31295015500902.Pdf (6.441Mb)
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST: AN ANALYSIS by MOSES H. PERMAN, B.A. A THESIS IN GOVERNMENT Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Technological College in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS Approved August, 1968 Ti /Vo. /^i" Cop. ^ CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1 I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 3 II. STRUGGLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1948 34 The Arab Refugee 38 The Jordan River Controversy 46 The Arab Boycott III. BIG POWERS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 60 IV. PRESENT SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 95 A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 109 ii INTRODUCTION Since the 1920's, tension has been an ever present element in Je;vish-Arab relationships. As a result of the conflict existing between the two peoples, a situation has developed in the Middle East which is virtually intolerable to the international community. There is need for an analysis of the factors contributing to this situation. To accomplish this analysis, it was necessary to examine, in detail, the nature of the Arab-Israeli disputes that have caused three wars in the past twenty years, and the relation that big powers have had to the conflict. In Chapter I, the role of big powers in the creation of the Arab-Israeli disputes is introduced. In offering conflicting promises of Palestinian territory, Great Britain laid the groundwork for much of the conflict that was to follow. As a result of the situation created externally, the two peoples went to war. After the war of 1943 failed to achieve any solutions, the conflict grew increasingly real, and between 1948 and 1957» various manifestations of the increasing tension became clear. In Chapter II, the Arab refugee issue, the Jordan River controversy, and the Arab boycott of Israel are shown to have exerted tremendous pressures on the two peoples. As a result of these internal pressures, tensions increased until the Arabs and Jews v;ere forced to go to war. 1 Chapter III portrays the increasing influence big powers have exerted in the area and illustrates their role in accelerating the conflict, once again, into war. In Chapter IV, the author offers suggestions as to viable means of re-establishing relationships in the area, and as to the problems that will certainly beset any such attempts to bring peace to the Middle East. CHAPTER I HISTORICAL BACKGROUND From its very inception, Israel has been an aggra vating factor in Middle Eastern instability. The product of big power involvement, Israel has, by its very existence, irritated its Arab neighbors into almost irreconcilable hostilities. The creation of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, and the concurrent problems that have been generated as a result, have led Arab poli ticians to express distaste for the creation of the Jewish state and the events that led up to ito For instance, President Nasser said that Palestine was a tragic creation of "Western Imperialism." During I917, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, David Lloyd-George, for a number of reasons felt that it was essential to acquire the good graces of world Jewry 2 by responding favorably to Zionist aspirations. Lloyd George was aware of the prominence of Jews in the Russian revolution, and the effect such a response might have in keeping the Russians and Germans at war. In addition. Gamul Abdul Nasser, Address at Cairo University, August 8, 1967. 2 Royal Institute of International Affairs (here after cited as R.I.I.A.), Great Britain and Palestine 1919-45 (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. l48. Lloyd George thought that an Allied pronouncement in favor of Zionism might help win over German Jewry to the Allied cause, and thus produce dissension within the Central Powers. Finally, it was desirable to have full coopera tion of the -United States where there was measurable support for the idea of a Jewish National Homeland. The Zionists, led by Dr. Chaim Weizman, insisted upon a British protectorate over Palestine as the best guarantee for a future Jewish Homeland.-^ In May I917, Britain's foreign secretary. Lord Arthur J. Balfour, paid a visit to the United States in order to get endorse ment from President Wilson before committing the British Cabinet to such a program. Although President Wilson did not formally endorse the idea of the protectorate, he did Instruct Colonel E. M. House, his chief personal advisor, to approve the pro-Zionist draft declaration proposed by the British Cabinet.4 Later, concerning Palestine, President Wilson made the following statement concerning a Jewish National Home there: As for your representations touching Palestine, I have before this expressed my personal approval of the declaration of the British Govern ment regarding the aspirations and historic claims of the Jewish people in regard to Palestine. I am, -^Chaim Weizman, Trial and Error (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishing Company, 1949), p. 334. ^Ibld., p. 49. 5 moreover, persuaded that the Allied Nations, with the fullest concurrence of our own government and people, are agreed that in Palestine shall be laid the foundations of a Jewish Commonwealth.5 On November 2, 1917» following acceptance by the British Cabinet of the major points of the draft. Lord Balfour addressed the following letter to the great Zionist financier. Lord Edmund de Rotschild: "Dear Lord Rothschild, "I have the great pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionism's aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet. "His Majesty's Government views with favor the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish national home, and will use their best endeavors to facili tate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by the Jews in any other country. "I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation. "Yours sincerely, /- "Arthur James Balfour" The declaration was well timed. Shortly thereafter, December I917 and July 1918, Turkey and Germany attempted to win Jewish favor by offering the German Zionists a 7 chartered company in Palestine.' The offer, however, was %ew York Times, March 3, 1919j P. !• Great Britain, Parliament, British and Foreign State Papers, (No. I62, 1920), p. 44. "^R.I.I.A., 02. cit., p. 149. made too late to affect a general change in pro-Ally Zionist orientation. On July 24, 1922, the Council of the League of Nations approved the mandate for Palestine, declaring that . the mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2, 1917> by the Government of His Britanic Majesty, and adopted by the said powers, in favor of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people." When the news of the declaration reached Sherif Hussein of Mecca, he requested an explanation from the British authorities. The British responded to Arabia Commander D. G. Hogarth of the Arab Bureau in Cairo, who subsequently assured Hussein that Britain's determination to assist the return of the Jews to Palestine went only "so far as is compatible with the freedom of the existing population," and no mention was made of a Jewish State.-^ This oversight, when coupled with the continuing presence in Palestine of Zionist commissions-working to establish residence, caused local unrest over the popularly accepted idea of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Subsequently, Britain did start Israel on the road to existence pursuant to the Balfour Declaration of 1917> o Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Papers (CMND. 1785, 1922-23), p. 11. ^R.I.I.A., 22. cit., p. 149 but a great change in policy thinking occurred between the issuance of the Balfour Declaration and Britain's final voting in the United Nations General Assembly vote in November, 1947. On N'oveinber 7, I9I8, Great Britain and France Issued a common statement to the Arabs emphasizing a complete and definite emancipation of the Arab people. Their objective was to create an independent Arab state or confederation of states which was to supplant the Ottoman Empire as a bulwark of defense for the British lifeline to India. Hussein's son. Emir Faisal, chief spokesman for the Arab cause, appeared before the Council of the League of Nations in November of I918 and insisted upon the Arab right to self determination in the matter. Faisal was induced to sign an agreement with Dr. Weizman, welcoming the Jewish people to immigrate to Palestine before imple mentation of the allied wartime promise. Thus the basic Arab-Jewish conflict was established by the British. The Zionist objective was to obtain not only international confirmation of the Balfour Declaration, but more important, to secure its inclusion in the text of George Lenczowski, The Middle East in V/orId- Affairs (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, I962), p. 85. 8 the peace treaties of the Paris Peace Conference. The Arabs were, as Emir Faisal indicated, insistent upon the rights of self-determination for the indigenous population. The problem was the development of means whereby Zionists, who advocated a--Jewish homeland in Palestine, and Arabs who desired self determination, might be brought together with the rest of the Arab Middle Eastern peoples into a mutual respect for the rights of all inhabitants of Palestine; i.e., the problem was in working out the consummation of their conflicting national aspirations in goodwill and unders tanding. During the interwar years, 1919-1939, Arab relations with the Jews were characterized by two diametrically opposed trends. On the one hand, conservative Arab elements accepted the Jews and desired to cooperate with them as much as possible.