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A Case Study of the LTTE Global Journal of HUMAN-SOCIAL SCIENCE: F Political Science Volume 19 Issue 2 Version 1.0 Year 2019 Type: Double Blind Peer Reviewed International Research Journal Publisher: Global Journals Online ISSN: 2249-460x & Print ISSN: 0975-587X State Reforms in Response to Terrorism: A Case Study of the LTTE By Tiara Biswas Abstract- This paper is a case study of the state reforms put into place due to and after the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The LTTE is one of the most known organisations of recent times, indirectly but not solely responsible for the Tamil Diaspora witnessed during the 90s. This paper has reviewed and qualitatively analysed literature which examined the history of the LTTE, it’s structures, the reforms made by it and the aftermath of its defeat. The research question looks at the state reforms put into place during the reign of the LTTE, and after its defeat. GJHSS-F Classification: FOR Code: 360199p StateReformsinResponsetoTerrorismaCaseStudyoftheLTTE Strictly as per the compliance and regulations of: © 2019. Tiara Biswas. This is a research/review paper, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution- Noncommercial 3.0 Unported License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/), permitting all non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. State Reforms in Response to Terrorism: A Case Study of the LTTE Tiara Biswas Abstra ct- This paper is a case study of the state reforms put itself. Acts of terrorism are perpetrated from actors into place due to and after the defeat of the Liberation Tigers within the nation, not an external threat. This study, by of Tamil Eelam. The LTTE is one of the most known focusing on the single case of the LTTE, aims to organisations of recent times, indirectly but not solely highlight the governmental response by looking at responsible for the Tamil Diaspora witnessed during the 90s. actors and outcomes of this particular case. This paper has reviewed and qualitatively analysed literature which examined the history of the LTTE, it’s structures, the II. Literature Review 2019 reforms made by it and the aftermath of its defeat. The research question looks at the state reforms put into place The empirical study conducted by ear during the reign of the LTTE, and after its defeat. Y Sarvananthan (2018) distinguishes the semantics between terrorism and liberation, using LTTE as a case I. Introduction 19 study. The argument made by this paper is that the errorism is the violence or threat of violence LTTE may have initially been a liberation movement, but against soft targets perpetrated by non-state due to the tactics and methods adopted by it, it soon Tactors in pursuit of political goals. Regardless of escalated into a terrorist movement. Some of the ideology or political alignment, acts of terrorism have characteristics that marks it as a terrorist movement are always been conducted with political goals in mind. (i) armed struggle was based overwhelmingly on acts of When identifying ideologies in relation to terror attacks, violence, devoid of mass mobilisation, political four groups have been identified - right wing, left wing, agitations and popular participation, (ii) support of the nationalist/separatist and single issue terrorism. masses was seeked out through persecution rather than Nationalist/separatist groups are ones that are driven by persuasion, (iii) deliberate targeting of unarmed civilians, a pursuit for independence or greater autonomy from an (iv) reliance on suicidal armed attacks, (v) recruitment existing territory. They usually conduct attacks which and employment of children in combat and (vi) limit civilians casualties as their goal is to attract people internecine war against members of its own community. to their cause. Attacks from these kinds of groups are After Prabhakaran assumed sole leadership of the LTTE ) F usually more focused on targeting those with power in in the early 1980s, he wanted to be the sole ( Volume XIX Issue II Version I an attempt to make them withdraw or make representative for the Tamil struggle and began concessions. For my paper, I want to focus on one such prosecuting other Tamil Liberation groups. This caused separatist group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil being a a rapid decrease in the public support towards the separatist group, instead stating themselves as “fighting LTTE. The central argument of this paper is that, based for self- determination and restoration of sovereignty in on the six criteria above, LTTE was a terrorist what it recognized as its homeland”. While the LTTE organisation,that initially started as a liberation - does not identify as a separatist group, it has the movement. This study helps support my claims that the characteristics of one as it clearly wanted to set up a LTTE was indeed a terrorist organization, even though separate state for the Tamils. This paper focuses on they did not choose to call themselves one. how the LTTE used means of terrorism to spread their In this paper (De Votta, 2009), the author political agenda and the state response they elicited studies the history and tension between the Sinhalese during and after their reign. and Tamils of Sri Lanka, the birth of the LTTE and the The study is important as it seeks to examine Sinhalese government indirect role in the radicalisation the responses from a state when faced with terrorism. of the Tamil youth. Up till the independence of Sri Lanka, Terrorism is not a new concept, most of us are familiar Tamil elites had always viewed themselves ethnically with the reasons as to why and how it happens equal to the Sinhalese. Due to their small numbers as Global Journal of Human Social Science regardless of the variety of types of terrorisms. The well, the Tamils called for equal political representation- paper studies the direct response to terrorism not only between themselves and the Sinhalese. This unity was on a country’s government, but on the citizens and rocked in 1956 when Bandaranaike asked to make international community as well. For the case chosen, Sinhalese and Tamil the national languages of the the threat of terrorism comes from within the nation country but instead embraced only Sinhalese last Author: Symbiosis School for Liberal Arts, India. minute to win the elections. This was the beginning of e-mail: [email protected] the ethnic outbidding the Tamilian minorities would face. ©2019 Global Journals State Reforms in Response to Terrorism: a Case Study of the LTTE Incidents which would rule out the Tamil minorities The defeat of the LTTE has been the only relief became a trend, thus making the quest for a separate the Sinhalese citizens have experienced in a long time. eelam (state) inevitable. The LTTE was established Even then, they struggle to relish it. Sri Lankan citizens initially as the the Tamil New Tigers in 1972 but later on who took part in the war still seem to be disappearing changing its name to the Liberation Tamil Tigers of (Candela & Aldama, 2016). The following is one such Eelam by 1976. Under President Jayawardene’s incident, Thaya Malar’s son returned home after the war government, the Tamil diaspora began. Tamil homes ended. But one night, he disappeared. The mother had been looted and destroyed and many Tamil women believes that the Sri Lankan Army had something to do raped. Tamilians began seeking refuge in India and with it. She even wrote a letter to then President, other countries. This diaspora further strengthened the Mahinda Rajapaksa, but received no response. After the need for an eelam. Rebel groups grew stronger in war ended, nearly 300,000 Tamils who had been numbers. The LTTE, in particular, went from being the enlisted in the fighting by the LTTE, were detained by the Tamilian’s saviour to their cause of distress. The LTTE’s state (Ganguly, 2016). As non-militant families began to need for control over all rebel groups was the start of return to their villages, many found that their homes had 2019 their downfall. Along with this, they began enlisting been destroyed or were part of military zones. Many children and women for their cause due to the quick became refugees due to this. Post war, signs of ear progress were everywhere. New roads were paved, Y decline of trust in them by the Tamilian minority. The paper (Stokke, 2006) examines LTTE’s bridges rebuilt. However, people despaired over the 20 idealized state structure and their political plans for Sinhalese triumphalism that followed the defeat of the reorganising the state. This paper was published before LTTE. Rather than aiming for national reconciliation, the downfall of the LTTE, thus putting issues in a former President Mahinda Rajapaksa and his different context. The eelam state planned to focus on government behaved as if it was not the LTTE that was three key areas : security, welfare and economic defeated, but the entire Tamil population (Ganguly, development. The Tamil Eelam judicial system had 2016). included district courts for civil and criminal cases as “The army set up numerous checkpoints in Tamil well as two high courts in Killinochi and Mullaitivu. The areas and instituted intrusive surveillance. Tamils penalties were strict, from fines to to jail terms but also lived with the constant threat of arbitrary arrest and including capital punishment in rare cases. The other abuse. They spoke of the ubiquitous white vans, institution for maintaining law and order was the Tamil civilian vehicles used by security forces to abduct Eelam Police, formed in 1991. LTTE representatives suspected LTTE supporters, who were then brutally said that the Tamil Eelam Police were responsible for the tortured in custody.
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