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Common-Cause Failure Database and Analysis System: Event Data Collection, Classification, and Coding

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Common-Cause Failure Database and Analysis System: Event Data Collection, Classification, and Coding NUREG/CR-6268, Rev. 1 INL/EXT-07-12969 Common-Cause Failure Database and Analysis System: Event Data Collection, Classification, and Coding Idaho National Laboratory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research Washington, DC 20555-0001 The INL is a U.S. Department of Energy National Laboratory operated by Battelle Energy Alliance NUREG/CR-6268, Rev. 1 INL/EXT-07-12969 Common-Cause Failure Database and Analysis System: Event Data Collection, Classification, and Coding Manuscript Completed: August 2007 Date Published: September 2007 Prepared by T.E. Wierman/INL D.M. Rasmuson/NRC A. Mosleh/Univ. of MD Idaho National Laboratory Risk and Reliability Assessment Department P.O. Box 1625 Idaho Falls, ID 83415-3850 Department of Materials and Nuclear Engineering University of Maryland College Park, MD 20742-2115 A.D. Salomon, NRC Project Manager Prepared for Division of Risk Assessment and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 NRC Job Code Y6546 ABSTRACT This report on the Common-Cause Failure Database and Analysis System presents an overview of common-cause failure (CCF) analysis methods for use in the U.S. commercial nuclear power industry. Idaho National Laboratory staff identify equipment failures that contribute to CCF events through searches of Licensee Event Reports, Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System failure reports, and Equipment Performance and Information Exchange failure reports. The staff then enter the event information into a personal computer-based data analysis system (CCF system). This report summarizes how data are gathered, evaluated, and coded into the CCF system, and describes the process for using the data to estimate probabilistic risk assessment common-cause failure parameters. iii iv FOREWORD This report presents guidance for collecting, classifying, and coding common-cause failure (CCF) events. It updates NUREG/CR-6268, “Common-Cause Failure Database and Analysis System,” published in 1998. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) and the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) maintain a CCF database for the U.S. commercial nuclear power industry. The CCF data effort consists of CCF event identification, CCF event coding and CCF parameter estimation. CCF events are component failures that satisfy four criteria: (1) two or more individual components fail, are degraded (including failures during demand or in-service testing), or have deficiencies that would result in component failures if a demand signal had been received; (2) components fail within a selected period of time such that success of the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) mission would be uncertain; (3) components fail because of a single shared cause and coupling mechanism; and (4) components fail within the established component boundary. The NRC draws from three data sources to select equipment failure reports for CCF event identification: (1) the Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (NPRDS), which contains component failure information from 1980 through 1996; (2) the Equipment Performance and Information Exchange (EPIX) System, which contains component failure information since 1997; and (3) Licensee Event Reports (LERs). RES and INL data analysts review failure data to identify independent and CCF events. The CCF data collection and analysis activity consists of CCF event identification, event coding, and loading the CCF events into a software system to estimate CCF parameters. The CCF event identification process includes reviewing failure data to identify independent and CCF events. The data analyst uses the guidance in this report to code the CCF events consistently and accurately. The data analysts then load the CCF events into the CCF database. The events are stored in a format that allows PRA analysts to review the events and develop an understanding of how they occurred and to estimate CCF parameters and their uncertainties. The CCF database not only stores the CCF event descriptions but also event counts and information associated with the events. It also automates the estimation of CCF parameters. NRC risk analysts and senior reactor analysts use these CCF parameters estimates in Standardized Plant Analysis Risk models, reliability studies, and other PRA regulatory activities. The NRC staff also use CCF insights in inspection activities. The industry uses the CCF parameter estimates in their probabilistic safety assessments. __________________________________ Farouk Eltawila, Director Division of Risk Assessment and Special Applications Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research v vi CONTENTS Abstract........................................................................................................................................................iii Foreword....................................................................................................................................................... v Executive Summary..................................................................................................................................... xi Abbreviations.............................................................................................................................................. xv 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 1 2. Definition of Common-Cause Failures .................................................................................................. 5 2.1 Intrinsic Dependency ..................................................................................................................... 5 2.2 Extrinsic Dependency .................................................................................................................... 6 3. CCF Event Classification ....................................................................................................................... 9 3.1 Failure Causes................................................................................................................................ 9 3.2 Coupling Factors.......................................................................................................................... 11 3.2.1 Quality Based.................................................................................................................. 11 3.2.2 Design Based .................................................................................................................. 12 3.2.3 Maintenance Based ......................................................................................................... 12 3.2.4 Operation Based.............................................................................................................. 13 3.2.5 Environment Based......................................................................................................... 14 3.3 Defense Mechanisms ................................................................................................................... 14 4. The CCF Data Analysis Process........................................................................................................... 17 4.1 Identification of Analysis Boundaries.......................................................................................... 17 4.2 Data Collection ............................................................................................................................ 18 4.3 Event Analysis ............................................................................................................................. 18 4.4 Data Loading................................................................................................................................ 19 4.5 Quality Assurance........................................................................................................................ 19 5. Event Coding Guidance........................................................................................................................ 21 5.1 CCF Event Coding....................................................................................................................... 21 5.1.1 Event Name..................................................................................................................... 21 5.1.2 Plant Name......................................................................................................................21 5.1.3 Power Level .................................................................................................................... 21 5.1.4 Event Title....................................................................................................................... 21 5.1.5 System............................................................................................................................. 21 5.1.6 Proximate Cause ............................................................................................................. 21 vii 5.1.7 Timing Factor.................................................................................................................. 24 5.1.8 Component...................................................................................................................... 26 5.1.9 Sub-Component and Piece-Part ...................................................................................... 28 5.1.10
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