ASRXXX10.1177/0003122419831228American Sociological ReviewReed 831228research-article2019 American Sociological Review 1 –34 Performative State-Formation © American Sociological Association 2019 https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122419831228DOI: 10.1177/0003122419831228 in the Early American journals.sagepub.com/home/asr Republic Isaac Ariail Reeda Abstract How do proto-state organizations achieve an initial accumulation of power, such that they are in a position to grow (or shrink) as an organization, maintain their prestige (or lose it), and be viewed, by elite and populace, as something real and consequential that can be argued about, supported, or attacked? This article argues that state-formation has a performative dimension, in which the publicity of acts of violence, coercion, and negotiation made by agents of the proto-state, and the variable interpretation of these acts, are paramount to the state’s success (or failure) and developing character. In the model developed here, agents of a would-be state act in response to emergencies, and when public interpretations of those actions assign their character and effectiveness to “the state,” the state is performed into being. In particular, public performance solves, in part, agency problems obtaining between state rulers and their staff and elite allies. The formation of the federal government in the early American republic (1783 to 1801), whose success is insufficiently accounted for by extant theory, provides an opportunity to develop a model of the performative dimension of state-formation. Keywords agency theory, power, rebellion, federal government, political sociology In the study of state-formation, a healthy the “primitive accumulation of symbolic debate has developed concerning the trajecto- power” by the Brazilian state, the puzzle can ries of organizations with ambitions to sover- be phrased as a question: How do would-be eignty (Adams 1999; Gorski 1995; Kiser and states achieve an initial accumulation of Linton 2002; Kiser and Schneider 1994, power, such that they are in a position to grow 1995; Lachmann 1989; Loveman 2005; (or shrink) as an organization, maintain their Novak 2008; Steinmetz 2008). This debate prestige (or lose it), and be viewed, by elite has paid special attention to states’ funding and populace, as something real and conse- and command of physical violence (Tilly quential that can be argued about, supported, 1985), and to how organizations seek legiti- or attacked?1 macy, come to be taken for granted as part of the social landscape, and provide the catego- ries of understanding used in many other aUniversity of Virginia areas of social life (Bourdieu 2014). A remaining problem for this research con- Corresponding Author: Isaac Ariail Reed, Department of Sociology, cerns the initial moments of the accumulation University of Virginia, 130 Ruppel Drive, P.O. of power by proto-state organizations. Acutely Box 400766, Charlottesville, VA 22904 articulated by Loveman (2005) in her study of Email: [email protected] 2 American Sociological Review 00(0) Building on Loveman (2005) and other theory-testing, focuses on a case in which the recent arguments about states and power performative dimension was crucial to the emphasizing public communication and polit- process of state-making. ical semiosis (Adut 2018; Norton 2014; First, I show why the initial accumulation Santana-Acuña 2014; Wagner-Pacifici 2010), of state power is a theoretical problem for this article argues that state-formation has a sociology, discussing three models of state- performative dimension: the initial accumula- formation as different dimensions of the pro- tion of state power occurs, in part, through cess. I then set out a basic model of the “state by demonstration.” In this dimension of performative dimension of state-building, the accumulation of power, the publicity of grounded in the study of the public interpreta- the would-be state’s acts of violence and tion of the use of violence and coercion in coercion, and the variable interpretation of emergencies by state agents. Next, I provide these acts (including, as part of interpretation, an interpretation of American political devel- the attribution of such acts to the state), are opment in the years 1783 to 1801, beginning paramount to a state’s success (or failure) and with the relative insufficiency of extant theo- developing character. If the would-be state is ries of state-formation to account for the emer- compelling and convincing, to certain audi- gence of the federal government in the early ences, in its execution of violence on certain years of the United States of America. After targets, then it achieves a certain felicity con- providing an empirical account of the media- dition (Austin 1975; Goffman 1983; Wagner- tion of state action through the network of Pacifici 2017), helping make the state into an newspapers in the early American republic, I arbiter of social reality and an entity that ori- engage in a fine-grained tracing of the process ents the actions of elites and populace. This of performance in the key year of 1794. In that felicity features weaponry and finance, but its year, the federal apparatus, amid widespread utility for the accumulation of power is doubt about its future, performed particularly dependent on public interpretation. Public successfully. I then provide a contextualiza- interpretation, when it goes well for the per- tion of the successes of 1794 and their effects, formative state, helps solve agency problems drawn via a brief account of (1) a less propi- obtaining between rulers and their staff and tiously handled emergency in the early Ameri- allies. can republic (Fries’s Rebellion) and (2) the All states have a “public face” of some republic’s success in avoiding a civil war in sort. Symbols of the state, for example, are 1801. Finally, I discuss the relationship of the often displayed in prominent ways, with the theory developed here to a range of other result not only that people see them, but peo- sociological work on states and performance. ple see other people see them, so that states continue their existence, in part, through their publicity (Endelman 2015), which allows the STATE-FORMATION AS THE coordination of action (Chwe [2001] 2013). RESOLUTION OF AGENCY We can thus expect all processes of state- PROBLEMS: THREE EXTANT formation to involve some aspect of perform- MODELS ative display. However, based on the model developed here, we can also expect variation All organizations with ambitions to become in the degree to which such performances are states face a series of agency problems. These parasitic upon more well-known dimensions are problems arising from the recruitment of of state-formation, on the one hand, or form various persons and organizations into the an essential hinge for the initial success or state building project, and the ensuing delega- failure of a given organization’s ambitions to tion of tasks to staff, elite allies, or other ver- sovereignty, on the other. This article, which sions of a would-be state’s agents. Formal is an effort in theory-building rather than agency theory, as a part of rational choice Reed 3 sociology, often invokes strong assumptions will not take physically risky actions to secure about the strategic nature of human action the resources that might be used to pay them and motivation when analyzing these prob- and others). This intertwining has been dis- lems (Coleman 1994; Kiser 1999; Kiser and cussed extensively in the rational choice liter- Kane 2007). ature (Kiser 1994; Kiser and Schneider 1994), A broader account of agency theory sug- with particular focus on the question of how gests that the recurrence of agency problems accountability does or does not function to can serve as a theoretical frame for under- resolve such problems (Ermakoff 2011); here, standing a wide variety of power situations I place it in the broader context of the accumu- (Adams 1996, 2010, 2011; Norton 2015; lation of state power that includes coercion, Reed 2017; Shapiro 2005). Building on this economic interest, and legitimacy. work, we can view state-formation as the emergence of a solution to the problem of Exchange and Threat how a small set of principals (rulers) can secure and ensure that their agents (staff, Research that focuses on capital and coercion allied elites) enforce the rulers’ will and main- as explanatory factors in state-formation tain the rulers’ legitimacy (to some degree) examines how the mix of money, guns, and over the general population, under varying manpower initially at the disposal of would-be threat from opponents (Tyson 2018). rulers—and the strategic interactions between In particular, for state-formation to suc- rulers, elites, and populace—explains the ceed, a series of intertwining agency prob- eventual outcome of rulers’ efforts to over- lems must be overcome. Corrupt tax officials come agency problems and build an effective can be offered better rates to be honest and state apparatus. In this dimension of state- report on their dishonest co-workers, but (par- formation, hierarchical ties are constructed out ticularly if rulers lack money) they can also of resources granted to, and threats of resource be punished via imprisonment. However, the depletion directed at, elites and other agents use of physical coercion to shore up taxation (Brewer 1990; Kentor 2014; Tilly 1992). This is, itself, an agency problem.2 Rulers have to research is particularly sensitive to variations get their military officers or police