CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST: AN ANALYSIS

by

MOSES H. PERMAN, B.A.

A THESIS

IN GOVERNMENT

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Technological College in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Approved

August, 1968 Ti

/Vo. /^i" Cop. ^ CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1 I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 3 II. STRUGGLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1948 34 The Arab Refugee 38 The Jordan River Controversy 46 The Arab Boycott III. BIG POWERS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 60 IV. PRESENT SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 95 A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 109

ii INTRODUCTION

Since the 1920's, tension has been an ever present element in Je;vish-Arab relationships. As a result of the conflict existing between the two peoples, a situation has developed in the Middle East which is virtually intolerable to the international community. There is need for an analysis of the factors contributing to this situation. To accomplish this analysis, it was necessary to examine, in detail, the nature of the Arab-Israeli disputes that have caused three wars in the past twenty years, and the relation that big powers have had to the conflict. In Chapter I, the role of big powers in the creation of the Arab-Israeli disputes is introduced. In offering conflicting promises of Palestinian territory, Great Britain laid the groundwork for much of the conflict that was to follow. As a result of the situation created externally, the two peoples went to war. After the war of 1943 failed to achieve any solutions, the conflict grew increasingly real, and between 1948 and 1957» various manifestations of the increasing tension became clear. In Chapter II, the Arab refugee issue, the Jordan River controversy, and the Arab boycott of Israel are shown to have exerted tremendous pressures on the two peoples. As a result of these internal pressures, tensions increased until the Arabs and Jews v;ere forced to go to war.

1 Chapter III portrays the increasing influence big powers have exerted in the area and illustrates their role in accelerating the conflict, once again, into war. In Chapter IV, the author offers suggestions as to viable means of re-establishing relationships in the area, and as to the problems that will certainly beset any such attempts to bring peace to the Middle East. CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

From its very inception, Israel has been an aggra­ vating factor in Middle Eastern instability. The product of big power involvement, Israel has, by its very existence, irritated its Arab neighbors into almost irreconcilable hostilities. The creation of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, and the concurrent problems that have been generated as a result, have led Arab poli­ ticians to express distaste for the creation of the Jewish state and the events that led up to ito For instance, President Nasser said that Palestine was a tragic creation of "Western Imperialism." During I917, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, David Lloyd-George, for a number of reasons felt that it was essential to acquire the good graces of world Jewry 2 by responding favorably to Zionist aspirations. Lloyd George was aware of the prominence of Jews in the Russian revolution, and the effect such a response might have in keeping the Russians and Germans at war. In addition.

Gamul Abdul Nasser, Address at Cairo University, August 8, 1967. 2 Royal Institute of International Affairs (here­ after cited as R.I.I.A.), Great Britain and Palestine 1919-45 (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. l48. Lloyd George thought that an Allied pronouncement in favor of Zionism might help win over German Jewry to the Allied cause, and thus produce dissension within the Central Powers. Finally, it was desirable to have full coopera­ tion of the -United States where there was measurable support for the idea of a Jewish National Homeland. The Zionists, led by Dr. Chaim Weizman, insisted upon a British protectorate over Palestine as the best guarantee for a future Jewish Homeland.-^ In May I917, Britain's foreign secretary. Lord Arthur J. Balfour, paid a visit to the United States in order to get endorse­ ment from President Wilson before committing the British Cabinet to such a program. Although President Wilson did not formally endorse the idea of the protectorate, he did Instruct Colonel E. M. House, his chief personal advisor, to approve the pro-Zionist draft declaration proposed by the British Cabinet.4 Later, concerning Palestine, President Wilson made the following statement concerning a Jewish National Home there: As for your representations touching Palestine, I have before this expressed my personal approval of the declaration of the British Govern­ ment regarding the aspirations and historic claims of the Jewish people in regard to Palestine. I am,

-^Chaim Weizman, Trial and Error (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishing Company, 1949), p. 334. ^Ibld., p. 49. 5 moreover, persuaded that the Allied Nations, with the fullest concurrence of our own government and people, are agreed that in Palestine shall be laid the foundations of a Jewish Commonwealth.5

On November 2, 1917» following acceptance by the British Cabinet of the major points of the draft. Lord Balfour addressed the following letter to the great Zionist financier. Lord Edmund de Rotschild: "Dear Lord Rothschild, "I have the great pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionism's aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet. "His Majesty's Government views with favor the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish national home, and will use their best endeavors to facili­ tate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by the Jews in any other country. "I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation. "Yours sincerely, /- "Arthur James Balfour" The declaration was well timed. Shortly thereafter, December I917 and July 1918, Turkey and Germany attempted to win Jewish favor by offering the German Zionists a 7 chartered company in Palestine.' The offer, however, was

%ew York Times, March 3, 1919j P. !• Great Britain, Parliament, British and Foreign State Papers, (No. I62, 1920), p. 44. "^R.I.I.A., 02. cit., p. 149. made too late to affect a general change in pro-Ally Zionist orientation. On July 24, 1922, the Council of the League of Nations approved the mandate for Palestine, declaring that . . . the mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2, 1917> by the Government of His Britanic Majesty, and adopted by the said powers, in favor of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people." When the news of the declaration reached Sherif Hussein of Mecca, he requested an explanation from the British authorities. The British responded to Arabia Commander D. G. Hogarth of the Arab Bureau in Cairo, who subsequently assured Hussein that Britain's determination to assist the return of the Jews to Palestine went only "so far as is compatible with the freedom of the existing population," and no mention was made of a Jewish State.-^ This oversight, when coupled with the continuing presence in Palestine of Zionist commissions-working to establish residence, caused local unrest over the popularly accepted idea of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Subsequently, Britain did start Israel on the road to existence pursuant to the Balfour Declaration of 1917>

o Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Papers (CMND. 1785, 1922-23), p. 11. ^R.I.I.A., 22. cit., p. 149 but a great change in policy thinking occurred between the issuance of the Balfour Declaration and Britain's final voting in the United Nations General Assembly vote in November, 1947. On N'oveinber 7, I9I8, Great Britain and France Issued a common statement to the Arabs emphasizing a complete and definite emancipation of the Arab people. Their objective was to create an independent Arab state or confederation of states which was to supplant the Ottoman Empire as a bulwark of defense for the British lifeline to India. Hussein's son. Emir Faisal, chief spokesman for the Arab cause, appeared before the Council of the League of Nations in November of I918 and insisted upon the Arab right to self determination in the matter. Faisal was induced to sign an agreement with Dr. Weizman, welcoming the Jewish people to immigrate to Palestine before imple­ mentation of the allied wartime promise. Thus the basic Arab-Jewish conflict was established by the British. The Zionist objective was to obtain not only international confirmation of the Balfour Declaration, but more important, to secure its inclusion in the text of

George Lenczowski, The Middle East in V/orId- Affairs (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, I962), p. 85. 8 the peace treaties of the Paris Peace Conference. The Arabs were, as Emir Faisal indicated, insistent upon the rights of self-determination for the indigenous population. The problem was the development of means whereby Zionists, who advocated a--Jewish homeland in Palestine, and Arabs who desired self determination, might be brought together with the rest of the Arab Middle Eastern peoples into a mutual respect for the rights of all inhabitants of Palestine; i.e., the problem was in working out the consummation of their conflicting national aspirations in goodwill and unders tanding. During the interwar years, 1919-1939, Arab relations with the Jews were characterized by two diametrically opposed trends. On the one hand, conservative Arab elements accepted the Jews and desired to cooperate with them as much as possible. On the other, extreme nationalists within the Arab world attempted to impose their will on Arab masses in order to remove all vestiges of outside elements in the "Arab world." During the first two years after the first world war, it seemed that the Arabs had accepted the Balfour Declaration. They sold land to the Zionists, whom the Arabs outnumbered five to one, and their general attitude toward the Jewish national movement was one of almost unanimous approval. Farad Kassab, a Syrian author, wrote: :. ,i'~^x^ '•^ ^.i^V'^

e^Jews _ cf^the -Orient are at home. This is their only r-*a#* &,--^:' <;W; .;. ••,^-::^^,.-..v:.iatherl.and.i^^^^p^ev..4:an.-' t...4cnc;v anv other.

•:S£'-v--]^!S'^ ^sacL of the High Office of /r--vv.>;^;?:^ •-^^.Grand Sheri.fV-'c^i^^i^K'in.T'^jM advances and Turkish

r •>•• '^^

\'m'-'-::'>ri '••' ''^r,,^' j?Vig;ii:s:-ft5cron May 15, 1915, ^he'leaders of the Arab revo- •^>*and Iraq,

work ""With.' Vae ^^SsvBrltish^ag^: ecognition- of n''specif ied "bdundaries, which included^-Pal es''t^:^§fc.. /Emir Faisal presented this ".bvi-l". w»^.- -.Damascus Protocol'^to his father in Mecca. -^ Sherif Hussein

••-.•». ' ••'•"",•. '*. -

'"'%' •'*•.' • ••"*•' - :••'' .''••';'••.' ;.:sen't a note dated July 14, 1915, to Sir Henry McMahon,

-••'•5'*?' • ^>'-- British High"Commissioner, of Egypt stating Arab terms for 14 intervention on the side of .the allies in World War I. .Hujssein: stated: ;.v?- vV - > ,-•

•LV. .', • .'• ''> "-'^ • ;;i'''i^y'•"'.-,• ••-' v^ Great Britain [mustl recogni^ze the indepen­ dence of -the Arab countries which" are bounded by ljr%----^'\^'^^^ Turkey. pn the north, ..the Mediterranean Sea on the

'•:«»v';;;, ^

11. Israeli- Office -of* Information, ' 1 Bulletin w York,-1961:),%p. 27...;:. 12 Wif iji.. Yale, The Near East ',•( Ann Arbor: University ;i'x=>.. .'••>.:J '••M. fHichigan -Mpj, a958jp|r7r52T i^aei-

George JPitonius, The Arab Awakenlng \Philadelphias ii^Xi|i^cdt,fv^6mpanyj 1939), P. 164.

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•"•'it''' ^^'•; :' •.•••-3;^:- ';<;;;'5;

[•f'^'. M .•'i.-S : 10 west, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean in the south, and by Persia on the east.-'-^ An exchange of notes ensued between the men. In McMahon's note of October 24, 1915, to Sharif Hussein he pledged: That . . . with the exception of Damascus, Homa, Hama, and Aleppo ... Great Britain is prepared to recognize and uphold the independence of the Arabs in all the regions lying within the frontiers proposed by the Sherif of Mecca. . . . when circumstances permit, Great Britain will help with her advice and assist them in the estab­ lishment of governments to suit those diverse regions.16 However, the defeat of the Turks at the hands of the Allies brought not only Arab claims to those captured lands, but also British and French claims. During World War I, the British, French and Russians conferred in I916 on the matter of dividing the Middle Eastern holdings of the Ottoman Empire into spheres of influence.1 7' Under the terms of the Sazanov-Paleogue agreement, the Russians were to acquire vast-mining lands north and east of Turkey in the Black Sea area; France's area of interest was Syria and Lebanon; and

•^^Ibid., p. 414. ^^Ibid., p. 419. 'This bargain was formalized on April 26, I916, under the name of the Sazanov (Russian foreign minister)- Paleogue (French ambassador in Russia), agreement. This agreement formed an integral part of the general settlement reached between Russia, France, and Great Britain usually called the Sykes (Sir Mark Sykes, British negotiator)-Picot (Georges Plcot, French negotiator), agreement.

»'. VJ 11 England's fortune centered about Palestine and Iraq. While completely forgetting the Arabs, the three Allies -I o planned to internationalize Jerusalem. Thus, British promises to the Arabs of captured Middle Eastern lands were not to be implemented. Rather, on August 10, 1920, as a result of talks between Prime Minister David Lloyd-George and French President Millerand at the San Remo (Italy) Conference, the British, French, and Turkish came to an agreement in the Treaty of Sevres to establish Syria and Mesopotamia "as independent states subject to rendering of administrative advice and . assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone."1 ^9 As a result of his brief tenure as military governor in Syria during the interim period following the end of the first vjorld war. Emir Faisal was recognized as head of the Arab national movement. He became realistically aware that nationalistic ambitions were, in fact, stifled under the terms of the Treaty of Sevres. To concede to Western pressure would have been tantamount to losing his popularity •and leadership among the active Arabs. He therefore decided

Lenczowski, oj^, cit., p. 9^. "ibid., p. 92. The mandates for former Turkish territories were alloted on April 25, 1920 at the San Rerao Conference; Syria and Lebanon went to France; Palestine and Mesopotamia went to Britain. 12 to identify himself with a new revolutionary nationalist party in Syria, al-Fatat, irrespective of more or less formal understandings vjhich were reached at the Paris Peace Conference. In March 1920, the Syrian National Congress pro­ claimed the now popular Faisal, King of Syria. The congress claimed to represent not only Syria, but Palestine and TransJordan as well. 20 The French, however, opposed Faisal on the grounds that he was overly nationalistic and was a disruptive influence in the state. The Syrians were most disturbed by the high-handed ousting of Faisal by the French on August 7, 1920. In Iraq, the revelation of wartime deals among the Allies, the promises to the Zionists, and above all, the French counter opposition to the coronation of Emir Faisal in Syria, were instrumental in producing national political extremism. The revolutionary Iraqi organization, el-Ahd, in May, 1920, chose Faisal's older brother Emir Abdullah to head the new government and defied a British takeover. The British immediately moved reinforcements into Baghdad 21 and ousted Abdullah.

Philip David, The Syrian National Congress (Paris: A Lamere, 1923), p. 5^. The British recipe was to give moderate local leaders something to show for their modera­ tion during World War I; therefore. Trans Jordan was created out of the original Palestine mandate, and given to Emir Abdullah to administer in 1921. 21 Lenczowski, o£. cit., p. 9^. 13 During March 12-24, 1921, the head of the British Colonial office, Winston Churchill, held a conference on Middle Eastern affairs in Cairo in hopes of establishing a unified policy for the region. The foreign office decided to offer Faisal the kingship of Iraq to appease Iraqi nationalism, since the French had indicated that op they would not allow Arab government in Syria. In an effort to avenge his brother's disgrace, and, if possible restore Faisal to power, the deposed Abdullah sought to lead a Bedouin army to war against French-held Syria. Winston Churchill went to Jerusalem to placate him. He succeeded by offering Abdullah power to administer the new Arab region of Trans Jordan. During this time, Churchill endeavored to obtain a liberalization of French policy in Syria.2 3-^ What therefore was initially conceived as a temporary arrangement between.the British and Abdullah acquired all the features of permanency when Abdullah was appointed Emir of Trans Jordan. When the Council of Baghdad crowned Emir Faisal King of Iraq on July 11, 1921, the Arab nationalist leaders and opportunists achieved a certain identity of purpose with respect to the foreign elements in the Arab States

22 Carol A. Fischer, and Fred Krinsky, Middle East in Crises (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1959), p. 21^. ^^Ibld., p. 215. 14 and/or Palestine. They sought control over Palestinian Jews as well as Christians wherever their purposes con­ flicted.^^

The Jews in Palestine were then subjected to a continuous projgram of nationalist propaganda from Damascus. Some extremist Palestinian Arab contingents, supported by al-Fatat, eager for unification with Syria, and frustrated by French control, began the first of what was to be almost thirty years of violent demonstrations. In May, 1922, the British Colonial Office voted to allow Jewish immigration into Palestine as a follow up to the British promise of a Jewish Homeland as stated in the Balfour Declaration. Unfortunately, the announcement was made during the Moslem Nebi Moussa celebrations, and the excitement of the celebrations, coupled xvith anger over the announcement, caused riots'that soon became uncontrollable. -^ In light of these anti-Jewish disturbances * Winston Churchill, on June 3, 1922, prepared the Churchill Memo­ randum in which he reaffirmed Britain's desire to create a Jewish national home in Palestine. He errphasized, how­ ever, that the Balfour Declaration did not contemplate that Palestine as a whole would be converted into a Jewish

24 Walter Z. Laquer, The Middle East in Transition (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958), p. 181. 2^^ ^Frank Gervasi, The Case for Israel (Ne;v York: Viking Press, 1967),.p. 39.

I yr 15 national state, and that Britain would facilitate Jewish immigration only to the extent dictated by the economic absorptive capacity of the country. It was obvious that Britain now considered the Balfour Declaration as a political liability that stood in the way of a coherent 27 policy towards the Arabs. ' But the Arabs were not to be so easily placated. Many minor incidents continued to occur in relations between pQ Palestinian Arabs and Jews. One such incident was the Black Friday riot of I929 which occurred on the anniversary of the destruction of the Jewish temple, in which Arabs openly asserted, through their attack on the Wailing Wall, that they were determined to prevent the further growth of the Jewish population. After this incident, similar occurrences became more vicious and definitive. -But the most generally disruptive factor of this interwar period was the rise of Jewish ownership of land to which private benefactors contributed through personal channels and through the Jewish National Fund. By 1948, one third of the land in Palestine not owned by the British government had been purchased, and thus was in the hands

26 Lenczowski, ££. cit., p. 377. ^"^Ibid., p. 382. pO Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Papers (CMND. 5^79, 1937-38), p. 91.

r.i^ 16 of Jewish people. An additional factor was the rising tempo of Jewish immigration, especially following the advent of Hitler to power.^^ The Arabs, however, also contributed to the difficulties. During Hitler's rise, there arose a similar methodical fanatic, Haj Amir el-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem who had led the Black Friday riots in I929. Husseini, failing to have the effects he hoped politically, initiated a new campaign against the Jewish settlers in Palestine that took the form of an appeal to the mass Arab prejudices and sensi­ bilities through the local Moslem preachers who were under Mufti's command.-^3 0 In 1936, approximately 60,000 new Jewish immigrants arrived in Palestine, mostly from Germany. This huge Immigration, coupled with Husseini's propaganda, caused a period of renewed unrest in Palestine. In 1937, the Palestine Royal Commission was appointed by the British governm.ent to determine the causes of the I936 conflicts between the Arabs and the Jews. As a solution to this problem, the commission proposed a partition plan, wherein

"israel Office of Information, Israel's Struggle for Peace (New York: I96O), p. 23- From I92O to 1932, the average annual Jewish immigration had been 10,000. After the advent of Hitler to power in 1933, until the second v;orld war broke out in 1939, it averaged 50,000 yearly, including those who had entered illegally. ^ Gervasi, 0£. cit., p. 45. 17 Palestine would be divided into an Arab state, a Jewish state, and a neutral conclave around Jerusalem and Bethlehem that would remain under British administration.-^3 1 The Arab High Committee, led by Hussein, rejected the British plan* -^ The British government subsequently turned down the partition report.-3^2 Instead, in February, 1939, Great Britain convened the London Conference attended by Zionists, Arab representatives from Palestine, and dele­ gates from existing Arab states: Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Trans Jordan.-^-33^ The conferences included both moderate Arab and Jewish delegations. It was not able to discuss anything beyond, the immigration question. The Arabs dem.anded that all Jewish immigration be stopped as prior to any other concern (independence), while the Jews stressed uninter­ rupted immigration as a necessary prerequisite to state­ hood. The status quo was thus maintained. On May 17, 1939, the Chamberlain Government issued a White Paper which laid down new principals concerning Palestine:

-^Lenczowski, 0£. cit., p. 382. ^^Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Papers, (CMND. 5^79, 1937-38), p. 97- ^^Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Papers, (CMND. 6019, 1939-^0), pp. 1-12. 18 1. Palestine was to become independent within ten years and was to be linked with Britain by a special treaty.

2. Jewish im.migration was to be limited to a total of 75,000 persons for the next five years, after which it was to cease altogether. 3. Palestine was to be divided into three zones. The first would allow land transfers from Arabs to Jews; the second would restrict such transfers; and the third 34 would prohibit all such transfers.-^ The League of Nations Mandates Commission immediately concluded that the new British policy was in violation of the terms of the mandate. The commission concluded: From the first, one fact forced itself on the notice of the Commission, namely, that the policy set out in the White Paper was not in accordance with the interpretation which, in agreement with the Mandatory Power and the Council, the Commission has always placed upon the Palestine Mandate. ^-5 Britain attempted to explain that she v/as not bound by the principal of economic absorptive capacity, but instead, had to take into account the political absorptive capacity of the Arab world as a whole.-^ That is, the

34 Ibid. •^-^League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, The (MacDonald) White Paper, May, 1939, paragraph z. 36 •^ Lenczowski, o£. cit., p. 385.

mtm 19 tenseness of the international situation in the months preceding the outbreak of the second world war led Britain to adopt a conciliatory policy toward the Arab world, situated as it was astride the vulnerable part of the British life line to India and South East Asia., When World War II broke out, the Arabs and the Jews were still struggling with immigration and demands for independence. The difficulties were complicated by a call to the Arab masses from the former Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amir el-Husseini, who at this time, was working for 37 the Nazis.^' The call was, as expected, to overthrow British rule and to annihilate the Jews. The British were able to restrain the call to Arab revolt in Palestine and bring about a temporary cessation of hostilities there through their work with moderate Arab leaders. The White Paper continued to "curtail Jewish immigra­ tion to 15,000 each year for the period of 1940-45. However, because of the serious refugee problem of European Jews that had escaped the death houses, an extra 25,000 were admitted during that time.^ The Palestine Jewish community and the Zionist

•^'Esco Foundation, Palestine; A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. II (New Haven; Yale University Press, I96I), p. 96I. ^°Israel Office of Information, 0£. cit., p. 28. 20 movement throughout the world responded to the KTiite Paper by organizing "illegal" entry into Palestine for victims of Nazi persecution. However, the peace in Palestine was not broken until I943 when the American Zionists trXed,- to implement a pro-Zionist program in Palestine called the Biltmore Program.^° The Biltmore program was presented by the American Zionist Organization in New York on May 11, 19^2, by David Ben Gurion. The Program called for: (1) the establishment of a Jewish state in all of Palestine, (2) the creation of a Jewish army, (3) the repudiation of the White Paper of 1939, and (4) unlimited immigration into Palestine under 'the auspices of the Jewish Agency. Irritated by immigration restrictions and inspired by American Zionist successes, the extremist Palestinian Zionists, represented by the Irgum Aval Leurai and its splinter group led by Abraham Stern, immediately initiated a program of terrorist activities against the British to compel them to accede to the Biltmore program. To the Arabs, this new expanded Zionist interest in Palestine was another foreign intrusion foisted on them by Western Imperialists. Their only course of resistance against the implementation of the above program

-^"Lenczowski, o£. cit., p. 389. 21 was' to declare Palestine a continuous battlefield. The British were faced with the unresolved problem of what to do about the Middle East after the war. With the exception of President Wilson's principal of self-determination of nations enunciated during World War I, the United States Government had remained indifferent towards the Palestine question. Perhaps the United States displayed little interest in the Palestine problem because of its isolation from European made politics. Many prominent American Jews, however, such as Justice Louis D. Brandeis and Justice Felix Frankfurter, supported the Zionist movement.4 1 The rise of the Nazis brought about some basic changes, however, in American thinking. The American public was aghast at Hitler's perse­ cution of the Jews. To many Americans, Palestine had appeared to concern only Zionists, Arabs, and the British government. But even before the end of World War II, Americans had begun to realize that Palestine was the only refuge for many hundreds of thousands of Jews.4 2

40 John A. DeNova, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963), P. 246. 41 Carl J. Friedrich, American Policy Toward Palestine (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Affairs Press, 1944), p. 30. 42 Sumner Welles, We Need Not Fail (Boston; Houghton Mifflin Co., 19^8), p. 15. 22 In their 1944 platforms, both the Democratic and Republican parties inserted,planks calling for the exercise of American influence in expediting a Palestine settlement. Congress adopted a concurrent resolution: Resolved, that the United States shall use its good offices and take appropriate measures to the end that the doors of Palestine shall be opened ' for free entry of the Jews into that country, and that there shall be full opportunity for colonization, so that the Jewish people may ulti­ mately reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic commonwealth.^3

The reality of American opposition to past British procedure, especially in regard to matters of Jewish immigration, was expressed by both President Franklin D. Roosevelt and President Harry S. Truman. On March 9, 1944, President Roosevelt issued the following statement: The American government has never given its approval to the White Paper of 1939* The President is happy that the doors of Palestine are open to Jewish refugees -and that when future decisions are reached, full justice will be given to those who seek a Jewish National Home.^^ President Truman continued President Roosevelt's policy for the settlement of the Jewish refugees in Palestine. In October 1945, he called upon the British to open the

-^United States Congress, House, The Jewish Home in Palestine, Congressional Record, Vol. 90, Part 1, Seventy-eighth Congress, 2nd Session, January 27, 19^4, p. 856. The American Zionist Organization, Palestine (New York, 19^^), p. 3. 23 gates of Palestine to 100,000 displaced Jews in Europe.^^ In reply, the British government proposed the creation of an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry to study the matter. Accordingly, the committee of inquiry was organized composed of six Americans and six British members under the chairmanship of Judge Joseph Hutcheson of the Fifth United States Circuit Court of Appeals. In its report, issued on April 20, 1946, the committee estimated the number of Jews it might be possible to settle in Palestine, the number that should be returned to the countries from which they fled during the war, and examined the possibility of relieving the European situation by allowing immigration of dislocated Jews to countries outside Europe.4 6 The British insisted that every effort be made to devise some arrangement that would enable Arabs and Jews to live together, independent of British rule. The committee recommended that 100,000 Jewish refugees be admitted entry to Palestine immediately. In long range considerations, the committee recommended that Palestine be treated neither as an Arab nor as a Jewish

•^Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1956), p. 138. 46 United States, Department of State, Admission of Jews to Palestine, Report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, April 20, 1946, pp. 2-12.

I'-rJi;"- ' • 24 state, but rather as a trusteeship under the United 47 Nations. The United Nations was to administer the area under principals of legal and cultural equality for both Arabs and Jews. The. 6ri,tish, however, ignored the committee's 48 •recommendations. Even though Britain could not afford to antagonize American opinion, she refused to relax the restrictions against the entry of the 100,000 Jewish war refugees as the Anglo-American Committee had suggested. The Zionists, feeling that British policy was one­ sided and desiring not only easier, immigration practices but also a Jewish state in Palestine, initiated an active 49 campaign in the fall of 1946 to gain their objectives. American Zionists brought political pressure upon the United States Government, urging it to assume more responsibility to finding a solution to the Palestine question. Meanwhile in Palestine, terrorist activity was instigated against British authority. Jewish activists sabotaged British military and radar installations con­ structed to guard against illegal entry of refugee ships.

''^Reuven Hillel, Member of Israeli Permanent Mission to the United Nations; private interview in New York, May 20, I968. Bartley C. Crum, Behind the Silken Curtain (New York: Simon and Shuster, I947), p. 64. °Truman, 0£. cit., pp. l4l-42. 25 The Jewish terrorists caused great havoc to orderly British administration by local bombings and continuous street clashes. Subjected to pressure from Washington and at odds with the Zionists as well as the Arabs because the Anglo- American Committee had not recognized Arab political aspirations in Palestine, the British Government decided to place the question of Palestine before the United Nations.-^ On April 2, 1947, the head of the British delegation to the United Nations addressed a letter to Dr. Victor Hoo, the Acting Secretary General of the United Nations, requesting that the question of Palestine be placed on the agenda of the next regular session of the General Assembly. The British also asked that a special session be called to consider the Palestine problem and to make recommenda­ tions to the regular General Assembly session which was to convene in September, 19^7- The Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Arab Higher Committee had an opportunity to present their views concerning the termination of the mandate to the First Committee (political and security), of the General Assembly.

•^Lenczowski, o^. cit., p. 392. ^•'•United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1946-47, p. 276. 26 The Jewish Agency called for the right to build their national home in Palestine as had been recognized by the League of Nations. The Arab Committee requested the termination of the Mandate; instead it advocated a single Arab state in Palestine, but the General Assembly rejected this proposal.-^ •

After considering both positions the First Committee recommended a special meeting of the General Assembly. The General Assembly met from April 28, 1947 to May 15, 1947, and adopted a resolution calling for the creation of a United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), charged with the task of recommending possible solutions to the Palestine problem.-^-^ The committee was given wide powers to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine. They were authorized to conduct investigations in Palestine" and wherever they might wish and were to report by September 1, 19^7. UNSCOP completed its work on August 3, 19^7. In making its investigations and its report, the committee studied documents, held meetings with' the. parties concerned.

^^Ibid., pp. 286-87. ^%nited Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Resolution A/106 (S-1), May 15, 19^7- The committee was composed of Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia. 27 and observed conditions in Palestine. The committee failed to achieve a unanimous report and put forth a majority and a minority report. The majority report of UNSCOP endorsed by the representatives of Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, and Uruguay, provided for the partitioning of Palestine into three parts: an Arab state, a Jewish state, and an internation­ alized city of Jerusalem. During the transition from United Nations administration to the State of Palestine, 150,000 Jewish immigrants were to be permitted to enter <4 the Jewish state.-^ After two years, an independent and economically unified Palestine was to be established under United Nations auspices .-^-^ The minority report supported by India, Iran, and Yugoslavia, called for a single independent federal state with an Arab majority and a three year limitation on 56 Jewish immigration.-^ Both Arabs and Jews rejected the minority report even though earlier indications were that the Arabs were in favor of it. The British government announced that it would support neither of the plans. The Soviet government

^United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Document A/364, September, 1947, p. 18. ^^Ibid., pp. 122-140. ^^Ibid., pp. 141-45. 28 and the United States government were in agreement on their support of the majority report. The Jews received this report with mixed emotions. Although some of them wanted all Palestine as a Jewish state, many-sa-w the partition plan as their opportunity to realize the dream of a Jewish State in their coveted "homeland. "^"^ President Truman expressed Arab reactions as follows: The Arab's reaction was quite plain. They did not like it. They made it clear that partition would not be carried out except over their forceful opposition. On October 9, 19^7, I was informed that the Arab League Council had instructed the governments of its member states to move troops to the Palestine border, ready for later use.58 In September of 1947, an ad hoc committee was established to study the Palestinian situation. It was composed of all United Nations members and the following items were placed on the agenda: 1. The question of Palestine (as proposed by Great Britain); 2. The report of UNSCOP; 3. The termination of the m.andate over Palestine and the recognition of its independence as one state.

^''Truman, 0£. cit., p. 155. 58Ibid . 29 On November 29, 19^7, the General Assembly adopted the partition plan (majority plan of UNSCOP) thirty-three to thirteen (two thirds was required for adoption) with ten 59 abstentions.-^^ One reason for the favorable partition vote was American officials sought support for their position from South American states to do their utmost to secure an affirmative vote for the majority plan of UNSCOP. As President Truman suggested, "I was of the opinion that the proposed partition plan for Palestine could open the way for peaceful collaboration between Arabs and Jews." According to the majority plan, the Arab state of Palestine was to include the Central and Eastern part of Palestine from the Valley of Esdraelon down to Beersheba, Western Galilee, and a strip of land along the Mediterranean coast from Gaza southward and along the Egyptian border to the Red Sea. Jaffa would constitute an enclave in.the Jewish state which was to extend over Eastern Galilee and the Valley of Esdraelon, a coastal area from Haifa to south of Jaffa, and a major part of the Negev. Jerusalem and Bethlehem were to be outside of both states and subject

•^^United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Resolution A/181-11, November 29, 1947. 60 Joseph Dunner, The Republic of Israel (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950), p. 29. Truman, o^. cit., p. 156. 30 to United Nations administration. The Assembly's final action on partition was to appoint a commission to carry out the partition plan. In addition, the Assembly asked the Security Council to take the necessary measures to implement the plan. As it turned out, the General Assembly did not put partition into effect. Actually, it gave its approval to a plan only in principle.

The British, who had made clear their resolve to "accept" all United Nations decisions, but to enforce them only if both Jews and Arabs agreed, announced on December 3, 1947 that they would terminate the mandate on May 15, 1948. Consequently, a void in big power determination of law and order existed in the Middle East when the British withdrew their forces. To the Arabs, the United Nations action meant that the outside world, predominantly Western and far removed from the scene, had once again imposed its will upon Eastern peoples. This was certainly not in respect for self determination. The Arabs felt particularly resentful

^^United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly,, Resolution A/181-11, November 29, 19^7- -^Truman, 02. cit., p. 159. ^Mohammed Mamouf, Director of the New York Arab Information Office; private interview. May 21, I968. 31 towards the United States since they believed that it was the country whose influence helped to rally votes for partition. They also reproached Americans for betraying promises made by President Roosevelt to the effect that no basic decision, of Palestine vjould ever be taken without the agreement of both parties concerned.^ On February 6, 1948, the Arab Higher Committee of Palestine stated that: "any attempt by the Jews or any other power or group of powers to establish a Jewish state in Arab territory is an act of oppression which will be resisted in self-defense by force." To further compli­ cate the issue and set the stage for possible violence in the area, the United States on March 19, 1948, requested abandonm.ent of efforts to implem^ent partition. '' The Soviet Union felt, however, that a peaceful solution to the partition problem could be brought about by the presence of British, American, and Soviet troops to police this transitional phase in Palestine. The United States reaction was negative due to the implied threat of Russian expansion. Washington wanted no part in an

^Lenczowski, o^. cit., p. 553. Larry L. Leonard, "The United Nations and Palestine," International Conciliation, October 1949, p. 650. 67 '^A. G. Mezerik (ed.). The Israeli-Arab Controversy (New York: International Review Service, 1962), p. ^^» 32 agreement by which Russian troops would be in a position to gain access to the Eastern Mediterranean and to the oil reserves of the Middle East.^^

The New York Times summed up the situation on March 21, 1948 as follows;

The present shift of American policy on Palestine . . . holds little promise of being able to avoid the hazards it is intended to cir­ cumvent, o 9

With- an obvious vacuum of official responsibility and support for the implementation of the United Nations partition resolution, the time was ripe for war as the Arabs sought to obtain their objectives. The partition of the territory of Palestine was to have been a matter between the Palestinian Arab and Palestinian Jew, but the nationalisms of both Arab and Jew were as involved as if they were all in Jerusalem square.

^8 Sidney B. Fay, "Arabs, Zionists, and Oil," Current History, May, 1948, p. 276. Also see; James R. Duce, "Blood and Oil, Aramco's Secret Report on Palestine," The Nation, June 26, 1948, pp. 705-O7. Because of Arab resis­ tance, partition could only be implemented by force. Since the Security Council had no international police force, only the British (who were unwilling), Russians and Am-ericans could supply the needed troops.- Hence the United States did not want Russian troops in Palestine when there was no means of knowing when they would withdraw. In addition, an agent from ARAMCO assured the Arab League after meeting with the United States Department of State, that if the Arabs would maintain oil concessions, he would seek a compromise solu­ tion to the partition plan for the Jews in the form of a Vatican state within a state arrangement which would be acceptable to the Arabs. ^9New York Times, March 21, 1948, p. 6. 33 On May l4, 1948, the United Kingdom relinquished its mandate over Palestine and, at midnight, the Jewish state of Israel was proclaimed. The United States gave de facto recognition of the State of Israel on May l4, 1948."^^ Three days later, on May 17, 1948, the U.S.S.R. gave Israel recognition, and a few hours afterward armies from Syria, Trans Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt entered Palestine.

'^'^New York Times, May 15, 1948, p. 9. CHAPTER II

STRUGGLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1948

Upon the outbreak of hostilities, Alexandre Parodi, President of the Security Council, informed the council members on May 15, 1948, of two messages he had received: one from the Jewish Agency dated May 1, 1948, concerning the continuous presence and activity of Arab armies in Palestine, and the other from the Foreign Minister of Egypt dated May 15, 1948 who asserted that the Egyptian Government was intervening in Palestine "to re-establish respect for universal morality and the principles recog- 2 nized by the United Nations." On May 20, 1948, Warren Austin, the American delegate, moved for a declaration that a breach v;ithin the meaning of articles 39 -and 41 of the Charter existed 3 in regard to the Palestine problem,-^ On the basis of this request and due to continued violence in the Middle East, on May 22, 1948, the Security Council adopted a resolution calling for immediate cessation of acts of arm^ed force.

•^United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, Document S/736, May 1, 1948, p. 42. ^Ibid., S/745, May 15, 1948, p. 83. ^Ibid., S/753, May 20, 1948, p. 90.

3^ 35 and it requested that all parties concerned give the highest priority to the negotiation and maintenance of a 4 truce. Earlier, on May 20, 1948, the General Assembly adopted a resolution which empowered a United Nations Mediator in Palestine to be chosen by a committee of the General Assembly.-^ The committee composed of representa­ tives of China, France, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom and the United States appointed Count Folke Bernadotte, President of the Swedish Red Cross, as United Nations Mediator on Palestine. His m.ain role was to promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine. On June 11, 1948, largely through his efforts, a truce was established. The truce was to last until July 18, 1948; however, the situation in Jerusalem rapidly deteriorated and skirmishes continued. On August 19, 1948, the United Nations Security Council warned that both Arab and "Jewish authorities would be held responsible for thwarting the authority of the United Nations, whether the violations

^Ibid., Resolution S/773, May 22, 19^8. •^United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly., Resolution A/186, May 20, 1948. ^Ibid.

-yrf^i 36 were committed by regular or irregular troops."^ Upon the death of Count Bernadotte, Dr. Ralph Bunche, Director of the Division of Trusteeship in the United Nations Secretariat, was appointed acting mediator by the United Nations Security Council. Since the truce had been broken. Dr. Bunche concentrated on obtaining a cease fire. He suggested prompt intervention by the Security Council which voted unanimously for the imple­ mentation of an immediate and effective cease fire which o both parties accepted. To eliminate any future threat to peace, the Security Council on November l6, 1948, requested Dr. Bunche to seek peace in Palestine in the form of an armistice. As a result of the mediation efforts, a series of a.rmistice agreements was signed between the Israeli government and Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria during the period of February 24, I949 to July 20, 1949.^ The armistice

'United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, Document S/983, August, 1948, pp. 50-51. On August 19, Egyptian troops murdered two observers at Gaza. On September 17, Count Bernadotte and chief French observer. Colonel Andre Serat, were murdered by the Israeli terrorist group, the Stern gang. These calculated murders were criticized strongly by United Nations personnel. o United Nations,.Official Records of the Security Council, Document S/IO7O, November 4, 1948. "united Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1948-49, pp. 82-84. 37 agreements contained the following provisions; 1. Article I guaranteed the right of each party to security from armed attack by the other. 2. Article II guaranteed territorial integrity . fxojn guerilla attacks. 3. Article VII reiterated that both parties guaranteed to respect the other's rights during transition from the present truce to permanent peace. The Jewish-Arab war of 1948 profoundly changed the political situation in the Middle East. In this instance Israel emerged victorious and the Arab states were humiliated. Although hostilities were ended by the Armistice Agreements of 19^9, certain internal pressures developed, after the war, and were related to it, which presented a constant threat to stable peace, and which ultimately resulted in further Arab Israeli conflicts in 1956 and 1967. These pressures centered primarily around three issues; the Arab refugee, the Jordan River, ana the Arab boycott.

•^United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, Document S/1032/Rev. 1, April 3, 1949, p. 425. 38 The Arab Refugee

Of the three problem areas, that of the Arab refugee has presented the most constant threat to peace. The Arab-Israeli war drove nearly one million Arabs from their homes. The refugees fled to the surrounding Arab countries or to the Arab secftlons of Palestine. The Honorable Edwin Samuel, Member of the British House of Commons and first High Commissioner of Palestine, offered the following reasons- for the Arab exodus: . . . three main causes can be distinguished-, first, the desire to get out-of the way of battling armies, coupled with a belief in Arab victory and an early return to their homes. Secondly, a dislike for living, even temporarily, under Jewish rule; and thirdly, a real fear of physical extermi­ nation, after the annihilation of Deir Yassin by Jewish terrorists before the end of the Mandate, with this deliberate intention. Many Arab villages were blown up by the Israel army at the end of the war of liberation in order to discourage the return of the Arab refugee.-'-^ By the middle of November, 1948, the refugee problem had become one of the United Nation's foremost problem^s.

W. E. de St. Aubin, "Peace and Refugees in the Middle East," Middle East Journal (July, 1949), p. 37. See also: United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Document A/648, September 16, 1948. According to this report, there were 330,000 official Arab refugees. ] 2 Honorable Edwin Samuel, C.M.G. "The Impact of Immigration on Israel," The Political Quarterly, Vol. XXIV (London: Turnstile Press, 1953), P- 282. In one of the more serious encounters between Arab and Israeli forces in 1948, the Irgun or underground Israeli army killed some 250 men, women, and children, in Deir Yassin, a small Arab village outside of Jerusalem which had no apparent strategic value. 39 and the Acting United Nations Mediator, Ralph J. Bunche, requested the United Nations General Assembly to undertake measures to relieve the needs of the now scattered, non- 13 supportive refugees. -" In the spring of 1949, the number of displaced persons eligible for relief was estimated at 940,000.-^^

The General Assembly indicated its concern with the question of re-establishing the refugees in their homes in Palestine or elsewhere. On December 11, 1948, the Assembly resolved that the Palestinian refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest 15 possible date. -^ The resolution also provided that compensation was to be paid for the property of those choosing not to return. Finally, the resolution estab­ lished the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine and authorized it to facilitate refugee repatria­ tion, resettlement, economic and social rehabilitation, and to set up subsidiary bodies and appoint technical

•'•-^United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Resolution A/212-III, November 19, 1948. l4 Lenczowski, 02. cit., p. 401. 1 5 •^-^United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, December 11, 19^^! Resolution A/194-III. 40 experts to assist in furthering its work. In August, 19^9, the Conciliation Commission established the Economic Survey Mission, to be headed by Mr. Gordon R. Clapp of the Tennessee Valley Authority. The Economic Survey Mission was to examine the economic situation arising from the recent hostilities in the Near East ... to recommend to the United Nations means of overcoming resultant economic dislocations, of reintegrating the refugees into the economic life of the area; and of creating conditions which will be conducive to the establishment of permanent peace. 1"^ The Mission was concerned with finding an avenue , to permanent solutions for the rehabilitation and resettle­ ment of Arab refugees. The Mission concluded that direct assistance to the refugees was a stopgap measure initiated to contain the plight of the refugees until more permanent programs in the form of work projects enabled refugees to become an economic asset to neighboring countries in which the refugees found themselves. On November 8, 19^9, Gordon Clapp sent a report to the General Assembly recommending creation of a new agency to carry out a relief program on a diminishing scale and to inaugurate a works -I o program under which refugees could become self-supporting.

^^Ibid. •'•'^United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1949, P« 239. l^Ibid. 41 On December 8, 19^9, based on the recommendations of the Economic Survey Mission, the General Assembly unanimously approved the establishment of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA or UNRWAP), to carry out relief and works projects in collaboration with local governments.-'-^ UNRWA was to be financed by donations from member states, while dona­ tions in kind were also to be accepted from nonmember 20 states. UNRWA's program was calculated to improve the productivity of the area while continuing relief until all refugees would be absorbed. The theory behind the establishment of UNRWA was that once economic problems were resolved, political tensions would cease. The Israelis and. Arabs were concerned with political rhetoric; that is, finding an immediate and permanent solution based on responsibility for the initiation of the refugee problem. The Arabs maintained that they had not given the world this problem, but that it was forced upon them by the expansion of Jewish immigration after World War 11.^"^

•^^United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, December 8, 1949, Resolution A/302-IV. Ibid. 21 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Document A/2184, September 9, 1952, p. 2. 42 The Israeli government would not accept full responsibility for the Arab refugees. Abba Eban, Israeli delegate to the United Nations, remarked;

You cannot let loose a war and then wash your hands of all responsibility for its most tragic consequences. The entire sequences of suffering inflicted by and on both sides in such a conflict, rests squarely on the shoulders of those • who started the war.22

The members of the United Nations were not as deeply concerned with the political responsibility for the condition of the Arab refugee as were the parties directly involved. Several plans for resettlement were presented which were based on the belief that either Iraq, Syria, or Jordan could well absorb the total number of refugees. But the Arab states assumed little responsibility for the resettlement of the refugees other than the fact that Jordan permitted the refugees to reside in the camps along both sides of the Jordan River. Israel did not consent to the return of any of these refugees. First the Israelis felt that a large Arab population, indoctrinated by years of propaganda against Israel, would form a vast fifth column in the country which might undermine Israel's national security.

?2 Abba S. Eban, "The Arab Refugee," Speech before the Ad Hoc Committee of the Seventh Regular Session of the United Nations' General Assembly, October 30, 1952, New York: Israel Office of Information, p. §. " 43 Secondly, the vacuum left by the Arabs was partially fulfilled by the incoming Jewish refugees. ^ Cooperation between the Arab states and Israel over the refugee problem has been lacking. For example, Israel still feels threatened by her neighbors, and maintains that she will not compromise on any refugee solution with the Arabs until, as expressed by Mrs. Golda Meir, Israeli Foreign Minister in December, I962, the Arabs agree to respect Israel's national and economic security. 24 The Arab states, however, rem.ain unv/illing to deal politically with Israel even when it concerns future adaptation and integration of the Arab refugee into the mainstream of political and economic life.2 -^5 The vjar of June 5-10, I967 produced 200,000 additional refugees who, in the course of Israeli occupation of Jordan's ?6 West Bank, moved across the river from Israel to Jordan. The reasons for this flight are similar to the reasons for the original refugee exodus in 1948. First, people

^^Israel Office of Information, Refugees in the Middle East (New York, I967), PP. I6-I8. 9U "The Arab Refugee Problem," Speech by Mrs. Golda Meir, Israel Minister for Foreign Affairs, before the Special Political Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, December l4, I962. ^%ew York Times, February 22, I968, p. 4. Michal Shiloh, Israeli Consul for Educational Affairs; Private interview in New York, May 21, I968. 44 fled for human reasons to escape the hostilities. Second, many of the refugees, who lived in refugee camps on Jordan's West Bank, fled because they feared that if Israel succeeded they would be in danger of losing their UNWRA rations.F The nature of the Arab refugee's total situation, as a result of the June War of I967, has changed little. The Israelis have reiterated that the Arab refugees of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War have become part of their environment and could not possibly be physically integrated into Israel. The Arab states contend that the refugees are being temporarily cared for and are only awaiting return to their sovereign home, Palestine. ^ Prospects concerning the future of the refugee problem will vary, as a result of the June War, depending on whether the refugees in question are those of the Gaza strip, in the Nablus-Hebron areas, or in countries surround­ ing Israel. Only the last group can be dealt with without regard to current Israeli views (other than compensation). The solution to the problems of the'other tv:o areas depends

'Sami Hadawi, Bitter Harvest; Palestine between 1Q14 and I967 (New Yorki The New World Press, 1967), p. 27. p p Israel Office of Information, ££. cit., p. 7. "Moshe Dayan, Speech Before the I^gyptian POW camp at Athlit, Occupied F;gypt, January 19, 1968. 45 somewhat on what the territorial settlement will be. In other words, all Palestinians who came to be considered residents of Israel are no longer refugees, for they will be repatriated. If the Israelis significantly attempt to rehabili- tate these refugees, they will have provided a basis for cooperation with the Arab states. This alternative to repatriation could be broadened, and in the course of time, give way to programs of inter-state development and construction (to encompass all refugees, 1948 through 1967). The Arab refugee issue is a constant irritant to peaceful solution of the various issues that exist between the Arabs and Israelis. A comprehensive program for re­ settlement of the Arabs is an absolute necessity. The challenge should be an object of determination to both Arab and Jew in the Middle -East. The possibility of such a solution ever occurring, however, is slight. The problems are, and remain a tragic political manifestation of lack of responsibility. The responsibilities of war have not been met. The only way the Israelis can broaden any cooperative development program concerning the Arab refugees would be for the Arabs to recognize the Jewish state within their midst, in terms 30 of a negotiated peace treaty. The fact that the Arabs

-^ Abba Eban, Israel's Call for a Negotiated Peace, Israel Office of Information, March 25, PP. 4-5.

t;- ••' 46 have not agreed to this is expressed in an interview of King Hussein during a state visit to the United States on November 7, I967. Hussein said:

Speakine in the name of the whole Arab nation . . . (Jf Israel desiresj to make herself an acceptable neighbor in the Arab world [Israel mus-t] first allow the return of the Arab refugees to their homes and their land.31 The reality of conflict between Israel and her Arab neighbors also carries over into economic spheres, as evidenced by the Jordan River controversy and the Arab economic boycott of Israel.

The Jordan River Controversy

If tension over the Arab refugees stood in the v/ay of peaceful negotiations, problems relating to the control of the Jordan River waters ultimately destroyed them. The Jordan River is the agricultural life line of both Jordan and Israel. Its waters constitute, at present, the only feasible source from which irrigation may be conducted. A few miles south of the Sea of Galilee, close to the small Jordanian town of Naharayim, is the confluence of the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers, which also marks the frontier

^ King Hussein, Speech to the National Press Club, November 7, 1967, p. 5. ^7 between Jordan and Israel. Neither bank of the Yarmuk is patrolled since both sides are valuable to the Jordanians and Israelis who farm the adjacent land. It would be difficult to imagine a war starting here; however, both nations need this water to supply their expanding populations. Currently, both nations are drawing as much water as possible from the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers without seriously diminishing their flows. Soon Jordan and Israel will be overtaxing the reserves of the Jordan confluence. At the present time, however, neither Jordan, Israel, nor any other interested state in the area has been able to start discussions for a joint water conservation project, 32 let alone arrive at a solution.-^ A number of studies have been conducted on the subject of the potential utilization of the waters of both the Jordan and Yarmuk. In 1944, a pilot scheme was devised by professor Walter Lowdermilk, an American conservationist. He suggested the creation of a Jordan Valley Authority, with power to sponsor development of a hydroelectric power project on the Yarmuk and a water division plan to supply the needs of both Jordan and Palestine.-^-^ The success of the plan was dependent on

^^I. L. Kenen (ed.), "The Jordan River Controversy," Near East Report, August, I967, PP. 13-1^. -^-^Walter Lowdermilk, Palestine, Land of Promise (New York: Harper's, 1944), p. 29. 48 mutual cooperation between Palestine and Jordan, and did not take into account the political situation that was to result from the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1948. The most progressive proposal concerning bi-national use of the Jordan River was envisioned by Eric Johnston. On October 16, 1953, President Eisenhower appointed Johnston his personal representative to Israel to examine the possibilities of a major water plan that would be supported financially by the United States.^ Johnston spent two years consulting all countries who had an interest in the problem: Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. He incorporated into his plan the principles of Professor Lowdermilk's proposal, Johnston proposed an electrical power plant on the Litani River, a tributary of the Jordan which starts in Lebanon; a series of pumping stations; and irrigational canals strategically placed along the Jordan to facilitate farming operations in Jordan and Israel. The plan was to supply roughly forty percent of the river's available reserves to Israel, forty-five • percent to Jordan, ten percent to Syria, and roughly five percent to Lebanon.-^-3^5

-^Ernest Stock, The Road to Sinai (New York; Columbia University Press, I968), p. 52. See also: United States, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXIX, No. 748, October 26, 1953, p. 55'3> ^^Terrence Prittie, Israel, Miracle in the Desert (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, I967), pp. 59-60. 49 The Israelis, attempting to irrigate and make productive as much land as possible, were anxious to get started. On September 2, 1953, they initiated a project to divert the Jordan River waters from a spot in the demilitarized zone between Israel and Syria.^^ The Syrians complained to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organi- ' zation that this violated the armistice agreement. They also objected to any Israeli project in the area taken without prior Syrian approval. In addition, the Syrians indicated that this diversion project would deprive Arab 37 lands of water.-^^ The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, established by the Security Council in 1949 to keep the peace between Arab countries and Israel in the demilitarized zone, ordered Israel to stop work on the project. Israel refused. Syria then took its complaint to the United Nations Security Council which requested that a special group headed by an American, General Vagn Benike, conduct an on-the-spot investigation.'^ The Benike

-^United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, Document S/2762, September 2, 1953. The demili­ tarized zone came under the jurisdiction of the United Nations as a result of the Armistice agreements.

-^^Edward Rizk, The River Jordan (New York: Arab Information Service, 1964), p. 14.

^ United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, Document S/3108/Rev. 1, October 16, 1953. 50 group reported that the Syrian complaint was valid and that the Israeli project would divert the water's original flow from the Syrian side.^^ On October 27, 1953, the Security Council adopted a resolution ordering that the status quo be restored in the demilitarized zone.^^ Concurrent with this United Nations investigation, the United States refused to grant Israel any economic aid until Israel complied with the United Nations order. Consequently, Israel consented to stop work on the Jordan River project until the United Nations Security Council made its final decision on the Syrian protest. Eric Johnston concluded his plan for the Jordan River confluence on August 7, 1955* Concerning this plan Johnston later said, "All that was needed to implement the 4? agreement was a go-ahead signal from the four governments." The Arab League met to consider the Johnston plan in Cairo on October 15, 1955' A Syrian-sponsored proposal to reject the plan was approved by the League on the basis that any such acceptance of the plan would imply de facto

^^Ibid., S/3122, October 23, 1953. ^^Tbid., Resolution S/3128, October 27, 1953. ^•^William R. Polk, The United States and the Arab World (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, I965), p. 266. "^New York Times, August 10, 1958, p. 4. 51 recognition of the state of Israel.4 3^ Johnston had failed to consider the political nature of his proposed project. Although it was proposed to solve a functional problem, it did not differ in theory from Lowdermilk's direct cooperation-plan. Whether Israel's initial determination to develop the Jordan River project alone frustrated any proposed cooperation between the Arab states and Israel can only be conjecture. The fact remains that preliminary agreement was established for Johnston to carry out his research, . 44 Israel continued to supply her water needs by building a pumping station at Bnot Ya' Ahab in-January of 1962, on the Israeli side of the Galilee outside of the demilitarized zone. -^ The Arabs objected to the construc­ tion of the Galilee water carrier. They feared Israel would exploit the Jordan River reserves to irrigate the Israeli desert country, the Negev. The Syrians retaliated

^Edward Rizk, oj^. cit. , p. 21. ^\errence Prittie, Israel,-Miracle in the Desert (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1967), P. 59- The initial agreement was between Israel and the Arab states of Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. •^Nadav Safran, The United States and Israel (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 63. The Israelis sought to divert 20 percent of the Jordan's flow. Rizk, 22. cit., p. 3. The Negev is the desert country of southern Israel which amounts to 55 percent of the land of the state of Israel. 52 by initiating a water diversion project of their ovm to 47 cut off the headwaters of the Jordan. ^ Such a project, if followed to completion, would have rendered the Jordan River useless as a source of water from which irrigation projects in'-either Jordan or Israel could be started. The streams that supply the Jordan are low in salt content and useful for irrigation, while the Jordan itself is too high in salt content for normal agricultural or industrial usage. 48 On August 12, 1966, Syrian bulldozers began construc­ tion on their diversion project. The Israelis responded 49 . • by firing on the Syrian workers. '^ However, the work was temporarily brought to an end not by arms, but by lack of voluntary financial and military support from the other Arab League states.-^ Any joint Arab project to divert the headwaters has been halted by the Arab-Israeli war of June 5-10, I967 since the Israelis captured the headwaters area. However, Israeli control is not a permanent solution to the Jordan

^"^Ibid. On January I7, 1964, the Arab League gave its approval. ' ^^Yitzhak E. Streifler-Shavit, "Desalination," Technion, January, I968, pp. 9-10. °Prittie, 0£. cit., p. 62. •^ I. L. Kenen, o^* dt., pp. B-14-15. 53 River question or any other Middle Eastern controversy. It is possible that the Israelis and Arabs might come to terms and sign a treaty concerning altering some of the tragic effects of a twenty year political and military conflict. Thi'S must eventually occur if we are to think positively about the direction of Middle Eastern relations. However, should this happen, Israel and its Arab neighbors (by virtue of the Jordan controversy) would again be faced with a political impasse which could have military conse­ quences. The only alternative is for the Israelis and the Arabs to establish peaceful cooperation in use of the Jordan. Satisfactory solutions to the Arab-Israeli problems, as over the Jordan River controversy, have been hampered by the inability to get both sides together to negotiate. Herein lies the danger, not so much in the issues that divide. Israel and the Arab states, but in the lack of mutual respect for each other's position and the inability to hold any long term discussions. As long as there is peace along the Jordan, there can also be progress towards resettlement of the Arab refugees. It is estimated that 20,000 families could be settled in the Jordan Valley area alone. "^ This is made

^•^Freda Kirchway, Security and the Middle Ea.st (New York: Nations Associates, 1954), p. 76. In an interview with Michael Shiloh, he pointed out that as many as 60,000 families could be settled in the area. 5h possible by the Bnot Ya'Ahab diversion project which provides irrigation of formerly arid lands in the valley 52 area. The Jordan River problem indicates the concern for useable water in the area. Since the area lacks reserves of useable water, the Israelis have attempted to obtain water from the sea by applying advanced desalination processes. Unfortunately, this is an expensive process since installation costs are high. Certainly, this must ultimately provide their chief water source. Already at Ashod, along the southern coast of Israel, the Israelis soon expect to produce 165,000 gallons of purified sea water a year to irrigate the Negev, whose vast lands could accommodate twice the number of existing Arab refugees.-^-^^

52 -^ Prittie, op. cit. , pp. 36-40. Israel's advanced technology can be used to construct needed programs. For example, Israel's chief port of Haifa was not constructed with the idea of its eventually having to serve a dynamically growing Israel. Therefore, on August 6, 1956, the Knesset (Israel's "parliament") sought to obtain the services of the Rotterdam Port Authority to come to Israel and recommend the building of a second port somewhere along the southern Israeli coast. The Rotterdam Port Authority suggested Ashdod as a logical place for a new port and as a structural linkup to future plans for development of the Negev. \^fhen the work started on the port there was no human habitation in the area. Ten years later, Ashdod, a city of 35,000, opened its facilities to international shipping traffic. Ashdod, example extraordinary of Israel's technical potential, stimulates thinking concerning future Arab- Israeli cooperation between Jordan and Israel for the rehabilitation of the Arab refugees by way of bi-functional construction efforts to establish a permanent home for the refugees in arid lands. •^^Yltzhak Streiffer-Shavit, 0£. £it., pp. 11-14. 55 The Arab Boycott

While the Jordan River controversy in large part contributed to the antagonism between Arabs and Israelis, the Arab boycott substantially has prevented, and continues to prevent, any re-establishment of economic, and thus political, exchange. The Arab boycott, introduced by the Palestine Arab Higher Committee in 1939, was originally an attempt, led by the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, to deny the Jews the use of the port at Haifa. The Jews circum­ vented the boycott by building a separate port nearby at Tel Aviv.

The present Arab boycott, however, was started in 1950, by the Arab League which established the Central Boycott Office in Damascus as the coordinating mechanism. The boycott calls for blacklisting those companies which trade with Israel.-5^4 The United Arab Republic also refuses Israel the right of passage through the Suez Canal. In support of this policy the Arab states maintain that "technically, a state of war still exists between Israel and the Arab states. The Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel did not end that state of war; it only terminated active hostilities."-^-^ The objective of the

^ Sami Hadawi, "Arab Blockade and Boycott of Israel," Arab Information Paper No. 17, New York, 1966, p. 72. ^^Ibld., p. 71. 5(^ League has been defined by Abdul Kerim Ayidi, Supervisor of the General Boycott Office, at a conference of branch offices held May I7, 1957 in Damascus. He stated; The foremost aim of the boycott is to prevent Israel goods from reaching Arab countries, and Arab goods from reaching Israel. The Boycott Office hopes to have [by this policy] a serious effect on its [Israel's] political and economic life, and in this way Israel can be destroyed.36 The Central Boycott Office has taken the following steps to implement this policy; 1. The office restricts any Arab nationals from carrying on commercial relations with Israel. This crime is punishable by prison sentence 57 and fine.-^' 2. The office has suspended all postal, telephone, and telegraph facilities to Israel.-^ 3. The office usually tends to boycott all Jewish- directed firms.-^5^9 4. The Arab governments refuse to provide visas to travel in Arab states if there is any

•^^Ibid., p. 35. •^'John A. De Nova, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East (Minneapolis; University of Minnesota Press, 1963), p. 146. ^^Ibid. ^^I. L. Kenen (ed.), "The Arab Boycott Today," M<=>ar East Report, August, I967, p. B-24. 51 evidence that the traveller intends to visit Israel.^^

5. Saudi Arabia requires that the.United States Government submit "a detailed list of the names and identities" of its members and employees at Abrahran Air Force Base so that it will not include such objectionable personnel. 6. The boycott office calls for a blacklist of all those companies whose vessels call at Arab 6? ports carrying goods consigned to Israel. 7. Aircraft making use of Israeli facilities are forbidden to overfly Arab territories, to seek flight information, or obtain rescue services from Arab sources. ^ The Arab spirit of non-cooperation limits any multilateral plans for the development of Middle Eastern resources. The void which the boycott creates has been mostly breached by the generally favorable policies which the United States Congress and American industries have

60 Regional Development for Regional Peace (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Institute, 1958), p. 276. 6l United States, Department of State, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, TIAS No. 2290, 1957^: ' 62 I. L. Kenen, op. cit., p. 146. ^^Ibid.

3?-y 58 established towards Israel. In 1965, the United States Congress adopted an amendment to the Export Control Act of I949. The amendment prohibits American businessmen from supporting restrictive trade practices or boycotts fostered or imposed by any foreign country against another country friendly to the United States. This law was intended to activate a pattern for American industry of non-compliance with the Arab demands that American industry prove its non-use of Israeli goods in manufacturing. The amendment declared that the United States Government; . . . requests American business' firms not to cooperate in restrictive trade practices or boycotts imposed by a foreign country against another foreign country friendly to the United States.^^ The nearly twenty-one years of Arab boycott has not served the Arab cause. Jordan's products bound for Eastern and Western Europe must go overland through Syria and Iraq rather than to the natural and cheaper method of transport via the Israeli port facilities of Haifa or Ashdod.^^ Iraq had to extend its oil pipelines two hundred miles to avoid tying into the pre-19^8 connection with

^^I. L. Kenen (ed.), "The Boycott," The Near East Report, May 16, 1967, p. 40. •^United States, Statutes at Large, Vol. 79, 89th Congress, 1st Session, 1965, P. 209. ^^William R. Polk, ££. cljt., p. I65. 59 Haifa on the Mediterranean. The once large exchange of goods between Jordan and Israel, before the strict appli­ cation of the boycott by Jordan, accounted for seventy percent of trade in each direction. Now this formerly mutually remunerative trade is non-existent. According to the Lebanese Newspaper Al Hayat, "the boycott has at 67 times caused more damage to Lebanon, than to Israel." ' Finally, the boycott aggravates and perpetuates tension, and flouts the principles of international economic intercourse. That is to say, the policy of the Central Boycott Office endangers the peace and security of the world, because boycott and blockade are instruments 68 of warfare. The repercussions of strict application of boycott provisions makes certain that peace in the area will remain unobtainable.

"^Al Hayat, Beirut, Lebanon (Ahmed Azzani, tr.), January 7, 1968. United States, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXVII, No. 9^2, July 15, 1957, PP. 112-13- CHAPTER III

BIG POWERS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

As far as Arab and Israeli peoples were concerned, prior to 1948, big powers were of little significance as compared to local problems. However, in the post war era, Arab and Israeli interest in the big powers was greatly expanded. After World V/ar II, the development of nuclear weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union was largely responsible for their importance in the inter­ national arena. At the same time, a large number of ex- colonial areas attained sovereignty. In the midst of the Arab-Israeli tensions after the war, these newly indepen­ dent states became involved in the political game, the stakes of which became United States and Soviet Union military aid. With the military aid from these sources, many of these Middle Eastern states could begin to act as political entities with the capability of extending their foreign policies more forcefully. With the advent of increased power, waging war became ever easier, and accordingly, became more frequent. Prior to and during World War I, the United States government rarely took notice of political or economic

60 61 developments in the Middle East. After World War I, President Wilson stated:

I am, moreover, persuaded that the Allied Nations, with the fullest concurrence of our own Government and people, are agreed that in Palestine shall be laid the foundations of a Jewish Common­ weal th.l This statement led to a belief on the part of European statesmen that the United States would accept some respon­ sibility for the achievement of a just and enduring peace in the Middle East, based on the application of her own 2 domestic political ideals. Since the end of World War II, the over-riding goal of United States foreign policy has been containment of Soviet political influence. Part of this policy, immediately after the war, was the development of a series of interlocking mutual defense alliances from Europe to the Far East. American thinking on European defense centered on the "Northern Tier": Greece, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan.-^ However, the end of World V/ar II revealed that the Soviet Union was continuing its historic drive to expand into the Middle East and the Balkans. In 1946,

1 Frank Gervasi, The Case for Israel (New York: The Viking Press, I967), p. 199. ^Ibid., p. 25. -^Lewis W. Koenig, The Truman Administration; Its Principles and Practices (New York: New York University Press, 1956}, p. 295. 62 the Soviet Union refused to participate in the super­ vision of elections in post war Greece, during which time the Greek communist party carried on a guerilla war. Later, the Soviet Union made demands for Turkish territory and threatened to force Turkey to acknowledge Soviet partnership in controlling the Turkish Straits, thus providing Russia with an outlet to the Mediterranean Sea. And, after V/orld War II, Russian troops remained in Iran for a period of some nine months, during which time the government of Iran was threatened with collapse. The United States, therefore, due to Soviet actions in the area and because of the decline of British power, was forced to undertake responsibility for the maintenance of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. On March 12, 19^7, President Truman, in a message to Congress, stated that the United States would support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressure. This message reformulated the principles of American foreign policy in terms of the worldwide containment of Communism.-^ The policy of containment was

United States, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XVI, No. 403, March 23, 1947, PP- 534-37- President Truman asked Congress to approve $400,000,000 for assistance to Greece and Turkey for the period ending June 30, 19^8. ^^Hans J. Morganthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), P. 19. 63 closely linked with economic aid. The Mutual Security Program with Greece, Turkey, and Iran recommended to Congress by President Truman on May 21, 1951, explained that aid to the Middle East was necessary because the Soviet Union was applying steady and relentless pressure to the area which our aid alone could not withstand. "Endangered by political and economic instability, the security objective in the area must be to create stability 7 by established and sound economic progress."' But increasingly, after 1952, money was put directly into the creation of military strength rather than to building economic strength. Of the over 5^0 million dollars proposed for 1953 for the Middle East, exclusive of eco­ nomic assistance, 4l5 million dollars was to be spent on o military aid, increasingly for Greece, Turkey, and Iran. When the United States attempted to implement its containment policy, it found that the Arab Middle East was not eager to be bound up in it. There were two reasons for this: the growing spirit of Arab nationalism, and the problem of Palestine. The nationalist spirit precluded

6 United States, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXIV, No. 622, June 4, 1951, P. 884. "^Ibid., p. 885. o United States, Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstracts of the United States, 1954, pp. 900 and 905. 64 any defensive pact with a big power. Understandably, the Arab states did not feel that the American sponsored collective defense system for the Middle East was of paramount importance to their national security. The Palestine problem occupied their attention more than the Soviet threat of intervention. The Arabs were more fear­ ful of Zionism than of Communism. They were somewhat concerned that the United States might back the new state Q of Israel in aggressive expansion.-^ The Soviet Union had not been actively involved in the Palestine problem. Nevertheless, Russia supported the state of Israel politically (in the' United Nations the Soviet Union voted for partition in 1947), and militarily by supplying Israel with modern armaments through Czechoslovakia during their fight for independence in 1948-49."''^ Russian support during that period might be attributed to two principal lines of reasoning. In the first place, the second major political party, Mapam, was pro-Soviet, and made every effort to create a neutralist climate within Israel. In the second place.

^Carol A. Fischer and Fred Krinsky, Middle East in Crisis (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1959), P. 32. •^^Frank Gervasi, The Case for Israel (New York: The Viking Press, I967), p. 88. ' Nadav Safran, The United States and Israel (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 100-01. ^5 the USSR's support of the Israelis was a result of American defense plans in the Middle East. On October 15, 1951, the United States sought to join Egypt in a collective allied Middle East command with the United Kingdom, France, 12 and Turkey. •' - The Egyptians refused, preferring to main­ tain strictly a neutral and united Arab front, and preferring to avoid big power involvements within the Middle East. The Soviet Union, therefore, elected to support Israel as a main counterbalance to American defense plans for the Middle East."^-^ On April 21, 1954, the United States signed a Western oriented military agreement with Iraq. On February 24, 1955, Iraq signed a Western oriented Middle East defense pact of mutual cooperation xvith Turkey. 15^ Since these agreements bypassed the Arab League and were centered in Baghdad, vrhose government v;as hostile to Nasser, it brought about an immediate deterioration of American relations with F^ypt

1 2 United States, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXV, No. 643, October 22, 1951-, P- 647. •*•-^Walter S. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959), p. 193. l4 United States, Department of State, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, TIAS No, 31O8. -1 t: -^Aid was expanded to Iraq, as well as Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Britain, through the Baghdad Pact which was finalized between these countries in October, 1955* 66 and with those Arab countries in which President Nasser had a strong influence: at first Syria, and for a time "16 •Jordan. In Nasser's view Egypt should have been permitted to take the lead in constructing a security system in the Middle East, and that such a security system should be composed purely of Arab states. "^ When the United States succeeded in drawing Iraq and Turkey into a Middle East defense pact, Israel requested to the United States, Britain, and France to include Israel in the Western defense system. . Soviet leaders regarded an extension of NATO in the Middle East with grave misgivings and immediately sought to reconcile themselves with Egypt in order to break up the West's favored position in the Middle East."^^ As early as May 31, 1950, Israel's intention to abandon a neutralist policy had been indicated in an

1 6 Laqueur, o£. cit., p. 193. "^A. J. Hood, Engineer with Standard Oil Company in Iraq and Qatar from 1957-65; private interview in Dallas on May 28, I968. Iraq's participation in the Western defense scheme not only crossed Nasser's striving for a strong Arab bloc, but it also gave Britain, which had agreed to withdraw its army from the Suez Canal zone on October 19, 195^, an opening for a return to the area. -| o Laqueur, o^. cit., p. 234. •^^Soviet News, London, April 17, 1955, p. 1- It was at this time that Moscow realized than an effective way to approach the Arab states, especially Egypt, was to adopt an anti-Israel line. article in Israel's leading newspaper, Ha-Arez. The article stated: "In view of the West's (sic) to ren.ain a determining factor in the Middle East, we have no alternative but to adopt ourselves to it."^° While this view did not reflect the government policy, it had much support among the populace.

Israel's relations with the Soviet Union (prior to the alliance request) were marred by three difficulties. First was Israel's reliance on financial help from the United States in order to meet its security requirements. As Ben-Gurion pointed out in the Knesset: "Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union give us arms directly. But when the Soviet Union says no, that goes for every-

r>-\ body in Russia. It isn't so in America." Second, Israel supported the United States' action in defense of the Republic of Korea by sending medicines to the South Koreans. This evoked some changes in the Soviet attitude towards "neutralist" Israel.2 2 Finally, Israel was affected by the wave of anti-Semitism which occurred in the Soviet Union at this time. On March 23, 1952, the Soviets arrested Mordecai Oren, a leading Mapam functionary

^^Ha-Arez, May 31, 1950, p. 1. 21 Israel, Knesset. Speech by David Ben-Gurion to the Knesset. Vol. V, p. 1587, 1953- z^ 22 Laqueur, o^. cit., p. 180. 68 on leave in Russia.2 3-^ Oren was convicted on November 3, 24 1952. On January 13, 1953, the Soviets accused several Jewish doctors of conspiring against the government.2 -^5 These incidents caused a violent reaction in Israel. On February 9, 1953, several unidentified persons exploded ?6 a bomb on the premises of the Soviet embassy in Tel Aviv. On February 11, 1953, a^ editorial in Ha-Arez suggested that it was time for Israel to identify with the United States. The editorial stated: Israel's vital interests demand, above all, that its relations be close with countries where Jewish communities are free to further the fulfill­ ment of Israel's historic mission, and whose governments render practiced assistance to enable it to stand up to the trials of today and those which lie ahead tomorrovj. Clearly the arrest and conviction of Oren indicated that the Soviet Union was not such a country. As a consequence of the development of ill feeling between the two countries, the Soviet Union did not find it difficult to drop Israel in favor of the Arabs. Moscow pointed out that the Israel dependence on American aid supplemented by West German

^^Michael S. Cohen, "Five Years of Israeli Diplomacy," Zionist Newsletter (May 5, 1953), PP- 1-3. ^^Ibid. ^^Ibid. ^^New York Times, February 10, 1953, P- 1- ^'^Ha-Arez, February 11, 1953, p. 3. 69 reparation payments signified that Israel had become a creature of Western Imperialism. Peace, meanvjhile, had never really come to the Middle East. Despite the armistice agreements (Spring 1949), the borders of Israel were fronts rather than frontiers. Israel, therefore, embarked upon a policy of large scale retaliation for Arab border violations. The retaliatory actions were aimed primarily at E^gypt who sponsored the Fedayeen guerilla elements. As a result, Egypt soon became alarmed for its security, and sought more and better military equipment. President Nasser of Egypt explained that it was Israeli reprisal raids against Gaza and Khan Yunis in 1955 which prompted him to negotiate for arms. " He sought twenty million dollars worth of arms from the United States, at the same time refusing to enter into mutual defense pact with the United States. The latter offered to sell Nasser arms, cash on delivery, if he would accept an American military advisory mission 30 to supervise the use of such arms.-^ Nasser refused to

^Ernest Stock, Israel on the Road to Sinai (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1967), p. 58. ^^New York Times, October 1, 1955, P. 1. The raid on Gaza took place February 28; the raid on Khan Yunis took place on August 22. ^^Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, I965), pp. 24-25. 70 accept the offer on the grounds that it was too conditional. He explained his refusal by stating that a United States mission meant American influence and that such influence was not acceptable to the Arab people.-^''" Instead, after the Israeli reprisal raid against Gaza on February 28, 1955, Nasser turned to the Soviet Bloc and concluded an arms-for-cotton agreement with Czechoslovakia on September 27, 1955.-^^

The Russian sponsored arms deal was of a magnitude that was three times the initial Egyptian arms request 33 from the United States.-^-^ Soon thereafter, on January 19, 1956, Syria and Saudi Arabia indicated a willingness to make similar arms arrangements with the Soviet Union.-^3 4 The United States, realizing that the Northern Tier concept had been outflanked, attempted unsuccessfully to reactivate the earlier arms arrangement with E^ypt. It

-^^ Wilton Wynn, Nasser of Sgypt: The Search for Dignity (Cambridge: Arlington Books, Inc., 1959), PP. HO- 112. ^^A. G. Mezerik (ed.), Arab-Israeli Conflict (New York: International Review Service, I962), p. 72. This deal signified a great breakthrough for Soviet relations with the Arab Middle East. ^^Philip W. Thayor, "Tensions in the Middle East," Middle Eastern Journal, Summer, I956, p. 295. As time passed and arms shipments continued, the value of the arms deliveries was considered to be in the range of 250 to 400 million dollars. ^ Mezerik, 0£. cit., p. 71. 71 soon became apparent that the Egyptians in 1955 were attempting to use the cold war to internationalize Arab affairs and to gain a lever to extract better terms from both the West and the East.-^-^ Concerning the above developments, V/alter Eytan, Director of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, comments: Defense of the area as a whole, in the language of the Western powers, meant a defense against Soviet attack. The Soviet Union, for its part, has always seen Western plans for defense of the Middle East as the beginning of aggression • against itself. The global-struggle between East and West was now superimposed on the local tug of war between the Arab states and. Israel and the two were never again to be disentangled.36

Although it was receiving arms from France, Israel sought to counter the Egyptian-Czech (and United States- Iraq) arms deals by requesting arms from the United States. The United States, however, refused the request. President Eisenhower did not feel that Czech arms were a threat to Israel's security.-^3'7 In addition. President Eisenhower

^%ew York Times, July 29, 1956, p. 5. ^Walter Eytan, The First Ten Years: A Diplomatic History of Israel (New York: Simon and Schuster, I958), p. 1^1. •^^Western Rocky Mountain News, November 9, 1955, p. 4. Dwight D. Eisenhower speech to the Denver Press Club. 1^ did not want to contribute to the arms race.-^^ The imbalance between Egypt and Israel, resulting from the Czech-Egyptian arms arrangement, plus the establishment of a joint Egyptian-Syrian military command on October I9, 1955, threatened Israel's national security.-^^ As Moshe Dayan, Chief of Staff of the Israeli Army, pointed out in his book. The Sinai Campaign; "Israel was under no illusion as to the aggressive purpose of this united military organization, nor against whom it was directed." David Ben-Gurion, during a speech to Parliament on February 28, 1956, said; "Israel stands in imminent danger of attack by Egypt." 4l Meanv^^hile, Elgypt sought to secure the necessary hard currency funds to construct the long planned Aswan High Dam which, when completed, would permit the irrigation of approximately twice the acreage then irrigated in E^ypt, and in addition would provide much needed

Ibid. President Eisenhower pointed out that the arms deal between the United States and Iraq under the Baghdad Pact, was purely intended for regional defense purposes, and did not in the least endanger Israel. Concerning the Czechoslovakian-Egyptian deal, Eisenhower suggested that Israel still had a qualitative military advantage over the Elgyptian army. -^^New York Times, October 20, 1955, p. 1, 17. 40 Moshe Dayan, The Sinai Campaign (New York: The Viking Press, I96O), p. 5. New York Times, February 29, I956, p. 5. 73 hydroelectric power to the Nile Valley.4 2 Egypt sought a loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The bank agreed, contingent upon British and American participation to the amount of seventy million dollars, to lend Egypt 200 million dollars.4 ^3 Great Britain and the United States were willing to finance the project so as to keep the Soviet Union 44 out of Africa. In December, 1955, the United States was prepared to agree to a loan, but Egypt did not accept immediately because it thought that it could get a loan on better terms from the Soviet Union.4 5-^ If this was a play to get the better terms from the United States as in the Czech arms deal, it did not work. The United States Secretary of the Treasury, George Humphrey, decided that Egypt was holding an option on the Western offer vjhile 46 shopping around for a better offer from Russia. Humphrey,

^^Dick Hall, Conservationist with the- Bureau of Reclamation, United States Department of the Interior; private interview in Lubbock, Texas, May 4, 1968. -^Eisenhower, ££. cit. , p. 31. Elizabeth Monroe, Britain's Moments in the Middle East (London: Methuen Press, 1965), P. 187- Britain had declared it would remove troops from the Suez Canal. In light of the absence of any Western physical influence in the area, Britain desired more than ever to avoid the Soviet encroachment, p. I87. ^^V/illiam R. Polk, The United States and the Arab Vforld (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 272. 46 Eisenhower, 0£. cit., pp. 31 and 33* 7^ as did Secretary of State Dulles, also doubted whether Egypt would be able to pay the interest and principal on the loan in view of its expensive arms purchases from 47 the Soviet Bloc. ' Accordingly, despite the United States' desire to keep Russia out of Africa, and even though the United States wished to increase its influence in Egypt, the United States began to have second thoughts about extending a loan to Egypt. When support from the Soviet Union for the Aswan High Dam did not materialize. President Nasser tried to take up the loan offer from the United States. At this point Secretary of State Dulles announced on July 19, 1956, that the United States was withdrawing J, o its offer. Enraged and humiliated by Dulles' action. President Nasser struck out at the only available target, the Suez Canal. In a speech in Alexandria on July 26, 1956, Nasser announced that he had"nationalized the Universal Suez Maritime Canal Company and that he would use the profits from operation of the Suez Canal to build 49 the Aswan High Dam Diplomatic efforts to curb national control of the Canal were unsuccessful. Among the proposals offered ^'^Ibid., p. 32. ^^Herman Finer, Dulles Over Suez (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964), p. 48. ^^New York Times, July 27, 1956, p. 1. jV%

75 instead nationalization was a Suez Canal Users Associatlo.:;. The United States sought politically through the Suez Canal Users Association (SCUA), of which it was a cooperative member along with Great Britain and France, to convince-Egypt of the rashness of the nationalization act and arrange some sort of compromise.-^^ However, when the plan was brought to the United Nations, the Soviet Union vetoed the SCUA.^-^ At no time during this United States election year did President Eisenhower entertain thoughts of using United States troops to force a solution.-5^2 Britain and France, hov/ever, who were the chief users of the Canal and were dependent' on the flow of Middle Eastern oil and commerce through the Canal were significantly affected by the nationalization. In addition, France had wanted to halt Egyptian aid to revolutionary Algeria. Therefore, Britain and France decided to resort to forceful measures in an effort to

•^Eisenhower, o^. cit. , pp. 50-51- The SCUA would employ pilots to coordinate traffic,through the Canal. SCUA would also collect dues, giving Egypt an "appropriate" payment for facilities provided. The Soviets vetoed the implementing section of the resolution which called upon Egypt to cooperate with SCUA. ^-^United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, Document S/3199, October 4, I956. The Soviet government made its decisions "In view of the unchanged attitudes of the parties. ..." ^Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 90. 7(> cause Egypt to disgorge the Canal. ^-^ Israel, meanwhile, sensing the tide of events, decided to join the fracas in an effort to achieve a long range and a short range objective. Her immediate objectives were two fold—the destruction of Egyptian terrorist camps along the Jordan River and the opening of the Gulf of Aqaba (entrance to the Straits of Tiran, militarily closed on September 22, 1953 by Egypt) to Israeli shipping. Her long range objective was to bring Egypt to the conference table by crushing her militarily. On October 29, 1956, Israel moved against Egypt. On the pretext of intervening to draw the combatants apart and prevent escalation of the war, Britain and France on November 3, 1956, invaded Egypt.-^5 4 The super powers applied pressure to Britain and France to cease the combined attacks on Egypt. On November 3, 1956, Soviet Premier Bulganin wrote to President Eisenhower proposing "joint and immediate use" of the strong naval and air forces of the two powers to end the British, French, and Israeli attack on Egypt.-^-55^ In addition, the Soviet Union further threatened on November 4,

^^F. Roy Willis, Europe in the Global Age; 1939 to the Present (New Yorkl Dodd, Mead and Company, I968), pp. 291-92. •^Anthony Eden, The Memoirs of Anthony Eden (Boston; Houghton Mifflin Company, I96O), p. 586. ^•^Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 89. 77 1956 that if the British and French did not at once cease their attacks, they would intervene, with rockets if 56 necessary.-^ Furthermore, the Soviet Union implied that the very existence of Israel had been put into question.-^"^ Although the United States did not threaten to intervene militarily, to protect Egypt, it warned Britain, France, and Israel that it would not protect them should the Soviet Union decide to intervene.^^ In addition, the United States took the lead in the General Assembly against Israel, France, and Britain.-^^ The United States introduced a draft resolution that was adopted on November 3, I956 urging all parties involved in hostilities in the area to cease fire and withdraw their forces behind the Armistice line. Due to American pressure, the joint Anglo-French force and the Israelis 6T ceased fire on November 7, 1956. A United Nations

•^ New York Times, November 5, 1956, p. 8. 57 -^'Laqueur, op. cit. , p. 238. -^ Eisenhovjer, o£. cit., p. 91» 59 •^^United Nations, Yearbook of the United >jations, 1956, pp. 28-29. The General Assembly had been called into emergency session under terms of "Uniting for Peace" since the use of the veto by Great Britain and France had rendered the Security Council powerless in the face of a deteriorating situation. "^United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Resolution A/997, November 3, 1956. "New York Times, November 7, I956, p. 1. 78 Emergency Force (UNEF) was established under the command of Major General E. L. M. Burns to guarantee cessation of hostilities and to supervise the withdrawal of non- Egyptian troops from Sinai.

After defeating Egypt in the Sinai peninsula, Israel sought to establish direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab states. ^ Through talks, it was hoped that Israel could obtain from Egypt freedom of passage for Israeli ships through the Suez Canal.^^ Although the United States agreed with these goals, it suggested that Israel withdraw completely from Egyptian territory before attempting to establish negotiations. -^ Israel had, however, obtained the shipping rights through the Gulf of Agaba.

Shortly after the Suez crisis was alleviated, new sources of tension appeared. Syria agreed to buy large amounts of arms from the Russians on August 15, 1957.

6? United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Secretary General to the United Nations General Assembly, Document A/39^3, October 9, 1958. 63 -^^David Ben Gurion, Israel; Years of Challenge (New York; Holt, Reinhart, and Winston, I963), p. 172. 64 Ibid., pp. 169-70. •^Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 94. Norman Greenwald, The Mideast in Focus (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, I960), p. 82. While the Russians supplied unconditional aid to Arabs, asking only neutrality, the Eisenhower doctrine, by demanding resistance to communism, inflamed Arab nationalism. 79 The United States, not sure of Syrian intentions, became alarmed by apparently groiving communist domination in 67 Syria. ' Saudi Arabia also indicated that it would be 68 interested in Russian arms. The United States, pre­ occupied with expanding comimunist influence in the Middle East, countered by sending arms to Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia.^ Iraq, charter member of the Baghdad Pact and the nation which was the bastion of American influence in the Middle East, overthrew its pro-Western government on 70 July l4, 1958, through a coup d'etat.' One of the primary reasons for the coup was that Americans were pressuring the Royal government to use its troops in agreement with the precepts of the Eisenhower doctrine (in case communist oriented Egyptians or Syrians should attempt to take over the government). The Eisenhower doctrine, passed by a joint resolution in Congress.on January 10, 1957 suggested that: The Armed forces of the United States as is deemed necessary [will] secure and protect the territorial integrity and political

"^George E. Kirk, Contem'porary Arab Politics (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), pp. 98-99- ^^Polk, op. £it^. , p.. 281. ^^Ibid., p. 253. "^Safran, op. cit., p. 251. 80 independence of such nations requesting aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism.71

Meanwhile, in the spring of 1958, a Syrian sponsored revolution broke out in Lebanon between pro-Western and neutralist forces. After eliciting an invitation from Lebanese President Chamon, President Eisenhower ordered American troops to Lebanon "to restore stability to the 72 government."' Simultaneously, Britain responded to a call from King Hussein and landed paratroops in Jordan in concert with the American action.'-73^ The minimal object of the Anglo-American m.ove was to protect the pro-VJestern governments of Jordan and Lebanon from being overtaken by the Arab revolutionary tide. The Arab states felt that the Anglo-Am.erican interference was imperialistic and that the Eisenhower doctrine had once again been imposed on the Arab people.'7 4 The Arab states took the issue to the United Nations, asking the Secretary General to help in making practical

'United States, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXVI, No. 918, January 28, 1957, PP- 126-28. 72 ' Leonard Binder (ed.), Politics in Lebanon (New York: John V/iley and Sons, Inc., 1966), pp. 232-33. "^^Ibid. "^^Polk, op. c^. , pp. 283-84. 81 arrangements which would facilitate the early withdrav;al of foreign troops from Lebanon and Jordan. On August 21, 1958, the General Assembly adopted a unanimous resolution calling for mutual respect of territorial integrity."^-^ Just when the United States' effort to shape the diplomacy of the Middle East had been acknowledged a complete failure, the area itself began to develop the elements of a balance of power that was to accomplish the American aims of checking Nasser and the Russians. The key to the nev; balance was Iraq. The new regime led by General Karem Kassim began by proclaiming its allegiance to Arab solidarity and established close relationships with the Soviet Union.'76 The advent of the new regime released a number of popular groups oppressed under the previous regime, chief among which were the Ba'thists, the right wing nationalists, and the well organized communists.'' Sensing popular discontent with pro-Western influence, Kassim allied himself with

^^United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, 3rd Emergency Session. August 21, 1958, Resolution A/1237-EsIII. "^^Harry B. Ellis, Challenge in the Middle East (New York: The Ronald Press, I960), p. 148. "^"^Malcohm Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1958-67 (London: Oxford University Press, I967), p. I63. The Ba'thists are socialist oriented. 82 local communist interests in an effort to strengthen his position in the government."^ While Ba'thists and rio;ht wing nationalists sought a merger with the United Arab Republic (UAR), pro-communist Kassim elements feared that Nasser would suppress communism in Iraq as he had done in Egypt and Syria. They therefore were reluctant to join the unification movement. Subsequently, Nasser blamed the communists for preventing Arab unity.'^ However, it was not communist activity in Iraq, but an independent military coup in Syria that shattered Nasser's claims in September, 196I. The military coup broke up the UAR, stopping Nasser's pan-Arab movement, and left the Middle East in a balanced stalemate which was to last for six years. As an immediate result of the political develop­ ments of 1955-61, the Soviet Union had made appreciable gains in the Arab Middle East. More importantly, however, Soviet policy toward the Middle East seemed much easier to adopt than the Eisenhower doctrine.

78 '^Interview with Mr. Hood, Engineer for Standard Oil Company, May 28, 1968. Mr. Hood suggested that in 1958 and early 1959, the desire' for a communist type government was sincerely expressed by pro-Kassim forces. However, once Kassim established control, communism was de-emphasized. Today, Iraqi leadership seeks the most advantageous road between West and East. Concerning Israel, Iraqis lean toward the Nasser line. "^^Kerr, op. cit., pp. II7-I8.

V J~\^ 83 Even if the Arabs chose to recall that the Soviet Union was almost as prompt as the United States to recog­ nize the new state of Israel, and that not long before had been perhaps the main political supporter of the United Nations partition scheme, the Arabs could point to Soviet sales of arms to Arab states and to the Soviet's attitude during the Suez crisis as recommendation enough for favoring Soviet policy.

The arms reliance was perhaps the chief accelerating factor for a third war in the Middle East, that should have been avoided. The Arabs had no unity as illustrated by the breakup of the UAR. In addition, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, between 1963 and 1964 became locked in a struggle for control of Yemen. The competing nations of the Mahgreb--Algeria, Tunisia, and Morroco--amongst themselves did not have the best of foreign relations. Finally, the Middle Eastern nations adjoining Israel recognized, different

0-1 ideological principles. Egypt sought a pan-Arab state. Since splitting with Egypt, Syria had drifted toward

fin Kahlid J. Babaa, Director of the Arab Information Center in Dallas; private interview in Dallas, April 11, 1968. Mr. Babaa pointed out that the Arab League, although neutral in most respects, adopts the Russian line when it leads to arms deals with which the Arabs can defend them­ selves vis-a-vis the Israelis. 0-1 Gamal Abdul Nasser, The Philosophy of Revolution (Buffalo, New York: Keynes and Marshall, Inc., 1954), p. 85. 84 Op sympathy with the Soviet Union. The royalist govern­ ments of Jordan and Saudi Arabia favored their V/estern backers. -^ While these inter-Arab quarrels raged, the Arab League was poWerless to bring cooperative pressure on the West, or anyone else. At the end of 1964, a common identity of purpose was achieved. The catalyst was Israel. Israel completed its Jordan River diversion project at Beth Shean by which the Israelis diverted the waters from their natural storage basin, the Sea of Galilee. 84 The Arabs felt that this act was tantamount to aggression against Arab rights and threatened to meet it by force. -^ Such talk vjas com.m.on in the years before the project was finished. In Syria especially, successive Insecure regimes had found it convenient as a means of waving their Arabism in the faces of their critics, in the

op Kerr, op. cit., p. 129. Syria had drifted toward sympathy with the Soviet Union due to the latter's military and economic support of the Syrian regime. In addition, the communist party had become the strongest party in Syria. ^^Ibid. S^Ibid. 85-^Sam i Hadawi, Palestine; Questions and Answers (New York: Arab Information Center, 1966), p. 73. 85 86 familiar Arab game of more-anti-Israel-than-thou. Now that the diversion project was completed, the Arab states had to make a decision as to whether or not to go to war with the Israelis. Egypt and Jordan could least afford to be dragged into a Syrian provoked battle with Israel. King Hussein would stand to lose his territory west of the Jordan and, perhaps, his throne. President Nasser was in no position to fight since half his army was bogged down in Yemen, defending the republican Yemen faction (against the Royalist faction supported by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia). Yet if no one went to war, Nasser stood to lose prestige, for the Arabs looked to him to prevent Israel from carrying out her objectives 87 which infringed on Arab sovereignty. ' All steps short of war v;ere attempted to halt the Israelis; on January I7, 1964, the Arab League decided to take action to divert 88 the Jordan at its tributaries. The project failed. Early in I966, the Palestine Liberation Army, in con­ junction with Syrian trained terrorists, began a vigorous 89 campaign of guerilla harrassment against the Israelis.

Safran, op. cit., p. l4l. ^"^Interview with Dr. Babaa, April 11, 1968. ^^See chapter 2, p. 52. ^Theodore Draper, "Israel and World Politics," Commentary, Vol. XLIV, No. 2 (August, I967), P. 26. 86 On December I7, 1964, the Cairo magazine, Rose al-Yusouf, published an article containing two principal lines of Egyptian reasoning. The first was that the UAR would not let itself be pushed into a battle with Israel before the attainment of unity among all Arab 90 countries.^ The second point, which seemed to contra­ dict the first, was that the UAR would know when and how to eliminate Israel.'9^1 In other words, Egypt knew that it could not win a war with Israel by Itself, but it could not turn away from its self-designed leadership of pan- Arabism. Meanwhile, the Syrians accused the Egyptians of too much talk and too little action.^" They pointed out that Nasser's government had so far failed to serve popul^ar Arab will."-^ Jordan, meanwhile, suggested that Nasser had used the United Nations Emergency Force as a barrier between Israel and Egypt and Insinuated that the Egyptians had by design avoided possible confrontation 94 with Israel.-^

" Kerr, opo cit., p. 131* ^-^Ibid. , p. 132. ^^Ibid. ^-^Leonard Binder, "The Middle East Crisis: A Trial. Balance, " Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (Septemiber 1967), P- 33. ^Draper, op. cit., p. 29. 87 Still, the Israeli-Arab war of June 5-10, I967 might have been avoided if not for one more external factor. Sensing the division of Arab politics, the Soviet Union and the United States attempted to take advantage of_t_he situation to extend their influence over the Middle E^st. The United States sent arms to Saudi Arabia and Jordan amidst the charge by Nasser that the United States was using King Faisal and King Hussein to reactivate the Eisenhower doctrine.'^'95^ Meanv;hile, the Soviet Union attempted to play on the revolutionary spirit of the Syrians, Iraqis, and Egyptians by supplying them 96 with millions of dollars worth of sophisticated arms.^ In this way, the Soviets hoped to force these countries to be dependent on them as a source of future supply.^9'7 V/hile the United States and the Soviet Union made few advances (except in Syria where knovm communists had improved their positions immensely), they did succeed in taking some of the sting out of the power struggles of the area. For Instance, on November 7, I966, Egypt and Syria signed a treaty of mutual' defense, the first 98 such agreement between the two countries since 1958.^^

°%err, op. cit., p. 150.

9^Ibid., p. 195. ^"^Ibid. ^^Ibid., p. 162. 88 More importantly, the Arab states now had the wherewithall to conduct a massive military operation against their common enemy, Israel. An additional internal complicating element was the continuous large scale terrorist activity carried on by El Fatah terrorists against Israel with recruits dravjn from the Arab refugees. While not the immediate cause of the war, they nevertheless helped produce in Israel a nearly irresistible determination to go to war against Syria. The reason, beside the fact that Syria had become the most violent proponent of anti- Israel activity, was that Syria v/as responsible for the origin of most of the El-Fatah activity. Though the Arab refugee terrorists functioned as extragovernmental units, their base camps vjere in Syria.9 ^9^ In a climactic incident on April 7, I967, the Syrians opened fire on Israeli farmers who were plowing in the demilitarized zone east of Lake Tiberias. Israel immediately sent into the area air units which destroyed the Syrian artillery and six Syrian MIG's which had come to aid the gun positions. Yet'this small defeat in the air only served to accelerate el-Fatah activities on the ground. Premier Levi Eshkol warned that further incursions would not be tolerated.

°'^I. L. Kenen (ed.), "Bear Hug for Syria," Near East Report, May 31, 1966, p. 42. •^^^New York Times, April 8, I967, p. 1. Israel. Knesset, Speech by Premier Levi Eshkol, Vol. XIX, May 13, 1967, p. 1. 89 On May 15, I967, the Soviet Union accused Israel of moving heavy concentrations of troops near the Syrian border in what was said to be an Israeli upcoming reprisal raid against the territory of Syria. In conjunction . with the UAR-Syrian mutual defense treaty, Nasser announced that he had moved troops into the Sinai Peninsula.10 3-^ Further, Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran to Israel after he had requested the United Nations Secretary General to withdraw UNEF. 104 These actions lit the fuse that ignited the Arab's third attempt at "jihad" against Israel. The withdrav/al of UNEF from Egyptian territory left a void which allowed the Egyptians to once again occupy Sharm el--Sheikah, 105 and thus the Tiran Straits. -^ The three conditions that Nasser wanted prior to an engagement with Israel were fulfilled: (1), there was unity among the Arabs exhibited by King Hussein's decision to put Jordan's military under Egyptian command; (2), international circumstances were

-^^^New York Times, May I6, I967, P. I6. •^^^Ibid., May 18, I967, p. 29. •^^ United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, May 29, 1967, Document S/pv 1343, pp. 36-37. Mohammed el-Kony, Egyptian ambassador to the United Nations justified such action by stressing that ifeypt was still at war with Israel. -^^%ew York Times, May 24, I967, p. 1. 90 favorable because Egypt enjoyed the strong support of the Soviet Union and could freely draw upon its arsenals; and (3), Egypt was better armed than she had ever been, certainly more so than Israel. Thus Israel, seemingly bottled up by a united and well supplied military machine, decided to strike first rather than wait for the blow to

J fall. As Premier Eshkol stated in his address to Knesset on May 30, I967, "Arab actions have forced us to take all necessary initiatives to secure our national Inter- ests.. ",,10 6 On the morning of June 5, 1967, Israel launched a surprise and massive air attack on the Egyptian air force which Israel found on the ground. The raid destroyed 80 percent of the Egyptian air force. The Israelis then turned to the Syrian and Jordanian armies which at this time did not stay outside the struggle. After a few days of heavy fighting, the Israelis captured the west bank of the/ Jordan River, and the mountainous Golan Heights of Syria. A Security Council resolution called on the Arab and Israeli forces to cease fire, which they did on June 7-

Israel, Knesset, Foreign Office, Document 2240, May 30, 1967, p. 2. -^^"^United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, Resolution S/233, June 7, 1967, p. 1. 91 The United States, both inside and outside the'^ United Nations, gained specific approval for the Israelis to invoke the right of self defense. Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg repeatedly blocked Soviet attempts to brand Israel as an aggressor; and President Johnson, rather than insisting upon troop withdrawal prior to negotiation. Issued a five point program which would establish a 108 foundation for a durable peace in the area. The aftermath of the June war of I967 reveals that Israel has chosen to pursue a separate foreign policy based on her paramount national interest and territorial security. The Arab states, instead of modifying their stands in order to negotiate, are clamoring to regain their lost territory and with it their lost integrity. These opposed objectives have given rise to violence between Israel on the one hand and E^ypt, Jordan, and Syria on the other. Such violence might at any time erupt into a fourth round. A thorough evaluation of the causes of the explo­ sive situation between the Arab states and Israel must include mention of the age-old nationalism of Israel and

-^ New York Times, June 9, I967, P. 1; and August 20, 1967, p. 2. President Johnson's five point program included the following; (l), recognition of the right to a national life; (2), justice for the refugees; (3), innocent maritime passage; (4), limits on the waste­ ful and destructive arms race; (5), political independence and territorial Integrity for all nations. 92 her neighboring Arab states, who as much as any political entities, glorify their pasts.''•^^ The preservation of the ethnic integrity of the Israeli population is linked to Israeli nationalism. The Israelis are firmly committed to preventing the return of large numbers of Palestinian Arab refugees. The ideological reasoning is that Israel is basically a Jewish state, related to world Jewry, which desires to preserve its homogeneity. Accordingly, it currently attempts to keep its doors open for settlement to Jews from other countries. In this way, the national security of Israel is perpetuated by additional Jewish immigration. 111 More importantly, the Zionist philosophy creates a strong social cohesion through its myth: in this case, identification with the religio- historical Jewish heritage and the belief in a revived Jewish creativity in Palestine. Arab nationalism is very similar to Zionism in two points in particular. First, it is based on Islam which

'^Greenwald, opo cit., p. 96. Israel. Knesset, Speech by Moshe Sharret, Vol. I, June 5, 1948, p. 729. ''Security is our first consideration. Any wave of Arab refugee returnees can undermine Israel from within," •''Ben Gurion, op. cit., p. 22. "The cardinal aim of our state is the redemption of the people of Israel and the ingathering of the exiles." 93 is a monotheistic faith with a universal gospel.'^"'"^ Second, it is dedicated to the idea that the Arab peoples will be unified in one political unit. The Arab states regard Israel as a threat to the Arab world and to the success of the pan-Arab movement, rather than to the security or the economic well being of a particular Arab state. -^ In other words, it is not a particular Arab national interest, but rather a pan-Arab nationalist sentiment which finds the notion of peaceful coexistence with Israel unacceptable. ll4 Therefore, the creation of Israel was at its inception and remains today, a blow to 'the prestige of the newly emergent Arab states. This loss of prestige has been compounded by military defeats of the Arab armies, and the perennially destitute Arab refugee. Strongly associated with both nationalisms is the status of Jerusalem. Because of the remaining western wall of the Temple of Solomon and the Moslem Dome of the Rock, both Israel and Jordan desire to control Jerusalem.

•) 1 p Dr. Naseer Arri, "Social and Political Transfor­ mation in the Arab Middle East," Unpublished paper. University of Texas, March, 19D7, PP. 1-6. •^Nasser, op. cit., p. I03. 11 4 J. S. Raleigh, "Ten Years of the Arab League," Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. VI, No. 3 (March, 1955), pTTlT 9^ In this respect, both the Arabs and the Israelis feel they have a religious right to control this religious world capitol. The I947 United Nations partition reso­ lution recommended that the entire city of Jerusalem be established as a separate body or city. However, the resolution was not implemented. In the war of 1948-49, Arabs occupied the old walled city of Jerusalem, while the Israelis annexed the new sectors. As a result of the June war of I967, Israel has assumed jurisdiction over a united Jerusalem. Although Moslems have been assured visitation rights to worship at their holy places, their lack of adm.inistrative control over the Holy City alienates them toward any rational discussion of the future status of Jerusalem by introducing into the situation a feeling of nationalistic absolutism. An internationalized Jerusalem is out of the question for two reasons. First, Israel has annexed the old city and has established a single administration for all of Jerusalem. Second, an internationalized Jerusalem must either dominate or be dominated by Israel or Jordan since neither Arabs nor Israelis would accept a situation wherein Jerusalem and its holy places would be controlled by an outside power, even an international regime. CHAPTER IV

PRESENT SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

As a result of circumstances in the Middle East, Arabs and Israelis have developed foreign policy objec­ tives which are, on the whole, totally incapable of functioning in the area. These policies are beset by many problems. The very nature of the perpetual Arab- Israeli conflicts and Israel's resultant independent policies have served to strain relations, while big power involvement has provided an immensely complicating factor. Arab states are primarily concerned with one element of the Arab-Israeli conflict—the Arab refugee. They seek actively to resettle these refugees in their former home, Palestine, through political, military, and economic pressure. The Israelis, on the other hand, are absolutely opposed to repatriation on the grounds that such repatriation would create a large fifth columji of sympathetic Arabs within their political midst. They seek to avoid the problem by establishing national security in a highly trained military and a stable economy. Politically, the Israelis hope to maintain a minimum territory under their administrative control.

95 96 "Despite the Arabs' Intense interest in the refugee problem, their responses to Israeli proffered settlement talks has been cool. There are many reasons for this, but chief among them is the Arabs' refusal to recognize the exlstenc-e of Israel, even in a de facto manner. Considering the Arabs' concern with the refugee problem, it is perhaps not amiss to state that any future resettlement plan which falls to comprise repatriation will fail. The Palestine refugees in the states surround­ ing Israel provide a constant reminder to the Arabs of their defeat and frustration, and the presence of these refugees keeps Arabian emotions at a high pitch. Without a geopolitical entity which might have cushioned some of their hostilities, the refugees constitute a great pressure program for repatriation within the respective countries which is almost impossible to overcome. The refugees constitute, moreover, a great power factor which allows individual Arab states to control others with the threat of insurrection. Consequently, independent Arab states cannot deal solely on the basis of the most viable political relationship with Israel to solve the refugee problem, or even the water problem for that matter. Thus the Israelis must unequivocably make the concession that will lead to the removal of this large extragovernmental source of perpetual tensions, the Arab 97 refugee. They must do this if they are to deal bi­ laterally with a particular Arab government v:hich does not fear political reprisal from its neighboring Arab states. Such a concession will not remove past aniffiosi- ties. It will, however, put Jordan, and perhaps Ifeypt, in a better position to carry on negotiations with Israelo Israel's policy of acting primarily in regard to territorial security has led it to rely heavily on well trained military strength, and has goaded Arabs to seek the same. Major territorial gains by Israel in the June war of 1967 have worsened Israel's position toviard even the most moderate of Arab states. Besides acquiring the Sinai Peninsula, Jordan's west bank, and Syria's Golan Heights, the war contributed a quarter of a million Arab refugees. A possible concession by Israel could be to assimilate those refugees within the captured areas as Israeli or West Bank Arab citizens. Otherwise, the Arabs unanimously agree that if Israel is to avoid another war, she miust withdraw her forces from these lands prior to 2 the establishment of any indirect negotiations. In this

Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Speech by King Hussein, November 7, I967, pp. 4-6. . 2 Khalid J. Babaa, Director of Arab Information Center in Dallas; private interview in Dallas, April 11, 1968. See also: New York Times, November 12, I967, p. I6. 98 respect, the Arabs see a step toward a stabilized situ­ ation with Israel, through a modus Vivendi embodied in an unwritten armistice agreement.^ What exists now is an absence of the psychological element of political relationships between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Military power has been substituted for political power, "the essence of which is the psychological relationship between two minds." Thus, the Arab states feel that when they are ready to militarily defeat the Israelis, they will do so. In light of these circumstances, Israel has pursued a lone policy following her own interests, some­ times conflicting with powerful interests (Russia and the United States). As a result of the Suez war, and the inability of anyone to prevent the occurrence of the June war of 1967, the Israelis have felt that they stand alone as far as Soviet and American backing and as far as national security and peace are concerned.^ In addition.

•^Ibid. In a letter from Israel Consul Yaacov Hess, dated February 20, I968, Mr. Hess pointed out that Israel would refuse anything short of a permanent peace treaty. 4 / Hans J. Morgenthau. Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, I967), p. 64. ^Reuven Hillel, Member of Israeli Permanent Mission to the United Nations; private interview in New York, May 20, 1968. 99 Israel had several times sought to come to terms with the Arab states from 19^9-1955. But without big power assistance, she has been able to effect no changes. Fearing that their conciliatory attitude toward Arab provocations would be damaging in the long run, the Israelis sought to gain Arab respect for their security by emphasizing their military retaliation toward the Fedayeen. As Abba Eban pointed out: "while others have networks of alliances, we have only our own strength." Thus Israel's reprisal policy came into existence as a partial answer to guerilla attacks. The Israelis believed that through this policy, they would emphasize that they were too strong for the Arabs to defeat. Consequently, the Arabs would be forced to come to the negotiating table. At the present time, this military policy has not achieved its initial political aim; In addition, Israel's reprisal raids have come to be regarded as "out of propor- 7 tion to the Arab guerilla attacks."' Currently, Israel is continuing this policy. As long as power is a primary instrument in Arab-Israeli relations, the Arab states will

Abba Eban, Voice of Israel (New York: Horizon Press, 1957), p. 192. "^Washington Post, April 15, I968, p. A-25. It might be well to point out that such inconclusive results in the United Nations have had an adverse effect tovjard solving the Arab-Israeli conflict. 100 be determined to overcome Israeli military strength. The Arabs feel that time will provide an ansvjer o for Israeli technical ability in the art of making v:ar. They believe that there vjill be perpetual warfare between them unless one of two events occurs; Israel changes or is made to change its policy objectives; or, a mythical leader (Saladln) arises which will displace the Israelis as the ancient Moslem crusader did the Christians in 1215. The final and most significant complication that has resulted in Middle Eastern difficulties has been the mili­ tary intervention from the Soviet Union and the United States. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have stated that they seek the territorial integrity of states in the Middle East, Both the United States and the Soviet Union have granted large amounts of econom.ic aid to Israel and the A.rab states. However, this economic aid to the area has been accompanied by tremendous military aid which has accelerated the arms race and posed a problem in the area in the way of unbridled military power. The presence of this military power has allowed states in the area to seek their political and military goals with greater effectiveness. The presence, moreover

^Dr. Ragaei, El Mallakh, "The Credibility Gap and the Middle East," Speech at Colorado State University, January 23, 1968. ^Interview with Dr. Babaa, op. cit., April 11, 1968. 101 of great military strength has twice forced Israel to compensate by the use of preventive war. For a given militarily gained advantage, the success of Israeli and Arab activity is related to the political level of the big power's interest. Thus, in 1956, the Israeli's military successes were not tolerated by either the United States or the Soviet Union. Israel's preventive attack, although supported by Britain and France, did not permanently attain its intended political goal, i,e., rendering E^ypt harmless by putting her in a position where she would negotiate with Israel. It might be well to point out that the limited strategic gains retained by Israel in 1956 were in areas where Israel had legitimate grievances recognized by the international community, namely the guerilla raids from the Gaza strip and the interference with its navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba. In the war of 1967, her gains were more permanent Israel's new position as a result of the June war of 1967 revealed that she was initially going to hold the captured lands to supplement her military superiority by territorial security. But the problems of the large numbers of Arab refugees that must be contained in these areas threatens to plague Israel with the exact problems

Abba Eban, Address to the General Assembly, Israel Office of Information, June 29, 1967, p. 15. 102 she hoped to avoid by going to war. Moreover, through el-Fatah, Syria and Jordan have separately sponsored a vigorous campaign to keep Israel off balance on the West Bank, while King Hussein and President Nasser slowly evolve a future strategy for a final fourth round."^"^ Unfortunately, this military position may ulti­ mately prove to be untenable and the Israelis may soon become unavoidable recipients of a new status quo from which it will be impossible to retreat; a status quo symbolized by guerilla raids and Israeli military repri­ sals. It is evident that the Soviet Union and the United States are not willing to cooperate to halt the arms race and are thus supplying ammunition for a fourth round. Since the six day war, the Soviets have resupplled Egypt with 400 jets and 800 tanks, restoring more than 80 percent of her former arsenal.1 2 The United States has supplied Israel with 48 Skyhawk aircraft, while it has sent 20 13 Thunderchief aircraft and some 30 tanks to Jordan.

Life, Beirut, Lebanon, (trans, by Ahmed Azzani), March 12, 1968, p. 2. -| p New York Times, December 12, I967, p. l44; see also Christian Science Monitor, November 20, I967, P. 1^. •^-^Washington Post, March 29, I968, p. 23. 103 It is obvious, therefore, that Soviet and United States commitments in the Middle F^st are great, and considering these commitments, the inevitable question must be posed—can the Soviet Union or the United States . avoid being dragged into a war in the Middle East, or will they again sit on the sidelines, politically deny­ ing each other's designs in the area, while Arabs and Israelis fight it out? And if they stand aside and watch the battle in the war arena, will they ultimately see a calming of Arab-Israeli tensions, or will the seeds for another war be merely implanted in the closing of the present? Certainly the Israelis do not maintain a too optimistic view of the situation. A member of the Israeli Parliament summed up Israel's difficult situation as a military victor without peace. He said; What will happen if we win? Will peace come then, and will tension subside; or will we prepare for a third or a fourth round? V/e cannot occupy all the Arab states. ... We cannot force tens of millions of Arabs to make peace with us. If we conquer a few strategic points, it is obvious the war will not end thereby. . . . Furthermore what are we to expect from a leader whom we have frustrated and humiliated, and who rules over a defeated people. Peace is a far better alternative than war. ... It is not good enough to say that peace takes goodwill on the Arab side (aJso). . . .1^

•^Israel, Knesset, Speech by Yitzhak Greenberg, Vol. VIII, January 19, 1956, pp. 733-3^. 104 As each of the areas of needed settlement is discussed, it becomes increasingly clear that the future role of international powers in guaranteeing stability in the Middle East will have to be great indeed. Some thought will have to be given by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the international community to the kind of machinery that would best serve to nurture into political reality the proposals for a solution to the refugee problem. Such a proposal must take into con­ sideration Israel's national security which posits resettlement of the 1948-49 and 1967 refugees as suicidal, but which offers to help pay for resettlement and training of these refugees in the land in which they now reside. The problem becomes one of an international cooper­ ative assault on underdevelopment, ignorance, and destitution within the area. Such a regional economic development program would be invaluable in consolidating non-belligerent arrangements through limited cooperation between Arab and Israeli administrators. In light of the reluctance of the Arab states to initially deal directly with Israel, the potential benefits of such a development program, might be lost to the region. This could occur if the United States and the Soviet Union do not suitably divorce their military commitments from the need of a bi­ laterally administered, revamped economic development program for the Middle East. Such a policy turnabout by 105 the United States and the Soviet Union would enhance the possibility of a range of lov: level, Arab-Israeli transactions being carried out. Arab and Israeli emotions are not so intense in the West Bank area that this could not occur. -Already, tentative efforts at re-establishing communications have been m-ade in this area. A system of regulated marketing was introduced which included Amman and Jerusalem. Thus, the West Bank Arab can sell his 15 products to additional markets. -^ In addition, Israel and Jordan have made their customs restrictions m.ore flexible, thus allowing business to continue its normal financial practices. Finally, the Israelis have incorpo­ rated form.er Arab officials, vjorkers, and engineers in West Bank Development, thus laying the groundwork for Israeli-Jordanian cooperation in the event of a definite peace. Future transactions might evolve into various multilateral arrangements regarding the refugees, joint water development and a host of potential unexplored areas of Israeli-Arab cooperation. The weight of Soviet-United States combined support of such programs might ultimately transform the internal hostilities. The steps will be slow at first, but the pressure and direction must be constant if more disastrous recurrences of hostility are

1 5 -^Israel Office of Information, \\fhere Jew and Arab Meet (New York, I968), p. 6. 106 to be avoided.

Since June, I967, the world has been doing what it can (through the United Nations) to learn if there is any way to settle peacefully the long standing Arab- Israeli conf-lict. As previously stated, those dealing with this problem have to find some way of side-stepping Arab and Israeli resolve on non-cooperation, and some way of changing the current policies of the Soviet Union which feels that peace in the Middle East would be a setback to its campaign to undermine the West. On November 22, I967, the Security Council adopted a British resolution authorizing the dispatch of a special representative to negotiate with Arabs and Israelis to promote agreement toward an acceptable, peaceful solution.1 '7 The resolution listed (in very general language) terms to guide the envoy's mission. Such vague language gives the Soviet Union and the United States room with which to compromise their established positions on the situation. The Soviet Union had demanded immediate and unconditional Israeli withdrawal. The United States contended that any withdrawal must be in the context of peace and recognized boundries.

1 6 I. L. Kenen, "Viewing the News," Near East Report (January, I968), p. A-1. •'-'^United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, Resolution S/8309, November 22, I967,

«,f' 107 The resolution also calls for termination of belligerence, respect for territorial boundries, and political independence of all states in the area (along with freedom of navigation and a just resettlement for the refugees).

In December, I967, United Nations Special Envoy, Gunner Jarring, left for the Near East to attempt to convince the Israelis and the Arabs to come together to negotiate. Thus far, the difficulties Mr. Jarring has encountered have rendered the resolution inconclusive. Mr. Jarring has 'neither convinced the parties involved, nor has he shown the international community whether further steps should be taken toward implementation of the Security Council resolution. In summary, the perpetual problem of the Arab- Israeli conflict has evolved through a number of factors. First, due to the conflicting promises made-to Arabs and Israelis by Great Britain and France, the award of Pales­ tine to the Jews immediately irritated the Arabs. More­ over, while Zionism received world-wide support, the Arabs were condemned to a losing battle for their land, and their rights to self determination. As tensions began to develop, the problem of the Arab refugee, the lack of coordination on the Jordan River, and an economic boycott against Israel provided visible manifestations of the 108 serious internal problems that plagued the area. When the big powers took their cold war conflict to the Middle East, their provisions of military aid greatly acceler­ ated the problems by giving to newly emergent states the power to wage war. While Israel repeatedly won the battles, frustrating and humiliating the Arabs, the Israelis themselves were angered and frustrated by their inability to achieve any other than purely military victories. While the Arab refugee constantly reminded the Arab of his military failures, the perpetual struggles and guerilla harrassments constantly reminded the Israelis of their diplomatic failures. Despite the revelations of the recent wars that have shown that the Arab-Israeli conflicts are virtually insurmountable, and that diplo­ matic failures after the wars of 1956 and I967 were not exclusively the failures of the Israelis, there remains over Israel a gloomy resignation to an apparently endless parade of border struggles, petty grievances, and war. The Israelis realize the superior position they currently hold, and have attempted to use that position to bring the Arab states to the conference table, but to no avail. Only through big power pressures, carefully planned, bi­ laterally conceived, and delicately implemented, can the problem of the Arab-Israeli conflicts ever be solved. A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

Antonius, George, Arab Avjakenlng. New York; G, P, Putman and Sons, I938, Binder, Leonard (ed.). Politics in Lebanon. New York; John Wiley and Sons, Inc.,. 1966. ' Bullard, Sir Reader (ed.). The Middle East. London; Oxford University Press, 1958. Calvocoressi, Peter. Suez; Ten Years Later. New York; Random House, 1967. Crum, Bartley C. Behind the Silken Curtain. New York; Simon and Schuster, 1947. David, Philip. The Syrian National Congress. Paris: A Lameere, 1923* Dayan, Moshe. The Sinai Campaign. New York; The Viking Press, i960. De Nova, John A. American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, Minneapolis; University of Minnesota Press, 1963. Draper, Theodore. Israel and World Politics.. New York: The Viking Press, I968, Dunner, Joseph, The Republic of Israel, New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1950. Eban, Abba, The Voice of Israel. New York: Horizon Press, 1957. Eden, Anthony, The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, I960, Eisenhower, Dwight D, Waging Peace, Garden City, New York Doubleday and Company, 1965* Ellis, Harry B. Challenge in the Middle East, New York: The Ronald Press Company, i960.

109 110 Eytan, Walter, The First Ten Years; A Diplomatic History of Israel, New York: Sim.on and Schuster, 1958, Finer, Herman. Dulles Over Suez, Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 19^41 Fischer, Carol A., and Krinsky, Fred. Middle East in Crisis. Syracuse; Syracuse University Press, 1959* ^ Friedrich, Carl J. American Policy Toward Palestine, Washington, D,C,: Foreign-Affairs Press, 19"44, Gervasi, Frank, The Case for Israel, New York; The Viking Press, I967. Great Britain and Palestine, 1919-I945. London; Published by the Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946. ' Greenwald, Norman, The Middle East in Focus, Washington, D,C.: Public Affairs Press, i960. Gurion, David-Ben. Israel: Years of Challenge. New York: Holt, Reinhart, and Winston, I963. Hadawi, Sami. Bitter Harvest; Palestine Between 1914 and 1967. New York: The New World Press, I967. Hutchinson, E. H. Violent Truce; The Arab Israeli Conflict 1951-55. New York: The Davin-Adain Company, 1958. Israel's Struggle for Peace. New York: Published.by Israel Office of Information, I96O. Kerr, Malcohm. The Arab Cold War: 1958-1967. London: Oxford University Press, I967. Kirchway, Freda (ed.). Security and the Middle East, New York: Nations Associates, 1954. Kirk, George E. Contemporary Arab Politics. New York: Frederick A, Praeger, I96I. Koenig, Lewis W. The Truman Administration; Its Principles and Practicei^ New York: University Press, 1956. Laqueur, Walter Z. The Middle East in Transition. New York: Frederick A, Praeger, 1958. 11 The Soviet Union and the Middle East, New York: Frederick A, Praeger, 1959, Lenczowski, George, The Middle E3.st in World Affairs, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1962.

Lowdermilk, Walter. Palestine, Land of Promise. New York: Harp.ers,-, 1944, Mehdi, M. T. Peace in the Middle East. New York: The New World Press, 1967. Mezerik, A, G, The Israeli-Arab Controversy, New York: International Review Service, I962, Monroe, Elizabeth. Britain's Moments in the Middle East, London: Methuen Press, I965, Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, I967. Nasser, Gamul Abdul. The Philosophy of the Revolution. Buffalo, New York: Keynes and Marshall, Inc., 1954. Nutting, Anthony. I Saw for Myself. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, I21C, , 1958, Palestine. Nevj York; Published by the American Zionist Organization, 1944. Palestine: A Study of Jewish, Arab, and British Policies. Vol. 2. New Haven: Published by Yale University Press for the Esco Foundation, 196I. Partner, Peter. The Arab World. New York: Frederick A. • Praeger, 196O. Pinner, Walter. How Many Arab Refugees? London: Macgibbon and Kee, 19^0. Polk, William R. The United States and the Arab World. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963. Prittie, Terrence. Israel, Miracle in the Desert. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1967. Razzaz, Munif al. The Evolution of the Meaning of Nation­ alism. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., I963, 112 ' Refugees in the Middle East, New York: Published by Israeli Office of Information, I967, Regional Development for Regional Peace, Washington, D.C.: Published by the Public Affairs Institute, 1958. Rosner, Gabriella, The United Nations Emergency Force. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963. Safran, Nadav. The United States and Israel, Cambridge, Massachuseitts: Harvard University Press, 1965. Stock, Ernest. The Road to Sinai. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, I967. Thomas, Hugh. Suez. New York: Harper and Row, Inc., 1967. Truman, Harry S. Memoirs Vol. II. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1956. Weizman, Chaim. Trial and Error. New.York: Harper Brothers Publishing Company, 1949. Welles, Sumner. We Need Not Fail, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948, Where Jew and Arab Meet, New York: Published by Israel Office of Information, I968. Willis, F, Roy, Europe in the Global Age: 1939 to the Present, New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1968, Wynn, Wilton. Nasser of E^ypt: The Search for Dignity. Cambridge: Arlington Books Inc, 1959. Yale, William. The Near East. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958.

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS

Great Britain. Parliament. British and Foreign State Papers. No. I62, I920. Great Britain. Parliament. Parliamentary Papers. CMND. 1785, 1922-23. 113 Great Britain. Parliament. Parliamentary Papers. CMND. 5^79, 1937-38. Great Britain. Parliament. Parliamentary Papers. CMND. 6019, 1939-40. ' Israel. Knesset. Foreign Office, Document 2240, Hay 30, 19^7. Israel, Knesset. Knesset Records, Volo lo June 5, 1948. Israel. Knesset. Knesset Records. Vol. V. May 11, 1953. Israel. Knesset. Knesset Records. Vol. VIII. January 19, 1956. ~~ Israel. Knesset. Knesset Records. Vol. XIX. May 13, 19670 League of Nations, Permanent Mandate Commission. The White Paper, Paragraph z. May, 1939. United Nations, Bulletin, Vol. V, No. 2, December 1, 1948. United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Document A/286, April 3, 1947: United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly. Resolution A/106 (S-1), May 15, T9W7~ United Nations. Official Records of the General Assembly. Document A/364, September 16, 1947. United Nations. Official Records of the General Assemblyo Resolution A/181-11, November 29, 1947. United Nations. Official Records of the General Assembly. Resolution A/186, May 20, 1948. United Nations, Official Records of the General Assemblyo Document A/648, September 16, 1948, United Nations. Official Records of the General Assembly. Resolution A/212-III, November 29, 1948. United Nations. Official Records of the General Assembly. Resolution A/194-III, December 11, 1948. United Nations. Official Records of the General Assembly. Resolution A/302-IV, December 8, I949. 114

United Nations. Official Records of the General Assembly. Document A/2184, September 9, 1952. United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly. Resolution A/997, November 3, 193^"^ United Nations. Official Records of the General Assembly. Document 1237-(HI), August 21, 1958. United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly. Document A/3943, October 9, 1958, United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, Document S/736, May 11, 1948^ United Nations. Official Records of the Security Council, Document S/745, May 15, 1948. United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, Document S/753, May 20, 1948, United Nations. Official Records of the Security Council, Resolution S/773, May 22, 1948. United Nations. Official Records of the Security Council. Document S/783, May 25, 1948. United Nations. Official Records of the Security Council. Document S/983, August I9, 1948, United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council. Document S/IO7O, November 4, 1948, United Nations. Official Records of the Security Council. Document S/1302, April 3, 19^9- United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, Document S/2762, September 2, 1952. United Nations. Official Records of the Security Council. Document S/3108/Rev. 1, October 16, 1953- United Nations. Official Records of the Security Council. Document S/3122, October 23, 1953. United Nations. Official Records of the Security Council. Document S/3128, October 27, 1953. United Nations. Official Records of the Security Council. Document S/3199, October 4, 1956. '. 115

United Nations. Official Records of the Security Council. Document S/pv 13^3, May 29, 196yi United Nations. Official Records of the Security Council. Document S/233, June 7, I967. United Nations. Official Records of the Security Council. Docum.ent S/8309~ (III), November 22, 1967- United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations 1946-47, United Nations. Yearbook of the United Nations 1947-48. United Nations. Yearbook of the United Nations 1948-49, United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations 1949. United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations 1956. United States. Departm-ent of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Statistical Abstracts of the United States, 19.5^ Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office, 195^. United States. Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XVI, No. 403. Washington, D.C: Governrr.ent Printing Office, 19^7. United States. Department of State Bulletin. Vol, XXI, No, 531, Washington, D,C.: Government Printing Office, 19^9. United States. Department of State Bulletin, Vol, XXIV, No. 622, Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1951- United States. Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XXV, No, 643, Washington, D.C; ' Government Printing Office, 1951. United States. Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XXIX, No. 748. Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1953. United States. Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XXXVI, No. 918. Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1957. 116

United States, Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XXXVII, No. 942. Washington, D.C; Government Printing Office, 1957. United States. Department of State, The Mutual Security Program for Fiscal Year, 1955. V/ashington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1955. United States,"' Department of State, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements. TIAS No, 2290, Washington, D,C: Government Printing Office, 1954, United States. Department of State. United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, TIAS No, 3108. Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1954. United States. Department of State. Report of the Anglo- American Com.mittee of Inquiry. Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1946. United States. Statutes at Large. Vol, 79, 89th Congress, 1st Session. Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1965. United States Congress. House. Congressional Record, Vol, 90, Part l,.78th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D,C: Government Printing Office, 1944. United States Congress, House. Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Arab Refugee. 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D,C,; Government Printing Office, 195^.

ARTICLES

Binder, Leonard, "The Middle East Crises: A Trial Balance," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. September, 1967, p. 33. Bu siness International. May, 1957, PP. 24-26. Capil, M. "Political Survey I962, Arab Middle East," Middle F^stern Affairs. Vol. XIV, No. 2. February, I963, PP. 34-47.

littMMMi..^ 117 Cohen, Mildred S. "Five Years of Israeli Diplonacy," Zionist Newsletter. May, 1953, p. 1. Draper, Theodore. "Israel and World Politics," Commentary. August, 1967, p. 26. Duce, James. "Blood and Oil, Aramco's Secret Report on Palestine," The Nation. June 26, 1948, pp. 705-O7. "Egypt," Time Mag:azine. August 6, I956, pp. 19-20. Fay, Sidney B. "Arabs, Zionists, and Oil," Current History. May, 1948, p. 276. Hadawi, Sami. "Arab Blockade and Boycott of Israel," Arab Information Center. Information Paper No. I7, p. 71. Kenen, I, L, (ed.). "Bear Hug for Syria," Near East Report. May 31, 1966, p. 42. ' > "The Boycott," Near East Report. -May I6, 19^7. p. ^0. "The Arab Boycott Today," Near East Report. August, 1967, P- B-24. "Viewing the News," Near East Report. January 19, I968, p. A-1. Leonard, Larry L, "The United Nations and Palestine," International Conciliation. October, 19^9, p. 650, Marshall, Charles Burton, "Reflections on the Middle East," Orbis. Summer, I967, pp. 3^3-360, Thayor, Phillip W. "Tensions in the Middle East," Middle East Journal. Summer', I956, p. 295. Raleigh, J. S. "Ten Years of the Arab League," Middle Eastern Affairs. March, 1955, p. 71. Samuel, Edwin. "The Impact of Immigration on Israel," The Political Quarterly. June, 1953, p. 282. Shavit, Yitzhak E. "Desalination," Technion. January, 1968, pp. 9-14. ^ Soviet News. April I7, I955, pp. 1-12. 118 St. Aubin, W. E. "Peace and Refugees in the Middle East," Middle East Journal. July, 1949, p. 37.

NEWSPAPERS

Al Hayat. (Beirut, Lebanon). January 7, I968, p. 2. American Examiner. (Kansas City, Missouri). February 1, 1968, p. 1. Christian Science Monitor. (Boston, Massachusetts). November 20, I967, P. 1^. Ha-Arez. (Tel Aviv, Israel). May 31, 1950, p, 1, Ha-Arez. (Tel Aviv, Israel). February 11, 1953, p. 1. Life. (Beirut, Lebanon). March 12, 1968, p. 2. New York Times. March 3, 1919, p. 1. New York Times. March 21, 1948, p. 6. New York Times. May 15, 1948, p, 9. New York Times. February 10, 1953, P- 1^. New York Times. October 21, 1953, p. 1. New York Times, October 1, 1955, P. 6, New York Times, October 20, 1955, PP. 1, 17- New York Times, January 19, 1956, pp. 1, 3. New York Times, February 29, 1956^ p. 5. New York Times. May 6, 1956, p. ^- New York Times. July 27, 1956, p. 1. New York Times. July 29, 1956, p. E-5. New York Times. November 5, 1956, pp. 1, 8. New York Times. November 7, 1956, p. 1. Nftw York Times. August 10, 1958, p. 4, 119

New York Times, April 8, I967, p. 1. New York Times. May 16, I967, p. 16. New York Times. May 18, I967, p. 29. New York Times. May 24, I967, p. 1. New York Times". June 9, I967, p. 1. New York Times. August 20, 1967, p. 2. New York Times. November 12, I967, p. 16. New York Times. December 12, I967, p. 144. New York Times. February 22, I968, p. 4. New York Times. March 8, I968, p. 9. Washington Post. February 19, I968, p. 8. Washington Post. February 27, I968, p. 12. V/ashington Post. March 29, I968, p. 23. Washington Post. April 15, I968, p. 25. Western Rocky Mountain News. November 9, 1955y P* ^.

ADDRESSES

Dayan, Moshe. Speech Before the Egyptian POW Camp at Athlit, Occupied EgyptT January 19, I968. Eban, Abba. Speech to the United Nations General Assembly October 30, 1952.- Speech to the United Nations General Assembly June 29, 19677 Eisenhower, Dwight D. Speech to the Denver Press Club. November 9, I955. Eshkol, Levi. Speech to the Knesset. May 13, 1957. Greenberg, Yitchak. Speech to the Knesset. January 9, 1956. 120 Gurion, David Ben. Speech to the Knesset. January 6, 1953. King Hussein. Speech to the National Press Club. November 7, 196^^ Kosygin, Alexis. Speech to the United Nations General Assembly. June 7, I967. Mallakh, Ragaei el. Speech to the Students and Faculty of Colorado State University. Greely, Colorado, January 23, 1968, Meir, Golda, Speech Before Special Political Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, December 14, 1962. ^~"^ Nasser, Gamul Abdul, Speech at Cairo University, August 8, 1967. Sharett, Moshe, Speech, to the Knesset. June 5, 19^8,

INTERVIEWS

Babaa, Khalid J. Director of Arab Information Center, Southwestern Office. Dallas, Texas, April 11, 1968. Hillel, Reuven. Member of the Israeli Permanent Mission to the United Nations, New York, May 20, I968. Hood, A. J. Engineer and Driller with Standard Oil Company in Iraq and Qatar, Dallas, Texas, May 28, 1968, Mamouf, Mohammed, Director of Arab Information Center, New York, May 21, 1968, Okdah, Mahmoud el. Assistant Director Arab Information Center, New York, May 21, I968, Shiloh, Michael, Consul for Education Affairs, Embassy of Israel. New York, May 21, I968. w'-

121 MISCELLANEOUS

Naseer, Arri. "Social and Political Transformations in the Arab Middle East," Unpublished Paper. University of Texas, March, 1967, pp. 1-6. Hess, Yaacov. Consulate General of Israel. Letter from Houston, Texas, February 20, I968. Hess, Yaacov, Consulate General of Israel, Letter from Houston, Texas, May 7, I968.