When Malware Attacks Your IBM I, AIX, and Linux Servers
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A Story of an Embedded Linux Botnet
A Moose Once Bit My Honeypot A Story of an Embedded Linux Botnet by Olivier Bilodeau (@obilodeau) $ apropos Embedded Linux Malware Moose DNA (description) Moose Herding (the Operation) What’s New? Take Aways $ whoami Malware Researcher at ESET Infosec lecturer at ETS University in Montreal Previously infosec developer, network admin, linux system admin Co-founder Montrehack (hands-on security workshops) Founder NorthSec Hacker Jeopardy Embedded Linux Malware What marketing likes to call "Internet of Things Malware" Malware Running On An Embedded Linux System Like consumer routers DVR Smart TVs IP Camera monitoring systems … Caracteristics of Embedded Linux Systems Small amount of memory Small amount of flash Non x86 architectures: ARM, MIPS Wide-variety of libc implementations / versions Same ABI-compatible Linux kernel (2.4 < x < 4.3) Support ELF binaries Rarely an integrated UI Networked Why Threats On These Systems Matters? Hard to detect Hard to remediate Hard to fix Low hanging fruit for bad guys It’s Real Several cases disclosed in the last two years A lot of same-old background noise (DDoSer) Things are only getting worse Wait, is IoT malware really about things? NNoo.. NNoott yyeett.. So what kind of malware can we find on such insecure devices? Linux/Aidra Linux/Bassobo ChinaZ family (XOR.DDoS, …) Linux/Dofloo Linux/DNSAmp (Mr Black, BillGates) Linux/Gafgyt (LizardStresser) Linux/Hydra Linux/Tsunami … LLeessssoonn LLeeaarrnneedd ##00 Statically-linked stripped binaries Static/stripped ELF primer No imports (library calls) present -
1994 Hearings on Software Patents
United States Patent and Trademark Office Public Hearing on Use of the Patent System to Protect Software-Related Inventions Transcript of Proceedings Wednesday, January 26, 1994 Thursday, January 27, 1994 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Before Bruce A. Lehman Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks Location: San Jose Convention Center 408 Almaden Avenue San Jose, California UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE Public Hearing on Patent Protection for Software-Related Inventions San Jose, California -- January 26-27, 1994 Table of Participants Before: Bruce A. Lehman Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks United States Patent and Trademark Office The Panel: Ginger Lew General Counsel-Designate United States Department of Commerce Lawrence Goffney Assistant Commissioner for Patents-Designate United States Patent and Trademark Office Micheal K. Kirk Assistant Commissioner for External Affairs United States Patent and Trademark Office Jeffrey P. Kushan Attorney-Advisor United States Patent and Trademark Office Recording Technicians: Karl Henderscheid Support Office Services 52 Second Street, Third Floor San Francisco, CA 94104 (415) 391-4578 Trascriber: Milton Hare Rogershare Transcribers 541 Maud Avenue San Leandro, CA 94577 (510) 357-8220 - ii - UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE Public Hearing on Patent Protection for Software-Related Inventions San Jose, California -- January 26-27, 1994 Witnesses January 26, 1994 January 27, 1994 Mr. Clark Mr. Fiddler VideoDiscovery Wind River Systems Mr. Poppa Mr. Warren StorageTek Autodesk, Inc. Mr. Ryan Ms. O'Hare Intellectual Property Owners, Inc. Mr. Glenn Mr. LeFaivre Intellectual Property Section of the State Bar of California Apple Computer Mr. -
Survivor: a Fine-Grained Intrusion Response and Recovery Approach for Commodity Operating Systems
Survivor: A Fine-Grained Intrusion Response and Recovery Approach for Commodity Operating Systems Ronny Chevalier David Plaquin HP Labs HP Labs CentraleSupélec, Inria, CNRS, IRISA [email protected] [email protected] Chris Dalton Guillaume Hiet HP Labs CentraleSupélec, Inria, CNRS, IRISA [email protected] [email protected] ABSTRACT 1 INTRODUCTION Despite the deployment of preventive security mechanisms to pro- Despite progress in preventive security mechanisms such as cryp- tect the assets and computing platforms of users, intrusions even- tography, secure coding practices, or network security, given time, tually occur. We propose a novel intrusion survivability approach an intrusion will eventually occur. Such a case may happen due to to withstand ongoing intrusions. Our approach relies on an orches- technical reasons (e.g., a misconfiguration, a system not updated, tration of fine-grained recovery and per-service responses (e.g., or an unknown vulnerability) and economic reasons [39] (e.g., do privileges removal). Such an approach may put the system into a the benefits of an intrusion for criminals outweigh their costs?). degraded mode. This degraded mode prevents attackers to reinfect To limit the damage done by security incidents, intrusion re- the system or to achieve their goals if they managed to reinfect covery systems help administrators restore a compromised system it. It maintains the availability of core functions while waiting for into a sane state. Common limitations are that they do not preserve patches to be deployed. We devised a cost-sensitive response se- availability [23, 27, 34] (e.g., they force a system shutdown) or that lection process to ensure that while the service is in a degraded they neither stop intrusions from reoccurring nor withstand re- mode, its core functions are still operating. -
Systems Management Performance Reference Information 7.1
IBM IBM i Systems management Performance reference information 7.1 IBM IBM i Systems management Performance reference information 7.1 Note Before using this information and the product it supports, read the information in “Notices,” on page 267. This edition applies to IBM i 7.1 (product number 5770-SS1) and to all subsequent releases and modifications until otherwise indicated in new editions. This version does not run on all reduced instruction set computer (RISC) models nor does it run on CISC models. © Copyright IBM Corporation 1998, 2010. US Government Users Restricted Rights – Use, duplication or disclosure restricted by GSA ADP Schedule Contract with IBM Corp. Contents Reference information for Performance 1 Disk Watcher data files: QAPYDWSTAT ... 237 Collection Services data files ......... 1 Disk Watcher data files: QAPYDWTDER ... 239 Collection Services data files containing time Disk Watcher data files: QAPYDWTRC .... 240 interval data ............. 1 Data files: File abbreviations ........ 244 Collection Services data files: Field data for CL commands for performance ....... 244 configuration database files........ 221 Intelligent Agents ............ 247 Collection Services database files: Field data for Intelligent Agent concepts ........ 247 trace database files .......... 229 Developing agents........... 250 Collection Services data files: System category Set up your agent environment ...... 252 and file relationships .......... 229 Managing agents ........... 260 Collection Services data files: Task type extender 231 Disk -
Sureview® Memory Integrity Advanced Linux Memory Analysis Delivers Unparalleled Visibility and Verification
SureView® Memory Integrity Advanced Linux Memory Analysis Delivers Unparalleled Visibility and Verification Promoting trustworthy and repeatable analysis of volatile system state Benefits Increased Usage of Linux in Forensics Field Guide for Linux Global Enterprises Systems2,” the apparent goal n Enables visibility into the state n Scans thousands of The use of Linux is everywhere of these attackers is to steal all systems with hundreds of of systems software while in the world. Linux is used in types of information. Perhaps of gigabytes of memory executing in memory our stock exchange transactions, greatest concern are the synchro- on Linux systems n Provides a configurable social media, network storage nized, targeted attacks against n Delivers malware detection using scanning engine for automated devices, smartphones, DVR’s, Linux systems. For several years, scans of remote systems an integrity verification approach online purchasing web sites, organized groups of attackers to verify that all systems software throughout an enterprise running is known and unmodified and in the majority of global (a.k.a. threat actors) have been n Incorporates an easy-to- Internet traffic. The Linux infiltrating Linux systems and to quickly identify threats use GUI to quickly assess Foundation’s 2013 Enterprise have been communicating with n Allows the integration and interpret results End User Report indicates that command and control (C2) of memory forensics into n Delivers output in a structured 80% of respondents planned servers and exfiltrating data enterprise security information data format (JSON) to to increase their numbers of from compromised Linux sys- and event management facilitate analytics systems (SIEMS) supporting Linux servers over the next five tems. -
Malware Trends
NCCIC National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center Malware Trends Industrial Control Systems Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) Advanced Analytical Laboratory (AAL) October 2016 This product is provided subject only to the Notification Section as indicated here:http://www.us-cert.gov/privacy/ SUMMARY This white paper will explore the changes in malware throughout the past several years, with a focus on what the security industry is most likely to see today, how asset owners can harden existing networks against these attacks, and the expected direction of developments and targets in the com- ing years. ii CONTENTS SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................................ii ACRONYMS .............................................................................................................................................. iv 1.INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 State of the Battlefield ..................................................................................................................... 1 2.ATTACKER TACTIC CHANGES ........................................................................................................... 2 2.1 Malware as a Service ...................................................................................................................... 2 2.2 Destructive Malware ...................................................................................................................... -
Russian GRU 85Th Gtsss Deploys Previously Undisclosed Drovorub Malware
National Security Agency Federal Bureau of Investigation Cybersecurity Advisory Russian GRU 85th GTsSS Deploys Previously Undisclosed Drovorub Malware August 2020 Rev 1.0 U/OO/160679-20 PP-20-0714 Russian GRU 85th GTsSS Deploys Previously Undisclosed Drovorub Malware Notices and history Disclaimer of Warranties and Endorsement The information and opinions contained in this document are provided "as is" and without any warranties or guarantees. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government. This guidance shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. Sources and Methods NSA and FBI use a variety of sources, methods, and partnerships to acquire information about foreign cyber threats. This advisory contains the information NSA and FBI have concluded can be publicly released, consistent with the protection of sources and methods and the public interest. Publication Information Purpose This advisory was developed as a joint effort between NSA and FBI in support of each agency’s respective missions. The release of this advisory furthers NSA’s cybersecurity missions, including its responsibilities to identify and disseminate threats to National Security Systems, Department of Defense information systems, and the Defense Industrial Base, and to develop and issue cybersecurity specifications and mitigations. This information may be shared broadly to reach all appropriate stakeholders. Contact Information Client Requirements / General Cybersecurity Inquiries: Cybersecurity Requirements Center, 410-854-4200, [email protected] Media Inquiries / Press Desk: Media Relations, 443-634-0721, [email protected] Trademark Recognition Linux® is a registered trademark of Linus Torvalds. -
Bladecenter Interoperability Guide
Front cover BladeCenter Interoperability Guide Quick reference for BladeCenter Includes internal components and interoperability external connectivity Covers software compatibility Discusses storage interoperability Ilya Krutov David Watts Note: Before using this information and the product it supports, read the information in “Notices” on page iii. Last update on 24 February 2015 This edition applies to: BladeCenter E BladeCenter H BladeCenter HT BladeCenter S BladeCenter HS12 type 8028 BladeCenter HS22 BladeCenter HS22V BladeCenter HS23 (E5-2600) BladeCenter HS23 (E5-2600 v2) BladeCenter HS23E BladeCenter HX5 BladeCenter PS700/701/702 BladeCenter PS703/704 © Copyright Lenovo 2015. All rights reserved. Note to U.S. Government Users Restricted Rights -- Use, duplication or disclosure restricted by GSA ADP Schedule Contract Contents Notices . iii Trademarks . iv Preface . .v Authors. .v Comments welcome. vi Do you have the latest version?. vi Chapter 1. Chassis interoperability. 1 1.1 Server to chassis compatibility . 2 1.1.1 HS22 chassis support . 3 1.1.2 HS22V chassis support. 4 1.1.3 HS23 (E5-2600) chassis support . 5 1.1.4 HS23 (E5-2600 v2) chassis support . 6 1.1.5 HS23E chassis support. 7 1.1.6 HX5 chassis support . 8 1.1.7 PS700 chassis support . 9 1.2 I/O module to chassis interoperability . 10 1.2.1 SAS, InfiniBand, Pass-thru, and interconnect modules interoperability . 10 1.2.2 Ethernet I/O module interoperability . 11 1.2.3 Fibre Channel I/O module interoperability. 12 1.3 I/O module to adapter interoperability . 13 1.3.1 I/O module bay to adapter mappings . 13 1.3.2 Ethernet I/O modules and adapters . -
IBM System X and Bladecenter Business Partner Guidebook Titles of Interest
July 2011 CLICK HERE to check for updates Your Road Map to Success with IBM IBM System x System x and and BladeCenter BladeCenter Business Partner Guidebook Over 100,000 copies downloaded! Edited by Jim Hoskins IBM System x and BladeCenter Business Partner Guidebook Titles of Interest More IBM Titles of Interest • IBM Information Infrastructure Business Partner Guidebook • Exploring IBM SOA Technology & Practice • Exploring IBM Accelerators for WebSphere Portal Top Internet Business Titles • 101 Ways to Promote Your Web Site • 3G Marketing on the Internet • Protect Your Great Ideas for Free! • And many more… For more information, visit us at maxpress.com or email us at [email protected]. IBM System x and BladeCenter Business Partner Guidebook Twentieth Edition Your Road Map to Success with IBM System x and BladeCenter Edited by Jim Hoskins (version 20.0e) 605 Silverthorn Road Gulf Breeze, FL 32561 maxpress.com Notices Production Manager: Jacquie Wallace Cover Designer: Lauren Smith This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is sold with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering professional services. If legal, accounting, medical, psychological, or any other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought. ADAPTED FROM A DECLARATION OF PRIN- CIPLES OF A JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND PUBLISHERS. Copyright 2011 by Maximum Press. All rights reserved. Published simultaneously in Canada. Reproduction or translation of any part of this work beyond that permitted by Section 107 or 108 of the 1976 United States Copyright Act without the permission of the copyright owner is unlawful. -
IBM Z Connectivity Handbook
Front cover IBM Z Connectivity Handbook Octavian Lascu John Troy Anna Shugol Frank Packheiser Kazuhiro Nakajima Paul Schouten Hervey Kamga Jannie Houlbjerg Bo XU Redbooks IBM Redbooks IBM Z Connectivity Handbook August 2020 SG24-5444-20 Note: Before using this information and the product it supports, read the information in “Notices” on page vii. Twentyfirst Edition (August 2020) This edition applies to connectivity options available on the IBM z15 (M/T 8561), IBM z15 (M/T 8562), IBM z14 (M/T 3906), IBM z14 Model ZR1 (M/T 3907), IBM z13, and IBM z13s. © Copyright International Business Machines Corporation 2020. All rights reserved. Note to U.S. Government Users Restricted Rights -- Use, duplication or disclosure restricted by GSA ADP Schedule Contract with IBM Corp. Contents Notices . vii Trademarks . viii Preface . ix Authors. ix Now you can become a published author, too! . xi Comments welcome. xi Stay connected to IBM Redbooks . xi Chapter 1. Introduction. 1 1.1 I/O channel overview. 2 1.1.1 I/O hardware infrastructure . 2 1.1.2 I/O connectivity features . 3 1.2 FICON Express . 4 1.3 zHyperLink Express . 5 1.4 Open Systems Adapter-Express. 6 1.5 HiperSockets. 7 1.6 Parallel Sysplex and coupling links . 8 1.7 Shared Memory Communications. 9 1.8 I/O feature support . 10 1.9 Special-purpose feature support . 12 1.9.1 Crypto Express features . 12 1.9.2 Flash Express feature . 12 1.9.3 zEDC Express feature . 13 Chapter 2. Channel subsystem overview . 15 2.1 CSS description . 16 2.1.1 CSS elements . -
MTS on Wikipedia Snapshot Taken 9 January 2011
MTS on Wikipedia Snapshot taken 9 January 2011 PDF generated using the open source mwlib toolkit. See http://code.pediapress.com/ for more information. PDF generated at: Sun, 09 Jan 2011 13:08:01 UTC Contents Articles Michigan Terminal System 1 MTS system architecture 17 IBM System/360 Model 67 40 MAD programming language 46 UBC PLUS 55 Micro DBMS 57 Bruce Arden 58 Bernard Galler 59 TSS/360 60 References Article Sources and Contributors 64 Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors 65 Article Licenses License 66 Michigan Terminal System 1 Michigan Terminal System The MTS welcome screen as seen through a 3270 terminal emulator. Company / developer University of Michigan and 7 other universities in the U.S., Canada, and the UK Programmed in various languages, mostly 360/370 Assembler Working state Historic Initial release 1967 Latest stable release 6.0 / 1988 (final) Available language(s) English Available programming Assembler, FORTRAN, PL/I, PLUS, ALGOL W, Pascal, C, LISP, SNOBOL4, COBOL, PL360, languages(s) MAD/I, GOM (Good Old Mad), APL, and many more Supported platforms IBM S/360-67, IBM S/370 and successors History of IBM mainframe operating systems On early mainframe computers: • GM OS & GM-NAA I/O 1955 • BESYS 1957 • UMES 1958 • SOS 1959 • IBSYS 1960 • CTSS 1961 On S/360 and successors: • BOS/360 1965 • TOS/360 1965 • TSS/360 1967 • MTS 1967 • ORVYL 1967 • MUSIC 1972 • MUSIC/SP 1985 • DOS/360 and successors 1966 • DOS/VS 1972 • DOS/VSE 1980s • VSE/SP late 1980s • VSE/ESA 1991 • z/VSE 2005 Michigan Terminal System 2 • OS/360 and successors -
Linux Security Review 2015
Linux Security Review 2015 www.av-comparatives.org AV-Comparatives Linux Security Review Language: English May 2015 Last revision: 26 th May 2015 www.av-comparatives.org -1- Linux Security Review 2015 www.av-comparatives.org Contents Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 3 Reviewed products ............................................................................................................... 4 Malware for Linux systems ..................................................................................................... 5 Linux security advice ............................................................................................................ 6 Items covered in the review .................................................................................................. 7 Avast File Server Security ...................................................................................................... 8 AVG Free Edition for Linux.................................................................................................... 11 Bitdefender Antivirus Scanner for Unices ................................................................................ 13 Clam Antivirus for Linux ....................................................................................................... 17 Comodo Antivirus for Linux .................................................................................................. 20 Dr.Web Anti-virus for