Melanesia in Review: Issues and Events, 2001

A review of Solomon Islands is not vesi, a spokeswoman for the former included in this issue. governing party (Soqosoqo ni Vaka- vulewa ni Taukei, or svt) predicted F i j i that “if you force the Gates (High Fiji seemed to come full circle in 20 0 1 . Court) judgement upon the Fijian The year began with the nation ner- people against their will our chances vously awaiting the outcome of a of returning to democracy will be Court of Appeal hearing on the fate destroyed for a long time” (Sun, 18 of the interim government installed Jan 2001, 1). In an unusual show of after the 2000 coup. It ended in a unity, Fijian political parties issued a similar way, with the same Court of joint statement demanding the contin- Appeal preparing to rule on the future uation of the interim government. of the newly elected government of They warned that any attempts to Laisenia Qarase. Throughout 2001, “derail Fijian leadership” would be Fiji’s political course followed surpris- strongly resisted. Meanwhile the ing and at times startling directions, Taukei Movement was reported to as the country picked its way through be mobilizing its supporters to oppose the debris and rubble left by the crisis the reinstatement of the 1997 consti- of 2000. tution. Provincial councils and chiefs The legal challenge to the interim also denounced the intervention by government had come when dairy the courts. According to one chief: farmer Chandrika Prasad, whose “We will die defending the President property was stolen and family terror- and Interim Government against ized after the coup in May 2000, suc- rulings detrimental to us as a race” cessfully obtained a ruling in the (Times, 26 Jan 2001, 3). High Court in November 2000 that While a Fiji Times editorial dis- declared the 1997 constitution extant missed such threats as “empty politi- and the interim government without cal posturing,” it pointed to the mili- any legal basis. The government tary as being the final arbiter of the appealed the ruling to the Court of interim government’s and hence Appeal because, as Interim Prime nation’s future. There were indica- Minister Qarase explained, “We need tions, in an army briefing to the presi- confirmation so that we can progress dent leaked to the media, that the Fiji further towards parliamentary military intended to “uphold the rule democracy” (Post, 28 Feb 2001, 3). of law—even if that means upholding The lead-up to the Court of Appeal the Gates rul i n g” (Ti m e s , 24 Ja n 20 0 1 , hearing in February was marked by 1). However, army statements also heightened tensions, as nationalist reaffirmed its “steadfast support” for Fijian leaders warned of bloodshed the president and interim government, and chaos should the ruling go against and the position that national security the interim government. Ema Drua- remained its “paramount concern.”

439 440 the contemporary pacific • fall 2002

It was in this atmosphere of tension a court decision may restore a demo- and uncertainty that the Court of cratically elected parliament displaced Appeal began its hearing on 19 Feb- by a coup d’etat” (Post, 7 Mar 2001, ruary. The interim government’s case 2). However, the Court of Appeal had was that the 1997 constitution had not ruled on how the democratically indeed been abrogated according to elected parliament should be restored, the doctrine of necessity—to avert and it was this question that con- further threats to peace and security; founded commentators and political and that a new legal order was now parties in the immediate aftermath of in effective control, commanding the the ruling. acceptance if not approval of a wide As a way of buying time and per- section of the population. The respon- haps legitimacy, the acting president dents (Chandrika Prasad’s lawyers) and interim government announced claimed that there was no necessity for that they would seek guidance from the purported abrogation of the con- the Great Council of Chiefs before stitution—that such a step was “irra- making their next move. Although tional and disproportionate.” They pledging publicly to abide by the further argued that no new legal or court’s ruling, the interim government political order was in place (the fact showed no immediate sign of relin- that the interim government had sub- quishing power (much to the Labour mitted to the courts was evidence of Party’s chagrin). When the Great that). Nor was the interim governm e n t Council of Chiefs convened it was in effective control, since it lacked presented with two starkly opposing both legal and political legitimacy. “road maps.” One was prepared by In a landmark ruling handed down the interim government and its legal on 1 Ma rch 20 0 1 the Court of Appeal advisors and proposed a quasi-con- dismissed the interim government’s stitutional approach: that the Great appeal. It declared that the 1997 Council of Chiefs accept the court constitution remained the supreme ruling; that it legitimize Ratu Iloilo’s law of the country; that parliament appointment as president; that it was not dissolved but prorogued for accept that the president has “res e rv e d six months; and that the office of powers” to dissolve parliament and president only became vacant on 15 call fresh elections; and that the December 2000 with the resignation interim government continue to gov- of Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara. Accord- ern in a caretaker capacity until elec- ingly, Ratu Josefa Iloilo was still act- tions are held. The second was pre- ing in the position. The court argued pared by a group of indigenous Fijian that that there was no justification for lawyers led by the General Manager abrogation of the constitution, and of the Native Land Trust Board. This that the interim government had failed rejected the constitutional approach to demonstrate or prove effective con- entirely and instead called on the trol. One of the lawyers representing Great Council of Chiefs “to resume Ch a n d r i k aP r a s ad de s c r i b ed th ec o u rt ’s its sovereignty granted to them by the ruling as historic and setting a power- Deed of Cession,” which could be ful precedent. “It is the first time that used to empower the interim govern- p olitical reviews • melane sia 441 ment. The interim government should the House (since he had rec o m m e n d e d continue to rule by decree and a “new the dissolution of parliament). The legal order” should be created throu g h acting president then swore in former the adoption of a new constitution. Labour parliamentarian Ratu Tevita Moreover all those charged with Momoedonu as prime minister (to treason (such as George Speight) regularize the appointments of the should be granted immediate and president and vice president as well unconditional amnesty (Sunday as to recommend the dissolution of Times, 11 Mar 2001, 2). parliament). Ratu Tevita had stood in As the Great Council of Chiefs as prime minister once before (follow- deliberated on these momentous ing the takeover of parliament in May issues, the deposed People’s Coalition 2000). Once his prime ministerial government struggled (and failed) to duties were completed, Ratu Tevita reach a consensus on its preferred immediately tendered his resignation course of action. Former Deputy and that of “his government,” paving Prime Minister Tupeni Baba led a the way for the president to appoint a faction that supported the reconven- caretaker government. The following ing of parliament and the formation day, having tendered their own resig- of a government of national unity, to nations, the interim government was govern for two or three years during again sworn in as a caretaker govern- which time issues such as land and ment to lead the country into elections the constitution would be addressed. later in the year. Former Prime Minister Mahendra Not surprisingly, this outcome sat- Chaudhry led another faction strongly isfied some but shocked others. It was opposed to the creation of a govern- described by a military spokesman as ment of national unity. Although ini- the “least worst option” to return the tially calling for the reinstatement of country to parliamentary rule within his government, Chaudhry subse- the shortest time. The business com- quently recommended to the acting munity described the move as “deci- president that parliament be dissolved, sive but conciliatory.” On the other fresh elections held, and in the mean- hand, the Labour Party, the National time a caretaker government be Federation Party, and the trade union appointed comprising members of movement condemned the outcome as the dissolved parliament. “unconstitutional and unlawful.” A Chaudhry’s advice gave the acting civil society group, the Citizens Con- president the opportunity to imple- stitutional Forum, filed a motion in ment the resolutions agreed to by the the High Court seeking to annul the Great Council of Chiefs, which essen- president’s decision to dissolve parlia- tially followed the quasi-constitu- ment. Meanwhile the international tional path advocated by the interim community welcomed the decision to government and supported by the go to the polls, although political and military. On 14 March the acting economic sanctions on Fiji remained president dismissed Chaudhry as in place pending the outcome of the prime minister on the grounds that he elections. no longer commanded the support of As the country moved into election 442 the contemporary pacific • fall 2002 mode, the political landscape was savu dam, Viti Levu’s main source of transformed. Political parties frag- hydropower. The caretaker govern- mented and new alignments were ment also agreed to pay landowners forged. Within the Labour Party, the at Nadi Airport f$1.2 million in com- rupture over the Court of Appeal pensation after protests threatened the ruling proved irreparable, and a operations of the airport. (Both pay- breakaway group led by Tupeni Baba ments were subsequently put on hold formed their own party, named the after court action was taken by oppos- New Labour Unity Party (n l up). This in g landowners and by the Native joined with so-called moderate politi- Land Trust Board.) But it was mainly cal parties in a loose political alliance. the caretaker governm e n t ’s use of agri- The major Fijian parties (sv t, Fijian cu l t u r a l assistance funds that drew the Association Party, Nationalist Party, ire of its political opponents. Promi- Party of National Unity, and Veito- nent sv t politician, Jim Ah Koy—who kani Ni Lewenivanua Vakarisito) also would lose his Kadavu seat to the s d l splintered along provincial, policy, party—lashed out at the Qarase gov- and personal lines. Two new parties ernment: “What has this government emerged that would command the done in its one year? All they have majority of Fijian support. One was done is spend the money that the sv t the Conservative Alliance /Matanitu government put in place. Look at the Vanua (c a m v), based in the north of number of knives, forks and outboard the country, which attracted hard-core engines they have given out as bait for supporters of the 2000 coup perpetra- this election!” (Post, 7 Aug 2001, 1) tors and included in its election lineup The members of the caretaker gov- the coup “leader” George Speight ernment were branded as hypocrites (still held in custody). The other party and opportunists—for capitalizing on was created by caretaker Prime Minis- the fruits of office while those who ter Laisenia Qarase and included in helped put them there (George Speight its lineup most of the members of the and his group) languished on the interim government. Named the Soqo- prison island of Nukulau. Although a soqo ni Duavata ni Lewenivanua number of Fijian politicians (and the (s d l) or United Fiji Party, it was c a m v pa rty) called for an amnesty for launched with much fanfare on 9 the rebel group, neither the caretaker May 2001. government nor the military seemed The s d l party soon alienated most inclined to “interfere” in the court other Fijian parties. While condemned proceedings, which limped along from by some for undermining Fijian politi- one adjournment to another. The case cal unity, the main grievance against it was finally moved to the High Court seemed to be the party’s use of politi- in July after the conclusion of com- cal office for its own advantage— mittal proceedings in the Magistrate mobilizing state resources to secure Court to determine evidence to sup- support within the Fijian electorate. port treason charges. Barring any fur- Among the initiatives taken in the ther delays (such as George Speight’s lead-up to the election was approval periodic firing of counsel), the case for a f$52.8 million compensation was set to begin in February 2002. payment to landowners at the Mona- The lack of progress in the Speight p olitical reviews • m ela n e s i a 443 group prosecution, together with the argued that while the president did act failure to identify others involved in in a manner inconsistent with the con- the takeover of parliament, over- st i t u t i o n when he failed to summon shadowed efforts (such as community parliament (after the Court of Appeal events organized by the police) to pro- ruling), such action was justified on mote reconciliation and heal the the grounds of necessity. To reconvene wounds of 2000. On the anniversary parliament and return the Chaudhry of the 19 May takeover, the Fiji Times government to office would have condemned the failure to bring those created “a wholly unacceptable risk to responsible to justice. “The identities the peace and welfare of the nation” of those faceless cowards who insti- as well as a “legal and administrative gated the hostage taking and sup- nightmare” (Times, 12 July 2001, 12, ported Speight throughout are still 14). a mystery.” Revelations by a senior Threats of unrest should the army officer on the eve of his resig- Labour Party win the elections and nation from the Fiji military forces reports of divisions in the military pointed to the possibility that such ci rculated in the weeks before the poll. individuals were protected because But despite the tense atmosphere, pub- of their powerful and prominent posi- lic opinion surveys indicated that vot- tions. He alleged that seven plotters ers were primarily concerned about we re still at large, including prom i n e n t economic issues. This underscored the business people and a senior military precarious state of the economy in the fi g u re. These allegations, which stirred wake of the political crisis of 2000. much controversy and speculation, A number of garment factories closed were given some credence when Police their operations in early 2001, leaving Commissioner Isikia Savua and high more than a thousand workers unem- chief (and Fiji’s High Commissioner ployed. Uncertainty of land tenure to Malaysia) Adi Samanunu Talakuli was causing a drastic drop in cane were cleared of any wrongdoing, production, while the expiry and non- despite their well-publicized support renewal of land leases left many farm- for the hostage-takers in parliament. ers homeless and destitute. Tourism Meanwhile the caretaker government arrivals had also declined signifi- passed a decree granting immunity to cantly, leading to the loss of some two soldiers involved in the revenge kill- thousand jobs in the industry (Sun, 23 ings that followed the mutiny of Mar 2001, 5). While political parties November 2000. This decree was promised to address these concerns, labeled a “travesty of justice” by the there were indications that voters Fiji Times, on the grounds that it remained skeptical of what a new allowed murder to go unpunished. government would deliver. According On 11 July the High Court to one evicted cane farmer: “It seems removed the final legal hurdle to the these politicians get into parliament to August elections when it dismissed a serve themselves and forget the diffi- motion brought by the Citizens Con- culties the poor people face everyday” stitutional Forum seeking to annul the (Times, 9 Aug 2001, 3). president’s dissolution of parliament. Under the scrutiny of Common- In his ruling, Justice Michael Scott wealth and United Nations observers, 444 the contemporary pacific • fall 2002 the election took place without inci- negotiations and brinkmanship. With dent in late August. Despite predic- the single largest party in parliament, tions of a divided and fragmented Qarase appeared the most likely can- Fijian vote, the result was an almost didate for prime minister. But to form sweeping victory for Qarase’s s d l a majority government in the seventy- party (in Fijian constituencies). The one-seat parliament, he needed to only other serious contender was the create a coalition with several of the c a m v party. No other Fijian party smaller parties. Moreover, under the won a seat. Meanwhile, the Labour constitution, all parties with at least Party swept to victory in all the Indo- 10 percent of the seats (seven seats or Fijian constituencies. The final tally more) were entitled to places in cabi- gave s d l 31 seats, c a m v 6 (including net in proportion to their seats in George Speight), Labour 27, New parliament. This posed a dilemma Labour Unity Party 2, the United for Qarase, who had made it clear General Party 1, the National Federa- he would not work with Chaudhry in tion Party (n f p) 1, and independents government. There was also the possi- (subsequently aligned to the s d l) 2 bility that if Qarase joined forces with seats. minor parties, he would need to give Analyses of the vote revealed that them places in cabinet that would Labour increased its share of Indo- dilute s dl’s majority. Labour could Fijian voters compared to the therefore end up with more places in National Federation Party, and this cabinet than s d l—an unacceptable was attributed to a combination of its prospect. On 10 September, and still record in office and Chaudhry’s “bold without any resolution to his political leadership.” Meanwhile s d l’s success conundrum, Qarase was sworn in as was due in no small measure to its prime minister. He immediately issued largesse during the election (especially an invitation to Chaudhry to be part its distribution of agricultural assis- of his government, which Chaudhry tance funds—a “scam” that would duly accepted. But Qarase did not come back to haunt the s d l in the follow up, and Chaudhry was not new year), as well as to the endorse- consulted further on the makeup of ment of the Methodist Church estab- cabinet. lishment. s d l policies, which included Initially s d l seemed to favor an legislating a twenty-year blueprint alliance with the so-called moderate of affirmative action programs for parties (n l u p, United General Party, Fijians, revising the 1997 constitution and National Federation Party) rather to entrench Fijian leadership, and than the c a m v party. The latter had reverting to the Native Land Trust insisted, as a condition of any part- Act, also appealed to and appeased nership, that the detainees on Nuku- (nationalist) Fijian sensitivities and lau (including George Speight) be aspirations stirred up by the events released and granted immunity. But of 2000. In this way it was able to talks with the “moderates” proved neutralize much of its competition. inconclusive and a breakthrough The conclusion of the vote count with the c a m v party came after was followed by five days of tense they agreed to drop their demand for p olitical reviews • m ela n e s i a 445 immunity for the rebels (reportedly should be referred immediately to the after George Speight and his fellow Court of Appeal” (Times, 29 Sept detainees gave the pa rty the go-ahead). 2001, 1). The case was set down for On the night of 11 Se p t e m b e r, the s d l hearing in February 2002. and c a m v parties signed a memoran- Yet another legal wrangle erupted dum of agreement that specifically as a direct consequence of this court excluded any reference to immunity. action. It concerned the appointment A memorandum was also signed with of eight senators nominated on the one of the n l u p members of parlia- advice of the leader of the opposition. ment (although this was later When the president offered the posi- denounced by his party). The next tion of leader of the opposition, day, as word of the horrific terrorist Chaudhry refused it (so as to await attacks on the United States reached the Court of Appeal ruling). In order Fiji, the new cabinet was sworn in. It to fill this position, the president even- comprised twenty ministers and eight tu a l l y appointed the lone n f p mem- assistant ministers. Qarase rewarded ber. According to the constitution, the his minority allies (c a m v, n l u p, and leader of the opposition’s senate nom- independents) with a total of five cab- inees should comprise the nominees inet posts. of parties in the House of Representa- The exclusion of the Labour Party tives that were entitled to participate was immediately branded as uncon- in cabinet. Thus the Labour Party stitutional by observers both locally eventually presented the leader of and ab road. But the s d l rem a i n e d the opposition with their list of eight defiant. According to a party spokes- nominees. However, before handing man, to bring Labour in would be this list to the president, opposition “an unworkable coalition” because of leader Prem Singh took it on himself fundamental differences between the to amend the list (dropping four of pa rties (Po s t , 18 Sept 20 0 1 , 3). Qarase Labour’s nominees and including four meanwhile claimed that Chaudhry had of his own). These nominees were put certain conditions on his partici- sworn in, but the president’s office pation in government that were unac- subsequently decided to seek Supreme ceptable. But Chaudhry denied this, Court clarification on whether this claiming that it was Qarase who had action was “lawful and constitution- set down conditions for Labour’s ally sound” (Times, 23 Oct 2001, 1). inclusion—namely that it agree to In the meantime, Labour senators support s d l’s policies on the affirma- boycotted the remaining sessions of tive action blueprint, among other parliament. things. At the end of September the Despite these constitutional dis- Labour Party filed legal objections putes, the international community against its exclusion from cabinet in moved to normalize relations with Fiji the High Court (a move welcomed by in the wake of the elections. In early Qarase as a way to resolve constitu- October, Australia announced it was tional issues). The presiding judge lifting all aid and other sanctions, and moved to “fast-track” the case a visit by Foreign Minister Alexander because “it raised issues of law that Downer followed in December. How- 446 the contemporary pacific • fall 2002 ever, a request from Australia that Fiji December over the Qarase govern- participate in the so-called “Pacific ment’s proposed legislation to provide solution” to the burgeoning refugee affirmative action programs for problem was withdrawn after a public indigenous Fijians. As critics attacked and political outcry in Fiji. Also in the legislation for being “racially dis- December, the Commonwealth Minis- criminatory” and unconstitutional, its terial Action Group lifted Fiji’s suspen- defenders (including the prime minis- sion from the Commonwealth Coun- ter) described the bill as necessary for cils, paving the way for Fiji to attend peace and stability, in other words, the next Commonwealth Heads of national security (Sun, 17 Dec 2001, Government Meeting. New Zealand 1). But such attempts to “buy” stabil- and Britain then announced the ity by removing “barriers to Fijian resumption of full relations with Fiji. advancement” had failed in the past Only the European Union continued to avert political crises and had its aid sanctions on the country, to be instead fostered massive corruption reviewed once the constitutionality of and abuse of public funds (the farm- the government had been resolved. ing assistance scheme being only the As the year drew to a close, the latest example). The vicious cycle of nation’s fate was again in the hands political instability, racial policies, and of the Court of Appeal. Although the economic mismanagement thus election was a major step forwa rd and looked set to continue. In such a situ- its outcome was seen to reflect the ation it was perhaps no wonder that “will of the people,” Fiji’s return to so much seemed to depend (however democratic rule was far from complete unrealistically) on the rulings of the or secure. In its first months in office courts. the (elected) Qarase administration sandra ta rt e confronted a legal challenge that had the potential to force a change of gov- ernment. It also confronted a political Re f e re n c e s challenge (a f$25 million farming Post, The Daily Post. Daily. Suva. assistance scandal) and a security challenge (a plot to kidnap and assas- Sun,The Fiji Sun. Daily. Suva. sinate members of government in The Sunday Times. Weekly. Suva. order to force the release of George Times,The Fiji Times. Daily. Suva. Speight and his companions on Nuku- lau). The repercussions of these were still unfolding in early 2002, but they New Caledonia threatened further instability and unrest. Fiji remained on a political As France continued to delegate knife-edge, balanced precariously administrative and fiscal responsibili- between the forces of racial extrem- ties to the terri t o ry in compliance with ism on the one hand and democracy the 1998 Noumea Accord, the March on the other. 2001 municipal elections, challenges Nowhere was this more evident in forming the executive council of the than in the debate in parliament in Congress, and senatorial elections in