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The Proof of Emptiness Bh©aviveka'sJewel in the Hand
FONG, LAI,YAN
How to cite: FONG, LAI,YAN (2015) The Proof of Emptiness Bh©aviveka'sJewel in the Hand, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/11319/
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Title: The Proof of Emptiness – Bhāviveka’s Jewel in the Hand
Author: Lai Yan Fong
Abstract: This study seeks to examine the Svātantrika Madhyamaka proof of emptiness in Bhāviveka’s Jewel in the Hand (* Karatalaratna , KR). The proof comprises two inferences, the first of which is to the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things and the other to the ultimate unreality of unconditioned things. However, emptiness and logical reasoning are seemingly mutually exclusive, in that emptiness is non conceptual and ineffable while logical reasoning is conceptual and verbal. How can Bhāviveka prove emptiness by logical reasoning? The thesis addresses this theoretical tension in two parts: Part I – an introduction to the proof, and Part II – a commentary with the translation of the objections raised by the opponents and Bhāviveka’s responses related to the first inference.
Chapter 1 in Part I explains the formation of the two inferences. Chapter 2 clarifies Bhāviveka’s notions of the two truths in relation to the proof. The theoretical tension is solvable as the ultimate emptiness is understood as the expressible (paryāya ) ultimate truth, which is conceptual. The proof is further considered as the true (tathya ) conventional truth, through which the realisation of the inexpressible (aparyāya ) ultimate truth is facilitated. Chapter 3 examines the two inferences in terms of inferences for others. Although they are considered the summary of the conclusions of all individual inferences regarding the ultimate emptiness of different things, they are unestablished as standalone inferences because their reasons ( hetu ) are fallacious. Thus, they fail to prove the expressible ultimate truth. Chapter 4 suggests that the proof might be defensible referring to later developments in Buddhist logic.
Part II analyses the objections to Bhāviveka’s first inference and his notion of self emptiness and Bhāviveka’s defences, based on the translation of the relevant part in KR. These objections are refuted by logical reasoning, although not obviously with satisfactory results.
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THE PROOF OF EMPTINESS – BHĀVIVEKA’S JEWEL IN THE HAND
by
Lai Yan Fong
A thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the University of Durham for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Philosophy 2015
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABBREVIATIONS 5
PART I – INTRODUCTION 11 Chapter 1: Preliminaries 12 1.1 Dharma , satya , śūnyatā , svabhāva 13 1.2 The tension between logical reasoning and emptiness 16 1.3 The formation of the two inferences in the proof 19 1.3.1 Dignāga’s logical system 21 1.3.2 Bhāviveka’s proof 32 1.4 Previous research 38 1.5 Overview 40 Chapter 2: Bhāviveka’s Understanding of the Two Truths 48 2.1 Introduction 48 2.2 What is emptiness in the ultimate sense? 48 2.2.1 The ultimate emptiness as described by Bhāviveka 48 2.2.2 The epistemological interpretation of emptiness 53 2.3 Bhāviveka’s system of the two truths 55 2.3.1 Nāgārjuna’s explication of the two truths 56 2.3.2 Bhāviveka’s four categories of truth 58 2.3.3 Spiritual practice in terms of the two truths 70 Chapter 3: The Establishment of the Proof 77 3.1 Introduction 77 3.2 On the common agreement on the concept of a term 78 3.2.1 Terms as general qualities 78 3.2.2 The discussion of the merely false conventionalities 81 3.3 The general result of the whole inferential process 84 3.3.1 Inference as a process 85 3.3.2 The absence of a negative example and the third characteristic of a reason 87 3.3.3 Non implicative negation 91 3.4 The modifier “in terms of the ultimate truth” 94
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3.5 On taking all conditioned things or all unconditioned things as the subject 96 3.5.1 The fallacy of the reason being too specific 96 3.5.2 “Arisen from conditions” as the distinctive characteristic of “all conditioned things” 98 3.6 Is the expressible ultimate truth provable by inference? 102 Chapter 4: Closing Remarks 104
PART II – TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY 112
APPENDIX – THE CHINESE TEXT 243
BIBLIOGRAPHY 258
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ABBREVIATIONS
CBETA CBETA Chinese Electronic Tripi aka Collection (V5.2), distributed by the Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Association, May 2014. DDB Digital Dictionary of Buddhism