BICOM Strategic Assessment The Second Lebanon War: 10 Years on July 2016 Key Points claimed victory. Yet the government’s failure to achieve its self-declared war aims, the relatively • On the tenth anniversary of the Second high Israeli death toll – 120 Israeli soldiers Lebanon War, a future war with Hezbollah is and 43 civilians – and the heavy impact of considered the most threatening scenario for Hezbollah rocket fire on the civilian population in the IDF due to the organisation’s significant Northern Israel, shocked and angered the Israeli military capability. public. Meanwhile Israel faced international condemnation, accused of using ‘disproportionate’ • In light of the failure of an ‘enhanced’ UN force in its military operations in Lebanon. With force to prevent Hezbollah rearming, Israel many Israelis demanding the resignation of the is sceptical of relying on international forces prime minister, defence minister and IDF chief to defend its borders, a policy that has of staff, the government set up a commission of consequences for the security component inquiry chaired by retired judge Eliyahu Winograd. of negotiations over the establishment of a Palestinian state. The Winograd Commission’s final report on the government’s handling of the Second Lebanon War • The IDF’s new security doctrine reflects a referred to it as “a great and grave missed opportunity” focus on non-state actors and asymmetric with its harshest criticism aimed at the military and warfare, and establishes new military and political leadership. In particular, the commission strategic approaches as well as redefined found “serious failings and flaws in the quality of standards of what victory means. preparedness, decision-making and performance in the IDF high command... [and] serious failings and • Israel’s political leadership has failed to fully flaws in the lack of strategic thinking and planning, implement recommendations for improving in both the political and military echelons,” noting the national security decision-making process that the “inadequacies of preparedness and strategic that were exposed during the war. and operative planning go back long before” the war. Among its many criticisms, the commission found that the cabinet had failed to formulate clear July-August 2006: The Second Lebanon War objectives and policy options. On the morning of July 12, 2006, two Israeli Ten years on from the Second Lebanon War and soldiers were kidnapped and eight others killed with Israel enjoying relative quiet on its northern when Hezbollah fighters carried out a surprise border, this paper seeks to evaluate what has cross-border raid, thus effectively ending the six- changed since the events of 2006 and which year period of relative quiet that had existed along lessons have (or have not) been learned from it. the Israel-Lebanon border following the unilateral withdrawal of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) from Lebanon in May 2000. Ten Years on: An Evaluation of Developments Post-2006 What later became known as the Second Lebanon War ended 34 days later on August How Israel’s security doctrine was altered by the 14, when the United Nations Security Council Second Lebanon War Resolution (UNSCR) 1701 went into effect. Since its establishment in 1948, Israel’s security When the war ended, both Hezbollah and Israel doctrine has been based on three strategic pillars, often referred to as the three “D’s” – deterrence, prolonging the period between wars. Moreover, early detection, and the decisive defeat of the the strategy redefines the concept of “military enemy (military decision). decision”, tying it to “achieving the political goals set for the campaign, leading to a post- Yet the 2006 Lebanon War marked a turning war improved security situation”. This reflects point in Israel’s strategic priorities, with the threat an acknowledgment that in asymmetric conflict, of engaging in armed conflict with conventional conclusive defeat or surrender of the enemy armies shifting. Instead, Israel’s military and should not typically be the expected outcome. political leadership were forced to grapple with The strategy also emphasises the importance of developing a response to asymmetric conflicts international media, humanitarian concerns and against actors who, while being non-states, international legitimacy as relevant to the IDF’s possessed the military capacity and strength ability to fight. akin to regular armed forces, and had no ‘political address’ with whom to engage in post- Eisenkot’s strategy confirms the addition of a war diplomacy. Moreover, Israel’s inability to fourth “D” – “defence” – to Israel’s core security militarily defeat these non-state actors enabled pillars: “defence” – described as preparing the them to capitalise on a narrative that they won the military and the public for steps the army will war, as Hezbollah claimed in 2006. In light of the take to address threats on Israeli soil – constitutes Second Lebanon War, two of the classic pillars of a crucial addition, especially as the increasing Israel’s traditional security concept – deterrence rocket arsenals and the evolving subterranean and decisive victory, both of which were further threat along both the Israel-Lebanon and the challenged in subsequent conflicts in Gaza – Israel-Gaza borders has increased the likelihood underwent a radical transformation. that the next war will impact the home front in unprecedented ways. Israel’s military: Learning the lessons The adoption of the new IDF strategy marked a milestone in Israeli national security. In the In 2006 the IDF was largely unprepared for a wake of the Second Lebanon War and Operation war with Hezbollah, having been in the process Protective Edge in 2014 – both of which were of adapting operational concepts for the Lebanese marred by the failure of the political leadership to theatre after the Syrian withdrawal and due to set out clear objectives for the war – the army set being predominantly focused on counterterrorism out to provide a more realistic definition of what operations in the West Bank during the Second “decisive victory” meant in the emerging era of Intifada. Thus, on July 12, the IDF had no updated hybrid warfare. Releasing an unclassified version plan for the widespread military campaign that of the strategy is intended to clarify to the public the political leadership authorised. what the military can and cannot achieve based on political directives. However the IDF has learned from its failures in the Second Lebanon War and from subsequent wars between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. In Israel’s political echelon: still muddling through August 2015, the newly installed IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot unveiled a new national security The army’s preparedness for the next war stands strategy for the military: the Gideon Doctrine. The in stark contrast to that of the political leadership. document highlights major changes in Israel’s The adoption of the new IDF strategy is notable in strategic landscape, noting that the main threat that its existence follows years of failed attempts confronting Israel today is from violent and well- by the political leadership to formulate a written armed non-state organisations such as Hamas national security doctrine. While Israel is often and Hezbollah, which have forced Israel into five lauded for its tactical proficiency, it is frequently instances of armed conflict in the past ten years chastised both by domestic commissions of (including Operation Summer Rains in Gaza in inquiry and policy analysts for its decision-making June 2006). process as well as lack of long-term planning and clear strategic agenda. To Israel’s detriment, this Responding to the challenge posed to Israel’s has not sufficiently changed over the past decade. security by these hybrid actors, the doctrine The government’s decision-making process updates one of the three D’s, “deterrence” – a with respect to national security continues to central pillar of Israel’s security doctrine – suffer from several key flaws, most notably the clarifying the IDF’s role in developing a means for weakness of the security cabinet, which is often ill-informed to make suitable decisions during ensuring that it served as the only armed presence security crises, and which – due to the number in southern Lebanon. of coalition partners – is heavily politicised and wracked with competing agendas. However UNIFIL and the LAF have failed to live up to expectations as demonstrated by Hezbollah’s A major section of the forthcoming state significantly increased military strength. This comptroller report (the Shapira report) on the situation, as well as the international community’s government’s handling of Operation Protective failure to successfully pressure Hamas to Edge in 2014 reportedly excoriates the demilitarise in Gaza, offers a lesson. While government for failing to fully implement the international actors are increasingly needed as Winograd Committee recommendations. Indeed interlocutors to end asymmetric conflicts against the cabinet’s deliberations during Operation non-state actors, they are rarely strong enough to Protective Edge were indicative of this in that help Israel achieve its political objectives vis-à-vis once again, the problem was less a lack of quality these groups. intelligence information provided to cabinet members, but rather the lack of an understanding Israel’s negative experience with the efficacy of of the government’s overall strategy as well as international forces also ties in to the government’s insufficient processes to keep cabinet members opposition to an international presence along the informed of developments. In July 2016, former Jordan Valley in the context of a future peace National Security Advisor Uzi Arad testified agreement with the Palestinians. The feeling that before a Knesset Committee, noting that decision- the best guarantor of Israel’s security is Israel making within the security cabinet – on a range itself – a long held belief by the framers of Israel’s of issues including the handling of the 2010 Gaza security concept – is perceived as being validated Flotilla crisis, Israel’s natural gas industry, and by the UNIFIL experience.