DOCSLIB.ORG

IT and Outsourcing in North Korea a Unique Perspective on an Evolving Technology Sector

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
IT and Outsourcing in North Korea a Unique Perspective on an Evolving Technology Sector viewpoints DOI:10.1145/2240236.2240245 Paul Tjia VEmerging Markets Inside the Hermit Kingdom: IT and Outsourcing in North Korea A unique perspective on an evolving technology sector. HE OUTSIDE WOrld’S view of emerged, which fall into three main its export work, KCC’s main focus has North Korea ranges from the types, all state owned in whole or part. been the local market and it develops fear of nuclear demagoguery, There are a number of large special- various products, such as Red Star (the through tales of economic ist IT service providers who work both North Korean version of Linux), e-learn- difficulties, to the fun pok- for local and overseas clients. The big- ing products, and translation software. Ting of the film Team America. Behind gest of these is the Korea Computer KCC also produces games; their version these and many other—almost univer- Center (KCC). Established in 1990, it of Go, a popular Asian chess-like game, sally negative—projected images of the has more than 1,000 employees. Like has won the Go computer games world country, there is another side. Some- almost all IT firms, it is headquartered championship for several years. Simi- what unexpectedly, the Democratic in the capital, Pyongyang, but also has lar, but smaller corporations such as People’s Republic of Korea—to use its regional branches throughout the the Pyongyang Informatics Centre and official title—has a sizeable IT sector. country and offices overseas that en- Korea Pioneer Technology are employ- Some 10,000 professionals work in the able it to work for clients in Europe, ing hundreds of staff. field, and many more have IT degrees. China, South Korea, and Japan. Despite Some IT firms have developed They are already engaged in outsourc- from the internal IT departments of ing contracts for other countries, and large commercial enterprises, such keen to expand further. Having access to as Unha Corporation or Korea Roksan General Trading Company. As the North Korea’s IT Sector a pool of highly country’s IT sector has become more The origins of the local IT sector can technically skilled dynamic, some of these are being be traced back to the 1980s, with the spun off as separate ventures, allow- establishment of various IT research labor is a key rationale ing the IT firms to take on a broader organizations and the creation of IT behind the growth scope of clients and IT service ac- faculties in higher education institu- tivities. Third, there are a number of tions such as Kim Il Sung University of IT outsourcing joint venture IT firms. These include and Kim Chaek University of Technol- in North Korea. Nosotek (set up with a German en- ogy (the latter having an international trepreneur) and Hana Electronics collaborative research program with (which involves U.K. investment), Syracuse University). Over time, sev- plus several joint ventures with Chi- eral hundred IT “corporations” have nese business partners. 22 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE acm | AUGUst 2012 | VOL. 55 | NO. 8 V viewpoints An IT company in Pyongyang, North Korea. Pyongyang has become a base for IT offshoring. Historically, North Korea’s IT infra- always significant proportions of M.S.- tions like China or the Philippines. The structure has been behind the curve and Ph.D.-qualified software engineers, country’s highly regulated economy is but in recent years the country has and a surprising number have partici- also an advantage in reducing attrition been investing in order to catch up. In pated in training courses abroad: most rates—the type of “job-hopping” that a typical IT firm, one can therefore see often in China and India, but also in Eu- can bedevil Indian contracts is pretty staff using state-of-the-art technology, rope. These organizations are already much unknown in North Korea. mostly imported (for example, hard- well versed in quality assurance meth- Some of the outsourcing to Pyong- ware from Dell, running the latest ver- ods including ISO9001 and CMMI. yang-based firms is quite general. At the sions of Windows or Unix). An example of the typical skills fairly low-skill end is basic digitization. Internet access is still heavily regu- profile is shown in the accompanying For example, Dakor—a Swiss joint ven- lated but a recently laid optical fiber table, which gives the expertise list for ture—is conducting data entry work for backbone connecting all cities and Daeyong Corporation, a relatively small European research firms and interna- counties provides for a high-speed start-up based in Pyongyang that is in- tional organizations like the United Na- network—“Kwangmyong”—utilizing volved in Web and mobile applications tions and the Red Cross. Work involv- a fairly sophisticated architecture that development—including Android and ing more skill includes producing Web forms what can be seen as a “national Blackberry—for foreign clients. sites for U.S. and European customers intranet.” A nationwide 3G mobile tele- (though in most cases, the end client communications network was com- IT Outsourcing to North Korea is unaware of North Korean involve- pleted in 2009. Mobile operator Ko- Having access to a pool of highly tech- ment since this is subcontracted by an ryolink (a joint venture with Orascom nically skilled labor is a key rationale intermediary that deals direct with the Telecom from Egypt) has more than behind the growth of IT outsourcing to client). Examples of projects involving one million subscribers. North Korea. But such labor is available more advanced skills include North Of course, the core of any IT sector is in many parts of Asia. A unique selling Korean firms providing programming its human resources. As noted earlier, point for North Korea is cost. Tariffs inputs for enterprise resource plan- A I some 10,000 professionals already have asked can be less than U.S. $10 per hour, ning systems, business process man- J T IT careers, and thousands of North Ko- enabling clients to employ experienced agement systems, and e-business ap- AUL AUL P rean youngsters graduate with IT de- software engineers for just a few hun- plications. One corporation is building grees each year, thus creating a large dred dollars per month. This means a bank management system—based pool of technically qualified staff. In the North Korea undercuts not just India on the tenets of Islamic banking—for a PHOTOGRAPH BY BY PHOTOGRAPH corporations I have visited, there are but also later-emerging software loca- client located in the Middle East. AUGUst 2012 | VOL. 55 | NO. 8 | COMMUNICATIONS OF THE acm 23 viewpoints But there are also emerging spe- cialisms within North Korea’s IT ex- port sector. Perhaps not surprisingly, one of these is IT security. North Ko- rea might have an image—warranted or not—of encouraging cyber attacks, but it has invested a lot in technology and expertise to thwart such attacks on its own systems and, more gener- ally, in security. Fingerprint identifica- tion products used for access control (and time attendance) have already been exported, and there are other products developed in areas of car li- cense plate identification, and voice/ face recognition. On the lighter side, film has been one of the main forms of state-sup- ported entertainment in the country IT security, such as facial recognition, is an important export commodity for North Korea. since the formal division of the Korean peninsula into two states in the 1950s. From this foundation has developed an export production capacity for high-quality cartoons and animation. The specialized state corporation SEK Studio, established in 1957, has more than 1,600 employees, and works for several European film production stu- dios. Other firms have worked on 2D and 3D animation contracts, and this is starting to expand into areas of relat- ed capability such as computer graph- ics and games exports for Wii, iPhone, BlackBerry and other platforms. Finally, North Korean IT corpora- tions have developed a set of language skills. English is quite widely used but specialisms have developed in Chinese Developers working on a graphics design project. and Japanese alongside (of course) Korean. North Korea is therefore be- ing used as a base for those who wish to have software products or systems translated into East Asian languages. At present, much of this work is near- shoring; that is, coming from clients based in China, Japan, or South Korea. But the potential is there for a wide range of customers who are targeting East Asian markets, which are consid- ered especially relevant to small- and medium-sized clients. The Challenges and Future of IT Outsourcing A I North Korea’s IT sector faces a number J of challenges, despite its government’s T AUL AUL eagerness to promote international P collaboration. First, and perhaps larg- est, is the challenge of perceptions. North Korean firms produce and export high-quality cartoons and animation work. North Korea confronts a difficult mix BY PHOTOGRAPHS 24 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE acm | AUGUst 2012 | VOL. 55 | NO. 8 viewpoints Example of a North Korean IT corporation skill set. obscure location for IT work, accom- panied by images of animal-drawn carts and corrupt bureaucrats. A few Major Skills Ansi C/C++, VC++6, VB6 brave U.S. firms stuck a toe in the wa- VC++.NET/CLR, C#, VB.NET, ASP.NET, .NET ter with some small onsite “body shop- DotNetNuke, Silverlight, Telerik Sitefinity Java, J2EE, Spring, Struts, Hibernate, Swing, JUNIT, ANT ping” projects and built up slowly from JBoss, Apache Tomcat there. Today, India’s software industry PHP4/5, Joomla, Wordpress, Magento, Drupal is a multibillion-dollar juggernaut on Zend Framework, CodeIgniter, CakePHP, Yii, Smarty which Fortune 500 and other firms rely MySQL, MSSQL, MS Access, PostgreSQL, Oracle Shell script , JavaScript, VBScript for portions of their IT services.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Dprk As an Example of the Potential Utility of Internet Sanctions
    \\server05\productn\B\BIN\25-1\BIN104.txt unknown Seq: 1 31-MAR-08 10:18 USING INTERNET “BORDERS” TO COERCE OR PUNISH: THE DPRK AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE POTENTIAL UTILITY OF INTERNET SANCTIONS BENJAMIN BROCKMAN-HAW E * INTRODUCTION ................................................... 163 R I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION .............................. 166 R A. Escalation ............................................. 167 R B. The Internet in North Korea ........................... 173 R II. SANCTIONS ................................................ 181 R A. General Information ................................... 182 R B. Telecommunications Sanctions Already Considered .... 184 R C. Multilateral Sanctions In Place Against the DPRK ..... 187 R III. THE UTILITY OF INTERNET SANCTIONS .................... 187 R A. Obtaining a desired result through the imposition of Internet sanctions ...................................... 187 R B. The Benefits and Costs of Imposing Internet Sanctions . 198 R C. General Concerns Associated with the Use of Internet Sanctions .............................................. 200 R 1. International Human Rights ....................... 200 R 2. Internet sanctions could harm regime opponents . 203 R 3. Internet sanctions could impair the ability of UN operations and NGO’s to function within the target country ..................................... 204 R IV. CONCLUSION .............................................. 205 R INTRODUCTION Speech is civilization itself. The word. preserves contact—it is silence which isolates. - Thomas Mann1 * J.D. Candidate 2008, Boston University School of Law. This article is dedicated to the memory of Dr. Robert Brockman, a man who surveyed this new world with the eyes of an old soul. 1 THOMAS MANN, THE MAGIC MOUNTAIN (1924) quoted in CHARLES R. BURGER & JAMES J. BRADAC, LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE 112 (Edward Arnold Publishers Ltd. 1982). 163 \\server05\productn\B\BIN\25-1\BIN104.txt unknown Seq: 2 31-MAR-08 10:18 164 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol.
    [Show full text]
  • 1:14-Mc-00648-UNA Document 7 Filed 07/29/14 Page 1 of 3
    Case 1:14-mc-00648-UNA Document 7 Filed 07/29/14 Page 1 of 3 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Ruth Calderon-Cardona, et al., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-mc-648 ) Democratic People's Republic of Korea, et ) HEARING REQUEST al., ) ) Defendants. ) ) ) INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAME AND NUMBERS’ MOTION TO QUASH WRIT OF ATTACHMENT The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”), a non-party, by counsel, respectfully moves this Court to quash the Writ of Attachment on Judgment Other Than Wages, Salary And Commissions (“Writ of Attachment”) issued by Plaintiffs in the above- entitled action, for the reasons set forth in ICANN’s accompanying Memorandum.1 Furthermore, ICANN, in accordance with Local Civil Rule 78.1, requests that an oral hearing be scheduled to inform the Court’s ruling on the Motion. 1 Plaintiffs issued to ICANN, and ICANN is moving to quash, writs of attachment in seven actions: (1) Rubin, et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., Case No. 01-1655-RMU; (2) Haim, et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., Case No. 02-1811-RCL; (3) Haim, et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., Case No. 08-520-RCL; (4) Stern, et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., Case No. 00-2602-RCL; (5) Weinstein, et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., Case No. 00- 2601-RCL; (6) Wyatt, et al. v. Syrian Arab Republic, et al., Case No. 08-502-RCL; and (7) Calderon-Cardona, et al.
    [Show full text]
  • Generic Top-Level Domains (Gtld)
    An essential pillar for any business is its brand. Brand presence on the Web is a key factor in a business appearing in Internet searches and being found by existing and prospective customers. For small business owners, the essential ingredients for building a strong brand are: o A memorable business name o brand identity elements: o domain name o logo o email address o business card o social Web presence ( Linkedin, Facebook, Twitter, et Generic Top-Level Domains (gTLD) The following table represents the generic top-level domains (i.e. including .com, .org, etc). Domain Purpose / Sponsoring Organization Generic top-level domain .COM VeriSign Global Registry Services Generic top-level domain .INFO Afilias Limited Generic top-level domain .NET VeriSign Global Registry Services Generic top-level domain .ORG Public Interest Registry (PIR) Generic-Restricted Top-Level Domains Generic-restricted top-level domain names are similar to the generic top-level domains, only eligibility is intended to be restricted and ascertained more stringently. Domain Purpose / Sponsoring Organization Restricted for Business .BIZ NeuStar, Inc. Reserved for individuals .NAME The Global Name Registry Ltd. Restricted to credentialed professionals and related entities .PRO Registry Services Corporation dba RegistryPro Sponsored Top-Level Domains (sTLD) These domains are proposed and sponsored by private agencies or organizations that establish and enforce rules restricting the eligibility to use the TLD. IANA also groups sTLDs with the generic top-level domains. Domain Purpose / Sponsoring Organization Reserved for members of the air-transport industry .AERO Societe Internationale de Telecommunications Aeronautique S.C. (SITA SC) Restricted to the Pan-Asia and Asia Pacific community .ASIA DotAsia Organization Ltd.
    [Show full text]
  • VBI Vulnerabilities Portfolio
    VBI Vulnerabilities Portfolio October 28, 2013 <[email protected]> http://www.vulnbroker.com/ CONFIDENTIAL VBI Vulnerabilities Portfolio Contents 1 Foreword 6 1.1 Document Formatting.................................... 6 1.2 Properties and Definitions.................................. 6 1.2.1 Vulnerability Properties............................ 6 1.2.2 Vulnerability Test Matrix........................... 8 1.2.3 Exploit Properties............................... 8 2 Adobe Systems Incorporated 12 2.1 Flash Player......................................... 12 VBI-12-033 Adobe Flash Player Client-side Remote Code Execution........... 12 2.2 Photoshop CS6....................................... 15 VBI-13-011 Adobe Photoshop CS6 Client-side Remote Code Execution......... 15 3 Apple, Inc. 17 3.1 iOS.............................................. 17 VBI-12-036 Apple iOS Remote Forced Access-Point Association............. 17 VBI-12-037 Apple iOS Remote Forced Firmware Update Avoidance........... 18 4 ASUS 21 4.1 BIOS Device Driver..................................... 21 VBI-13-015 ASUS BIOS Device Driver Local Privilege Escalation............ 22 5 AVAST Software a.s. 24 5.1 avast! Anti-Virus...................................... 24 October 28, 2013 CONFIDENTIAL Page 1 of 120 VBI Vulnerabilities Portfolio VBI-13-005 avast! Local Information Disclosure..................... 24 VBI-13-010 avast! Anti-Virus Local Privilege Escalation................. 26 6 Barracuda Networks, Inc. 28 6.1 Web Filter.......................................... 28 VBI-13-000
    [Show full text]
  • North Korea Security Briefing
    Companion report HP Security Briefing Episode 16, August 2014 Profiling an enigma: The mystery of North Korea’s cyber threat landscape HP Security Research Table of Contents Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... 3 Research roadblocks ...................................................................................................................................... 4 Ideological and political context .................................................................................................................... 5 Juche and Songun ...................................................................................................................................... 5 Tension and change on the Korean Peninsula .......................................................................................... 8 North Korean cyber capabilities and limitations ......................................................................................... 10 North Korean infrastructure.................................................................................................................... 10 An analysis of developments in North Korean cyberspace since 2010 .................................................. 14 North Korean cyber war and intelligence structure ................................................................................ 21 North Korean cyber and intelligence organizational chart ....................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • North Korean Strategic Strategy: Combining Conventional Warfare with The
    NORTH KOREAN STRATEGIC STRATEGY: COMBINING CONVENTIONAL WARFARE WITH THE ASYMMETRICAL EFFECTS OF CYBER WARFARE By Jennifer J. Erlendson A Capstone Project Submitted to the Faculty of Utica College March, 2013 In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree Master of Science – Cybersecurity – Intelligence and Forensics © Copyright 2013 by Jennifer J. Erlendson All Rights Reserved ii Abstract Emerging technologies play a huge role in security imbalances between nation states. Therefore, combining the asymmetrical effects of cyberattacks with conventional warfare can be a force multiplier; targeting critical infrastructure, public services, and communication systems. Cyber warfare is a relatively inexpensive capability which can even the playing field between nations. Because of the difficulty of assessing attribution, it provides plausible deniability for the attacker. Kim Jong Il (KJI) studied the 2003 Gulf War operational successes of the United States (U.S.) and the United Kingdom (U.K.), noting the importance of high-tech weapons and information superiority. KJI realized the only way to compete with the U.S.’technology and information superiority was through asymmetric warfare. During the years that followed, the U.S. continued to strengthen its conventional warfare capabilities and expand its technological dominance, while North Korea (NK) sought an asymmetrical advantage. KJI identified the U.S.’ reliance on information technology as a weakness and determined it could be countered through cyber warfare. Since that time, there have been reports indicating a NK cyber force of 300-3000 soldiers; some of which may be operating out of China. Very little is known about their education, training, or sophistication; however, the Republic of Korea (ROK) has accused NK of carrying out cyber-attacks against the ROK and the U.S since 2004.
    [Show full text]
  • Korea Computer Center
    Sanction catalogue 170.106.35.76 02.10.2021 12:41:16 KOREA COMPUTER CENTER List Type Entity List name SDN (OFAC) Programs (1) DPRK3 Names (4) Last name/Name KOREA COMPUTER CENTER Full name/Name KOREA COMPUTER CENTER Type Name Last name/Name CHOSON COMPUTER CENTER Full name/Name CHOSON COMPUTER CENTER Type Alias Quality Strong Last name/Name KOREA COMPUTER COMPANY Full name/Name KOREA COMPUTER COMPANY Type Alias Quality Strong Last name/Name CHUNG SUN COMPUTER CENTER Full name/Name CHUNG SUN COMPUTER CENTER Type Alias Quality Strong Addresses (6) Country China Full address China Country Germany Full address Germany Country Syria Full address Syria Country India Full address India Country United Arab Emirates Full address United Arab Emirates City Pyongyang Country North Korea Full address Pyongyang, Korea, North Identification documents (2) Type Secondary sanctions risk:: North Korea Sanctions Regulations, sections 510.201 and 510.210 Type Transactions Prohibited For Persons Owned or Controlled By U.S. Financial Institutions:: North Korea Sanctions Regulations section 510.214 Updated: 02.10.2021. 05:15 The Sanction catalog includes Latvian, United Nations, European Union, United Kingdom and Office of Foreign Assets Control subjects included in sanction list. © Lursoft IT 1997-2021 Lursoft is the re-user of information from the Enterprise Register of Latvia. The user is obliged to observe the Copyright law, Personal Data Processing Law requirements and Terms of Use of the Lursoft system. The user is forbidden to use any automatic systems or equipment (robots) in order to access the system without a written approval from Lursoft.
    [Show full text]
  • North Korea's Illicit Cyber Operations
    North Korea’s Illicit Cyber Operations: What Can Be Done? Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt February 2020 It should surprise no one that the DPRK is a sophisticated cyber actor. Over the past several years, Kim Jong Un’s regime has earned up to $2 billion through illicit cyber operations, providing North Korea with a significant cushion against the effects of international sanctions imposed on it and the efforts to leverage sanctions to generate greater pressure on Pyongyang to reach an acceptable agreement on denuclearization. The proportion of revenue generated by the DPRK through cyber operations has grown in relation to income generated through other illicit activities and its ability to adapt and move into areas such as cryptocurrency and the cybercrime underground make attacks harder to prevent and trace. This essay puts forward recommendations to achieve greater success in curbing this activity. The appendix provides a historical overview of the North’s illicit cyber operations and a description of the various methods Pyongyang has used to continually improve its cyber capabilities to generate revenue in evasion of sanctions. Background The DPRK’s advanced capabilities are consistent with the country’s national objectives, state organizations and military strategy. Given the relative weakness of its conventional military, the ability to carry out asymmetric and irregular operations is key to the North’s strategic objectives. The low cost of entry and high yield, the difficulties in attribution, a lack of effective deterrents, and the international community’s high level of monitoring traditional weapons capabilities— such as nuclear weapons—also make cyber capabilities a natural regime focus.
    [Show full text]
  • The Shadow Sector: North Korea's Information Technology Networks
    The Shadow Sector: CNS North Korea’s Information OCCASIONAL PAPER #36 MAY 2018 Technology Networks Andrea Berger, Cameron Trainer, Shea Cotton, and Catherine Dill James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies nonproliferation.org The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) strives to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction by training the next generation of nonproliferation specialists and disseminating timely information and analysis. CNS at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey is the largest nongovernmental organization in the United States devoted exclusively to research and training on nonproliferation issues. Middlebury Institute for International Studies at Monterey www.miis.edu The Middlebury Institute for International Studies at Monterey provides international professional education in areas of critical importance to a rapidly changing global community, including international policy and management, translation and interpretation, language teaching, sustainable development, and nonproliferation. We prepare students from all over the world to make a meaningful impact in their chosen fields through degree programs characterized by immersive and collaborative learning, and opportunities to acquire and apply practical professional skills. Our students are emerging leaders capable of bridging cultural, organizational, and language divides to produce sustainable, equitable solutions to a variety of global challenges. James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute
    [Show full text]
  • North Korea Freedomhouse.Org
    https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2015/north-korea#.VfGS-KHKgDs.cleanprint North Korea freedomhouse.org North Korea remained one of the most repressive media environments in the world in 2014, as its leader, Kim Jong-un, sustained his efforts to solidify his grip on power. The North Korean media have continued their propaganda efforts to consolidate national unity around Kim Jong-un, who assumed the country’s leadership after the death of his father and predecessor, Kim Jong-il, in December 2011. Freedom of expression in the country gained renewed attention worldwide in 2014 as the regime threatened war on the United States over a satirical Hollywood movie, Interview, about a fictional U.S. Central Intelligence Agency attempt to assassinate Kim. The U.S. government blamed North Korea for a subsequent cyberattack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, which released the film; the cyberattack resulted in numerous leaked e-mails. Legal Environment Although the constitution theoretically guarantees freedom of speech, provisions calling for adherence to a “collective spirit” restrict in practice all reporting that is not sanctioned by the government. Under the penal code, listening to unauthorized foreign broadcasts and possessing dissident publications are considered “crimes against the state” that carry serious punishments, including hard labor, prison sentences, and the death penalty. North Koreans are often interrogated or arrested for speaking critically about the government; they also face arrest for possessing or watching television programs acquired on the black market. Political Environment The one-party regime controls all domestic news outlets, attempts to regulate all communication, and rigorously limits the ability of North Korean people to access outside information.
    [Show full text]
  • VBI Vulnerabilities Portfolio
    VBI Vulnerabilities Portfolio March 31, 2014 <[email protected]> http://www.vulnbroker.com/ CONFIDENTIAL VBI Vulnerabilities Portfolio Contents 1 Foreword 7 1.1 Document Formatting.................................... 7 1.2 Properties and Definitions.................................. 7 1.2.1 Vulnerability Properties............................ 7 1.2.2 Vulnerability Test Matrix........................... 9 1.2.3 Asset Deliverables............................... 9 1.2.4 Exploit Properties............................... 10 2 Adobe Systems Incorporated 13 2.1 Adobe Reader........................................ 13 VBI-14-004 Adobe Reader Client-side Remote Code Execution............. 13 2.2 Flash Player......................................... 15 VBI-12-033 Adobe Flash Player Client-side Remote Code Execution........... 15 2.3 Photoshop CS6....................................... 17 VBI-13-011 Adobe Photoshop CS6 Client-side Remote Code Execution......... 18 3 ASUS 20 3.1 BIOS Device Driver..................................... 20 VBI-13-015 ASUS BIOS Device Driver Local Privilege Escalation............ 21 4 AVAST Software a.s. 23 4.1 avast! Anti-Virus...................................... 23 VBI-13-005 avast! Local Information Disclosure..................... 23 March 31, 2014 CONFIDENTIAL Page 1 of 134 VBI Vulnerabilities Portfolio VBI-13-010 avast! Anti-Virus Local Privilege Escalation................. 25 5 Barracuda Networks, Inc. 27 5.1 Web Filter.......................................... 27 VBI-13-000 Barracuda Web Filter Remote Privileged
    [Show full text]
  • North Korea Designations; North Korea Administrative Update; Counter Terrorism Desig
    North Korea Designations; North Korea Administrative Update; Counter Terrorism Desig... Page 1 of 32 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY Resource Center North Korea Designations; North Korea Administrative Update; Counter Terrorism Designations 10/4/2018 OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL Specially Designated Nationals List Update The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List: AL-AMIN, Muhammad 'Abdallah (a.k.a. AL AMEEN, Mohamed Abdullah; a.k.a. AL AMIN, Mohammad; a.k.a. AL AMIN, Muhammad Abdallah; a.k.a. AL AMIN, Muhammed; a.k.a. AL-AMIN, Mohamad; a.k.a. ALAMIN, Mohamed; a.k.a. AMINE, Mohamed Abdalla; a.k.a. EL AMINE, Muhammed), Yusif Mishkhas T: 3 Ibn Sina, Bayrut Marjayoun, Lebanon; Beirut, Lebanon; DOB 11 Jan 1975; POB El Mezraah, Beirut, Lebanon; nationality Lebanon; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions Pursuant to the Hizballah Financial Sanctions Regulations; Gender Male (individual) [SDGT] (Linked To: TABAJA, Adham Husayn). CULHA, Erhan; DOB 17 Oct 1954; POB Istanbul, Turkey; nationality Turkey; Gender Male; Secondary sanctions risk: North Korea Sanctions Regulations, sections 510.201 and 510.210; Passport U09787534 (Turkey) issued 12 Sep 2014 expires 12 Sep 2024; Personal ID Card 10589535602; General Manager (individual) [DPRK] (Linked To: SIA FALCON INTERNATIONAL GROUP). RI, Song Un, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia; DOB 16 Dec 1955; POB N. Hwanghae, North Korea; nationality Korea, North; Gender Male; Secondary sanctions risk: North Korea Sanctions Regulations, sections 510.201 and 510.210; Passport 836110063 (Korea, North) issued 04 Feb 2016 expires 04 Feb 2021; Economic and Commercial Counsellor at DPRK Embassy in Mongolia (individual) [DPRK2].
    [Show full text]