ilitary organisations worldwide have steadily increased IDSA Occasional Paper No. 15 Mreliance on space assets for communications, surveillance, and navigation. The military use of space includes communication, imagery, navigation, signal/electronic intelligence, early warning, and meteorology. Of all these, communication followed by imagery Space Capability and India’s Defence and navigations are the most important, widely and extensively used applications, both by civil and military organisations. India has Communications Up to 2022 and Beyond sufficient space capability as compared to China, to support its defence forces especially in the field of communication and sufficient capability for surveillance, the two major and most important applications of space systems. Colonel Deepak Sharma was commissioned in Corps of Signals in 1984. He has an M. Tech degree in Communications from IIT, Kanpur and has also done Technical Staff Course. He commanded Corps Engineering Signals Regiment in Counter Insurgency Environment and the unit was responsible for provisioning communication in entire Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. As a Commanding Officer in North-East in 'OP RHINO', he was awarded Army Commanders' Commendation Card for provisioning communication to troops of Corps who took part in flushing out Insurgents from Bhutan. After completion of M Tech from IIT Kanpur, in 1994, he was posted as Deputy Director from 1994 to 1997 and subsequently as Director from Dec 2006 to Jun 2009 in Directorate dealing with all the satellite communication aspects of the Army. Col. Sharma joined IDSA in July 2009, and is working on projects related to space capability and other aspects of the space system. Deepak Sharma ISBN 81-86019-84-7 9 7 9 8 1 8 6 0 1 9 8 4 8 Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi IDSA Occasional Paper No. 15 Space Capability and India’s Defence Communications Up to 2022 and Beyond Deepak Sharma Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses New Delhi Ó Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, sorted in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photo-copying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute for Defence Studied and Analyses (IDSA). ISBN: 81-86019-84-7 First Published: November 2010 Price: Rs 175/- Published by: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses No.1, Development Enclave, Rao Tula Ram Marg, Delhi Cantt., New Delhi - 110 010 Tel. (91-11) 2671-7983 Fax.(91-11) 2615 4191 E-mail: [email protected] Website: http://www.idsa.in Cover & Layout by: Geeta Kumari Printed at: M/s Printline H-10, IInd Floor, NDSE-I New Delhi - 110049 Tel: (91-11) 24651060, 24643119 E-mail : [email protected] Background The space assets are being exploited by our defence forces for communication, utilising our own satellite systems since 1990. However there are issues which require to be addressed in detail for enhancing the space based capability of our defence forces and enabling them to exploit the space assets for Network-centric warfare (NCW), as an integrated force. The space is an important third dimension area to be exploited by defence forces to have a decisive edge over its adversary, especially in nuclear threat and other similar environment. Space is emerging as an important 'arena' for future military operations. Information domination through space-based assets would become the key to this pursuit and would shape the outcome of war. Therefore the important space based capabilities desired and essential for military use are the following: (a) Space-based Observation/surveillance Capabilities. (b) Position and Navigational information. (c) Reliable Communication Capabilities. Of all the above, communication is the most important application which is widely and extensively used by the Indian defence forces, followed by imagery and navigation. One of the most important features of space- based system is that it provides global coverage. The footprint of the satellite can be planned and managed to suite global scenario of operations. Space systems are most suited for global, continuous and near continuous coverage and communication connectivity to allow the defence forces to execute its missions effectively. Ultimately, the exploitation of space by using satellite will facilitate real time connectivity between 'sensor, decision-makers, and shooters' at geographically separated locations. Communication in the defence forces is multi layered and flexible. The media could be terrestrial, radio or satellite. Satellite media is planned to provide global coverage and redundancy to other communication media. The satellite communication systems are ideal as primary means of communication for mobile, remote inhospitable terrain and for sea operations. The satellite payloads for a defence specific satellite should therefore cater for the needs of the forces to support NCW in the long term. 4 Deepak Sharma Legal Framework and Adoption of Multilateral Treaties for Outer Space1 The international legal framework for outer space establishes the principle that space should be used for “peaceful purposes.” Since the signing of the Outer Space Treaty (OST) in 1967, this framework has grown to include the Astronaut Rescue Agreement (1968), the Liability Convention (1972), the Registration Convention (1979), and the Moon Agreement (1979), as well as a range of other international and bilateral agreements and relevant rules of customary international law. The OST prohibits the stationing of nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction anywhere in space. The US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 eliminated a longstanding US/USSR-Russia prohibition on space-based conventional weapons, stimulating renewed concerns about the potential for space weaponisation. What began as a focus on multilateral space treaties, however, has transitioned to a focus on what some describe as 'soft law' referring to a range of non-binding governance tools including principles, resolutions, confidence-building measures, and policy and technical guidelines. The US has always been resisting international move for any legally binding treaties banning anti-satellite tests. In 2008, at the UN General Assembly, US had reiterated its rejection of legally binding approaches to security in space. The US has expressed the view that destruction of failed satellite by any nation is in consistent with the Outer Space Treaty. International legal events in 2008 had mainly focused on non-binding governance tools, which some refer to as 'soft law', such as transparency and confidence-building measures and codes of conduct. Support for these measures indicates a growing commitment on the part of some leading space-faring countries to better regulate activities in outer space by codifying generally accepted behaviours. However, the potential risk with this approach is that implementation will be arbitrary and selective, as demonstrated by the ongoing challenges faced by the Hague Code of Conduct, and that de facto international law will be made via the unilateral actions of states, as demonstrated by the US destruction of one of its own satellites. The US action to destroy its satellite and official responses by other governments may stand as precedents for procedures 1. Space report 2009, executive summary, available at www.spacesecurity.org Space Capability and India's Defence Communications Up to 2022 and Beyond 5 under which the use of force in outer space is legitimised, in the absence of specific treaty law. A range of international institutions, such as the UN General Assembly, the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN COPUOS), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and the Conference on Disarmament (CD), have been mandated to address issues related to space security. But the CD has been deadlocked without an agreed plan of work since 1996 and there has been no progress on space issues in 30 years, despite efforts to move forward on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) mandate to develop an instrument relating to the weaponisation of space. COPUOS remains active, with a focus on non- binding, technical approaches to security in space. Activities surrounding the UN COPUOS in 2008 reinforced the continued focus on nonbinding, technical approaches to international governance of outer space noted in. Despite drawbacks, these are the only mechanisms that are garnering widespread support and leading to improvements in the security of outer space in the face of continued lack of consensus on new treaties in both the UN COPUOS and the CD. However, the increased interaction between these two organisations suggests that addressing security concerns in space more comprehensively may become possible in the future, although the stark division between civil and safety issues and military and weapons issues remains institutionalised. All space-faring states emphasise the importance of cooperation and the peaceful uses of space, but with caveats based on national security concerns. States continued to express commitment to international cooperation on the peaceful use of outer space in their civil space policies in 2008. Some peaceful uses of space are increasingly viewed as strategic, however, which could limit opportunities for cooperation and cause political tensions in space, depending on whether states pursue independent or collective measures