MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAN: IMPACT and EFFECTS Paul Rogers
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Oxford Research Group Briefing Paper – July 2010 MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAN: IMPACT AND EFFECTS Paul Rogers EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This report concludes that military action against Iran should be ruled out as a means of responding to its possible nuclear weapons ambitions. The consequences of such an attack would lead to a sustained conflict and regional instability that would be unlikely to prevent the eventual acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran and might even encourage it. Oxford Research Group’s (ORG) analysis in its last report on the issue in 2006 (Iran: Consequences of a War ) examined the capabilities and intentions of the United States and Israel to carry out military action. While US action against Iran may now be unlikely, given the policies of the Obama administration, Israel’s potential for action against Iran has increased. This report examines the improvements in Israeli strike capabilities in the past four years and points to Israel’s newly developed ability to conduct major attacks on Iranian nuclear and missile programmes. Long-range strike aircraft acquired from the United States, combined with an improved fleet of tanker aircraft, the deployment of long-range drones and the probable availability of support facilities in north-east Iraq and Azerbaijan, all increase Israel’s potential for action against Iran. Many sections of the Israeli political elite regard the Iranian nuclear and missile programme as an existential threat to Israel. If there is no progress to curtail Iran’s nuclear ambitions by other means, there is significant Israeli support for military action. This might also extend to renewed action by Israel in southern Lebanon to counter the progressive re-arming of Hezbollah militias by Iran. Iran regards a civil nuclear programme as a technological right, and sees its missile force as primarily defensive, however this might be viewed in Israel. While there is little evidence of a nuclear weapons programme, there are indications that Iran is moving towards the means to acquire that capability, even if it does not plan to take the final steps and withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). While an Israeli military strike could not be initiated entirely without the knowledge of the United States, it could avoid over-flying US-controlled airspace. The operation would target a wide range of nuclear and missile facilities and would also be aimed at the technical support, including factories, research centres and university facilities that would underpin the rebuilding of the facilities after attack. There would be significant civilian casualties. An Iranian administration under attack would experience considerable national unity and would work rapidly to redevelop its weapons programmes, withdrawing from the NPT and prioritising nuclear weapons. This would lead to further Israeli military strikes, resulting in prolonged conflict – the start of a long war with potential regional and global consequences. Iran could, if it chose, take many other actions, including operations to affect world oil markets and to increase instability in Iraq and Afghanistan. Prospects for regional stability and wider global security would be very seriously damaged. The report concludes that military action against Iran should be ruled out in responding to its possible nuclear ambitions. Oxford Research Group | Military Action Against Iran: Impact and Effects, July 2010 INTRODUCTION In November 2002, four months before the Iraq War started, Oxford Research Group published a report, Iraq: Consequences of a War, (1) that examined the possible outcomes of a military operation to terminate the Saddam Hussein regime. Two of its main conclusions proved accurate - that regime termination was certainly feasible but that the occupation of Iraq by coalition troops would increase support for radical elements in the region and also incite an insurgency. Following this work, in February 2006, Oxford Research Group published a study, Iran: Consequences of a War, which analysed the possible outcomes of a military attack on Iran, either by the United States or Israel. (2) At that time, the prospect of a war with Iran was generally considered to be fairly low, but there were many opinion-formers close to the Bush administration who were advocating such a course of action, primarily because of fears of an Iranian nuclear weapons programme, but also because of claimed Iranian interference in Iraq. That paper took as an assumption: “…that any military action by the United States or Israel would have as its function the inflicting of severe damage on Iran’s nuclear installations and medium-range missile programmes, while, in the case of the United States, endeavouring to pre-empt any damaging Iranian response.” (3) It also assumed that such military action would not extend to any attempt to terminate the Iranian administration, but would be primarily focussed on an attack using strike aircraft and stand-off missiles, including sea-launched cruise missiles. The main elements of that report were summarised as follows: An air attack would involve the systematic destruction of research, development, support and training centres for nuclear and missile programmes and the killing of as many technically competent people as possible. A US attack, which would be larger than anything Israel could mount, would also involve comprehensive destruction of Iranian air defence capabilities and attacks designed to pre-empt Iranian retaliation. This would require destruction of Iranian Revolutionary Guard facilities close to Iraq and of regular or irregular naval forces that could disrupt Gulf oil transit routes. Although US or Israeli attacks would severely damage Iranian nuclear and missile programmes, Iran would have many methods of responding in the months and years that followed. These would include disruption of Gulf oil production and exports, in spite of US attempts at pre-emption, systematic support for insurgents in Iraq, and encouragement to associates in Southern Lebanon to stage attacks on Israel. There would be considerable national unity in Iran in the face of military action by the United States or Israel, including a revitalised Revolutionary Guard. One key response from Iran would be a determination to reconstruct a nuclear programme and develop it rapidly into a nuclear weapons capability, with this accompanied by withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This would require further attacks. A military operation against Iran would not, therefore, be a short-term matter but would set in motion a complex and long-lasting confrontation. It follows that military action should be firmly ruled out and alternative strategies developed. (4) The 2006 report attracted considerable attention, was translated into Turkish, Farsi and German, and was widely read in Iran and the United States. During the months that followed, there was further pressure from neo-conservative circles in the United States to take action against Iran, but the Bush 2 Oxford Research Group | Military Action Against Iran: Impact and Effects, July 2010 administration was preoccupied with a major insurgency in Iraq and increasing instability in Afghanistan. Israel, meanwhile, became involved in a brief but very violent confrontation with Hezbollah in southern Lebanon in a war that resulted in considerable international criticism of its actions, especially of the effects of the war on Lebanese civilians and the Lebanese economic infrastructure. The inability of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) to defeat Hezbollah in 2006, in the face of rocket attacks which continued throughout the war, caused considerable concern. In one sense, this reduced attention on Iran because of a perceived need for Israel to re-think its more immediate security posture, but in another sense, Iran was seen as the primary supporter and indeed armourer of Hezbollah and therefore a continuing long-term threat to the security of Israel. This added to the belief across much of Israeli political opinion that, if Iran was ever to develop nuclear weapons, it would constitute an existential threat to Israel, in spite of its own nuclear forces. The earlier (2006) Oxford Research Group analysis of the consequences of a war with Iran (cited above) concentrated on the impact of a US operation. Although contingency war plans for strikes on Iran may exist within US Central Command, the greater current risk is of an Israeli action, specifically intended to limit Iran’s ability to develop a nuclear weapons programme. While noting the US context, this paper therefore concentrates on Israeli capabilities and possible Iranian responses to such an attack. THE US CONTEXT Since January 2009, the Obama administration has sought to resolve the vexed question of Iran’s potential to develop nuclear weapons by negotiation. In the face of turbulent political circumstances within Iran, this has proved difficult, in spite of support from many western European countries. In February 2010, negotiations aimed at limiting Iran’s capacity to enrich uranium to beyond standard reactor grade (around 4%) appeared to have ended as President Ahmadinejad announced plans to commence enrichment to 20% at a 164-machine enrichment cascade at Natanz. (5) This was broadly legitimate under the terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in that such enrichment is appropriate for a nuclear research reactor in Tehran that is used, among other functions, for producing radio-isotopes for medical use. The problem was that this level of enrichment would take Iranian nuclear technicians closer to the experience and capabilities necessary for them to enrich uranium to the 85%+ level required for a nuclear weapon. More than a year into the Obama administration, and with the mid-term Congressional elections approaching, there is still a dominant view in neo-conservative and other right-wing circles that Iran is, and always has been, a much greater threat to US regional and global interests than Iraq ever was. A common view before the start of the Iraq War in March 2003 was that “if we get Iraq right, we won’t have to worry about Iran”.