EXTENSIONS of REMARKS 31205 EXTENSIONS of REMARKS AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION Chemical, Or Nuclear-And to Use Military Su Ty and Arms Reduction
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December 15, 1982 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS 31205 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION chemical, or nuclear-and to use military su ty and arms reduction. The rhetoric of the SPEAKS OUT ON AMERICA'S periority in a politically coercive fashion. campaign to stop immediately the modern DEFENSE NEEDS The dismissal of the importance of the ization of nuclear weapons-and against growing Soviet military power only serves their "first use"-is based on twisted argu those who hold that defense investments ments, and feeds the public's fear of nuclear HON. JACK F. KEMP should be determined by economic condi war in order to capitalize on it. The cam OF NEW YORK tions and scaled to social spending rather paign's propagandists, at home and abroad, IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES than be determined by the character and have shifted the focus of the discussion size of the threat. from deterrence of all forms of war and Wednesday, December 15, 1982 Soviet military power continues to grow in military aggression to the horrors only of • Mr. KEMP. Mr. Speaker, recently all fields. In the past, this growth has not nuclear war, and are hiding the burgeoning the delegates to the Air Force Associa been affected by variations in the pace of growth in Soviet nuclear weapons behind the US defense effort. Since the mid-1960s, misrepresentations of US responses to that tion national convention unanimously the Soviets have nearly doubled real de growth. adopted a strong statement on the fense spending and more than doubled mili The Air Force Association believes a nu threat, the need to rebuild our deter tary research and development. In short, clear freeze today is simply not in the na rent posture, and the misguided cam when we built, they built; when we stopped, tional or the free world's best interest. It paign to "freeze" all development, they built. would leave us with a permanently weak testing, and production of nuclear They have increased their intercontinen ened deterrent posture. It would perpetuate tal nuclear delivery vehicles nearly sixfold; the very vulnerabilities and inadequacies we weapons. In its new statement of that, coupled with improved accuracy, policy, AFA states: are making great efforts to overcome. It makes those weapons a major threat to US would decrease strategic stability and grant The central factor that would keep the and allied security. The number of nuclear U.S.S.R. from provoking nuclear war is the the Soviets, without incentive to recipro warheads carried by the Soviet ICBM force cate, their major objectives in the START prospect of losing. Thus, there is no more is now more than twice the US total, and commanding peace-keeping task than to de <Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) and Inter some of the Soviet warheads are more accu mediate-Range Nuclear Force negotiations. velop the forces and capabilities to convince rate than the best in the US inventory. the Soviets that they cannot win. The US properly seeks a long-term, mutual, They have more than tripled the number and verifiable nuclear freeze at equal and The statement of policy of the of their theater and battlefield nuclear sharply reduced levels of forces. 180,000-member Air Force Association weapons. They outproduce the US in tacti cal fighters by a ratio of better than two It is important for the American people to is designed to give voice to the objec and a half to one. The Soviet Navy, in are understand clearly that no negotiations can tives of the association and to support markably short time, has become a huge, change the fact, or disregard, that this armed strength, adequate to maintain heavily armed, powerful fleet encompassing country and the USSR-by the latter's the security and peace of the United nuclear-powered surface ships, the world's choice-are ideological and geopolitical ad States and the free world. largest submarine force, and, now, aircraft versaries. We negoiate from vastily different Mr. Speaker, I ask that the AFA carriers. The Soviet ground forces also have premises of morality, political philosophy, significant advantages in armored vehicles, and standards of right and wrong. Therfore, statement of policy be printed in its the US can no more negotiate from a posi entirety and I commend this thought tactical defenses, and active military man power. tion of weakness than it can deter through ful paper to my colleagues. The Soviet force modernization program inferiority. There is a clear-cut need to mod combines the historic emphasis of produc ernize aging and increasingly vulnerable nu THE FANTASY OF SIMPLISTIC SOLUTIONS ing large quantities of military equipment clear strategic systems. The nuclear freeze The Soviet threat is real. It is not a fanta with comprehensive qualitative improve movement disregards the fact that the cur sy contrived by fearmongers or arms mer ments. The US and its allies, therefore, rent strategic nuclear force balance is desta chants. It results from the most awesome cannot count on offsetting these increasing bilizing and will, if not corrected, increase war machine in history. The Soviet war ma quantitative deficiencies with greater tech the likelihood of nuclear war. This Associa chine is the product of a single-minded ide nological sophistication. The Soviet boast tion believes there is a right way to achieve ology spawned by force, committed to force, that the military balance has shifted in equal and sharply reduced levels of forces, and brandishing force domestically and ex their favor "once and for all and irrevoca to curb the so-called "arms race," enhance ternally to perpetuate an insecure, morally bly" is about to become a reality unless deterrence and stability, and lower the de hollow system of imperial power. And the America and the free world make a sus structive potential between the superpow war machine is growing. tained commitment to rebuild their de ers. The Administration has found the right Military power remains the principal in fenses. The fragile advantage of the US and way. strument available to the Soviet dictator its allies in tactics, training, and technology The Administration's five-pronged strate ship for extending the system's frontiers must be exploited to the utmost. gic force modernization program provides and to save it from internal dissension and Nowhere is revitalization more urgent fundamental leverage for equitable arms re disintegration. An ever-increasing share of than in nuclear deterrence capabilities. The duction; it does not move the world toward the Soviet Union's gross national product Soviets are designing their strategic nuclear nuclear war but away from it. The MX estimated to reach about twenty percent in forces so they can win a nuclear war. The ICBM, the B-lB, the Trident D-5 SLBM this decade-is being lavished on military central factor that would keep the USSR <sea-launched ballistic missile), an improved, expansion while the standard of living of from provoking nuclear war is the prospect survivable command and control system, the Soviet people stagnates, and its econo of losing. Thus, there is no more command and revitalized strategic defenses are needed my flounders. ing peacekeeping task than to develop the not only to counter current Soviet force The evidence that the Soviet Union and forces and capabilities to convince the Sovi levels but also at the reduced levels envi its Warsaw Pact outmans, outguns, and, in ets that they cannot win. Further, the sioned with the US START proposal. With the military sector, outproduces the United American people must not lose sight of the reduced numbers of warheads, survivability States and its allies is incontrovertible. fact that what constitutes-or does not con and effectiveness become even more critical There is a tendency to dismiss this fact with stitute-a credible US deterrent is deter than with a larger force. The nation must the claim that military superiority in the mined by the perceptions of the Soviet lead not forget that deterrence is a product of nuclear age is meaningless. Such a conten ership and not by ideals expressed by many capability and credibility. If either is low, so tion is a dangerous delusion and is contrary American and international groups. is deterrence. to logic and history. It disregards, to this na Americans should be concerned that do The combined effect of the strategic force tion's peril, the words and deeds of the mestic and international groups promoting modernization program will be that this na Soviet leadership that spell out a doctrine simplistically an immediate nuclear freeze tion's nuclear forces could survive Soviet geared to winning whatever type of wars the are achieving ends diametrically opposed to first strikes and retaliate. Such a condition USSR gets into-be they conventional, their own professed goals of nuclear stabili- will reduce sharply Soviet temptation to use e This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by the Member on the floor. 31206 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS December 15, 1982 their nuclear weapons for blackmail and lift SOVIET WATCH: SURVEYING tinued attempts to exploit Iran's instability. from the US National Command Authori THE BREZHNEV LEGACY While Americans were being held hostage, ties the terrible burden of either using the Brezhnev continued to fan anti-American strategic nuclear forces at once or surren fervor in Iran. dering. The present hair-trigger posture HON. JACK FIELDS In Asia, the Soviets financed and encour that encourages Soviet nuclear adventurism OF TEXAS aged the North Vietnamese invasion of the is incompatible with effective deterrence. IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Sout, in violation of the peace agreement of Modernization of the strategic nuclear Wednesday, December 15, 1982 1973h, and now is financially inderwriting forces alone is not enough.