problem of sustaining Canadian independence in a rapidly changing international order marked by the decline of Britain as a world power and the rise of the United States as a superpower. Much of this study attempts to explain how a small 1 group of men sought to defend Canadian national interest against the military and economic encroachment of foreign powers. Historians traditionally view these years as Canada's attempt to assert her growing nationalism by pursuing a foreign policy that would promote Canadian independence in world affairs without upsetting the inward search for national unity.1 In other words, the domestic scene largely dictated the 2 shape that foreign policy took. All major foreign policy decisions were governed by one key consideration: the French-Canadian factor. The French-Canadians made up one-third of the population of Canada during the 1930's and 1940's. Their international outlook was decidedly isolationist. They held a fear and a disdain for American republicanism and a deep-rooted suspicion of Britain. The Americans were viewed as assimilationists who would destroy the French-Canadian culture while the British were perceived as imperialistic war-mongers who would gladly sacrifice French-Canadian blood for the greater glory of the British Empire. Politically they leaned towards the Liberals and the Liberal party, in turn, depended upon their support. The Liberals, led throughout this period by Prime Minister Mackenzie King, recognized that French-Canada was an important component and a critical factor in the maintenance of national unity.