Rebel Regimes and Military Powersharing: Consequences of Conflict for Authoritarian Durability Anne Meng* Jack Paine† August 4, 2020 Abstract Dictators face a powersharing tradeoff: sharing power more credibly delivers spoils to elites, but also lowers organizational hurdles to staging a coup against the ruler. We argue that origins in violent rebellion create favorable conditions for achieving peaceful powersharing with military elites. Fighting enables rulers of rebel regimes to transform the military and to place members of their rebel group into top positions. Although these military elites possess the means to overthrow the ruler, sharing power with allies will alleviate coup risk. Using data on African regimes from 1960–2017, we establish that rebel regimes are significantly less likely to fall than others. We then show evidence for powersharing using originally collected data. Rulers in rebel regimes frequently transform the state military upon taking power. Compared to other regimes, they are more likely to appoint a Minister of Defense (who were usually guerrilla leaders) and less likely to face coups. *Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Virginia, Email:
[email protected] †Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Rochester, Email:
[email protected] 1 INTRODUCTION Choosing how much power to share with other elites is one of the most consequential decisions that author- itarian rulers make. Elites seek greater access to power and spoils, and—if marginalized from power—face incentives to challenge the dictator. In an attempt to lengthen his tenure in office, the ruler may choose to distribute rents and power to threatening elites, often by appointing them to key governmental positions (Haber 2006; Arriola 2009; Svolik 2012; Boix and Svolik 2013; Francois, Rainer and Trebbi 2015; Meng 2019).