Occupying For Peace, The U.S. Army In Mexico, 1846-1848 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Thomas W. Spahr Graduate Program in History The Ohio State University 2011 Dissertation Committee: Professor Mark Grimsley Professor John Guilmartin Professor Kenneth J. Andrien Professor Randolph Roth Copyright by Thomas W. Spahr 2011 Abstract This dissertation examines the United States‘ execution of the military occupation of Mexico during the Mexican-American War (1846-1848). It argues that the occupation was successful and played an important role in achieving the American strategic objectives. The occupation succeeded because (a) President James K. Polk and his military commanders formulated a sound and flexible strategy, (b) a relatively competent corps of professional army officers executed that strategy, and (c) the United States Army maintained consistent military superiority over the Mexicans throughout the conflict. This dissertation examines the military occupation in terms of the American management of the Mexican population down to the city level, and the American reaction to Mexican resistance after the conventional army was defeated and driven from different parts of the country. The Americans were successful during the occupation because they applied an artful blend of conciliation toward the population, calibrated coercion, and co-option of much of the Catholic clergy and Mexican elite. The American victories on the conventional battlefield and conciliation of the population did not in themselves convince the Mexicans to cease resistance. The Army eventually succeeded by transitioning to a more punitive policy, targeting those who resisted or abetted resistance, particularly the elite, and by demonstrating to the Mexicans that they were committed to continuing the occupation indefinitely. Throughout the occupation the Americans demonstrated a flexible strategy that exploited social and racial fault lines in Mexican society. II This dissertation does not ignore the faults of the American army in Mexico, often undisciplined and driven by its perception of racial superiority over its adversary. The army committed many atrocities against the Mexican population, and in other circumstances these acts might have undermined the overall effort. Yet the faults of the United States Army did not undermine the occupation because of aggressive efforts by the American leadership to control its troops, the consistent American ability to defeat the Mexicans in battle, and Mexico‘s own inability to unite against the foreign invader. Mexico‘s isolation from external support further hindered its attempts to resist. While misconduct and racism did not undermine the U.S. effort, they did contribute to a legacy of antipathy between the neighboring states. Finally, while the American military occupation succeeded in achieving the U.S. strategic objectives, it left Mexico frail and vulnerable to invasion by other foreign powers. III Dedicated to my girls: Megan, Cauley, Abby, and Ellie IV Acknowledgements I wish to thank my advisor, Dr. Mark Grimsley, for his support and encouragement of this project. I am indebted to him for taking me on as a student and for his infinite patience as I sputtered and sprinted through this process. I have learned an enormous amount from his guiding hand. I am also indebted to Dr. John Guilmartin, who mentored me through my master‘s degree and the general examinations for my Ph.D., and Dr. Allan Millett, who accepted me into the program at The Ohio State University and, although recently retired, continued to make himself available for guidance as I needed it. I also thank my superiors and peers in the West Point History Department: my superiors for affording me the time and having faith in me to complete this project; and my peers for the advice, camaraderie, and friendship they supplied throughout this long and sometimes grueling process. In particular, I thank Colonel Gian Gentile, Colonel Kevin Farrell, Dr. William Leemen, Dr. Samuel Watson, Major Jon Due, Major Mike Bonura, and Major J.P. Clark. I thank my fellow Mexican War historians, Dr. Timothy Johnson and Dr. Irving Levinson, for the advice they offered me as I developed my topic. While we do not agree on all points, their work has had a great influence on mine. I thank the staffs at the Benson Latin American Collection at the University of Texas, the National Archives in Washington, D.C., the Beinecke Collection at Yale, and the New York State Archives in Albany, New York for the efforts they made on my behalf. V I thank my family who proofread many of my chapters and demonstrated patience with me as I missed events and shortened holiday visits so I could find time to research and write. Most importantly, I would like to thank my wife, Megan, and daughters, Cauley, Abby, and Ellie, for their patience and understanding of the time I commit to my work and the nomadic lifestyle we lead. Megan has carried me through life for the last five years so I could focus on this project. My girls have never known a time when Daddy wasn‘t regularly sneaking away to his office to write. I love you and dedicate this work to you. VI VITA June 1, 1975………………………………….Born, Media, Pennsylvania 1997……………………………………………..B.A., History, University of Delaware 2007……………………………………………..M.A, History, The Ohio State University 2007-2010 ……………………………………Assistant Professor, West Point 1997-present ……………………………Commissioned Officer, United States Army FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: History VII TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ...………………………………………………………………………………………………..………….……….…..…..... II Dedication ...……………………………………………………………………………………………………….…………………… IV Acknowledgements ...………………………………………………………………………………………….………………….. V Vita ...………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..……. VII List of Maps ...………………………………………………………………………………………………….…………………… IX List of Illustrations …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. IX Introduction …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 1 CH I: The Mexican War: Opposing Strategies of Occupation ………………………………………… 18 and Resistance CH II: The United States Army and Military Occupation ………………………………………………. 55 CH III: The Learning Phase: The Initial Occupation …………………………………………………….. 93 of the North (May 1846-October 1847) CH IV: Making them Feel the Evils of War: Gaining Control ……………………………………… 132 in the North (October 1847-June 1848) CH V: Conciliation in Central Mexico (March 1847-October 1847) ………………………….. 191 CH VI: Pacification in the Capital …………………………………………………………………………………… 238 CH VII: Bearing the Burdens of War: Central Mexico ………………………………………………… 266 (September 1847 – June 1848) Conclusion …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 316 Bibliography ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 328 VIII List of Maps Map 1: The Mexican War Summary ……………………………………………………………………………… 22 Map 2: Taylor and Wool in Northern Mexico …………..…………………………………………………… 113 Map 3: Scott‘s Campaign in Central Mexico…………………………………………………………………. 201 Map 4: The Guerrilla War ..……………………………………………………………………………………………… 278 List of Illustrations Figure 1: Zachary Taylor ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 95 Figure 2: John E. Wool …………………………………………………………………………………………… 134 Figure 3: Winfield Scott …………………………………………………………………………………………. 193 Figure 4: The National Bridge ………………………………………………………………………………… 229 IX INTRODUCTION The Mexican War is typically remembered for its dramatic victories at Buena Vista, Cerro Gordo, and Mexico City, with little mention made of the occupation and the American interaction with the occupied population. The typical textbook interpretation goes directly from the fall of the Mexican capital to the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Yet the Mexican government did not stop resisting after Mexico City fell, but instead relocated their capital out of range of the Americans and continued their efforts to thwart their enemy‘s ambitions. They perceived the possibility of a European nation intervening on the Mexican side, and they found hope in the Whig Party‘s opposition to the war and the possibility of a political shift in the United States that would neutralize the expansionist impulse that had brought on the war. These hopes were not misplaced. European powers did indeed indicate some interest in intervening and there was an active anti-war party in the United States. In the meantime, lacking the ability to meet the U.S. forces in open battle, the Mexicans turned to guerrilla warfare. Mexico had succeeded through guerrilla warfare before, fighting for eleven years to throw off the yoke of Spanish colonization. Early successes inspired more hope in this course as guerrillas severely interdicted American supply lines and frustrated American commanders. It was not unreasonable for the Mexican government to hope that guerilla warfare could once again prevail. 1 The American army, however, succeeded in containing the guerrilla menace. It also maintained stability among the large, potentially restive Mexican populace through an artful combination of conciliation toward the population, calibrated coercion, and efforts to co-opt the Catholic clergy and Mexican elite. Ultimately the army not only contained the guerrillas but also played an important role in forcing the Mexican government to conclude a peace treaty by which it relinquished half of Mexico. The American military occupation of Mexico was not a perfectly executed operation, but it succeeded