Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy Author(S): Michele K

Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy Author(s): Michele K. Esposito Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Autumn 2006), pp. 114-147 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/jps.2006.36.1.114 . Accessed: 25/03/2015 17:15

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

University of California Press and Institute for Palestine Studies are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Palestine Studies.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:15:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions QUARTERLY UPDATE ON CONFLICT AND DIPLOMACY

16 MAY–15 AUGUST 2006

COMPILED BY MICHELE K. ESPOSITO

The Quarterly Update is a summary of bilateral, multilateral, regional, and international events affecting the Palestinians and the future of the peace process.

THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT for goods and persons almost entirely closed even as the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) con- This quarter was marked by Israel’s rein- tinued the air strikes and shelling of Gaza sertion of ground troops into Gaza with Op- under Operation Southern Arrow (begun on eration Summer Rains (launched on 6/28, 4/4; see Quarterly Update in JPS 140) to halt 9 mos. after its unilateral disengagement), Palestinian rocket fire (in a ratio of 10 IDF followed by its war on Lebanon with Op- strikes to 1 rocket attack). The IDF also con- eration Change of Direction (launched on tinued to separate the n. and s. West Bank by 7/13). The two operations inflicted a heavy closing (since 4/12) the Zatara checkpoint toll on Gaza and widespread devastation s. of Nablus and severely to restrict move- on Lebanon, but by the end of the quarter ment into and out of the n. Jordan Valley. both operations were seen as having failed As of 5/15, at least 4,386 Palestinians (in- to achieve Israel’s military objectives, even cluding 46 Israeli Arabs and 17 unidentified while undermining the government of newly Arab cross-border infiltrators), 1,017 Israelis elected Israeli PM Ehud Olmert, forcing him (including 311 IDF soldiers and security per- to shelve (most likely permanently) his con- sonnel, 206 settlers, 500 civilians), and 57 vergence plan for unilateral declaration of foreign nationals (including 2 British suicide Israel’s borders by 2010 (see Quarterly Up- bombers) had been killed since the start of date in JPS 140). At the end of the quarter, the al-Aqsa intifada on 9/28/00. Gaza’s Operation Summer Rains continued, while a shaky truce was in place in Lebanon, Ongoing Positioning after Elections where some 10,000 regular Israeli forces On the diplomatic front, Israel’s new remained in the south, cheek-to-jowl with Olmert government continued to pursue Hizballah fighters. its unilateral convergence plan for a lim- As the quarter opened, Israel and the ited removal of isolated settlements in the U.S. continued their suspension of all con- West Bank, reinforcement of settlements tacts with the Hamas-controlled Palestinian around Jerusalem and along the Green Line, Authority (PA) and to block all but humani- construction of the separation wall, and dec- tarian aid to the territories until Hamas met laration of Israel’s borders by 2010, while PA their demands (endorsed by the Quartet on Pres. Mahmud Abbas and PM Ismail Haniyeh 1/30/06) to recognize Israel, renounce vio- both pushed for an immediate resumption lence, and adhere to previous agreements. of final status negotiations with Israel. (Israel also demanded that Hamas annul its As noted in last quarter’s update, Abbas charter and that the new PA government and elements of Fatah were willing to work dismantle all Palestinian militant groups be- with Israel and the U.S. to strengthen Ab- fore contacts could resume.) Palestinians in bas’s roles as elected PA pres. and head of the West Bank and Gaza continued to suffer the PLO Executive Committee (PLOEC) to severe economic hardship due to the U.S.- enable him to bypass the Hamas-controlled and Israeli-led economic sanctions result- PA structures under Haniyeh’s authority. By ing inter alia in nonpayment of government 5/19, Abbas and Israel reportedly were in workers’ salaries for 2 mos. (see Quarterly active consultations through Abbas’s negoti- Update in JPS 140). An Israeli blockade of ations adviser Saeb Erakat and Israel’s Justice Gaza remained in place, with all crossings M Haim Ramon, as well as unofficial envoys

Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. XXXVI, No. 1 (Autumn 2006), pp. 114–147, ISSN 0377-919X, electronic ISSN 1533-8614. C 2006 by the Institute for Palestine Studies. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website, at http://www.ucpress.edu/journals/rights.htm.

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:15:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions QUARTERLY UPDATE ON CONFLICT AND DIPLOMACY 115 in Europe, on how to achieve this. In his Olmert Meets with Bush speech to the World Economic Forum (WEF) The main item on the agenda of Olmert’s in Cairo on 5/21, Abbas reiterated his call for upcoming first meeting (as prime minister) Israel to resume talks directly with him as with U.S. Pres. George W. Bush was his con- head of the PLOEC, arguing that negotiations vergence plan (renamed by advisers on the were under the PLO purview and stressing eve of the visit the “realignment plan,” be- that Haniyeh (who had not been invited to lieved to sound more benign in English) for the WEF) had agreed to this (see Quarterly which he was to seek U.S. endorsement. Update in JPS 140). On the sidelines of the Well in advance of the 5/23 meeting, the WEF, Abbas met with Israeli Vice PM and U.S., whose unquestioning support of Tel FM Tzipi Livni and Dep. PM Shimon Peres in Aviv was incurring criticism from the in- the first senior-level Israeli-Palestinian meet- ternational community in light of the wors- ing since 6/05. The Israelis repeated their ening conditions in the territories caused demands for changes by Hamas and spoke by U.S.-Israeli sanctions, made it known of a possible Abbas-Olmert meeting in the that it could not back further Israeli uni- near future, but Olmert stated (5/21) that lateral action, particularly defining borders, he would meet with Abbas only if he made without compromising other foreign policy efforts to disarm militant groups and force priorities, especially with regard to Iran’s the Hamas-led government to recognize past nuclear program (see Iran section below). deals with Israel, which Olmert doubted was The U.S. pressed Israel to at least make a possible. (“[Abbas] is helpless. He’s unable show of engaging Abbas in discussion on to even stop the minimal terrorist activities the convergence plan, also reportedly fear- amongst the Palestinians.”) Also on the WEF ing that bypassing Abbas altogether would sidelines, Livni met with Egyptian FM Ahmad undermine his standing with the Palestini- Abu al-Ghayt and rejected his proposal of im- ans and strengthen Hamas’s position further. mediate resumption of final status talks, stat- Washington also wanted Jordan to be con- ing Israel’s interpretation (not accepted by sulted on the plan. (Of note: The U.S. and the international community) that the road Israel also took steps just before the Bush- map required that Palestinians dismantle all Olmert meeting to soften their public image militant groups and halt all violence (includ- toward the Palestinians: USAID began dis- ing incitement) before negotiations could be tributing $800,000 worth of medicine in considered. (Of note: Israel’s long-standing the West Bank and Gaza on 5/17; the Is- position on the road map is that it is “dead” raeli cabinet approved on 5/21 the release and “no longer relevant.”) of $11 m. in VAT taxes withheld from the PA Meanwhile, Haniyeh endeavored to to NGOs in the territories unconnected to present his government as a rational in- Hamas for medical aid to Gaza hospitals.) terlocutor that could deliver significant Given U.S. constraints, the 5/23 meeting progress toward peace, security, and inter- largely became what former U.S. consul gen. nal reform if given a chance to act without Edward Abington characterized as the open- undue political constraints. In a high-profile ing of Olmert-Bush administration negotia- interview to the Israeli daily Ha’Aretz (pub- tions on the convergence plan. According to lished 5/23), he reiterated that if Israel were U.S. officials, Bush privately pressed Olmert to withdraw to 1967 borders, peace would to clarify the IDF status in the West Bank after prevail and the issue of Palestinian recog- implementation, Israeli plans for the Jordan nition of Israel could be opened. He also Valley, whether the separation wall would restated readiness to deal with Israel im- become the legal border, and the compati- mediately on day-to-day matters, though he bility of convergence with a 2-state solution. refused to discuss amending Hamas’s char- Olmert reportedly presented the rough out- ter on the grounds that he was speaking lines of the plan without a timetable for im- as the leader of “the government of all the plementation, noting that 6–9 mos. would Palestinians, and not as the leader of a move- be required to finalize details (in consul- ment (i.e., Hamas).” Haniyeh’s Dep. PM Nasr tation with the U.S.) and hinting that this al-Sha‘ir also stated (5/24) that the PA was set- would give Abbas time to crack down on ting up a national task force for negotiations Palestinian militant groups and transform with Israel charged with finding a way to ac- the PA into a “viable” negotiating partner. cept “international realities” without caving Publicly, Bush praised Olmert’s “bold in to foreign pressures to recognize Israel ideas” but stressed that “any final status formally before parallel recognition by Israel agreement will be only achieved on the ba- of Palestine and the rights of Palestinians. sis of mutually agreed changes, and no party

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:15:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 116 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES should prejudice the outcome of negotia- from a well-publicized PA fundraising tour tions on a final status agreement.” Bush wel- of Brunei, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, comed Olmert’s pledge to make a “serious Malaysia, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka; and $2 m. attempt” to work with Abbas, though both on 6/14 from PA Information M Yusuf Rizqa. men openly expressed doubts that Abbas On 6/4, the PA began using the funds to could deliver an acceptable deal. pay the 3/06 salaries of PA employees mak- Keeping his pledge to Bush, Olmert met ing under $330/mo. (around a quarter of with Abbas for the first time in over a year the 165,000 civil servants), while arranging on 6/22, at an informal breakfast hosted by interest-free loans from banks equivalent to King Abdallah of Jordan on the sidelines of a 1-mo. of pay for others. On 6/19, the PA conference of Nobel laureates in Petra. Noth- began distributing back payments of $300 ing of substance was discussed, but the men to civil servants earning over $330/mo., agreed in principle to hold a summit in the partially paying their 3/06 salaries; the pay- next few weeks. In statements afterward, the ments were made through special postal PA stressed (6/22) that it would only agree accounts since banks would not handle the to the summit with a well-planned substan- transactions. tive agenda aimed at reaching some kind On 6/8, the EU sent Quartet members of agreement, while Olmert told (6/22) the a draft proposal for the TIM. With the PA press that Israel had 3 “nonnegotiable con- able to generate only $35 m. of its $165 m. ditions” for resumption of substantive talks: monthly budget needs as a result of the siege the PA’s “total disarmament of terrorist orga- and sanctions, the plan envisioned 3 “win- nizations and total cessation of violence; full dows” of support: window 1 would disburse implementation of agreements; and recog- upward of $6 m./mo. to cover health and nition of Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish social service expenditures; window 2, up state.” to $15 m./mo. for utilities to ensure con- tinued fuel supplies; and window 3, up to The PA Cash Crisis and the $30 m./mo. in “social allowances” and “sub- EU’s Temporary International sidies,” still leaving the PA with a significant Mechanism monthly deficit. The U.S. responded that Meanwhile, the PA faced a deepening window 3 could violate its sanction laws as cash crisis, with no money coming into the it clearly entailed contributions to PA em- territories. EU plans launched last quarter ployee salaries and warned that even the to create a donor financing mechanism, the World Bank could face penalties. On 6/17, Temporary International Mechanism (TIM), after window 3 was modified to create a “so- to bypass the Hamas-led PA were not yet fi- cial safety net” for poor Palestinians (some of nalized, and emergency funds approved by whom may have received PA salaries previ- international donors could not reach the PA ously) and to pay “emergency allowances” to because almost all international banks, Arab some healthcare workers normally paid by banks included, had suspended operations the PA, the full Quartet endorsed the plan, with public and personal accounts in the with provisions for the U.S. to review imple- territories under threat of severe U.S. sanc- mentation after 3 mos. to judge if the process tions (see Quarterly Update in JPS 140). On should continue. The EU agreed to fund the 5/17, the Israeli Discount Bank, the last Is- TIM with an initial donation of $125 m., raeli bank doing business with Palestinian pending a donor conference, and hoped to banks, announced that it would suspend its begin making disbursements in 7/06. EU operations in the territories in 3–6 mos.) special envoy Benita Ferrero-Waldner met By mid-5/06, the PA had little option separately with Abbas and Livni on 6/19 to but to try to smuggle cash across the secure their backing of the TIM and to press Rafah border, where Israel had no direct Israel to use the mechanism to channel tens presence. From mid-5/06 to mid-6/06, at of millions of dollars in VAT taxes owed to least $26,815,000 (a fraction of the PA’s the PA. Both sides expressed reservations $125 m. monthly salary budget) was seized but hoped to see the plan implemented; at the Rafah crossing by PA customs officials Israel did not respond regarding the VAT alerted by EU monitors and was released to funds. the PA Treasury. The confiscations include The TIM disbursed its first funds to pay $815,000 on 5/19 from Hamas spokesman for fuel for Palestinian hospitals on 7/11 and Sami Abu Zuhri; $4 m. several days later by began paying salaries of doctors and nurses an unidentified Hamas official; $20 m. on on 7/27. By the end of the quarter, the EU had 6/14 by PA FM Mahmud Zahhar returning allocated $12.7 m. to window 1, $50.8 m.

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:15:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions QUARTERLY UPDATE ON CONFLICT AND DIPLOMACY 117 to window 2, and $12.7 m. to window 3, der the car of PSF central Gaza chief Nabil plus an additional $15 m. outside TIM for Hudud, killing him (5/24); a massive road- technical assistance and capacity building side bomb was also found (5/20) along the to the PA Office of the President. By 8/15, motorcade route of Internal Security Service the PA was also receiving some Arab donor dir. gen. Rashid Abu Shibak (appointed by aid through accounts controlled by Abbas, Abbas to wrest control of the security forces allowing the PA to pay civil servants back away from Siyam; see Quarterly Update in salaries for 3/06. The Palestinian Monetary JPS 140). Authority reportedly held (ca. 7/27) talks After an offer (5/22–23) by Egyptian se- with Israel’s Hapoalim and Discount banks, curity advisers (resident in Gaza) to broker convincing them to continue fund transfers emergency talks between Fatah and Hamas and defrayal services through the end of and following further talks, Siyam agreed 2006. (5/25) to limit the ESF’s patrol areas to make the units less visible, and the senior lead- Hamas-Fatah Tensions Escalate ership of Fatah and Hamas pressured their On the ground, the internal security sit- cadres to hold their fire, temporarily curbing uation in Gaza was deteriorating rapidly the violence that as of 5/25 had left 4 Fatah as elements within Fatah (suspected to be members, 3 Hamas members, and a Jorda- led by units of the PA Preventive Security nian embassy employee dead and at least Force [PSF] linked to Fatah strongman and two dozen people wounded. U.S. ally Muhammad Dahlan) continued to Concerned over the escalation and seek- challenge Haniyeh’s authority over the PA ing to reinforce Abbas, Israel agreed (5/25) security services. Last quarter, Haniyeh, frus- to allow Jordan and Egypt to supply Abbas’s trated over the unwillingness of the various presidential guard (Force 17) with weapons PA security branches to deploy on his or- and ammunition, backing a U.S.-led initiative ders to provide public security in Gaza and to expand Force 17 into a 3,500-member Abbas’s unwillingness to intervene, had au- force to counterbalance the ESF (see Quar- thorized his Interior M Said Siyam to create terly Update in JPS 140). Force 17 began a volunteer Executive Support Force (ESF) receiving 3,000 M-16 rifles and 3 m. rounds to patrol Gaza’s streets. While all factions of ammunition from Jordan on 6/14–15, and had been invited to participate, Fatah mem- Abbas swore in the first group of 300 new bers had balked, and the majority of the recruits (of an anticipated 1,000) around the 3,000-member ESF was made up of Hamas end of the quarter. members, with around 500 Popular Resis- tance Comm. (PRC) members comprising Abbas Threatens a Referendum the remainder (see Quarterly Update in With deteriorating conditions in the terri- JPS 140). tories and a dangerous diplomatic stalemate, On 5/17, the Interior Min. began deploy- Abbas unexpectedly seized the political ini- ing the ESF for the first time, prompting tiative. At the opening (5/25) of video-linked Abbas to order (5/17) 1,000s of PA po- national unity talks in Gaza and Ramallah lice into the streets in a show of force. aimed at reaching consensus on how to Fatah-Hamas violence quickly escalated, move forward, Abbas told the 500 or so with reports of Hamas members in Gaza reps. of Fatah, Hamas, smaller Palestinian being killed in drive-by shootings and kid- factions, and civil society groups that unless nappings by suspected Fatah gunmen (e.g., Hamas endorsed a 2-state solution based on 5/16, 5/17, 5/24); exchanges of fire be- 1967 borders within 10 days, he would put tween Fatah-linked PA security forces and this proposal to the Palestinian people in a ESF members (e.g., 5/18, 5/19, 5/20, 5/22, nonbinding referendum within 2 mos. The 5/24, 5/25), often with fatal results; and referendum would be based on the 18-point show-of-force parades by armed Fatah mem- prisoners’ initiative issued on 5/11 by jailed bers (e.g., 5/18, 5/21). Unidentified gun- senior Hamas and Fatah officials (see Doc. men (suspected Fatah) fired (5/20) on the B8 in JPS 140). The initiative, which had Gaza home of Hamas-affiliated Interior Min. the support of the majority of Palestinians spokesman Khalid Abu Hilal. Bombs planted according to polls (see the Palestinian Opin- by unknown individuals (suspected Hamas) ion section in Quarterly Update, JPS 140), exploded in the PA General Intelligence called for a Palestinian state within 1967 Service (GIS) offices in Gaza City in an ap- borders, urged Palestinians to “focus their parent assassination attempt on Fatah’s GIS resistance on lands occupied in 1967,” and Gaza head Tariq Abu Rajab (5/20) and un- used wording that could be the starting point

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:15:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 118 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES for a compromise on Hamas’s recognition of some kind of dialogue between us and the Israel and renunciation of violence. Haniyeh Palestinians” and, noting its failure to refer had already called the initiative worthy of to Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state and discussion, and Israel had not rejected this its insistence on the right of return, stated “internal” Palestinian document. that he could not “accept something that The move tested Change and Reform challenges the very fundamental principles party claims that as the elected representa- of Israel’s existence.”) Abbas nonetheless tives of the Palestinian people as a whole, declared (6/10) that a referendum would they would work within the democratic PA be held on 7/26, but added that talks with system and not as Hamas representatives. Hamas would continue up until the vote and (An Abbas aide admitted on 5/25 that “We’re that if a joint position was agreed before escalating the tension a little bit to try to cor- then, the referendum could be canceled. On ner them [Hamas] and show them as rejec- 6/11, the Hamas and Islamic Jihad prison tionist.”)Even if Haniyeh politically could not leaders withdrew their support for the pris- endorse outright a 2-state solution (consider- oner’s initiative, accusing Abbas of “playing ing it recognition of Israel without a parallel politics” with the document. As a result, Israeli recognition of Palestinian rights), he popular support for a referendum dropped could not legitimately oppose a referendum, to 47%, though the majority of Palestinians especially after having threatened Fatah with (75% as of 6/19) continued to support the a referendum on Hamas’s national unity plat- initiative itself. form during coalition talks and promised Meanwhile, Fatah-Hamas violence in that any viable peace agreement with Israel Gaza had picked up again as of about 6/1, would be put to a referendum (see Quarterly possibly in response to the referendum is- Update in JPS 140). sue. Exchanges of gunfire occurred between With the Hamas external leadership stat- Fatah/PSF and Hamas/ESF members (e.g., ing (5/30) opposition to a referendum, 6/1, 6/4, 6/14, 6/18, 6/21, 6/23, 6/24), caus- Haniyeh moved to negotiate with Abbas ing casualties. Suspected Hamas members on the prisoners’ initiative as the basis of fired a mortar at the PSF headquarters in a national unity platform. By Abbas’s 6/4 Gaza City on 6/6, wounding 4 officers and 2 deadline, the sides had narrowed their dif- janitors; Hamas members fired grenades at a ferences enough so that Abbas could extend PSF office in Khan Yunis; Fatah-affiliated PA his deadline until 6/6. Differences centered security forces (6/1) and ESF members (6/8) on (1) explicit recognition of Israel (Hamas paraded in shows of force; and Hamas mem- refused to do this without parallel recog- bers raided a pro-Fatah TV station (6/5). nition from Israel) and (2) the details of On 6/12, a massive clash took place out- implementing the initiative’s call to restruc- side the PSF headquarters in Rafah involving ture the PLO to include Hamas. (Of note: more than 100 Fatah and Hamas gunmen fir- Haniyeh reportedly demanded that the talks ing antitank weapons and rocket-propelled with Abbas be held in Gaza, concerned that grenades (RPGs), leaving 1 Hamas member a Ramallah venue could enable elements of and a bystander dead and 15 Palestinians Hamas’s West Bank leadership closely tied to wounded; each side claimed the other pro- the hard-line external leadership to scuttle voked the incident by attempting to kidnap the negotiations.) members of the other group. Hours later, With differences still outstanding on 6/6, 100s of pro-Fatah PA security forces and Abbas met with the PLOEC, which endorsed al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AMB; a hard-line Fa- moving forward with setting a date for a tah offshoot) members rampaged through referendum. In response, jailed Hamas mem- Ramallah, raiding, firing on, vandalizing, and bers involved in the drafting of the prisoners’ setting fire to the Palestinian Council (PC) initiative issued (6/6) a statement urging Ab- building; kidnapping Change and Reform bas to continue the talks, arguing that forcing PC member Khalil Rabei and setting fire a vote would cause more division, that a ref- to his offices (he was released hours later erendum would be costly, that the details of after Abbas’s intervention); and prompt- participation (territories only or diaspora as ing 7 other Change and Reform PC mem- well) needed to be worked out, and that in bers to seek refuge in the Muqata‘a under any case, the U.S. and Israel would undoubt- Abbas’s protection. The following day edly reject the initiative as falling short of (6/13), 10,000s of Hamas supporters rallied the 1/30 Quartet demands. (Indeed, Olmert outside the damaged PC building in solidar- on 6/11 criticized the initiative as “meaning- ity with the Hamas-led government. There less in terms of [creating the conditions for] were also car bombings in Gaza, killing a

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:15:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions QUARTERLY UPDATE ON CONFLICT AND DIPLOMACY 119 senior Hamas military commander on 6/5 Gaza militants with air strikes, blurring the and targeting a PSF member on 6/21 that lines between outright assassinations (2 Is- may have been products of Hamas-Fatah lamic Jihad members in n. Gaza on 6/5; tensions. The intra-Palestinian clashes left 7 another 2 in Gaza City on 6/13, also killing 9 Palestinians dead (including 2 Hamas mem- and wounding 32 bystanders; an attempted bers and 2 civilians) and more than 2 dozen assassination on 6/21) and more question- (mostly gunmen) wounded between 5/26 able attacks that the IDF claimed targeted and 6/24. Palestinian militants on their way to or from firing rockets into Israel (e.g., 6/9, 6/11, Israel Changes the Dynamic in Gaza 6/16, 6/20). On 6/23, the IDF made its first On 5/29, days after Olmert’s return from major arrest sweep into Gaza since disen- Washington and Abbas’s ultimatum to Hamas gagement, temporarily sealing off the Rafah on a 2-state solution, the IDF stepped up mil- crossing and sending troops into Rafah to de- itary actions in Gaza. The IDF had routinely tain 2 wanted Palestinians (allegedly Hamas crossed the Gaza border since disengage- members, which Hamas denied). ment was completed in 9/05 to search for Adding to tensions, a group of Egyptian tunnels and to level land, especially for con- border police patrolling at Rafah accidentally struction of a wall along the n. Gaza border, strayed (6/2) into the Negev and were fired but this time the IDF made its first ground on by IDF troops, who killed 2. Though Israel offensive into Gaza targeting Palestinian mil- initially claimed the Egyptians intentionally itants since disengagement; though brief, crossed the border and attacked an IDF post, it marked a precedent-setting escalation. Olmert later (6/4) admitted that the incident Undercover troops entered the former set- had been an accident and apologized to tlement area of Dugit to ambush and kill Egyptian pres. Husni Mubarak. 3 Islamic Jihad members preparing to fire Meanwhile, in the West Bank, the IDF rockets into Israel, withdrawing back into continued to impose tight restrictions on Israel immediately after. After troops cleared Palestinian movement, expand the separa- the area, helicopters crossed the border to tion wall, conduct arrest raids and house fire missiles at the site, wounding 4 Pales- searches, demolish Palestinian homes, con- tinian medics and 2 journalists. Hours later, fiscate and bulldoze agricultural land, raid helicopters returned, firing on a PA security and close Palestinian institutions, and fire detail investigating the scene, killing 1 PA on residential areas (see Chronology for de- officer and wounding a bystander. tails). The IDF also assassinated an Islamic Incidents soon spiraled: On 6/8, the IDF Jihad member in Qabatiyya on 5/29 and 2 assassinated ESF commander and charis- AMB members in Jenin on 6/13 and Ramallah matic PRC leader Jamal Abu Samhadana in on 6/22. Major clashes during an IDF arrest an air strike on Rafah, also killing 3 PRC mem- raid into Ramallah on 5/24 left 4 Palestinians bers and wounding 10. On 6/9, IDF artillery dead and at least 35 Palestinians and 1 IDF of- shelled the Bayt Lahiya beach, killing at least ficer wounded. Between 5/16 and 6/24, 75 8 Palestinian civilians and wounding 32. Palestinians were killed in Israeli-Palestinian (Though Israel immediately denied involve- clashes—no Israelis were killed during that ment and claimed that the explosion had period—bringing the comprehensive in- been caused by a Hamas rocket or planted tifada death toll to 4,461 Palestinians and bomb, a senior military analyst with Human 1,017 Israelis. Rights Watch concluded with certainty that an Israeli shell had caused the fatalities.) Re- Capture of an IDF Soldier Triggers sponding to the 6/9 IDF attack on the Bayt a Crisis Lahiya beach, Hamas suspended (6/9) its Against this background, 8 Palestinian 16-mo. cease-fire and began, along with militants representing Hamas’s Izzeddin al- Islamic Jihad, to lob 10s of rockets/day into Qassam Brigades, the PRCs, and the pre- Israel, wounding 4 Israelis and damaging a viously unknown Army of Islam staged a school and a house, before reimposing its predawn cross-border raid from s. Gaza on unilateral cease-fire on 6/15. Although the 6/25, sneaking through a sophisticated un- IDF acknowledged (6/20) that Hamas was derground tunnel to attack an IDF border again observing a cease-fire, it announced post near Israel’s Kerem Shalom crossing. (6/19) a new policy of attacking Hamas The militants, dressed in IDF uniforms, at- targets for each Palestinian rocket strike, re- tacking with grenades, rifles, and antitank gardless of what group was responsible for rockets, killed 2 IDF soldiers, wounded the fire. The IDF also increasingly targeted 4, and captured the lightly wounded Cpl.

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:15:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 120 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES

Gilad Shalit, spiriting him back into Gaza; 2 to deal with the situation would complicate of the gunmen were killed by IDF return fire. negotiations for his release. The attackers dubbed the assault Operation On 6/26, the gunmen issued their first Dispel Illusion and said it was in retaliation demands, calling for the release of all 113 for Israel’s 6/8 assassination of ESF head and Palestinian women and 318 children held PRC leader Abu Samhadana, though many in Israeli jails in return for information on analysts suspected that it was staged to scut- Shalit’s medical condition. Israel refused and tle the Fatah-Hamas talks on the referendum sent 2–3 armored battalions (around 3,000 and national unity platform (see Mideast troops) to the s. Gaza border, ignoring U.S. Mirror 6/26, 6/27, 6/29). appeals (6/26) to give diplomacy time to Israel immediately sent tanks and bulldoz- work before launching a military operation. ers half a mile into s. Gaza to search for Shalit; Egypt simultaneously deployed an additional sealed all crossings into Gaza, including the 2,500 border guards along the Rafah border Rafah crossing (3,000–4,000 Palestinians to prevent Shalit from being smuggled into were stranded on the Egyptian side of the Egypt. IDF preparations for a ground incur- border and 400 urgent medical cases seeking sion into s. Gaza continued into 6/27, with treatment abroad on the Gaza side) by bar- the deployment of another 2 infantry regi- ring the entry of EU monitors through Kerem ments, bringing the estimated force strength Shalom; shut off fuel supplies; barred Pales- on the border to 5,000 troops, backed by tinian fisherman from going out to sea; and Merkava tanks and D9 bulldozers. Inside tightened movement restrictions through- Gaza, Palestinian militants began building out the West Bank. Israeli Dep. PM and FM sand berms and setting explosive devices Tzipi Livni called on Abbas to order his secu- along likely invasion routes, fearing an as- rity forces to secure Shalit’s release, and Shin sault on the level of the 2002 Operation Bet head Yuval Diskin warned that Israel Defensive Shield. would ensure the collapse of the Hamas-led government unless the soldier was released A Sidebar on the Referendum alive. In the midst of the confusion and dis- Abbas immediately called for Shalit’s re- array following the soldier’s capture, the lease, but Haniyeh remained silent amid ongoing national unity talks between Ab- evident confusion within Hamas over the bas and Haniyeh were reaching their climax; incident. Hamas’s political echelon quickly by 6/25, Haniyeh was reportedly discussing denied (6/25) foreknowledge of the attack, with his leadership and Abbas the idea of with some figures urging that Shalit be freed dissolving his government to avoid a refer- immediately, and reports soon surfaced that endum and of appointing a government of a rogue cell from Khan Yunis was suspected. technocrats in its place. The Hamas leader- (Analysts noted that Hamas members who ship reportedly was seriously considering joined the PA cabinet and PC lost their po- the option but wanted guarantees that the sitions in the Hamas leadership and were siege on Gaza and sanctions on the PA would replaced, speculating that the resulting pro- be lifted as a result and that the technocrats motions within Hamas might have empow- appointed would have no party affiliations. ered more militant factions; see New York Meanwhile, at least 2 high-level meetings Times 7/21.) On 6/26, Haniyeh issued a state- by West Bank Hamas leaders had reportedly ment urging the gunmen not to harm Shalit been held on ways to foil the referendum, and to “respect him as a prisoner,” but did with Hamas’s Damascus-based leader Khalid not call for his release. He also urged all fac- Mishal ordering cadres during a conference tions to maintain a cease-fire so as to avoid call in Nablus to ramp up tensions with Fatah a massive IDF retaliation and, in coordina- to prevent any compromise deals. tion with Abbas, deployed security forces to On 6/27, hours before the IDF launched conduct house-to-house searches for Shalit. an all-out assault on Gaza,Abbas and Haniyeh, Egyptian intelligence officials resident in possibly eager to demonstrate movement to- Gaza as mediators among the Palestinian fac- ward meeting Quartet demands in order tions and between Israel and the PA quickly to preclude a harsh Israel retaliation, an- stepped in to try to negotiate a release. nounced that they, in consultation with Their judgment, first stated on 6/26, was other factions, had agreed on a national that the soldier’s capture had been sponta- unity platform and to work toward forma- neous rather than preplanned, that he was tion of a national unity government, thereby not being held by the Hamas cadres, and that suspending plans for a referendum on a 2- differences among the three factions on how state solution. The platform, based on but

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:15:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions QUARTERLY UPDATE ON CONFLICT AND DIPLOMACY 121 not identical to the prisoners’ initiative, ing southern and central Gaza. The IDF’s added new emphasis on the inviolability of clear assumption, though not officially con- international law, especially the Palestinian firmed, was that Shalit was being held in the right of return and to resist occupation, and Khan Yunis/Rafah area, and Dahaniyya was the illegality of Israel’s occupation and cre- well situated as a jump-off point for a raid to ation of settlements. Like the original, the free him. Later that day (6/28), the IDF con- text did not explicitly recognize Israel but ducted 7 air strikes on Gaza’s only electricity implied endorsement of previously signed plant near Gaza City (insured by the U.S. agreements recognizing Israel and the 2002 government’s Overseas Private Investment Arab League initiative calling for recognition Corp., which was liable for up to $48 m. in of Israel in exchange for Israeli withdrawal damages) and 6 transformer stations, black- from all territories occupied in 1967; called ing out 45% of the Strip and leaving it fully for formation of a Palestinian state on ter- dependent on electricity from Israel; shelled ritories occupied by Israel in 1967; recom- open areas of s. and n. Gaza; and repeatedly mended “concentrating” armed operations broke the sound barrier over the Strip. The in the occupied territories under a unified IDF also moved its elite Givati Brigade to the command; and prioritized the release of all n. Gaza border, warning residents to evacu- Palestinian prisoners. It also called for the ate the border area, and threatened to send reorganization of the PLO by the end of in troops if Palestinian rocket fire intensified 2006, so that Hamas and Islamic Jihad might in response to Summer Rains. (Rocket fire join. Provided that a new, fully representa- continued at a rate of around half a dozen tive Palestine National Council (PNC) were per day, causing no damage or injuries.) formed and the principles of democracy up- Publicly, Olmert warned that IDF op- held, the PLO would be reaffirmed as the erations would continue to escalate until Palestinians’ sole legitimate rep., the PNC Shalit was released, placing “the full re- authorized to ratify any peace agreement, sponsibility” for the current situation on and the PA supported (as a substructure of “the Palestinian-Hamas government and el- the PLO) as the core of the future Pales- ements that are connected to it in Syria.” tinian state. The text was initialed (6/28) by In a warning to Syrian pres. Bashar al-Asad all factions that participated in the national and Hamas’s Damascus-based leadership, unity talks except Islamic Jihad and was the Israeli air force made (6/28–29) over- passed to Abbas for implementation. At the flights of Asad’s residence in Latakia (where end of the quarter, Abbas had not formally he was staying) and along the Syrian coast, adopted the program, leaving open the pos- which Syria denounced as “an aggressive act sibility of further negotiations and changes. and provocation.” The U.S. (6/28) and UN Israel dismissed (6/27) the agreement, stat- (6/29) stated that Israel was within its rights ing, “There is an immediate crisis. . . . That to self-defense in launching Summer Rains the Palestinian leadership was putting en- but warned against actions that unneces- ergy into this document that has no bearing sarily harmed Palestinian infrastructure and on the most pressing issue [freeing Shalit] civilians. is disappointing.” Notwithstanding, Abbas Instead of making a quick assault to free and Haniyeh continued talks through the Shalit, however, Olmert staged a major ar- end of the quarter on implementation of the rest raid across the West Bank the night of understandings. 6/28–29, detaining 64 senior Hamas politi- cal officials, including 8 PA cabinet members Operation Summer Rains (Finance M Omar ‘Abd al-Raziq, Planning M The military onslaught that had become Samir Abu ‘Aysha, Jerusalem Affairs M Khalid inevitable with the capture of Shalit on 6/25 Abu ‘Arafa, Labor M Muhammad Barghouthi, began in earnest during the night of 6/27–28, Local Government M Issa al-Jabari, Prison- when the IDF launched Operation Sum- ers Affairs M Wasfi Kabaha, Religious Af- mer Rains. Initially, the operation seemed fairs M Nayif Rajub, Social Affairs M Fakhri to have a dual aim of freeing Shalit and Turkman) and 26 Change and Reform PC punishing the Palestinians to reduce their members, plus an additional 23 senior Izzed- support for the resistance and the Hamas-led din al-Qassam Brigades members. The plan PA. Ground troops crossed into s. Gaza, tak- had been prepared far in advance (some Is- ing the Dahaniyya airport area as a base of raeli analysts said since the 1/06 elections; operations, demolishing 5 Palestinian homes Ha’Aretz 6/29): the arrest warrants delivered and bulldozing wide swaths of land to clear by IDF soldiers had been ordered weeks ear- sight lines, and blowing up 3 bridges link- lier by Israeli Atty. Gen. Menachem Mazuz,

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:15:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 122 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES who had denied Shin Bet requests that the wider aim of neutralizing Hamas, Israeli officials be held in administrative detention PM Olmert convened (7/1) his security under the Unlawful Combatants Law, insist- cabinet and won approval to escalate at- ing that the arrests be made on criminal tacks, personally keeping U.S. Secy. of State charges (participation in a terrorist organi- Condoleezza Rice briefed by phone. Al- zation) valid in a court of law. During the though the full parameters of the IDF’s new day, IDF air strikes, shelling, and overflights directives were not spelled out, the cabinet continued in Gaza, cutting all electricity to authorization permitted the IDF to supple- n. Gaza. Palestinians in s. Gaza (thought ment air and artillery strikes with more to be Hamas members) blew a hole in the aggressive ground operations and to tem- Gaza-Egypt border wall, but PA and Egyptian porarily reoccupy former settlement sites security forces prevented all but a handful as needed to eradicate Gaza’s “terrorist in- of Palestinians from crossing. frastructure” and halt rocket fire into Israel. While heavy aerial assaults on Palestinian Thereafter, little mention was made of se- infrastructure and militant targets in Gaza curing Shalit’s release in the context of IDF continued over the next few days, it soon operations. became clear that the IDF did not know At the same time, the groups holding Shalit’s whereabouts: soldiers at Dahaniyya Shalit issued (7/1) a second statement de- did not move off site except to bulldoze manding the release of 1,000 Palestinian land, and DM Amir Peretz ordered (6/29) prisoners, including all women and chil- the Givati Brigade to suspend preparations dren, in exchange for his freedom. Israel to move into n. Gaza. Without a clear rescue ignored the offer, prompting Egyptian secu- plan, Summer Rains came to focus more rity envoy Omar Sulayman to cancel (7/2) obviously on punishing and destabilizing plans to go to Gaza to mediate Shalit’s re- the Hamas-led government. lease, stating that his efforts were unlikely to The direction the operation was taking result in a deal and that negotiations could was viewed with concern by large segments be left to lower-level officials. (Low-level me- of the international community: the heavy diation continued through the end of the damage to Gaza’s civilian infrastructure, quarter.) the arrests of elected PA officials, and the Beginning on the night of 7/3 and lasting toll on civilians of cuts to electricity, fuel, until 7/8, the Givati Brigade moved tanks and and water delivery and sewage treatment troops into n. Gaza, occupying the outskirts (dependent in urban areas on electricity or of Bayt Hanun, the Erez industrial zone, and gas) was seen as a disproportionate response the former Nisanit settlement site; ordered to a raid on a military target that caused PA security forces to withdraw and demol- only limited casualties. The UN’s emergency ished a PA security building; seized Pales- relief coordinator Jan Egeland warned (6/29) tinian homes as operational bases; leveled that a humanitarian crisis was imminent land in search of roadside bombs and tun- if electricity and fuel were not restored, nels; and conducted air strikes. After Hamas particularly to hospitals and clinics. responded by firing (7/4, 7/5) 2 2-stage The U.S., though cautioning (6/29) that Qassam rockets at Ashkelon (damaging a Israel’s actions could build popular support school), the Israeli security cabinet ordered for Hamas, generally fully supported its ally. (7/5) the army to expand n. Gaza opera- On 6/30, as IDF air strikes on Gaza heav- tions. Over the next 3 days, additional IDF ily damaged PA Interior Min. offices and troops and tanks entered n. Gaza, pushed destroyed several PA intelligence and ESF south to Jabaliya refugee camp (r.c.), and posts, U.S. Amb. to the UN John Bolton reoccupied former settlement sites along blocked discussion of a UN Security Coun- the coast as bases for launching incursions cil (UNSC) res. calling for an immediate halt into n. Gaza population centers (especially to Operation Summer Rains, stating that the Bayt Lahiya). Palestinian militants engaged U.S. “is of the firm view that a prerequisite the troops using RPGs, rifles, and roadside for ending this conflict is that the govern- bombs. Israel responded with air and ar- ments of Syria and Iran end their role as tillery strikes, tank and gunfire, as well as state sponsors of terror and unequivocally by bulldozing houses, fields, and roads to condemn the actions of Hamas.” widen the n. Gaza buffer zone and clear ar- eas in and around villages that could provide Olmert Adjusts His Aims cover for rocket fire and room for troops to Having secured tacit U.S. approval for maneuver. Palestinians fired some 25 rockets Israel’s use of military means to achieve its toward Israel, lightly injuring 3 Israelis. The

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:15:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions QUARTERLY UPDATE ON CONFLICT AND DIPLOMACY 123

IDF withdrew to Israel overnight on 7/7–8, ground offensives (some sources suggested declaring their military objectives achieved, that the IDF had unofficially named this though Palestinian rocket fire continued at new phase of Summer Rains “Operation the same pace. During the 5-day campaign, Grasshopper,” playing on how troops would at least 36 Palestinians (mostly gunmen) and hop in and out of Gaza), clearly stating there 1 IDF soldier were killed, more than 100 was no intention permanently to reoccupy Palestinians (a third of them children) and any part of the Strip. The IDF’s actions during 1 IDF soldier were injured, and some 100 the incursion were more aggressive and Palestinian homes were destroyed or heavily characteristic of IDF operations in the West damaged. Bank in recent years than those in Gaza prior On 7/8, the same day it moved troops to disengagement, where the IDF rarely out of n. Gaza, the IDF sent forces into east- entered Gazan towns and villages, more ern Gaza near Qarni crossing, shelled areas often firing on them from a distance. The around Gaza City, and expanded shelling and major ground incursions through the end of bulldozing around Rafah and Dahaniyya, or- the quarter included the following: dering residents near the airport to evacuate the area. (UNRWA opened two schools in r Central and s. Gaza (7/12–15): the IDF Rafah to house some 1,000 Dahaniyya resi- sent 10s of tanks and armored vehicles dents displaced by heavy shelling.) Although through the Kissufim crossing under he- initially it seemed that the operation would licopter and drone escort, and moved mirror the 7/3–8 n. Gaza offensive, the IDF north from positions near Abasan to withdrew troops from the Gaza City envi- attack al-Qarara and Dayr al-Balah, cut- rons into the Qarni industrial zone late in ting the Strip in half; ordered PA secu- the day, leaving only the Dahaniyya airport rity forces to leave the area; bulldozed contingent. From the launch of ground oper- more than 183 dunams (d.; 4 d. = 1 ations on 7/3 until 7/8, 48 Gazans were killed acre) of land; engaged in heavy air and and more than 100 were injured. Combined artillery strikes and major gun battles with ongoing violence in the West Bank (in- in Dayr al-Balah; made heavy air strikes cluding 3 assassinations and an attempted on Khan Yunis; killed 23 Palestinians; assassination; see Chronology for details), wounded at least 18. the comprehensive death toll as of 7/8 was r Bayt Hanun (7/16–18): troops con- 4,530 Palestinians and 1,021 Israelis. ducted arrest raids and house searches, Meanwhile, on 7/7, Shalit’s captors had bulldozed land and homes (leaving 60– issued a 3d statement, this one calling for 130 homes and an UNRWA clinic de- negotiations to end the fighting and free stroyed or uninhabitable), occupied Shalit, confirming that he was in good health. homes as observation posts, killed at Hoping to build on these apparently scaled- least 7 Palestinians, wounded 30. down demands and the relative lull in Gaza r Al-Shuka near Rafah (7/18): troops fighting, Haniyeh also called (7/9) for a forced 97 families (703 Palestinians) to mutual cease-fire. Olmert, however, rejected flee (UNRWA set up housing for them in bargaining, stressing (7/9) that Operation Jabaliya r.c.), cut electricity, bulldozed Summer Rains was not over and clarifying land. IDF intentions to “operate, enter, and pull r Al-Maghazi r.c. and areas of central Gaza out [of Gaza] as needed,” perhaps for several (7/19–21): troops occupied homes as months. sniper posts, engaged in heavy clashes with Palestinian gunmen, bulldozed A New Pattern of Battering Gaza 207 d. of land, demolished 4 homes, After 2 days of air and artillery strikes heavily damaged 9 homes, killed 18 only, the Israeli security cabinet met again Palestinians, wounded 125. on 7/11 to discuss how to move forward r N. Gaza and Gaza City environs (7/26– and authorized the IDF to expand the Gaza 28; code named Operation Samson’s offensive, without giving details. Through Pillars): troops engaged in intense the end of the quarter, Operation Summer clashes with and conducted air strikes Rains fell into a more discernable pattern, on Palestinian gunmen, leveled wide as laid out by Olmert on 7/9: Once troops tracts of land, demolished 9 houses, encamped at Dahaniyya and Qarni industrial heavily damaged 16 houses, bulldozed estate were withdrawn on 7/12, IDF forces at least 80 d. of land, killed at least 14 were stationed outside Gaza and were sent militants and 13 civilians, wounded at in for one or more days at a time to conduct least 66.

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:15:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 124 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES

r Al-Shuka and Rafah (8/1–6): troops re- mained very tight, with the northern and occupied the Dahaniyya airport; re- southern West Bank virtually cut off from peatedly shelled al-Shuka; sent in 50 each other. The one major military operation tanks, armored vehicles, and bulldoz- in the West Bank was in Nablus (7/19–21), ers; conducted air and artillery strikes; where the IDF sent in 50 armored vehicles searched houses; exchanged fire with and troops allegedly to search for Palestini- armed Palestinians; destroyed a PA se- ans “activated by Hizballah” to stage attacks curity office; bulldozed at least 20 d. on Israel. The Nablus governorate building, of land; forced 100s of families to flee; the PA compound (mostly destroyed during killed 8 militants, 1 PA security officer, Operation Defensive Shield in 2002), 3 secu- and 11 civilians; wounded more than rity force buildings, and the central prison 46. were put under siege and all Palestinians inside ordered to surrender: some 165 Pales- In addition, the IDF continued through- tinians (many of them PA security officers) out Summer Rains to conduct daily IDF air were forced out and detained, but about and artillery strikes, especially on n. Gaza, 10 remained inside, prompting the IDF to and frequently crossed briefly into Gaza to shell and bulldoze the buildings over 2 days, bulldoze land or search for tunnels along the exchanging fire with Palestinian gunmen border (see Chronology for details). Among and stone-throwing Palestinians; 7 Palestini- the air strike targets were government of- ans (including 3 armed AMB members, 3 fices, including the PA PM’s office (7/2), bystanders) were killed and 67 wounded PA FMin. offices (7/13, 7/16, 8/5), PA Inte- (including 27 children and 3 journalists cov- rior Min. offices (7/2, 7/5), PA Economics ering the raid). The IDF completely demol- Min. offices (7/15), and numerous ESF posts ished at least 6 other PA buildings before and training sites; Change and Reform of- withdrawing. An IDF soldier was killed in a fices in Bayt Lahiya were also hit on 7/14. separate arrest raid in Nablus on 7/17. The The IDF also made an assassination attempt IDF also assassinated 4 Islamic Jihad mem- (7/12) on chief Hamas bomb-maker Muham- bers in Nablus (7/29) and Jenin (8/6, 2 on mad Dayif (the target of 4 previous Israeli 8/9). On the Palestinian side, AMB members assassination attempts since 2000) in which kidnapped and killed (7/27) a Jewish settler the IDF dropped 2 quarter-ton bombs on from Yakir. Unidentified Palestinians took a 3-story building in Gaza City, wounding (8/14) 2 Fox News journalists hostage. Dayif; killing a senior Hamas member, his Meanwhile, at the G8 summit in St. wife, and 7 children; and wounding Hamas’s Petersburg on 7/16, the U.S. effectively se- n. Gaza military commander and at least 33 cured backing for Israel’s military escalation. bystanders, also damaging 15 surrounding Under U.S. pressure, the final statement de- homes. clared that the release of Israeli soldiers By 8/15, at least 213 Palestinians (mostly unharmed and an end to the shelling of civilians) had been killed and 650 had been Israeli territory were the “most urgent prior- wounded in Gaza since Operation Summer ities,” followed by a halt to Israeli operations Rains began on 6/28. By the end of the quar- and the release of Palestinian parliamentari- ter, UN agencies in the territories reported ans. Requirements to be met for a return to that the IDF was firing an average of 200–250 Israeli-Palestinian negotiations were, in or- artillery shells/day into Gaza (compared to der: a halt to “terrorist attacks” on Israel, an average of 9 Palestinian rockets/day into Abbas’s assurance that the Hamas-led gov- Israel); that the IDF had made 221 air strikes ernment fulfill the 1/30 Quartet demands, on Gaza in 7/06 alone; and that the IDF had expansion of the TIM (only the EU had con- bulldozed 3,666 d. of Gaza land between the tributed to date), Israeli compliance with the start of Summer Rains and 7/31. The poverty Rafah arrangements for freedom of move- rate in Gaza had reached 79% and the cost ment into and out of Gaza, resumption of basic goods was up 10%. Palestinians in of Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation, urban areas were receiving 6–8 hours/day of unification and reform of the PA security electricity and 2–3 hours/day of water. UN forces, and resumption of diplomatic con- estimates of overall damages to Gaza’s civil- tacts. The U.S. (7/16) and Britain (7/18) ian infrastructure since operations began on interpreted this to mean that Israel need 6/28 were $15.5 m. not end Operation Summer Rains until the In the West Bank, incidents of arrest raids PA released Shalit and halted rocket fire, and house searches tapered in late 7/06 and though other nations’ stances were more early 8/06, but restrictions on movement re- nuanced.

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:15:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions QUARTERLY UPDATE ON CONFLICT AND DIPLOMACY 125

The Convergence Plan Undermined With this caveat, 16 deaths were clear as- On the diplomatic and political level, sassinations (down from 20 last quarter), Operation Summer Rains was a serious set- accompanied by the killing of 16 bystanders back for Olmert. The offensive did not meet and the wounding of 66. The following in- its initial stated goal to free captured IDF dividuals were assassinated this quarter: the Cpl. Shalit (indeed, Israel’s 7/11 decision to AMB’s Muhammad Wahish (6/13), Ayman escalate scuttled whatever progress might Jabarin (6/22), Fida’i Qandil (7/4), Mahmud have resulted from a secret meeting that Haymur (7/5), and Tamir Kandil (7/7); day in Amman between Abbas and Shin Bet Islamic Jihad’s Muhammad Dadu (5/20), head Diskin to discuss a possible prisoner Tariq Zakarna (5/29), Imad Asaliyya (6/5), exchange) and did not discernibly advance Majdi Hammad (6/5), Shawqi al-Saiqali its secondary aims of collapsing Haniyeh’s (6/13), Hamad Wadiya (6/13), Hani Uwayjan government, undermining support for the (7/29), Sami al-‘Imar (8/6), Amjad al-‘Ajami Palestinian resistance, halting Palestinian (8/9), and Muhammad Atik (8/9); and PRC rocket fire, and improving security inside head and PA security chief Jamal Abu Israel. Combined with Israel’s deteriorating Samhadana (6/8). The IDF also attempted to security situation in the north due to the war assassinate 1 AMB member (7/6), 1 Hamas on Lebanon, which was also falling short of member (7/12), and 3 Islamic Jihad mem- goals (see Lebanon section below), public bers (6/21, 6/29, 7/6), killing a total of 14 criticism of Olmert’s government was on bystanders and wounding 51. Incidents on the rise, precluding further discussion of his 6/21 and 7/12 may have been assassination convergence plan as of late 7/06 through attempts targeting an Islamic Jihad and a PRC the end of the quarter. member. In addition, a senior Hamas mili- tary commander (6/5) and a senior Hamas Intifada Data and Trends political leader (7/5) were fatally shot by During the quarter, at least 314 Palestini- unidentified gunmen, and another senior ans and 6 Israelis were killed (compared to Hamas military commander was killed in a 101 Palestinians and 15 Israelis last quar- car bombing (6/27) in incidents that could ter), bringing the toll at 8/15 to at least have been either orchestrated by Israel and 4,700 Palestinians (including 46 Israeli Arabs carried out by collaborators or products of and 17 unidentified Arab cross-border in- intra-Palestinian rivalries; 3 such incidents filtrators), 1,023 Israelis (including 315 IDF have occurred previously (see Quarterly soldiers and security personnel, 208 settlers, Update in JPS 140). 500 civilians), and 59 foreign nationals (in- There were no Palestinian suicide bomb- cluding 2 British suicide bombers). Of note: ings this quarter, compared to 2 last quarter. 7/06, during which 191 Palestinians were On 7/26, an unidentified Palestinian gunman killed, was the deadliest month since Oper- fired on Israeli police in Jerusalem, wound- ation Defensive Shield in 4/02. According ing 2 before being shot dead; the incident to the Israeli human rights group B’Tselem, could be considered a suicide attack in that 48% of those killed in 7/06 were innocent it was almost certain the gunman would die. bystanders. Palestinian use of mortars and rockets At the end of the quarter, all crossings into remained high this quarter, averaging around Gaza were closed except Erez, which was 25–40/week at the opening of the quarter, open to a limited number of VIPs and medi- increasing significantly to around 75/week in cal cases. Limited fuel imports were allowed the 2 weeks following the start of Operation through Nahal Oz. According to the New Change of Direction against Lebanon, and York Times (7/4), as of 7/06, 48 of 60 facto- falling back to 11–35/week in the first half ries in the Qarni industrial zone had closed of 8/06. At least 25 Israelis were reported because of Israeli restrictions on movement, injured and damage occurred in 12 instances and at least half had permanently relocated (see Chronology for details). Of note: Hamas to other Arab countries. More than 20 other for the first time fired 2 2-engine Qassam companies in Gaza were considering or in rockets (the largest to date) into Israel on the process of making similar moves. 7/4 and 7/5, striking near Ashqelon, causing This quarter, as Israel stepped up air damage but no injuries. strikes on Gaza and media coverage became Israeli house demolitions were up signifi- spottier because of the focus on the war cantly this quarter, especially in Gaza, where on Lebanon, determining which IDF killings more than 120 homes were destroyed or in the Strip were targeted assassinations heavily damaged in the northern district and which resulted from more generalized (mostly in Bayt Lahiya), 13 in the central bombing missions became more difficult. district, and at least 15 in the south. In the

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:15:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 126 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES

West Bank, 7 homes were demolished in ficials had “conceded that 90-day visa entry Nablus, 3 in Jenin, 2 in East Jerusalem, and 1 cards, which were once routinely granted each in Hebron, Jericho, Qalqilya, Ramallah, in the past, especially to U.S. citizens, are and Tulkarm. Of note: By 7/20, IDF troops now more difficult to obtain, specifically in Gaza were using new tactics introduced for Palestinian American citizens traveling to in Lebanon, such as phoning Palestinians the West Bank and for U.S. nationals affiliated to warn them to evacuate their homes in with humanitarian organizations. Both the advance of air strikes destroying them (at U.S. Embassy and the Consulate in Jerusalem least 18 incidents reported beginning on are pursuing the issue.” 7/23 through the end of the quarter) and In addition to the 6/28–29 arrest of sending (beginning 7/24) automated phone Hamas-affiliated PA legislators and cabinet messages to residents of broad areas warn- ministers (at least 2 more, including PC ing them to evacuate in advance of air or speaker ‘Aziz Dwayk, were arrested on 8/5 artillery strikes. and 8/6), Israel revoked the Jerusalem resi- Jewish settler violence against Palestini- dency rights of 3 Hamas-affiliated PA cabinet ans seemed significantly lower this quarter, and PC members arrested on 6/28–29 (giv- but this might be a result of spottier media ing them 30 days to appeal or renounce their focus on the West Bank. Incidents included positions within the PA, or ultimately face settlers occupying or raiding Palestinian deportation to the West Bank when released homes and stores (6/4, 7/23), bulldozing from custody). The IDF also continued rou- land for expansion of settlements or creation tine harassment of Change and Reform PC of new settler-only bypass roads (7/5, 8/14), members during the quarter (see Quarterly beating or otherwise attacking Palestinians Update in JPS 140), searching their homes (5/21, 6/1, 6/4, 6/7, 6/8, 6/13, 6/17, 6/19, and offices (e.g., 5/29, 7/31) and detaining 6/22, 7/4, 7/16), vandalizing property (6/1, them for participating in public demonstra- 6/7, 6/13, 6/17, 6/19, 6/22, 8/12, 8/13), set- tions or other political activities in Jerusalem ting fire to property or pouring toxic liquid (e.g., 5/22, 7/6). on land (6/4, 6/13, 6/26, 7/6), and steal- The IDF deported (6/20) Tulkarm resi- ing or killing livestock (6/17, 6/25). Settlers dent Rasmi Subayh, held in administrative also stoned a Palestinian to death (6/20); detention since 9/05, to Gaza for 2 years. tossed grenades at shepherds, wounding Israel deported several West Bank adminis- 1 (7/25); and opened fire on Palestinians trative detainees to Gaza in 2002 and 2003 (7/25, 8/6), killing 1 and wounding 2. Of for periods up to 5 years, but has not done so 26 reported incidents (down from 49 last recently (see Quarterly Update in JPS 133). quarter), most continued to occur in He- bron (21), with a handful of incidents in Separation Wall Bethlehem (2), Nablus (1), Tubas (1), and This quarter, construction of the West Salfit (1). Bank separation wall was concentrated on By mid-6/06, it became apparent that segments s. of Bethlehem, northwest of Israel had launched a concerted campaign Nablus, s. of Hebron, and near Qalqilya. to expel from or bar entry to the territories The High Court of Israel approved (5/22) individuals in the following categories: Pales- a new segment through Ramallah that would tinians holding foreign passports (including cut off Palestinian access to at least 3,900 d. spouses of Palestinian ID holders); Arab na- of agricultural land and uproot 1,100 olive tionals; international peace activists; foreign trees. Another new segment around Shavei academics working or studying at Pales- Shomron settlement northwest of Nablus, tinian universities; and international NGO approved on 5/30, requires confiscation of employees. With long-term visas and resi- 53 d. of Palestinian land and the uprooting dency permits almost impossible to obtain of 350 olive trees. The High Court rejected from Israel, many such individuals who had (5/23) an appeal by East Jerusalemites chal- been working and living in the West Bank for lenging the wall’s route around Ma’ale Adu- years on 90-day entry visas, renewing them mim settlement on grounds that the Israeli on quarterly trips abroad, suddenly were DMin. had given “adequate consideration of denied visas when attempting to return. the barrier’s impact on residents while bal- While Israel had not infrequently denied re- ancing the security needs of Israeli citizens.” newals in the past, Palestinian human rights groups and the Israeli press stated that the INTRA-PALESTINIAN DYNAMICS policy had been building since 4/06, and by 6/11 had reached the point at which the The ongoing struggle between Fatah U.S. emb. had acknowledged that Israeli of- and Hamas for political dominance that has

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:15:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions QUARTERLY UPDATE ON CONFLICT AND DIPLOMACY 127 followed the 1/06 elections (see Quarterly Fatah was less accommodating to Hamas Update in JPS 140), and particularly the with respect to the PLO. Most notably, power struggles for control of security, was PLO Political Dept. head Faruq Qaddumi most evident on the ground this quarter (Fatah), charged with the PLO’s external in the above-mentioned clashes between relations, continued to challenge PA FM Hamas and Fatah over the ESF. But it also Zahhar (Change and Reform) for the right played out within the PA between Abbas to represent the Palestinians abroad. On and Haniyeh. Tensions on both levels were 5/29, Zahhar walked out of a meeting of the especially high during the first part of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in Malaysia quarter but moderated significantly after when Qaddumi publicly challenged his par- Abbas and Haniyeh agreed (6/27) to work ticipation in the forum, declaring “I am the toward a national unity government. minister of foreign affairs of the State of As the quarter opened, Abbas was still Palestine; he is only from the local govern- insisting that the Fatah-dominated security ment.” Zahhar continued, holding bilateral forces answer only to him and trying to have meetings on the sidelines of the conference, authority over the security forces formally but the row nearly undid Malaysian efforts transferred from the Interior Min. to the of- to pass a NAM motion declaring support for fice of the president (see Quarterly Update Palestinian unity; the motion was passed on in JPS 140). To this end, on 6/24, he unilat- 5/29. Zahhar also refused to attend an Or- erally deployed members of Force 17 (under ganization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) his command) to Qarni crossing to take over meeting in Azerbaijan on 6/20 to protest the PA security responsibility from forces un- OIC’s decision to invite Qaddumi as well. der Interior M Siyam’s purview. (Abbas had By 7/11, Abbas had informed PLO envoys done the same thing at the Rafah crossing abroad to take direction from Qaddumi, not last quarter.) Haniyeh rejected Abbas’s deci- Zahhar. sion but did not challenge the deployments Meanwhile, at the operational level on the ground. Haniyeh tried to keep the PA functioning After the 6/27 agreement, Abbas appar- and moving forward. Between mid-6/06 and ently scaled back his efforts to monopolize mid-8/06, the Change and Reform bloc re- security and agreed to work with Haniyeh portedly made some 200 key appointments to preserve the lines of security command in the PA Foreign, Waqf, Education, Health, mandated by law. By 7/7, commanders of Prisoner Affairs, and Agricultural Mins. and the Fatah-dominated security branches (ex- established internal disciplinary commit- cept Force 17, traditionally under presiden- tees for dealing with corruption complaints. tial control) had reportedly been informed Although some saw the appointments as that they would henceforth take orders aimed at minimizing Fatah’s influence, from Interior M Siyam, with only the rad- Haniyeh reportedly consulted with Abbas ically anti-Hamas PSF challenging the new on the changes and Fatah did not actively arrangements on the ground. Soon after, oppose them. Siyam, reportedly in coordination with Ab- In addition, PA cabinet secy. Muhammad bas, dismissed (ca. 7/13) hard-line Fatah Gaza Awad announced (7/2) that the portfolios of PSF head Sulayman Abu Mutliq and replaced the 8 cabinet ministers abducted by Israel on him with West Bank PSF head Ziad Habarih, 6/28–29 had been temporarily transferred to a Fatah member reputed to lack political am- ministers in the Gaza Strip, with dirs. gen. of bitions and not aligned with any particular the West Bank offices overseeing day-to-day Fatah faction. affairs. Transportation M Ziad Zaza took over Also on the security front, by 8/3, Siyam local government and labor, Refugee Affairs reportedly was creating a version of the ESF M Atif Adwan took over prisoners affairs and for the West Bank, called the “mobile forces,” Jerusalem affairs, Health M Bassam Na‘im expected to number 4,000 members. This took over social affairs, Information M Yusuf volunteer force was not permanently armed, Rizqa took over finance and religious affairs, though members armed themselves when and Economics M Ala’ al-Din al-‘Araj took escorting Change and Reform officials. The over planning. mobile forces reportedly started operating In late 5/06, Haniyeh made the in Nablus (with Nablus’s municipal guard highly controversial decision to suspend forming the core of the force) and expanded authorization of new Palestinian NGOs to Hebron and Qalqilya. Siyam reportedly pending a review of the registration process hoped to integrate them into the PA police and the criteria required for PA accredita- by 2007. tion. No explanation was given, but the

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:15:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 128 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES move was reportedly aimed at ensuring that 2. In light of the current crisis resulting donor aid would not be wasted on low- from the abduction of the Israeli soldier impact projects in the event that donor aid is [Shalit], in your opinion what is the shifted from the PA and run through NGOs. most suitable option for dealing with Critics condemned the move as an attempt the crisis? to control NGO operations and curtail their freedom of speech and action. Supporters West Bank Gaza Total argued that NGO authorizations under pre- a. Release the vious governments were often based more abducted on personal connections than on sound soldier to avoid business practice, noting that only a frac- an incursion tion of the more than 800 Palestinian NGOs into Gaza 16.4% 19.8% 17.6% was sufficiently organized to have a serious b. No release of impact on development and civil society. the abducted By late-5/06, critics of Haniyeh’s govern- soldier until the ment noted that records of PC meetings release of had not been put online for transparency, Palestinian that the PM’s Office Web site had not been prisoners 67.6% 70.7% 68.8% updated, and that some 100,000 Palestini- c. Try the Israeli ans had been added to the already strapped soldier and put PA health insurance rolls (hinting at nepo- him in a tism). Ministry officials countered (6/5) that Palestinian outgoing Fatah officials had refused to turn prison 12.7% 8.0% 10.9% over Web site passwords to their incom- d. No answer/ ing Change and Reform counterparts, that Don’t know 3.3% 1.5% 2.7% Web site hosting agreements had expired without funds to renew them, and that the 3. If the elections were held today, increase in health insurance rolls was neces- which list would you vote for? (* JPS sitated by the rapidly declining humanitarian has combined 9 smaller parties and blocs conditions in the territories. under “other” below, including indepen- dents, Democratic Front for the Liberation PALESTINIAN OPINION of Palestine [DFLP], Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine [PFLP], and Islamic Ji- The following data are excerpted had; see the JMCC Web site for details—Ed.) from a poll conducted by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center West Bank Gaza Total (JMCC) on 6 and 7 July 2006. Results a. Change and 29.6% 39.1% 33.1% are based on a survey of 1,197 men and Reform b. Fatah 30.3% 35.7% 32.2% women from the West Bank and Gaza. ∗ The results of the poll, the 59th in a se- c. Other 20.3% 13.9% 17.9% ries, were taken from the JMCC’s Web d. Would not vote 15.5% 10.9% 13.8% site at www.jmcc.org. e. No answer 4.3% 0.4% 3.0%

1. Do you support the resumption of the FRONTLINE STATES military operations that aim to abduct Israeli soldiers as a suitable response JORDAN within the current political conditions, or do you reject them and find them This quarter was marked by quiet diplo- harmful to the Palestinian national matic activity by the Jordanian government interests? as it sought to weigh in on developments that risked unleashing significant popular West Bank Gaza Total backlash. a. Suitable Before the Olmert-Bush meeting on 5/23, response 65.0% 70.0% 66.8% King Abdallah sent (5/19) a letter to Bush b. I reject them stating that the convergence plan would un- and find them dermine Jordanian security and asking him harmful 32.5% 27.5% 30.7% to press Israel to restart negotiations with c. No answer/ the PA through Abbas. When Olmert vis- Don’t know 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% ited Amman on 6/8—the first public trip to

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:15:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions QUARTERLY UPDATE ON CONFLICT AND DIPLOMACY 129

Jordan by an Israeli PM since 2003—Abdallah IDF tank hit a mine 4 mi inside Lebanese expressed concerns that further Israeli uni- territory. (An eighth IDF soldier was killed lateral actions could undermine Palestinian and 2 others were wounded in Lebanon late rights, and Olmert pledged to make every ef- that evening as they tried to recover the 4 fort for progress on a negotiated settlement bodies from the tank.) Simultaneously with before moving ahead unilaterally. As men- the ground attack, the IDF launched air and tioned above, Abdallah also facilitated the artillery strikes on some 40 Hizballah posi- informal meeting (6/22) between Abbas and tions, roads, bridges, and power stations in Olmert on the sidelines of a conference in s. Lebanon, with the stated purpose of pre- Petra honoring Nobel prize laureates, as well venting the captured soldiers from being as a meeting (7/11) between Abbas and Shin moved northward; at least 2 Lebanese civil- Bet head Diskin regarding a possible pris- ians and 1 Lebanese soldier were killed and oner exchange for the release of captured at least 10 wounded. Air strikes on a Pales- IDF soldier Shalit. tinian guerrilla base s. of Beirut caused no With Israeli’s military operations in reported injuries. Meanwhile, IDF Chief of Lebanon stoking popular outrage already Staff Dan Halutz called up a reserve infantry high over operations in Gaza, Abdallah de- division for deployment to the n. Israel bor- clined to receive Rice on her regional visit der and sent the navy into Lebanese waters, (7/24–26), reportedly fearing that the U.S.’s threatening an invasion. overt support for Israel’s actions was under- The Lebanese government immediately mining Jordanian popular support for the requested that the UN Interim Forces in U.S. and himself. Lebanon (UNIFIL) broker a cease-fire, but Also of note: On the sidelines of the Petra Israel stated that its offensive would con- meeting, Israeli Dep. PM Peres and King tinue until the captured soldiers were freed. Abdallah agreed (6/21) to move forward with Hizballah leader Shaykh Hasan Nasrallah de- long-stagnant plans to expand Israel’s Elat clared that the group planned to hold the 2 airport into an international “peace airport” soldiers to exchange for the 3–4 Lebanese straddling the Israeli-Jordanian border (see held by Israel: Samir Quntar, jailed since Quarterly Update in JPS 130). They also 1979 for his participation in a Palestine Lib- discussed expanding Qualified Industrial eration Front cross-border attack that killed 4 Zones to create more jobs for Palestinians, Israelis (see Quarterly Update in JPS 137 for Jordanians, and Israelis. earlier Israeli-Hizballah talks on his release); Yahya Skaff, a Lebanese Christian detained LEBANON in Lebanon in 1978 for participating in a The event shaping the quarter was military operation against the IDF; Nissim Hizballah’s 7/12 cross-border attack on Nasser, a Jewish Lebanese who moved to Israel, dubbed Operation True Promise, and Israel and took Israeli citizenship but was Israel’s immediate decision to launch a mas- arrested in 2002 for spying for Hizballah; sive military response, Operation Change of and Muhammad Farran, a teenage fish- Direction (initially called Operation Just Re- erman who went missing off the Lebanese ward), on 7/13 that quickly escalated into coast in 10/05. (Israel had acknowledged a full-scale war that continued with feroc- holding all but Farran.) Olmert held (7/12) ity until a tense UN-brokered “cessation of the Lebanese government, which includes 2 hostilities” went into effect on 8/14. Hizballah cabinet members, responsible for the attack, which he declared an act of war The Launch of War by a sovereign state and not an act of ter- Before dawn on 7/12, Hizballah fired sev- ror. Though Israeli officials said (7/12) that eral rockets across the Blue Line into n. Israel Syria was not, for now, a target, Israel’s Amb. as a diversion and then sent fighters across to the UN Dan Gillerman stated (7/12) that the Blue Line to attack 2 IDF jeeps patrolling the Iran-Syria-Hizballah “axis of terror must the border between Zarit and Shetula, cap- be stopped,” while the U.S. called (7/12) the turing 2 IDF soldiers, killing 3, and wounding incident an “unprovoked act of terrorism” 2. Soon after, it fired several shells at IDF po- and held Syria and Iran responsible for the sitions in the disputed Shaba‘ Farms area, ensuing violence. causing no damage or injuries. The IDF, in Before dawn on 7/13, Israel officially its first ground incursion into Lebanon since launched what it initially called Operation its 5/00 withdrawal, immediately sent a pla- Just Reward, staging massive air strikes on toon across the border to search for the s. Lebanon that killed at least 44 civilians missing 2 soldiers, losing 4 more when an and wounded around 100. It was at this

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:15:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 130 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES point that Hizballah began its rocket attacks ters, and Hizballah’s radio station. Hizballah on Israeli towns, firing some 60 Katyushas replied with rocket fire on n. Israel (vary- into n. Israel, hitting Carmiel, Majdal Qrum, ing from 20–90 rounds per day) and also hit Nahariya, Safad, and Zarit, killing 1 Israeli and disabled (7/14) an Israeli naval vessel and wounding 29. During the day, the IDF off the coast with a radar-guided C802 anti- imposed a naval blockade on Lebanese ports ship missile (similar to a Chinese Silkworm), n. of Beirut and made air strikes on Beirut launched with the aid of Lebanese army International Airport and a smaller military radar, prompting Israel to shell (7/15) every airport in n. Lebanon, a major oil depot major Lebanese port to take out Lebanon’s in Jiyeh, numerous roads and bridges, and coastal radar system. Hizballah’s TV station in Beirut and relay tow- Diplomatically, the Israeli and U.S. view ers in Baalbek. After Israel warned Lebanese from the start was that the 7/12 attack cre- to evacuate Hizballah-dominated areas of s. ated a “unique moment” and “moment of Beirut, Hizballah warned that it would strike opportunity” to break the “axis of terror” Haifa if the capital were attacked. When the comprising Hamas, Hizballah, Iran, and Syria IDF conducted overflights of Beirut soon and to change the regional dynamic in their after, Hizballah fired 2 rockets at Haifa, dam- favor. Some observers saw this as the prelude aging a hotel but causing no injuries. Heavy to a military strike on Iran, perceived as the exchanges continued through the evening, preeminent regional threat, by preempting with Hizballah firing another 90 rockets and possible Hizballah retaliation against Israel mortars at some 20 towns in n. Israel, killing from the north. In any case, the immediate a second Israeli and injuring around 60, goal was clear: Hizballah (with an estimated and the IDF attacking 100s of targets across active fighting force of 2,000–3,000 men, Lebanon (mostly in the south), firing artillery including elite forces of around 700, with at a rate of 1 shell/minute throughout the an estimated 8,000–20,000 reservists who day, killing at least another 10 Lebanese. All could be mobilized) had to be eliminated but 1 of the day’s 54 Lebanese fatalities and as a viable military and political force in the overwhelming majority of those injured Lebanon. Israel reportedly thought it could were civilians. Israel warned UNIFIL that it do this quickly through air strikes alone, and would target anyone moving near the Blue the U.S., backed by Britain and Germany, Line, including the UN observers, prompt- was willing to stave off all attempts to im- ing UNIFIL to confine to barracks its 2,500 pose a cease-fire to give Israel the time it troops (who are either unarmed or lightly needed. armed for personal defense only). On 7/14, the UNSC convened to debate This first day of fighting set the pattern for Lebanon’s appeal for an immediate cease-fire the days to come (see Chronology for details but was unable to issue a unified position on on clashes). Overnight on 7/13–14, Olmert’s the crisis largely because of U.S. opposition security cabinet approved a list of “more to statements criticizing Israel. (Two other significant” Hizballah targets and vowed to UNSC sessions before 7/18 ended similarly.) continue its offensive until Hizballah was At the 7/14 session, Israeli amb. to the UN disarmed. Over the next several days, the Dan Gillerman asserted that Israel was help- IDF steadily intensified attacks with three ing Lebanon achieve what it could not do aims: first, to disrupt Hizballah’s ability to itself—end the “terrorist occupation” of its move men and materiel; second, to prevent country—and that Siniora’s government “se- Hizballah’s resupply by imposing to the ex- cretly backs” Israel’s offensive. Meanwhile, tent possible a land, sea, and air blockade on the U.S. began blocking UN efforts to impose Lebanon; and third, to eliminate Hizballah’s an immediate cease-fire and ended its earlier command and control structure. Halting calls for Israeli restraint, though it did con- transportation and communications meant tinue to caution against actions that could massive air strikes on Lebanon’s civilian in- undermine Siniora’s government, which it frastructure. In the first few days alone, the viewed as an ally and democratic model for IDF targeted the Beirut airport twice more, the region. the Beirut–Damascus highway, numerous By 7/15, there was widespread agree- other roads and bridges, major power plants, ment that Israel was not merely responding gas stations, and fuel depots, while the Israeli with excessive force to a rare but not un- navy blockaded the entire Lebanese coast. precedented Hizballah attack, but had taken Efforts to eliminate the Hizballah leadership existing battle plans off the shelf. Senior began with heavy attacks on s. Beirut, de- Israeli and U.S. officials were commenting stroying Nasrallah’s residence, his headquar- privately that Israel planned to resist calls

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:15:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions QUARTERLY UPDATE ON CONFLICT AND DIPLOMACY 131 for a cease-fire and to continue up to several In a speech to the Knesset on 7/17, weeks of precision bombing of Lebanon to Olmert spelled out Israel’s 5 conditions for incapacitate Hizballah permanently. halting the offensive: “expulsion of Hizbal- lah from the area”; release of the 2 soldiers A Change of Direction abducted on 7/12; a “complete cease-fire”; By 7/18, the IDF was calling the offensive deployment of the Lebanese army to the Operation Change of Direction and, with south; and full implementation of UN Res. the major infrastructural targets knocked 1559, including disarmament of Hizballah out in the first few days, seemed to move and all Palestinian factions. At the same into a mode more akin to containment and time, Olmert vowed to “destroy every ter- clean-up. Increasingly, the homes of individ- rorist infrastructure everywhere.” Lebanese ual Hizballah members were targeted, the PM Fuad Siniora countered (7/18) that any remaining bridges and primary roads were solution to the crisis must include not only destroyed, and operations were launched the release of the 2 captured IDF soldiers but against individual towns and villages in s. the release of Lebanese in Israeli custody, Is- Lebanon that were Hizballah strongholds. rael’s withdrawal from the disputed Shaba‘ On 7/16, the IDF issued its first warnings Farms region, a return to the terms of the to the residents of 7 s. Lebanon villages to 1949 Israeli-Lebanese armistice, and provi- evacuate for their safety; by 7/19, Lebanese sion of maps showing the location of Israeli across the south were reporting receiving land mines in Lebanon. automated phone messages from the IDF Meanwhile, the U.S. stepped up pres- warning of pending strikes. At the same sure on the international community at an time, however, the IDF warned that it would emergency session of G8 leaders on 7/16 to begin targeting all trucks, including pick- draft a united position on the emerging cri- ups, moving s. of the Litani River on the sis. With irreconcilable gaps between the assumption that they were used by Hizbal- U.S. hard line, supported by Britain, and lah; the policy increasingly resulted in heavy the more moderate position of other states, casualties among civilians trying to flee to the wording of the G8’s final statement (see the north and hampered efforts to transport Doc. A1) was left deliberately ambiguous humanitarian aid. The IDF also stepped up to accommodate differences. (Specifically, strikes on Lebanese civil defense and mili- the U.S. refused to allow the word “dis- tary targets (notwithstanding Israeli claims proportionate” to describe Israeli actions to be “helping” Lebanon regain its rightful or to call for a “cease-fire,” while France security control). During this period, the and Russia refused to name Iran or Syria IDF also began sending small special forces as Hizballah supporters sharing responsibil- teams across the border into s. Lebanon to ity for Hizballah’s actions.) The statement conduct “pinpoint operations,” searching declared that “the root cause of the prob- for arms caches and tunnels and withdraw- lems in the region is the absence of a com- ing quickly. (Hizballah began engaging these prehensive Middle East peace,” placing the units on 7/19.) As of 7/18, the IDF reported war in a broader historical context, but it having carried out 2,000 air combat sorties also emphasized that “the immediate cri- against 1,000 targets and fired more than sis results from efforts by extremist forces 10,000 artillery shells, while Hizballah had to destabilize the region and to frustrate fired as many as 850 rockets into Israel. the aspirations of the Palestinian, Israeli By 7/18, the UN estimated that 500,000 and Lebanese people for democracy and Lebanese (out of a population of 4 m.) had peace,” placing the blame on Hizballah. The fled their homes, and the Lebanese had be- “most urgent priorities” were the release gun reporting shortages and rising costs of Israeli soldiers unharmed and the end to of essential items, such as food and gas. the shelling of Israeli territory. The tone of Though Lebanese casualty statistics at this the document allowed the U.S. (7/16) and point had become unreliable because of Britain (7/18) to claim an understanding the intensity of the fighting and difficult ac- that Israel need not end its offensive un- cess to the dead and wounded, estimates til Hizballah released the captured soldiers of Lebanese dead by 7/19 stood at over and halted fire; France, Japan, and Russia 300 civilians, 10 soldiers, and an unknown continued to call for an immediate cease- number of Hizballah fighters. On the Is- fire. Britain and France also raised (7/17) the raeli side, 15 civilians and at least 13 IDF possibility of sending an international peace- troops (including the 8 on 7/12) had been keeping force to s. Lebanon. UN Secy.-Gen killed. Kofi Annan endorsed the idea, but the U.S.

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:15:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 132 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES called it premature, and Israel rejected it gan (7/21) moving more troops and armor outright. to its n. border in preparation for what On returning from the G8 summit, Bush it said would be “limited” ground opera- endorsed (7/18) Israel’s military actions and tions to “mop up” Hizballah strongholds stated that the “root cause” of the crisis was and weapons sites. Meanwhile, the U.S. ap- “terrorism and terrorist attacks on a demo- proved (7/21) an Israeli request to expedite cratic country. And part of those terrorist delivery of precision-guided missiles (in- attacks are inspired by nation states, like cluding at least 25, possibly 100, 5,000-lb Syria and Iran. And in order to be able to GBU-28 bunker busters). Later reports by deal with this crisis, the world must deal observers on the ground (see Amnesty In- with Hizballah, with Syria and to continue ternational report in Doc. A3) described the to work to isolate Iran.” The same day, Rice IDF’s pattern at this stage for clearing vil- stressed that the time was not yet appropri- lages: warning civilians to leave, targeting ate for U.S. intervention. a house with an air strike to frighten lag- Olmert welcomed the G8 statement, gards, and then targeting sites controlled asserting (7/18) that “nobody in the inter- by Hizballah (including clinics, social cen- national community is asking us to halt the ters, youth centers, and media offices) or operation.”Separately, FM Livni spoke (7/18) necessary to civilians (gas stations, super- of a new diplomatic process “alongside the markets, water installations). Main streets of military operation that will continue”; she towns and villages were strafed with cluster specified that diplomacy was not meant to bombs, the first confirmed such use being in “shorten the window” of the army’s opera- Blida on 7/19. (The first IDF acknowledge- tion but rather “to be an extension of it.” She ment of cluster bomb use was by IDF Maj. further stated (7/19), “Israel and the inter- Gen. Benny Gantz on 7/26.) There were also national community have a common goal: rumors of the IDF using white phosphorus. to promote a process that will bring about By 7/21, local Lebanese officials estimated a long-term and fundamental change in the that 70% of s. Lebanon’s population had fled political reality of the region and that will north or to Syria. With refugees pouring into eliminate the threat of terrorism facing both Sidon, Tyre, and Beirut, the UN estimated Israelis and Lebanese.” that 500,000 Lebanese were in urgent need of humanitarian assistance that could not The Ground War Expands as be provided without Israeli-guaranteed safe- Expectations Diminish corridors, while UNIFIL troops themselves By 7/20, Israeli operations began to show were bunkered down and in need of food signs of disarray as it became clear that and water. Hizballah was not collapsing under the as- The actual ground assault began on 7/22, sault. While Hizballah rocket fire had been when Israel sent 2,000 troops, including a reduced, 30–50 rockets/day were still hit- tank brigade and armored units, across the ting n. Israel, causing limited casualties and Blue Line into Maroun al-Ras in the central damage, prompting most of the northern border region and moved into Bint Jubayl population to take to bomb shelters or tem- on 7/23, engaging in what it described as porarily head south out of rocket range. heavy, close combat with Hizballah fighters While the IDF continued nonstop heavy using mortars, antitank rounds, RPGs, and air and artillery strikes as well as pinpoint small arms fire. Although the ground offen- ground operations, it also began evident sive remained concentrated in the Maroun preparations for the wider ground offen- al-Ras and Bint Jubayl areas through 7/26, sive it initially had ruled out as unnecessary. the fighting across Lebanon immediately Multiple messages on the aim and extent became more intense and the humanitar- of ground operations led some to speculate ian impact more severe. By 7/24, the IDF that Israel was adjusting its tactics and goals had demolished 95% of Lebanon’s bridges more or less on the fly. and 80% of its primary roads while large On 7/20, the IDF warned the Lebanese swaths of the southern Beirut suburbs (and who remained s. of the Litani River (25 mi n. Hizballah strongholds) of Baabda, Chouaifat, of the Israeli border) to leave within 24 Hadet, Haret Hraik, and Kfar Chima had hours or be considered viable targets. It been leveled by IDF air strikes. In response simultaneously sent tanks and bulldozers to the ground incursion, Hizballah stepped across the Blue Line for the first time to up rocket fire on n. Israel to 100–130 clear hazards, called up (7/21) 3 battalions rounds/day, belying IDF claims that its capa- of reserves (around 3,000 units), and be- bilities had been degraded.

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:15:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions QUARTERLY UPDATE ON CONFLICT AND DIPLOMACY 133

By 7/25, returning IDF troops routinely Arab, and EU leaders, warning that the U.S. reported that Hizballah’s infrastructure of would not support a cease-fire that did not tunnels, bunkers, and armories was more include a solid plan for disarming Hizballah sophisticated and better hidden and its fight- and expanding Lebanese government con- ers more determined and better organized, trol throughout the country, warning (7/21) trained, and equipped than anticipated. In that the parties should not settle for “quick the most intensive clash, on 7/26, some fixes.” “What we are seeing here,” she said, 100 Hizballah fighters ambushed an elite “[are] the birth pangs of a new Middle East, Golani Brigade unit in Bint Jubayl (which and whatever we do, we have to be cer- the IDF had claimed to have secured on tain that we’re pushing forward to the new 7/25), killing 8 IDF soldiers and wounding Middle East, not going back to the old one.” at least 22; troops had been forced to en- Rice’s tour began on 7/24 with an unan- ter the area on foot because the “roads into nounced stop in Lebanon, where at a tense town were littered with antitank mines” and meeting with Siniora she presented plans therefore had to carry casualties for 2 mi un- (discussed by senior Saudi and Bush admin. der heavy fire to tanks that could transport officials on 7/23) for an international donor them to helicopters for evacuation. (The IDF conference to raise funds for Lebanon’s re- claimed to have killed 20 Hizballah fighters; construction and announced that the U.S. Hizballah would not confirm.) would contribute $30 m. to a UN emergency In light of the increasingly difficult bat- appeal to aid Lebanon. While Siniora wanted tle, Israel scaled back its war objectives: an immediate cease-fire, Rice discussed the instead of pledging to eliminate Hizballah idea of putting a robust international peace- and alter the regional dynamic, Israel now keeping force in s. Lebanon after a cease-fire stated (7/22, 7/23) that its overall aim was but emphasized that the U.S. would not back “to weaken Hezbollah sufficiently so that a cease-fire until Hizballah released the cap- the international community can help the tured IDF soldiers. Rice then met (7/25) Lebanese government to carry out [UN Res. with Olmert in Tel Aviv. Talks reportedly in- 1559] and exercise its sovereignty all over cluded discussion of Israel’s plans for an exit Lebanon, expelling any foreign fighters and strategy from Lebanon; senior Israeli offi- disarming Hezbollah.” On 7/25, the IDF cials later said they believed that they had stated plans to occupy a small strip inside until Rice’s return to the region to press s. Lebanon (possibly 2–6 mi deep) until an their military campaign. Indeed, from then international force of up to 20,000 heavily on, the closer the international community armed troops, preferably from NATO, could came to reaching agreement on a cessation be deployed to replace it. (NATO quickly of violence, the more Israel intensified and stated that its forces were overcommitted.) expanded Operation Change of Direction. For his part, Hizballah’s Nasrallah called (7/24) for an immediate cease-fire, saying An Immediate vs. a Sustainable Hizballah would accept the Lebanese gov- Cease-Fire ernment as its negotiator and would define At a major meeting in Rome at the end victory as the survival of its militia and its of her tour on 7/26, Rice met with Annan, continued determination to resist. Hizbal- Siniora, EU diplomats, and reps. from Egypt, lah’s dep. political chief Mahmud Komati Jordan, and Saudi Arabia to discuss a res- acknowledged (7/25) that Hizballah had not olution to the Lebanon crisis. Rice for the at all expected Israel’s response. first time explicitly laid out the U.S.-Israeli Meanwhile, diplomatic efforts increased demand for a “sustainable cease-fire,” argu- as civilian casualties mounted in Lebanon. ing that an immediate cease-fire (as desired After consulting with special envoys dis- by the other parties) would leave Hizballah patched to the region on 7/13, UN Secy.-Gen. capabilities diminished but not destroyed Annan stepped up (7/20) efforts for UNSC and the Lebanese government weak, allow- endorsement of a package calling for an im- ing Hizballah to rearm and reassert itself mediate cease-fire, the release of the 2 IDF quickly. She argued that what was needed soldiers, and insertion of an international was a “sustainable cease-fire” that would peace-keeping force in s. Lebanon, followed permanently disarm Hizballah, cut its ties by the full implementation of UN Res. 1559. to Iran and Syria, and enhance Lebanese (The U.S. immediately said it would not sovereignty and security control; if assuring contribute troops to an international mis- successful implementation required more sion.) Rice announced (7/21) plans to head time, it was worth allowing the war to con- to the region on 7/24 to meet with Israeli, tinue. Thus, while EU and Arab participants

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:15:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 134 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES called for “urgent work on an immediate Her visit was cut short, however. She arrived cease-fire,” Rice pushed for wording calling in Israel late on 7/29, where Olmert told her on the parties to “work immediately” toward he needed another 10–14 days to continue a cease-fire that would be “lasting, perma- military operations in Lebanon. But later nent, and sustainable.” As a compromise, that very night, the IDF dropped 2 2,000-lb Annan recommended a call for a temporary MK-84 guided missiles on a 3-story residen- “pause” in fighting to allow humanitarian aid tial building in Qana, s. Lebanon, killing to be delivered by an international force that what was originally reported as 57 Lebanese could remain to support the Lebanese army, civilians including 37 children (later, it tran- but Rice rejected this as a half-measure. The spired that the actual figures were at least meeting’s final statement vaguely pledged 28 Lebanese dead, including 16 children, to work toward a cease-fire while urging and 11 missing and presumed dead.) The Israel “to exercise its utmost restraint” and incident, which Israel blamed on Qana resi- promising to provide humanitarian relief dents who had failed to leave the area when to Lebanon. Annan urged that channels be warned to do so, sparked outrage across the opened to Iran and Syria to help end the region, with Siniora quickly informing Rice violence, but Rice disagreed. Participants that she would not be welcome and that agreed that an international force operating Lebanon would not participate in further under UN auspices was needed but failed to diplomatic discussions that did not involve reach understandings on its size, make-up, an immediate cease-fire. Rice, displeased mandate, or exit strategy. Further talks were that the Israelis had not informed her of planned for the coming weeks to flesh out the attack during their morning meetings details on the international force and on 1 on 7/30, leaving her to learn the news from or 2 UN resolutions to resolve the crisis. an aide who interrupted her meeting with As in the case of the G8 summit, Bush DM Peretz, immediately announced plans to and Blair immediately pressed their inter- return to Washington on 7/31. pretation of the meeting’s understandings, Before leaving, however, Rice obtained announcing plans (7/28) to work toward a (7/30) Israel’s grudging agreement to a UN res. that would call for a halt of fighting 48-hour partial suspension of air strikes conditioned on a broader political agree- on s. Lebanon, including a 24-hour window ment involving disarming Hizballah, with for relief agencies to transport humanitarian the aim of ultimately shifting the balance of goods and help civilians to safety, though it power in the region. Bush reiterated that warned that it would resume strikes if it de- the crisis posed a brief “moment of oppor- tected an “imminent launch” of Hizballah tunity . . . for broader change in the region.” rockets. It also declared that ground opera- The Lebanese cabinet countered (7/28) by tions would continue in the south, as would issuing a statement, endorsed by Hizballah, air and artillery strikes n. of the Litani. Mean- calling for an immediate cease-fire followed while, Annan called (7/30) a UNSC session by a prisoner exchange and reinforcement in response to the Qana strike, and while of UN troops along the Israel-Lebanon bor- the resulting statement expressed “extreme der. The same day, the UN called for an shock” over the incident, at U.S. insistence immediate 3-day truce to evacuate Lebanese there was no call for an immediate cease-fire. civilians still trapped in s. Lebanon and to Several days earlier, on 7/27, already con- deliver food and medical aid. (The Lebanese cerned about the possibility that interna- government was warning that the country tional intervention could force an abrupt had only a few days of fuel supply remaining halt to its military campaign, Israel’s secu- and that once it ran out, provision of nor- rity cabinet authorized the IDF to call up 3 mal health care and relief aid would cease.) divisions of reservists (15,000–30,000 units) Israel dismissed (7/29) the truce as “unnec- to press a ground offensive in s. Lebanon. essary” but began (7/29) allowing a handful On 7/30, immediately after the Qana strike, of planes and ships carrying relief supplies the IDF began expanding ground opera- to enter Lebanon. The IDF also allowed aid tions near Taybeh and n. of the Israeli convoys to travel by land if they requested town of Metula. Hizballah had similarly pre-approval on a case-by-case basis, but fre- stepped up its attacks, for the first time fir- quently denied them permission because of ing (7/28) 2 Khaybar-1 rockets, with a range ongoing operations. of up to 50 mi and payload up to 200 lbs, In a surprise move, Bush sent Rice back striking Afula, 30 mi inside Israel, just n. to the region almost immediately, where she of the West Bank, causing no damage or was to visit first Israel and then Lebanon. injuries.

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:15:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions QUARTERLY UPDATE ON CONFLICT AND DIPLOMACY 135

The 48-hour partial suspension of air its ability to coordinate large, synchronized strikes took effect at 2:00 A.M. local time strikes had not been diminished since the on 7/31. Hours later, the Israeli cabinet start of the war. At the same time, he offered approved yet another major escalation, to halt rocket attacks altogether if Israel pledging that combat would not cease until stopped targeting Lebanese cities, villages, an international force was deployed to dis- civilians, and infrastructure, but warned arm Hizballah and to monitor the Lebanon- that if the IDF expanded attacks on Beirut, Syria border to prevent its resupply. That Hizballah would target Tel Aviv. same day (7/31) Olmert defiantly declared The IDF steadily expanded ground op- that “there is no cease-fire and there will erations through 8/4, engaging Hizballah in be no cease-fire,” while IDF Northern Com- heavy clashes in some 20 villages and towns mand spokesman Maj. Siva Golan clarified in s. Lebanon, mostly concentrated within that “on the ground, it’s not a cease-fire at all, 2–4 mi of the border, reportedly with the just a limitation of planes shooting toward aim of creating a free-fire zone cleared of buildings and villages.” During the day, the Hizballah that could eventually be up to IDF launched air strikes in support of ground 10-mi deep. Air strikes also escalated, partic- troops in Taybeh, on targets in Bint Jubayl ularly in s. Beirut but also for the first time and near the Syrian border, and at a Lebanese hitting bridges and roads in Christian areas army jeep near Tyre, killing 1 Lebanese sol- n. of the capital to cut transportation routes dier and wounding 3. Relief agencies re- to Syria. ported that the IDF was still significantly Meanwhile, France and the U.S. had been hampering the transportation of aid despite leading UN talks to narrow differences be- the 24-hour relief window, though Lebanese tween the “immediate” versus “sustainable” rescue workers were able to begin combing cease-fire calls. On 8/5, they announced bombed-out areas for dead and wounded. On agreement on a draft res. that would call 8/1, the IDF sent up to 7,000 troops (6 com- for a “full cessation of hostilities” in place bat brigades) into villages stretching from (i.e., with some 10,000 Israeli troops in- Ayta al-Sha‘b near the center of the border side Lebanon), with Hizballah required to region, east to Bint Jubayl and Maroun al-Ras, stop “all attacks” and Israel required to halt and north to Taybeh and Kafr Kila, where only “offensive military operations.” There the Litani approaches the Israeli border, were no provisions for a prisoner exchange. bringing the estimated IDF force strength in- Instead, the res. would cite the “urgent” side Lebanon to around 10,000 troops, with need for the “unconditional” release of the as many as another 8,000 troops on the n. 2 IDF soldiers, while noting that the UN Israel border for rotation. Observers on the was “mindful” of the sensitivity of the is- n. Israel border reported (see Washington sue of Lebanese political prisoners in Israeli Post 8/2) that “areas where no troops were jails and encouraged that their “status” be seen less that a week ago [have become] resolved. The draft also proposed that af- teeming military camps, with buses regu- ter Israel and Hizballah agreed to the terms larly dropping off new arrivals.” Hizballah of a cease-fire, to be outlined in a second meanwhile fired (7/31) 3–4 mortars into res., Hizballah and the IDF would withdraw Kiryat Shimona on 7/31 and fired 8 rockets from a buffer zone in s. Lebanon that would and 4 mortars into Nahariya on 8/1. be taken over by a 10,000-member interna- When the partial suspension was lifted on tional force. Separately, the UN would be 8/2, Hizballah immediately and dramatically tasked with determining the borders in the escalated rocket fire to its highest level since Shaba‘ Farms area. the start of the conflict, firing some 230 Neither Lebanon nor Israel endorsed the rockets into Israel (including a 3d Khaybar-1 proposal. After 4 hours of debate on 8/5, the that struck just outside Jenin, 43 mi inside Lebanese cabinet, including its Hizballah the border, causing no damage or injuries). members, said it could not approve a draft Over the succeeding days, rocket firings that called for Hizballah to abide by a truce averaged 150–200, hitting Hadera (50 mi with IDF forces still in Lebanon, with Hizbal- from the border) on 8/4, marking its deepest lah arguing that this would cede its legitimate strike into Israel. Nasrallah stated (8/3) that right to resist occupation under international Hizballah’s purpose in observing the 48-hour law. While Israel did not comment on the suspension and then ramping up rocket draft as a whole, Israeli officials said (8/5) strikes was threefold: to prove that, unlike that allowing IDF troops to stay in Lebanon Israel, it was able and willing to observe was a crucial condition for its approval of a cease-fire; to match the IDF escalations a plan. Though the U.S. pushed (8/6) for a step for step; and to prove to the world that quick vote on the draft to “see who’s for

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:15:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 136 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES peace and who isn’t,” the UN was unwilling in the highest casualty rates to date for the to press a draft that could deepen splits IDF.Hizballah also continued rocket fire into within the fragile Lebanese government. n. Israel at a rate of c. 150/day. Meanwhile, France and the U.S. con- The Race to a Truce tinued tough negotiations on a UN draft, Over the next several days, the Lebanese with France endorsing and the U.S. rejecting cabinet, including Hizballah reps., unan- Lebanon’s amendments and the U.S. warn- imously approved (8/7) its own proposed ing on 8/9 that if no deal were reached amendments to the French-U.S. draft res. that within 24 hours, “then you’re looking at included an offer to deploy 15,000 Lebanese a major Israeli ground invasion.” In a final army troops to s. Lebanon to augment the push that stretched overnight on 8/10–11, UNIFIL forces and a staged plan involving an France and the U.S. both moderated their immediate cease-fire, UNIFIL deployment in stands and agreed on a new draft, which all areas where Israeli troops were operating they passed to Israel and Lebanon and sent (including Shaba‘ Farms), and UNIFIL trans- to the UNSC for an immediate vote. On 8/11 fer of those areas (minus the Shaba‘ Farms) (after Olmert had seen the draft), the IDF be- to the Lebanese army within 72 hours. The gan moving additional troops and armor into U.S. rejected (8/7) the proposal, the Arab Lebanon. League backed it (8/8), and Israel stated Late in the evening on 8/11, the UNSC (8/8) that the offer of Lebanese troops was unanimously approved Res. 1701 calling for worth consideration. a truce to go into effect as of 8:00 A.M.on Meanwhile, Olmert’s security cabinet 8/14 (see Doc. A2). The final res.’s main agreed (8/7) to speed up the IDF’s advance difference from the 8/5 draft was its adop- to the Litani and to increase attacks on tion of a modified version of Lebanon’s Lebanon’s civilian infrastructure to pressure call for a staged IDF withdrawal, calling for Lebanon to accept a cease-fire proposal ac- Israel to pull out of s. Lebanon “in parallel” ceptable to Tel Aviv. After destroying (8/7) with the deployment of 15,000 Lebanese the last remaining bridge across the Litani, army troops “support[ed]” by 15,000 inter- the IDF announced (8/7) that any vehicu- national troops (an expanded UNIFIL) to lar traffic s. of the river would henceforth prevent arms smuggling to Hizballah and be considered Hizballah activity and a le- create a zone free of Israeli and Hizballah gitimate target. Signaling a pending major forces. The international contingent, autho- assault, Israel effectively ordered an evac- rized through 8/31/07, would be allowed uation of n. Israel, announcing (8/8) that to take “all necessary actions” to secure the it would fund a 5-day “respite” in s. Israel southern zone, but the parameters for using for 15,000 residents remaining in Kiryat force were vague. Similarly, while the text Shimona (the n. Israeli town most heavily reiterated UN Res. 1559’s call for disarming targeted by Hizballah rocket fire) and other all militias, specifics on disarming Hizballah northern areas, bussing them there within were apparently left to an anticipated sec- the next 24-hours and housing them in ho- ond res. on a political settlement. Crucially, tels or on military bases. the res. still called for a “halt in place” and With its security cabinet on 8/9 ordering demanded that Hizballah cease all actions the IDF to “expel [Hizballah] from southern while Israel cease only offensive actions. Lebanon” and eliminate its rocket-launching Though Rice said (8/11) that “no one can capabilities, the IDF moved another 1,000 expect an immediate end to all acts of vio- troops into s. Lebanon and began (8/9) re- lence,” the U.S. did specify expectations that inforcing troops on the n. Israel border. On the IDF would not “move any further north” 8/10, it dropped leaflets on Beirut, warn- but would “stop where they [are]” and that ing residents to expect massive bombing “the large-scale bombing [would] stop.” Sep- and ordering residents of Burj al-Barajneh, arately, Rice announced (8/11) that the U.S. Hay Sullum, and al-Shoah neighborhoods to would increase its humanitarian funding to evacuate immediately, and on n. Lebanon, Lebanon from $30 m. to $50 m. warning truck drivers to stay off roads to Hizballah and the Lebanese government Syria. Israel also asked (8/10) the U.S. to endorsed UN Res. 1701 on 8/12, though speed delivery of M-26 artillery shells (short- Nasrallah said Hizballah would maintain its range antipersonnel rockets armed with “natural right to resist” in keeping with in- cluster munitions) along with other unspec- ternational law as long as IDF troops “are ified weapons. Meanwhile, daily IDF air and practicing an occupation and acts of aggres- artillery strikes across Lebanon and ground sion” inside Lebanon. The Israeli cabinet operations in the south continued, resulting approved (24–0, with 1 abstention) the res.

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:15:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions QUARTERLY UPDATE ON CONFLICT AND DIPLOMACY 137 on 8/13, but separately DM Peretz warned ready supplied by Iran) to the task. On the that “there is no situation in which Hizbal- ground, Hizballah officials in s. Lebanon and lah fires at [Israeli] forces that we will not s. Beirut took charge of clean-up efforts, retaliate” against. with Lebanese civil defense teams and army In the two days before the truce took ef- units often operating under their direction. fect, the IDF sent in additional troops and Hizballah teams also began recording and artillery and rapidly expanded ground offen- assessing damage to personal property and sives in the south to secure control of as infrastructure, with the aim of executing a much land as possible by the deadline, re- long-term reconstruction effort, expected to sulting in heavy clashes. It also intensified take 2–3 years. air strikes, particularly on s. Beirut. On 8/12, In terms of UN Res. 1701 implementa- Halutz stated that Israel had tripled its forces tion, Hizballah and the Lebanese government in Lebanon in the previous 2 days, which held (8/15) a day of talks on the army’s de- would place the number of IDF soldiers in- ployment to the south and the withdrawal side Lebanon at around 30,000 (though some of Hizballah fighters and their weapons to U.S. military experts placed the number sig- the north, without reaching an agreement. nificantly lower at ca. 10,000). In response, (Hizballah expressed willingness to with- Hizballah escalated its rocket fire, sending draw its core fighters and heavy equipment as many as 250 rockets into n. Israel on 8/13 north if the army pledged not to probe too (the most in 1 day to date), mostly targeting carefully for underground arms caches and Haifa, killing 1 Israeli. bunkers, while the government insisted that Israeli air strikes and Hizballah rocket it would not deploy the army until all of strikes continued overnight on 8/13–14, but Hizballah’s missiles, rockets, and arms were minutes before the 8:00 A.M. deadline both taken n. of the Litani.) The IDF met with sides went quiet. Over the next 2 days, the UNIFIL chiefs at the UNIFIL headquarters UN reported no violations of the truce, de- in Naqura on 8/14 to discuss the mechan- spite Hizballah and the IDF being in close ics of the phased withdrawal and prevention proximity in many areas. Hizballah held its of further exchanges of fire. The UN began fire, whereas the IDF fired on groups of talks on the mandate and make-up of the Hizballah members in 8 incidents it claimed expanded UNIFIL, holding (8/13–14) brief- were defensive (and therefore permitted un- ings with the military attaches of interested der UN Res. 1701), killing at least 8 Hizballah countries. Sweden announced (8/15) plans members. The IDF also vowed to maintain its to host a donor conference for Lebanon on air and sea blockade on Lebanon, continued 8/31 to raise funds for humanitarian needs to fly drones over s. Lebanon, and dropped and reconstruction. The UN reported (8/15) leaflets around the country blaming Hizbal- that $81 m. had already been committed lah for the devastation and warning that the to its $165 m. emergency appeal fund for IDF would “return and utilize the necessary Lebanon. force against every terrorist act launched from Lebanon which affects the State of Operation Change of Direction’s Toll Israel.” While UNIFIL noted no significant At the close of the quarter, it was still Israeli withdrawals across the Blue Line, the far too early to give a final assessment of IDF did pull out several hundred reservists the magnitude of the war’s devastation in and tanks to positions just inside n. Israel. either Lebanon or Israel; estimates varied As soon as the truce took effect, 10,000s significantly, even from the same source, but of Lebanese began returning to their homes are useful in conveying a general sense of to assess the damage (at least 5 civilians proportionality. were killed by unexploded IDF ordnance, In Lebanon, an estimated 1,200 civil- heralding one of the many hurdles to recon- ians (a third of them children) and 100–400 struction to come), and 10,000s of others be- Hizballah fighters and army troops had been gan returning from Syria. (Few Israelis who killed, some 4,000 civilians wounded, and fled n. Israel went home by 8/15.) In a tele- nearly 1 m. displaced. At least 15,000 resi- vised address, Nasrallah promised (8/14) that dences had been destroyed (including 80% Hizballah would provide funds to rebuild, of homes in Ghanduriyya and Taybeh, 50% including pledging money for 1-year’s rent in Markaba and Qantara, 40% in Bint Jubayl, and furniture to each family whose home and 30% in Mays al-Jabal, plus entire neigh- was made unlivable. On 8/15, Hizballah be- borhoods of s. Beirut as mentioned above) gan disbursing financial aid to displaced and 30,000 damaged beyond repair. Almost families, reportedly allocating $150 m. (al- all primary roads and bridges had been

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:15:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 138 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES destroyed, while wells, water mains, pump- during the campaign, prompting 100s if not ing stations, sewage treatment plants, 1,000s of Lebanese unable to flee north to electrical facilities, power plants, gas sta- seek shelter in Palestinian refugee camps tions, and ports had been deliberately in s. Lebanon. In total, the IDF reportedly targeted and extensively damaged. Strikes struck only 1 Palestinian guerrilla base s. of on the Jiyeh oil terminal caused a massive Beirut on 7/13, the home of a Hamas offi- oil slick that approached the proportions cial in s. Beirut on 7/15, 2 Popular Front for of the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill by the end the Liberation of Palestine–General Com- of the quarter. Losses were estimated at mand (PFLP-GC) bases in the Biqa‘ Valley on $2.5 b.–$3.6 b. for infrastructure, $2 b. for 7/19, targets on the outskirts of a Palestinian housing, and $2 b. for lost tourism, with camp s. of Tyre on 8/5, and the home of an reconstruction thought to take anywhere alleged Hizballah member in ‘Ayn al-Hilwa from 2 to 7 years. camp on 8/9. In Israel, 43 civilians (including 18 Israeli Palestinians) and 117 IDF soldiers had been Fallout in Israel killed. Statistics for civilians injured ranged By the end of the quarter, the Israeli from 850 to 5,000, with the lower figure military and government had come under likely representing actual cases of shrapnel increasingly heavy criticism by residents of wounds, etc. and the higher including cases n. Israel (complaints of lack of prepared- of shock. No statistics for wounded soldiers ness to protect them, rundown state of were available. The Israeli government put bomb shelters, etc.), reservists (severe sup- the figure of residences destroyed at 12,000, ply shortages, inadequate refresher training, but observers found the figure highly ques- poor command), and the public at large (re- tionable since Hizballah was estimated by peated downscaling of the war’s goals; the the IDF to have fired fewer than 4,000 rock- IDF’s inability to defeat Hizballah quickly and ets. Economic losses were estimated at $1 b. decisively). The first public acknowledge- for lost tourism and $2.3 b. representing the ment of the military’s failings came on 8/8, cost of conducting the war. No estimates when IDF Chief of Staff Halutz appointed were advanced for damage to personal prop- his deputy, Maj. Gen. Moshe Kaplinsky, as erty or the environmental cost of extensive his personal rep. to supervise the Lebanon brush fires caused by Hizballah rockets. offensive, overseeing the head of the North- The IDF reported (8/16) that the air force ern Command and commander of ground had made more than 15,500 combat sor- operations in Lebanon, Maj. Gen. Udi Adam, ties against 7,000 targets in Lebanon, while effectively firing him. After the truce was in the navy hit an additional 2,500 targets. The place, Olmert addressed (8/14) the Knesset number of IDF artillery shells fired was in and acknowledged that mistakes had been the 10,000s (the IDF reported having fired made, while DM Peretz promised (8/14) a more than 20,000 shells as of 7/23). In the “deep and wide investigation on all that oc- last few days of the offensive, the IDF re- curred before the war erupted and through portedly dramatically escalated its use of its duration.” cluster munitions on civilian areas of the south, raising concerns for Lebanese return- Hizballah’s Motivation ing their homes. The IDF also reportedly At the end of the quarter, a number of captured and brought back to Israel several explanations were circulating concerning dozen alleged Hizballah members as well as Hizballah’s motives in staging the 7/12 at- dozens of bodies of Hizballah fighters killed tack. Some analysts argued that Hizballah’s in combat. highly compartmentalized, autonomous cell Hizballah destroyed at least 20 IDF structure, the lack of fallout from previous in- tanks, 1 naval vessel, and at least 1 heli- cidents in which soldiers has been captured, copter. By 7/26, sources in Lebanon re- and standing orders to seize soldiers when ported that Lebanese security forces work- possible as bargaining chips pointed to an ing with Hizballah had detained more than act of opportunity. Many U.S. commentaries 80 Lebanese (at least 36 of them former accused Iran of ordering the kidnapping to members of Israel’s proxy militia, the South deflect attention from the mounting conflict Lebanon Army) suspected of spying for over its nuclear weapons program (see Iran Israel in s. Beirut, s. Lebanon, and the Biqa‘ section below), though U.S. admin. officials Valley. and intelligence analysts stated (ca. 8/4) that Of special note: The IDF overwhelm- there was no evidence of coordination be- ingly refrained from targeting Palestinians tween Iran and Hizballah either in staging

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:15:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions QUARTERLY UPDATE ON CONFLICT AND DIPLOMACY 139 the attack or during the war itself. The inci- special envoy Terje Larsen (and reportedly dent’s timing during the IDF assault on Gaza discussed with Syrian pres. Asad) to recog- led some to suggest a desire to relieve the be- nize Lebanese ownership of the disputed sieged Palestinians, particularly Hamas, but Shaba‘ Farms region in exchange for dis- while Nasrallah made statements of support armament of Hizballah and the Palestinian for the Palestinians, Hizballah’s demands re- factions. Under the 4-stage plan, Syria would mained focused on Lebanon: the release of legally forgo Shaba‘ Farms and formally ac- 4 Lebanese still in Israeli custody; an imme- knowledge it as Lebanese territory; Lebanon diate cease-fire and withdrawal of IDF forces would deploy its army to the Israeli border; from Lebanon, including from Shaba‘ Farms; Israel would withdraw from Shaba‘ Farms and provision of maps showing locations of and halt overflights of Lebanon; and Siniora IDF landmines placed in s. Lebanon before would formally announce the end of oc- the 5/00 pullout. cupation and order the disarmament of all A more complex explanation linked militias in Lebanon, including the Palestinian Hizballah’s action to domestic Lebanese factions and Hizballah. Despite discussions, politics, particularly to the national recon- Israeli defense establishment reportedly still ciliation talks that opened last quarter (see believed the chances for implementation of Quarterly Update in JPS 140) and which by such a plan, particularly of Syria’s agreement, early 7/06 had become focused on disarm- were low. ing Hizballah under UN Res. 1559. Under On 5/26 in Sidon, senior Palestinian this explanation, Hizballah staged the kid- Islamic Jihad official Mahmud Majzub and napping to relieve pressure on itself and to his brother were assassinated by a car bomb. remind the Lebanese of its importance as a Israel denied responsibility, but on 6/13, the resistance force, believing Lebanese back- Lebanese government reported that it had lash would be minimal thanks to a recent broken up a Mossad spy ring led by Lebanese alliance with Christian leader Michel Aoun Mahmud Rafah, who had confessed to being and the backing of pro-Syrian pres. Emile a Mossad operative since 1994 and to staging Lahoud, who also controlled senior military several assassinations including that of the echelons. In all cases, Hizballah assumed, Majzub brothers, Hizballah’s Ali Hasan Dib as Komati stated on 7/25, that Israel’s retal- in 1999 and Ali Salih in 2003, and Jihad Jib- iation would be limited, of a magnitude it ril (son of PFLP-GC leader Ahmed Jibril) in could absorb. 2002. Israel did not comment on the Mossad spy ring accusations. On 6/18, an Israeli Other Events of the Quarter military court in Tel Aviv sentenced Israeli A number of events that took place prior Arab army officer Lt. Col. Omar el-Heib to to the war should be signaled. On 6/10, 15 years in prison on charges of passing clas- Serge Brammertz, head of the UN team inves- sified information to Hizballah. Heib denied tigating the 2/14/05 assassination of former the charges and appealed. Lebanese PM Rafiq Hariri, issued a periodic Two days after the Majzub killings, report, saying that his team had made signifi- unidentified militants in s. Lebanon (thought cant progress in the investigation and asking to be Hizballah mbrs. retaliating on behalf the UN to extend his mandate and to allow of Islamic Jihad for the 5/26 assassination) him more time to investigate 14 other po- fired Katyusha rockets across the border at litical bombings and assassinations over the an IDF post, seriously injuring 1 soldier. The past two years. Brammertz said that Syria’s IDF inexplicably carried out air strikes on 2 cooperation had been “satisfactory,” that his PFLP-GC command posts, a weapons depot interviews with Syrian pres. Asad and VP near the Syrian border in the Biqa‘ Valley Faruq al-Shara‘ provided useful information, and on targets in s. Beirut, killing 1 PFLP-GC and that the team was now considering not member, wounding at least 5. The IDF ac- only possible involvement of the Syrian gov- tion triggered Hizballah mortar and rocket ernment and corrupt Lebanese officials but fire on at least 10 IDF outposts along the n. of other extremists. The UNSC voted (6/15) Israel border, wounding 1 IDF solider; the to allow Brammertz’s investigation to con- IDF responded with artillery and air strikes tinue for another year and to broaden its on Hizballah targets in s. Lebanon, killing at scope as requested. least 1 Hizballah member and wounding 2 As of late 5/06, Israeli defense officials civilians. Hizballah fired more rockets into had reportedly started promoting within n. Israel, causing no damage or injuries, be- their government a long-standing plan pro- fore UNIFIL brokered a cease-fire late in the posed by Lebanese PM Fuad Siniora and UN day.

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:15:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 140 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES

SYRIA Jordan led the camp lobbying to denounce the 6/25 Palestinian raid and to call for The U.S. and Israel turned up the diplo- Shalit’s release, while Syria led the camp that matic pressure on Syria this quarter by refused to do either, believing the 6/25 raid repeatedly holding it responsible, because of on a military target constituted legitimate its support for Hamas and Hizballah, for the resistance. capture of 3 IDF soldiers in the Palestinian Only after the Lebanon war began did and Hizballah cross-border attacks on 6/25 FMs agree to hold an emergency session to and 7/12 respectively. Israel’s above-noted discuss both Gaza and Lebanon. In the 7/15 buzzing (6/28–29) of the Syrian border and closed-door session, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, overflying Pres. Asad’s palace in Latakia was Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and a clear message after the Palestinian inci- the Palestinian rep. reportedly condemned dent. While the U.S.-Israeli tone suggested Hizballah for its “unexpected, inappropri- that Syria could become a target for retali- ate, and irresponsible acts,” while Syria sup- ation (political, economic, or military) if it ported Hizballah’s targeting of the IDF on did not break its ties to Hamas and Hizbal- 7/12 as legitimate resistance under inter- lah, some analysts noted (see New York national law and the UN charter. The final Times 7/26) that since Syria had been forced statement released condemned Israel’s ac- out of Lebanon under UN Res. 1559, it had tions, expressed solidarity with the Lebanese significantly less control over Hizballah or government, called for an immediate cease- ability to control what was happening in fire in Lebanon, denounced U.S. actions Lebanon. in the UN to block measures denouncing Several reports this quarter indicated Israeli aggression against the Palestinians, that in an effort to assuage the U.S., Syria and agreed to appeal to the UNSC to inter- had responded favorably to diplomatic mis- vene. Separately, Saudi Arabia issued (7/14) a sions (mid- and late 6/06) by Egypt, Saudi statement blaming Hizballah for the situation Arabia, and Abbas adviser Ahmad Qurai‘ in Lebanon, stating that “a distinction must (made at the U.S.’s behest) encouraging Dam- be made between legitimate resistance and ascus to press Hamas formally to accept the uncalculated adventures taken by elements 2002 Arab League initiative as a step toward inside Lebanon and those behind them with- recognition of Israel and to press Hamas out recourse to the legal authorities or con- leader Mishal to order the release of cap- sulting and coordinating with Arab nations.” tured IDF Cpl. Shalit. Nothing resulted from The statement added that “these elements whatever (if any) efforts Syria made. should bear the responsibility for their ir- On 5/17, before the upswing in violence, responsible actions, and they alone should the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed (13– end the crisis they have created.” 0, with China, Russia abstaining) res. 1680 As the Lebanon conflict escalated, Arab urging Syria to set its border and establish populations in many states increasingly diplomatic relations with Lebanon and call- demonstrated in support of Hizballah and ing on “Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias” against their own governments’ inaction to disarm. Syria denounced (5/17) the res. and implicit acquiescence in U.S. policy. as interference in its internal affairs and un- Widespread popular strikes began as early as justified political pressure. China and Russia 7/14 in Bahrain but escalated dramatically af- said (5/17) that they abstained because the ter the 7/30 Israeli attack on the UNIFIL base res. addressed a purely bilateral affair and in Qana, spreading beyond the occupied ter- did not encourage states to negotiate their ritories, Egypt, and Jordan to such U.S. allies differences through the UN. as Iraq, Kuwait, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia. Of note: massive protests were held (7/31, REGIONAL AFFAIRS 8/4) in Baghdad, with senior political fig- ures, including Pres. Jalal Talabani, PM Nuri Once again this quarter, the Arab states al-Maliki, VP ‘Adil ‘Abd al-Mahdi, Grand Aya- were unable to form a united position on the tollah Ali al-Sistani, and Shi‘i cleric Muqtada important issues at hand. On 7/4, nearly a al-Sadr, attending or making statements in week after Operation Summer Rains began, support of Hizballah. By late 7/06, the do- the Arab League dropped efforts to hold mestic tensions had prompted many nations an emergency session to discuss the Gaza that initially denounced Hizballah to moder- situation after failing to achieve consensus ate, if not halt, their criticism. By late 7/06, among members that could be translated Egypt was working for a cease-fire, Jordan into an Arab League statement. Egypt and was condemning “Israeli aggression,” and

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:15:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions QUARTERLY UPDATE ON CONFLICT AND DIPLOMACY 141

Saudi Arabia was warning that the ongoing Jordan agreed (6/21) to a PA request to sup- violence might jeopardize Arab support of ply Jericho with electricity by linking up to the 2002 Arab League initiative for compro- the East Jerusalem Electricity Company, eas- mise with Israel. When Rice made her tour ing the West Bank’s dependence on Israel of the region 7/24–26, Egypt and Saudi Ara- for electricity. Neither side had approached bia agreed to send reps. to meet with her Israel regarding logistics. in Europe, but declined (as did Jordan; see Also of note: On the sidelines of the above) to host her in their country, fearing WEF meetings in Egypt, Israel’s Tourism M domestic repercussions absent a call for an Yitzhak Herzog met (5/20) with his counter- immediate cease-fire. Similarly, during con- parts from Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, and sultations with Rice before her trip, Saudi FM Turkey. Prince Saud al-Faisal and former amb. to the U.S. and current National Security Council INTERNATIONAL head Prince Bandar Bin Sultan urged (7/23) Bush, Rice, and VP Dick Cheney to sup- UNITED STATES port an immediate cease-fire, warning that it was difficult to continue supporting the This quarter was characterized by the U.S. posture without appearing to be a U.S. Bush admin.’s virtually total alignment with proxy. They also delivered a letter from King Israel on its military offensives in Gaza and Abdallah with a similar message. Saudi Ara- Lebanon, in keeping with the shared U.S.- bia also pledged (7/25) $1.5 b. toward the Israeli view that the two conflicts provided reconstruction of Lebanon, in part to offset unique opportunities to eliminate Hamas domestic discontent. and Hizballah and advance U.S.-Israeli agen- Arab states also continued to try to get das for the greater Middle East. By the end of financial aid to the PA despite U.S.-led sanc- the quarter, however, Washington’s all-out tions. The PA and Arab League confirmed support for Israel combined with Israel’s (7/4) that $50 m. from the Arab League and failure to achieve its objectives in Palestine $50 m. from Saudi Arabia had been trans- and Lebanon had exacerbated tensions with ferred to an account controlled by Abbas, allies and hostility to the U.S. worldwide, marking the first funds to reach the PA since with possible repercussions for other long- sanctions were imposed. Kuwait transferred term U.S. policy goals (e.g., on Iran’s nuclear another $45 m. to Abbas controlled accounts program, Iraq, and “democratization”). by 7/19. The PA used all the funds to pay Encapsulating the message repeated overdue civil servants’ salaries. In addition, throughout the quarter was Bush’s weekly the Arab League sent (ca. 7/1) $15 m. to radio address of 7/29, where he stated: “This Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and to PLO moment of conflict in the Middle East is reps. at Palestinian embassies worldwide. painful and tragic. Yet it is also a moment The OPEC Fund for International De- of opportunity for broader change in the velopment (OFID) approved (6/13) $15 m. region.” Lebanon, he said, was only “the lat- for its Special Grant Account for Palestine, est flashpoint in a broader struggle between which is used to fund education, health, freedom and terror that is unfolding cross and infrastructure rehabilitation projects in the region,” and “the only way to secure our the occupied territories, adding to $40 m. nation is to change the course of the Middle already in the fund. OFID also announced East—by fighting the ideology of terror and (6/19) $3 m. in grants to support educa- spreading the hope of freedom” by support- tion, health, and social welfare projects ing democratic forces in Lebanon, Palestine, in the West Bank. There was no word on and Iraq and by defeating “terrorists, insur- how the money would be transferred to the gents, and illegal militias,” such as Hamas, Palestinians. Hizballah, Iran, al-Qa‘ida, and Syria. PA Undersecy. for Energy and Electricity Despite warnings by key Arab allies that Sulayman Abu Samhadana held (6/18–19) the U.S. pro-Israel policy was causing detri- talks in Cairo with Egyptian officials on mental strains in the region (as early as 5/17, implementing a plan, recently approved by Saudi FM Prince Saud, preparing for a meet- Egypt, for an electricity plant in Egypt to sup- ing with Rice, told American reporters that ply cheaper power to Gaza; electricity from the U.S. policy to isolate Hamas was based the Egyptian plant was estimated to cost 44% on “twisted logic” and would only radicalize of that currently purchased from Israel. The the Palestinians against the peace process), Kuwait Development Fund agreed to pay the Bush admin. failed to take them seriously. the $15 m. construction costs. Meanwhile, U.S. officials speaking off the record stated

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:15:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 142 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES

(7/15) that Bush believed that “whatever the Other “dissenting voices” included Rep. outrage on the Arab streets,”the Israeli offen- James P. Moran (D-VA), who warned (7/18) sives had “strong behind-the-scenes support that unquestioning political support could among key Arab leaders . . . with a tacit agree- be dangerous for Israel because Israeli offi- ment that the timing is right to strike.” cials “know they can only go so far as the United States backs them” and unwaver- Government Action and Legislation ing support “can encourage their leadership As the midterm election campaigns to overreach and create a situation that heated up this quarter, members of Congress becomes more problematic.” Rep. Sheila were quick to take strong legislative action Jackson-Lee (D-TX) presented (7/25) a draft in favor of Israel, occasionally placing them res. (H. Res. 945) expressing “deep concern at odds with the White House. On 5/23, for the ongoing violence in the Middle East,” the House approved (361–37, with 9 vot- especially in Lebanon, and calling for an ing present) the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism immediate cease-fire, an immediate halt to Act of 2006 (H. R. 4681; see Quarterly Up- targeting of civilian infrastructure, provision date in JPS 140), which would officially of humanitarian aid, and a comprehensive designate Palestinian territory as a “terror- and just solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. ist sanctuary,” impose greater restrictions on At the end of the quarter the draft had been aid, deny visas to Palestinian officials, reduce referred to the House Comm. on Interna- U.S. dues payments to the UN by the amount tional Relations. After Israel’s 7/30 attack of UN support to the Palestinians, and limit on UNIFIL’s base at Qana, Sen. Chuck Hagel the president’s authority to waive the bans. (R-NE) issued the first strong criticism from The White House protested (5/23) that the the Senate of Bush’s handling of Lebanon, bill “unnecessarily constrains” the presi- stating that “President Bush must call for dent’s action. Olmert’s speech to Congress an immediate cease-fire. This madness must on 5/24, praising the House passage of the stop.” measure and warning that Israel “cannot After Iraqi PM Nuri al-Maliki denounced wait forever” for the Palestinians to become (7/19) Israel’s massive bombing of Lebanon, acceptable negotiating partners, was inter- U.S. Senate Democrats threatened (7/24) rupted by 16 standing ovations. On 6/23, to boycott his scheduled 7/26 address to the Senate adopted its version of the act Congress, saying he must clarify his remarks, (S. 2370), which has 90 cosponsors, by con- condemn Hizballah, and tell the American sensus. The Senate and House versions must people “which side is he on when it comes now be reconciled. to the war on terror.” Senate Democratic Within days of the start of the Lebanon leader Harry Reid and several other senators war, the Senate unanimously approved sent (7/24) a letter to Maliki stating, “Your (7/18) S. Res. 534 “condemning Hezbol- failure to condemn Hezbollah’s aggression lah and Hamas and their state sponsors and and recognize Israel’s right to defend itself supporting Israel’s exercise of its right to raise serious questions about whether Iraq, self-defense” and urging Bush to “continue under your leadership, can play a construc- fully supporting Israel as Israel exercises its tive role in resolving the current crisis and right to self-defense in Lebanon and Gaza” bringing stability to the Middle East.” and to implement sanctions on Iran and On 6/9, the House approved (374–34) Syria. On 7/20, the House passed (410–8, $2.46 b. in aid to Israel for FY 2007—$2.34 b. with 4 present and not voting) a compan- in military aid and $120 m. in economic ion version (H. Res. 921) affirming “steadfast aid, plus another $40 m. for immigrant ab- support” for Israel’s actions in Lebanon. Ef- sorption. The figures were unanimously ap- forts by 4 lawmakers of Lebanese descent proved by the Senate Appropriations Comm. (Darrell Issa [R-CA], Nick Rahall [D-WV], Ray on 6/29 and sent with the rest of the foreign LaHood [R-IL], Charles Boustany [R-LA]) to aid bill to the full Senate for consideration. add wording quoting Rice’s call for restraint A bipartisan group of 13 representatives against civilian targets were rejected, even led by Reps. Michael McCaul (R-TX) and though the 4 approved the language sup- Joseph Crowley (D-NY) began (6/6) circulat- porting Israel’s “right to self-defense” and ing a draft res. “condemning the persecution placing blame for the crisis solely on Hamas, of Palestinian Christians by the Palestinian Hizballah, Iran, Syria, and elements of the Authority.” The drafters acknowledged that Lebanese government. Instead the measure the text was written by controversial Israeli recognized “Israel’s longstanding commit- researcher Justus Reid Weiner for a Likudnik ment to minimizing civilian loss.” center based in Jerusalem and that neither

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:15:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions QUARTERLY UPDATE ON CONFLICT AND DIPLOMACY 143 the Palestinian Christian community nor any charges of conspiring to pass classified na- major religious bodies in the West that have tional security information to journalists and ties to Israel/Palestine had been consulted. to Israel (see Quarterly Update in JPS 140). The res. was quickly denounced by Pales- They are the first nongovernment officials tinian Christians and the Catholic, Protes- to be charged under the act with verbally re- tant, and Orthodox leaderships in the U.S., ceiving and passing classified material. The prompting McCaul and Crowley to shelve trial has been delayed several times because (by 7/3) the measure, which reportedly had of the massive amount of classified informa- secured 21 cosponsors. tion involved; no date had been set by the end of the quarter. The Pro-Israel Lobby The 19-year-old LA-8 case, brought by Pro-Israel groups were quick to urge the government against 7 Palestinians and a strong support from Congress and the Bush Kenyan with alleged ties to the leftist PFLP, admin. following the launch of Israel’s op- resumed on 6/20. In 1987, the government erations in Lebanon. For example, some 50 had argued that the defendants should be American Jewish leaders from across the deported for supporting “doctrines of world country met (7/20) with Bush admin. offi- communism,” but as the government repeat- cials and congressional leaders in Washing- edly lost its case over the years the charges ton to urge that Israel be “given ample time were revised at least 3 times, most recently and freedom of action to inflict as much incorporating charges of supporting terror- damage as possible on Hizballah’s infras- ism. In 1997, a court granted the 8 legal tructure.” Lobbying by heads of American residency, but the Justice Dept. raised new Jewish groups had reportedly begun sev- charges of lying on visa applications. In this eral days previously, including an unusual latest hearing, the U.S. federal judge quickly visit by Anti-Defamation League national dir. ruled (6/23) that Aiad Barakat, one of the Abraham Foxman to Saudi amb. Prince Turki Palestinians in the case, should be granted al-Faisal to thank Saudi Arabia for blaming U.S. citizenship since the Justice Dept. had (7/14) Hizballah for the violence (see above). not credibly proven that he had falsely de- Within days of the launch of hostilities, sev- nied knowing that an acquaintance was a eral groups sent “emergency missions” to senior PFLP member. Israel to meet with leaders and tour the north in a show of solidarity. U.S.-Israeli Military Issues United Jewish Communities (formerly During his visit to Washington on 5/23, United Jewish Appeal) launched (8/2) a cam- Israeli PM Olmert met with U.S. Defense paign to raise at least $300 m. in emergency Secy. Donald Rumsfeld. The men agreed to humanitarian funds for Israel. The money build closer defense and security ties follow- would be used to offset the Israeli govern- ing setbacks over Israel’s arms sales to China ment expenses of evacuating (beginning (see Quarterly Update in JPS 139). Further 8/8) Israelis from n. Israel, add air condi- discussions were planned for Rumsfeld’s tioning to and otherwise refurbish bomb visit to Israel as part of a regional tour later shelters, provide trauma counseling, and in the year. create a $20 m. fund for the victims of the At the time of the visit, the U.S.-Israeli Hizballah rocket attacks and their families. military relations were still strained over the Leaders of the newly formed Christians U.S.’s refusal (apparently earlier in 5/06) to United for Israel (CUFI; see Quarterly Up- allow Israel to upgrade its F-35 Joint Strike date in JPS 140) gathered (7/19) some 3,400 Fighters with its own technology. The U.S. evangelicals in Washington for a press con- sells the plane as a finished product, con- ference and rally in solidarity with Israel. tractually barring purchasers from adding Participants met with their members of components. Israel argues that it must add Congress to urge them to support Israel. its own, more advanced navigation, sight- ing and fire control systems, and missiles Legal Actions to maintain the Israeli air force’s qualitative A federal judge rejected (8/10) an ap- edge. peal by former AIPAC officials Steven Rosen Also of note: On 7/20, the U.S. approved and Keith Weissman that the espionage case a more than $6 b. military equipment sale against them be thrown out on the grounds to Saudi Arabia to offset expected criticism that prosecution under the Espionage Act of an expedited arms delivery to Israel (an- infringes on their constitutional right to free nounced 7/21; there was at least 1 delivery speech. The pair have been indicted on ca. 7/23) and to facilitate Bush’s meeting

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:15:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 144 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES with the Saudi FM and National Security (The plane refueled in Scotland after the Council head on 7/23, ahead of Rice’s mis- Irish government refused landing rights at sion to the region. Shannon airport to protest the cargo.) Bush apologized to Blair on 7/28, though Blair de- RUSSIA fended the use of the airport, which had Russia’s activity this quarter was largely already been the subject of public contro- confined to the UN, where it was one of the versy for refueling U.S. flights involved in the main opponents to U.S. policy, challenging “extraordinary rendition” of alleged terror (7/16) the U.S. insistence on holding Iran and suspects in the U.S. war on terror. Syria responsible for the 6/25 Palestinian On 8/1, the EU rejected a request by 213 and 7/12 Hizballah attacks, pressing hard members of the U.S. Congress in a letter (e.g., 7/20, 8/6) for an immediate cease- sent to EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana fire in Lebanon, and urging (throughout that the EU add Hizballah to its terrorist list, the quarter) against imposing UN sanctions calling the proposed action too provocative on Iran over its continued enrichment of “given the sensitive situation.” uranium. In the negotiations over the UN Also of note: Ireland’s Foreign Affairs res. on a Lebanon cease-fire, Russia became Comm. issued (ca 8/4) a statement calling so frustrated with U.S. attempts to dictate for an immediate cease-fire in Lebanon and the wording that it threatened (8/10) to offer consideration of economic sanctions by the its own draft res. EU on Israel to protest its killing of UN Of note: Israeli Dep. PM and FM Livni re- personnel and civilians and the destruction ceived (6/15) new Russian special envoy on of Lebanese infrastructure. the Middle East Sergei Yakovlev (appointed UNITED NATIONS on 3/15/06), who reaffirmed Russia’s com- mitment to a safe and secure Israel. The pre- The UN’s efforts this quarter to halt vious envoy, Alexander Kalugin, was made Israel’s offensives against Gaza and Lebanon amb. to Jordan. were largely unsuccessful, and its role for the most part consisted of providing human- EUROPEAN UNION itarian aid to civilians in both areas, raising Despite the importance of developments funds from member states, and monitoring in Gaza and Israel, the EU played only a and reporting on events on the ground. On minor role this quarter. Before fighting be- 7/30, UN Secy.-Gen. Annan acknowledged gan on either front, Israeli PM Olmert toured the growing frustration of the international Britain (6/12–13) and France (6/14–15), dur- community, especially in the Arab and Mus- ing which British PM Tony Blair supported lim world, with the UNSC’s inability to take (6/12) Israel’s refusal to have contact with quick, forceful action to protect the Pales- the Hamas-led PA until it renounced vio- tinian and Lebanese populations. Referring lence and recognized Israel. Israeli Dep. PM to the blocking effect of U.S. objections to and FM Livni met (6/14) with the EU Coun- any moves critical of Israel, he warned that cil of Minters in Luxembourg, where she “the authority and standing of this council discussed Israel’s request to join the EU ed- are at stake” and that “people have noticed ucational agreement, the European space its failure to act firmly and quickly during program, the EU environmental agreement, this crisis.” and the EU research and development pro- Undeterred, the U.S. vetoed (7/13) a gram, but no agreements were reached. UNSC res. accusing Israel of using “dispro- (The EU has allowed only a handful of non- portionate force” and jeopardizing the safety EU member-states to participate in any of of Palestinian civilians in Gaza, and order- these fora; exceptions have been made for ing Israel’s immediate withdrawal from the Australia, Egypt, Japan, Morocco, Turkey, Strip. Although the measure also called for and the U.S.) Palestinians immediately to release Shalit After Israel’s launch of war against and halt rocket fire on Israel, U.S. Amb. to Lebanon, EU tensions with the U.S. rose the UN John Bolton called the measure “un- slightly but noticeably. On 7/26, British for- balanced” and said passage “would have eign secy. Margaret Beckett announced that exacerbated tensions in the region” at a cru- Britain planned to lodge a formal protest cial time. (The last UNSC veto was cast in with the U.S. after learning that U.S. aircraft 10/04, also by the U.S. over a res. condemn- transporting “bunker buster” bombs to Is- ing an Israeli operation. The U.S. has cast 8 rael refueled at a Scottish air base the week- of the last 9 UNSC vetoes, 7 of which were end of 7/22–23 without notifying Britain. related to the Arab-Israeli conflict.)

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:15:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions QUARTERLY UPDATE ON CONFLICT AND DIPLOMACY 145

UN special rapporteur John Dugard is- think is necessary but what we think we sued (6/21) a report on his 6/9–17 tour of can handle.” UNRWA, which was to fund the West Bank and Gaza, stating that human half of this year’s $384 m. emergency appeal rights conditions had substantially deterio- but had only received donations amount- rated since the Hamas-led government took ing to 30% of its commitment, held (7/17) power. He noted especially that the n. Gaza a meeting in Geneva to encourage interna- no-go zone declared by the IDF had been tional donors to increase aid transfers in extended to 500–600 m, that the number light of deteriorating humanitarian condi- of IDF checkpoints and roadblocks across tions in the territories. Finland pledged an the West Bank has increased dramatically additional $2 m., increasing its 2006 fund- (particularly around Nablus), and that Israeli ing to $6.6 m. UNRWA also reported (6/18) control over the Jordan Valley had intensi- that 14,500 PA employees had newly regis- fied, with the purpose of “de-Palestinization.” tered for aid in Gaza and 4,500 have done so UN special rapporteur on the right to health in the West Bank; the number in Gaza was Paul Hunt similarly noted (7/19) the deterio- expected to reach 23,000 soon. UNICEF sim- ration, stating that poverty rates in Gaza had ilarly tripled (6/18) its emergency appeal for reached 75%, and called for an investigation the Palestinian territories to $23 m. for 2006, into whether Israel’s 6/28 strike on the Gaza noting that 1 in 3 newborns is at risk of dy- power station constituted a war crime. ing in Gaza because of lack of medicines and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights essential drugs. Louise Arbour, a former chief prosecutor of On 7/27, the UN Economic and So- war crimes tribunals, stated (7/19) that the cial Council passed (45–3, with 3 absten- level of the killing and maiming of civilians tions; Australia, Canada, and the U.S. voting in Lebanon, Gaza, and Israel could constitute against) res. E/206/L17/Rev.1 calling on Is- war crimes and that members in decision- rael immediately to lift the siege on Gaza, making positions could be personally liable. observe the 1994 Paris Protocol provisions, Meanwhile, the International Comm. of the and transfer tax revenues to the PA. The U.S. Red Cross (ICRC) stated (7/19) that Israel explained (7/27) its vote on the grounds that had violated the principle of proportionality the res. “failed to address the fundamental provided for under the Geneva Conventions. causes of those hardships, including the ac- The new UNHRC (see Quarterly Update tions of the Hamas-led government” and “did in JPS 140) devoted its first 2 special ses- nothing to encourage peace and stability.” sions to Israeli actions in Gaza and Lebanon. Canada gave a similar explanation, denounc- On 7/6, the UNHRC issued (7/6) a res. ex- ing the UN’s “continual one-sided criticism pressing “grave concern” over Israeli actions of Israel.” in Gaza and demanding an immediate halt The UN Comm. on the Exercise of the to operations. Eleven members (including Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People Britain, Canada, France, and Germany) voted issued (7/27) a statement expressing grave against the measure, calling it “unbalanced” concern over ongoing IDF operations in in favor of the Palestinians. Separately, the Gaza, accusing Israel of “deliberately causing U.S., which is not a UNHRC member, voiced a major humanitarian crisis among the inno- (7/6) “regrets” over the res., stating that it cent civilian population . . . and hamper[ing] should have criticized the “failure of the any sustained international relief efforts,” Palestinian Authority to denounce terror.” noting that “deliberate attacks . . . against On 8/11, the UNHRC voted (27–11, with 8 civilian property and infrastructure in the abstaining, 1 not present) to condemn Is- Gaza Strip violate international humanitar- rael for “massive bombardment of Lebanese ian law,” and stating that Israel should pay civilian populations” and other “systematic” reparations immediately. human rights violations, and called for an in- Meanwhile, Israel made two advances in vestigation into “the systematic targeting and its efforts to normalize its standing in inter- killing of civilians by Israel in Lebanon.” EU national bodies. After years of discussion, countries, Canada, and Japan voted against. the ICRC passed (237–54) a res. on 6/21 en- The UN Office for the Coordination of dorsing the red crystal (used alone or fram- Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) increased ing another symbol) as a neutral emblem (5/31) the UN emergency appeal for 2006 to allow Israel’s Magen David Adom (MDA) by 79% to $384 m. to cover emergency jobs, to participate in the ICRC while maintain- food, and medical supplies for the occu- ing its red Star of David symbol. Adoption pied territories. UNOCHA dir. David Shearer of the red crystal was approved in princi- stated (5/21), “That amount is not what we ple in 12/05 (see Quarterly Update in JPS

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:15:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 146 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES

139), and the official endorsement followed visit to the U.S. early in the quarter. In his ICRC rejection (6/20) of controversial last- 5/23 meeting with Bush, Olmert argued that minute amendments proposed by Pakistan the turning point in Iran’s development of and Tunisia that included denunciation of a nuclear program could be months away. Israel’s occupation. MDA announced (6/23) While Bush said that all diplomatic options that as part of the 6/20 agreement with needed to be exhausted before discussing a the ICRC, it was launching a short-term ar- military strike, he emphasized that the U.S. rangement with the Palestine Red Crescent had been laying the groundwork for tough Society (PRCS) involving supplying the West action against Iran at the UN, “spending a Bank PRCS with 6 ambulances with Israeli lot of time working with our Russian friends license plates to facilitate passage through in particular [as well as China] to make it checkpoints and the pre-approval of 23 PRCS clear to them that Iran is showing no good staff members to cross IDF checkpoints with faith” in negotiations. Olmert’s 5/24 address minimal security checks. to Congress (which had been drafted by Re- At the UN, the Israel Women’s Lobby was publican party strategist Frank Luntz and granted (5/16) consultative status on the UN Israeli Nobel laureate Elie Wiesel) warned Economic and Social Council, enabling it that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose an to participate in deliberations advancing the “intolerable threat” and “cannot be permit- status of women. Israel hailed the decision as ted to materialize.” Afterward, Senate Armed “a further stage in the Foreign Ministry’s ef- Services Comm. chairman Sen. John Warner forts to integrate Israel in the important civil (R-VA) pledged to use Olmert’s comments to activity of the UN and as part of the normal- push the question of how the international ization and upgrading of Israel’s status in the community should react to Iran. activities of the international community.” On 6/6, EU foreign policy adviser Javier Solana presented Iran with an offer by the 5 TURKEY UNSC permanent members plus Germany: if Iran halted uranium enrichment, the six Turkish PM Tayyip Recep Erdogan was nations would help build nuclear reactors reportedly deeply involved this quarter in and guarantee supply of nuclear fuel for mediating efforts to end Operation Summer peaceful purposes, and the U.S. would agree Rains in Gaza. During the war in Lebanon, to direct talks on all issues except diplomatic Turkey sent (7/29) a warship with medical relations and lift some bilateral sanctions. supplies to Beirut and indicated (7/26, 8/8) The offer also included the sale of European willingness, in principle, to commit troops Airbus aircraft. to a UN peace-keeping mission to Lebanon On 7/3, the six states pressed Iran to ac- after a cease-fire. cept their offer and halt enrichment by 7/12 Within days of the Israel’s 7/30 attack or risk sanctions (though China and Russia on a UNIFIL post in Qana, the Turkish daily had not yet agreed to back sanctions). When Evrensel published a previously undisclosed Iran failed to meet the deadline, the 6— list of parliamentarians who were mem- especially the U.S.—began (7/13) to press bers of the Turkey-Israel Friendship Group, for a UNSC res. threatening sanctions. On founded several years ago, and denounced 7/31, days after Iran said it would reply by their continued participation in light of the 8/22, the UNSC passed a res. setting the ongoing war in Lebanon. By 8/2, 27 parlia- deadline at 8/31; with the Lebanon war fully mentarians had resigned their membership underway, the U.S. had not protested the or announced that they had done so pre- delay. viously. By 8/4, the number of resignations The timing and ferocity of Israel’s as- had reportedly reached 70 (the Turkish par- sault on Lebanon fueled speculation that it liament has 550 members). might be a prelude to military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities or at the very least to IRAN pressure Tehran in the UN on the nuclear is- Pressures on Iran increased this quar- sue. (On 5/22, Hizballah dep. chief Shaykh ter to halt uranium enrichment (begun last Na‘im Qassim stated explicitly that Hizballah quarter) and dismantle its nuclear program would not come to Iran’s defense if the U.S. (although, technically, Iran’s nuclear pro- targeted its nuclear program.) Meanwhile, gram to date has not violated the Nuclear the claims by Israel, the U.S., and to a lesser Non-proliferation Treaty, of which Iran is a extent Britain blaming Iran for Hizballah’s signatory). Iran’s nuclear program was high 7/12 cross-border attack on Israel had been on the agenda during Israeli PM Olmert’s largely discredited by the end of the quarter,

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:15:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions QUARTERLY UPDATE ON CONFLICT AND DIPLOMACY 147 with anonymous Bush admin. officials and on the Hamas-led PA. While the Local De- intelligence analysts acknowledging (8/4) velopment Forum (the replacement to the that there was little evidence supporting Local Aid Coordination Committee, the cen- Iranian involvement (see New York Times tral body overseeing donor activities from 8/5). within the territories) had not yet held its Also of note: An Iran specialist at Johns first meeting by the end of the quarter, the Hopkins University, Trita Parsi, leaked (5/25) 4 donor strategy groups on humanitarian to the Asia Times a 2-page document re- assistance, economics, infrastructure, and ceived from an Iranian official in 2006. The governance and reform continued to meet document, which Iran sent to Bush via the regularly, with all work coordinated through Swiss Embassy in late 3/03 or early 4/03, a committee that included reps. from the offers to accept peace with Israel, to “stop Abbas’s office, the PA Finance Min, and the any material support to Palestinian opposi- PA Planning Min. Donor reps. reportedly tion groups (Hamas, Jihad, etc.) from Iranian were eager to hold more meetings, identify territory,”to put “pressure on these organiza- priorities with the PA, and increase coor- tions to stop violent actions against civilians dination the PA given the deteriorating hu- within [the] 1967 borders,” to take “action manitarian and economic conditions on the on Hizbollah to become a mere political ground, but kept contacts low key in light organization within Lebanon,” and to give of U.S. opposition to contacts with Hamas. the International Atomic Energy Agency full All donor projects ongoing before the access to any facility it asks to see in ex- sanctions were imposed were continuing change for a “halt in U.S. hostile behavior except those funded by Britain, Canada, and rectification of [the] status of Iran in and the U.S., which were halted. No new the U.S.” and recognition of Iran as a re- donor funds were pledged or contributed, gional power. According to anonymous se- since funding was being rerouted through nior Iranian national security officials, Iran’s the EU-led TIM (see above), coordinated Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had with the World Bank not officially within been “directly involved” in drafting the pro- the donor structures. At the close of the posal. According to Flynt Leverett, at the quarter, Sweden announced plans (8/15) time senior specialist on the Middle East to host a donor pledging conference for at the U.S. National Security Council, there the Palestinians on 9/1 to raise funds for were “literally a few days” between receipt humanitarian assistance and reconstruction of the letter by Bush and an admin. message in Gaza, but this would not be within the to the Swiss amb. expressing displeasure that context of the donor mechanisms. Switzerland had forwarded the document. Of note: At a donor meeting on 8/8, U.S. special envoy for security affairs Maj. Gen. OTHER Keith Dayton proposed a $19.2 m. project Venezuela recalled (8/3) its amb. to Israel ($10.4 m. in 2006) to expand the Qarni com- to protest Operation Change of Direction. mercial crossing into Gaza to ease pressure on the Palestinian economy. To preserve DONORS Israel’s security, he proposed putting 90 in- ternational observers on the Palestinian side Donor activity was limited this quarter as of the crossing. The PA endorsed the idea; the donor bodies continued to go through a Israel said it would consider the proposal reorganization (see Quarterly Update in JPS only after the IDF soldier captured on 6/25 140) and in light of the U.S.-led sanctions is released.

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:15:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions