THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD GERMANY

SINCE THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE

9- t

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF ATLANTA UNIVERSITY

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT CF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR

THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

BY

LEROY R. JOHNSON, II

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

ATLANTA, GEORGIA

JANUARY, 1952 TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER Page PREFACE i

I INTRODUCTION 1

Background of United States Policy 1 Big Three Agreements at Teheran and Yalta 7 Agreements at the Yalta Conference 9 The Potsdam Conference Convenes 13 The Potsdam Agreements 15 SUMMARY 17

II FROM THE POTSDAM DECLARATION JULY, 1945, TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT DECEMBER, 1946 19

Provisions of the Potsdam Declaration 20 General Eisenhower 1s Governorship of Germany.. 20 The Allied Control Council 21 The Governorship of General Joseph T. McNarney 27 Secretary of State Byrnes' Stuttgart Speech... 30 The Governorship of General Lucius Clay During Crisis 36 The Secretary of State, George Marshall, Pro¬ poses the European Recovery Program 41

SUMMARY 47

III FROM CIVIL GOVERNMENT IN 1946 TO THE PARIS CON¬ FERENCE OF 1951 50 The Establishment of Civil Government 50 Steps Leading to the Establishment of the Germ¬ an Federal Government in the West 53 The European Recovery Program 62 The North Atlantic Pact » 63 The Petersberg Protocol 65 The Schuman Plan. 68 The Paris Conference of 1951 74 IV CONCLUSION 80

BIBLIOGRAPHY 84 PREFACE

America's foreign policy toward Germany has been severe¬ ly criticized and changed since the Potsdam Conference. Many who were responsible for these criticisms were not aware of

the reasons for the change in policy from the principles laid down in the Potsdam Agreements to one of expediency; or, they were critical for the sake of being so. A report and analysis of the relations with Germany since Potsdam and the implica¬

tions from President Franklin D. Roosevelt's quarantine speech of 1937 will give adequate support for the changes in the pol¬ icy of the United States toward Germany since Potsdam.

This study is designed to aid one in understanding the

activities of the United States in Germany since the Potsdam

Conference by indicating the trends, circumstances, and con¬ ditions which gave rise to our foreign policy, the primary purpose of it being the establishment of a unified democratic Germany. For a more detailed and extensive analysis of the

foreign policy of the United States toward Germany, the writer recommends James K. Pollock's Germany Under Occupation and Lucius D. Clay's Decision in Germany.

The writer wishes to express gratitude to those persons who have unselfishly extended invaluable assistance in the writing of this paper. These persons are Dr. William Boyd,

Political Science Department, Atlanta, University; Dr. J. li Errol Miller, Political Science Department, Lincoln Univer¬ sity (Missouri); and Dr. Robert Brisbane, Political Science

Department, Morehouse College.

L.R.J., II CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND OF UNITED STATES POLICY

The rise of Germany under Adolph Hitler between 1933-

1940 and her vicious scramble for world domination created conditions which accelerated the coming of World Was II.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt foresaw the impending con¬ flict. It was in his "Quarantine" speech on October 5, 1937 in Chicago that he cited the political situation of the world as being critical, and thus, a threat to all peace-loving na¬ tions. He stated that:

The peace, the freedom and the security of 90 per cent of the population of the world is being jeop¬ ardized by the remaining 10 per cent who are threat¬ ening a breakdown of all international order and law. Surely the 90 per cent who want to live in peace under the law in accordance with moral stand¬ ards that have received almost universal accept¬ ance through the centuries, can, and must find some way to make their will prevail.

It was from this speech that suspicion and doubt entered into American foreign policy toward certain European Govern¬ ments. Examples of such can be seen in the three following statements by the President. First, on October 12, 1937 in a speech made by the President to the American people, he

1 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Roosevelt's Foreign Policy, 1953- 1941 (New York, 1942), p. 129.

1 2

stated that "as we plan for the creation of higher standards of living for the people of the United States, we are aware that our plans may b e most seriously affected by events in 1 the world outside our borders." The President felt that the development of peace in the world was dependent upon the ac¬

ceptance by nations of certain fundamental decencies in their relations with each other. Ultimately, he hoped that each nation would accept the fact that violations of tnese rules

of conduct were detrimental to the well-being of all nations. Second, in a letter written by the President to Edward T. Tay¬ lor, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee on Decem¬ ber 28, 1937, the President expressed a growing concern for

national defense. He stated that previous estimates for Nav¬ al armaments had to be increased because of his growing sus- 2 plcion and fear of world events. And third, in the Presi¬ dent's Annual Message to Congress on January 3, 1938, he

stated that in spite of the desire of this nation for peace,

"certain European nations were moving in a direction which 3 would jeopardize that peace." Thus, the attitude of Roose¬

velt, as exemplified in the above statements, indicates the ex¬ tent to which he believed in the possibility of a European wTar

which would jeopardize the security of the United States.4

_ Roosevelt, op clt., op. 132. 2 Ibid., 135 3 Ibid., 138 4 5

In many quarters Roosevelt was castigated as a war monger.

John E. Miller, running on an anti-Roosevelt platform, de¬ feated Governor Carl E. Bailey of Little Rock, Arkansas, in a special senatorial election held on October 18, 1937, in Little Rock, Arkansas. During the campaign, Miller asserted that the President was playing politics with the world situ¬ ation. He said, also that the President was creating hys¬ teria among the people toward a war which was not likely to come.'*' Miller was joined in his criticism of Roosevelt by Senator Arthur Vandenberg. Senator Vandenberg, speaking be¬ fore a joint meeting of community and luncheon clubs in Grand Rapids, Michigan on October 28, 1937, declared that the Roose¬ velt Administration was a "preview to chaos." He asserted that the implication from Roosevelt's speech might provoke war. He warned of "benevolent dictators" and "scored reck- 2 less and over-night decisions" on important world matters.

These politicians were of the opinion that the President was disturbing the peace, under the guise of protecting the se- 3 curity of the United States. Likewise, press reaction to the President's speech was one of condemnation. The New York

Herald Tribune stated that the President advocated "a policy

- "Governor Bailey Beaten in Arkansas Senatorial Election" New York Times, October 19, 1937, p. 1. 2 "Senator Warns of Dangers in New Deal Attitude," New York Times, October 29, 1937, p. 1. 3 Roosevelt, op cit., p. 130. 4 of aggression,1,1 the London Times regarded Roosevelt's speech with skepticism and charged that the President was defending an attitude and not a program. It advocated the need for a 2 real program to assure peace. In 1939 however a war began in Europe from which the United States could not hold herself aloof, because the spread of a European war would place in Jeopardy "the American way 3 of life." Thus, by January, 1941, thé United States, though not directly involved in war, assisted those forces which were actively engaged in the fight against the Nazi menace.

Such help was administered through a lend-lease program es¬ tablished for this purpose. Under the lend-lease program, small combat ships, food, agricultural surpluses, and ammu- 4 niton were provided for allied countries. Likewise, increased credit funds which sought to provide aid to allied countries 5 were immediately approved by Congress.

The President had now begun to shape a policy of firmness toward Germany. He opposed Germany's utilization of manpower

1 "A Review of the President's Quarantine Speech," New York Herald Tribune, October 10, 1937, p. 2. 2 "Roosevelt Defends Attitude Not Program," London Times, October 8, 1937, p. 1. 3 Henry Morgenthau, Germany is Our Problem (New York, 1945) p. 97. 4 United States Department of State, Department of State Bulletin, (January 9, 1942), o. 20. 5 Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 3d sess., (January 3, 1941), p. 13972. 5 for war purposes. When several attempts to negotiate peace between Germany and other European nations had failed, the

President advocated that the following steps be taken: First,

that Congress should immediately approve an increase in the

/ financing of exports of agricultural surpluses and manufac¬ tured products to Finland and other countries for aid against

an aggressive Germany. Secondly, he urged the Congress to

appropriate immediate funds for the purchase of strategic war machinery. Thirdly, on February 9, 1940, the President in¬

structed Under Secretary of State Sumner Wells to go to Italy,

France, Germany and Great Britain solely for the purpose of .

getting an on-the-spot view of conditions in those countries.

Fourthly, by June 15, 1940, Roosevelt had promised more non- 2 military aid to France. Roosevelt's policy of firmness toward

Germany rested upon his desire to seek peace, economic pros¬ perity and political harmony for the freedom-loving peoples of 3 the world.

To maintain this peace meant that German military advance¬

ments had to be checked—a condition which was not accomplished.

Though preparation for military aggression began shortly after Hitler became Chancellor of Germany in January, 1933 it was 1 United States Department of State, Department of State Bulletin (January 9, 1942), p. 24. 2 Ibid., p. 31. 3 Morgenthau,, op cit. . p. 91. 6 not until September 12, 1936, that Hitler began his aggres¬ sive campaign in Europe. He began by demanding the Sudeten 1 2 area. of Czechoslovakia be returned to Germany. Hitler followed his demands with an ultimatum threatening to in¬ vade Czechoslavakia-if it were not met. Attempts were made by Britain's Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and the French

Premier Edouard Deladier to avoid a European war. Accordingly concessions were made to Hitler at Munich. Thus, the British and French agreed to a proposal providing■for a transfer to

Germany of "areas with over 50 per cent of German inhabit ants.1 2 3 4^

Not satisfied with the concessions Hitler, on March 14, 1939 dissolved the Republic of Czechoslovakia. German troops oc¬ cupied Czech Bohemia and Moravia, and,on March 16, 1939, Czech¬ oslavakia became a German protectorate. The'following series

1 The Sudeten area, a natural mountain boundary, was vital military ana. economic importance to the security of Czechoslovakia. The chief Czechoslovakian fortifications were located there. The Germans of the Sudeten mountains had nevér been part of the Reich .proper but subjects of pre-war Austria. After the first World War the Hlucin part of Germany, a sec¬ tion of 110 square miles, was ceded to Czechoslovakia. Eight¬ een per cent of the population of this ceded area tiras German, and the balance was Czechoslovakian. See Franklin Roosevelt, Roosevelt's Foreign Policy 1953-1941 (New York, 1942), p. 147. 2 Otto D. Toliscus, They Wanted War (New York, 1941), p. 106. 3 Ibid., p. 108. 4 Herman Rauschning, The Voice of Destruction (New York, 1941), p. 267. 7 of events show the speed of the moving Germany military ma¬ chine: on September 1, 1939, Germany launched her Blitzkrieg1 against Poland, and on April 9, 1940, she invaded Norway and Denmark by land, sea and air. Hitler was not content with these victories. He therefore, marched into Belgium, the p Netherlands a,nd Luxemburg on May 10 of the same year. By December 11, 1941, Germany climaxed her military demands by declaring war on the United States.

Shortly afterwards, the United States, England, and Rus¬ sia became allies in a world war. They proclaimed their com¬ mon purpose—a speedy victory over the enemy. Plans for con¬ quest began immediately among the three nations known as the

"Big Three". Conferences between the "Big Three" on military strategy for the defeat of Germany and postwar occupation be- 4 gan at Teheran and Yalta.

Big Three Agreements At Teheran and Yalta At the Teheran Conference which was held in November, 1943, the Allies stated that the purposes of the meeting were two-fold: (1) an agreement was to be reached in regard to the

1 A German word which gained popularity during World War II because of it's association with German warfare. The term refers to a sudded overwhelming attack with powerful forces. See Funk and Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English Language (New York, 1945), Vol. I., o. 91. 2 Rauschning, op. clt., o. 281. 3 Michael Sayer, The Plot Against the Peace (New York, 1945), p. 238. 4 Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (New York, 1950), p. 21. 8 terms of surrender for the enemy, and (2) the positions of the three countries in the post-war x^rorld were to he discuss¬ ed. President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill 11, and Gen¬ eralissimo Stalin agreed at Teheran that the terms of surrender for the enemy would be unconditional surrender.^- They pledged that the three countries would work together in the post-war 2 world to insure peace. It was agreed that unanimity among the major powers was essential to peace, and that the peace 3 must be kept by forde, if necessary. The principal task for the "Big Three" was to reach an agreement as to what consti¬ tuted the area of general security in the postwar world for 4 each country.

It is interesting to note at this point the differences of opinions which existed between Churchill on the one hand, and Roosevelt and Stalin on the other, concerning the strate¬ gy for invasion. Churchill insisted upon two invasions si¬ multaneously: one from the west and the otner through the

Balkans. Churchill had hoped that the Americans would spear¬ head the invasion through the Balkans in order to keep the

1 James K. Pollock, Germany Under Occupation (Ann^Arbor, 1949), p. 1. 2 Edward R. Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference (New York,"1949), p. 15. 3 Elliot Roosevelt, As He Saw It (New York, 1946), p. 177. 4 4 Ibid., p. 178. 9

Red Army out of Austria, Rumania and even Hungary, if possi¬ ble. Roosevelt and Stalin agreed on tne question of invasion.

They contended that the quickest way to win the war with mini¬ mum loss of personnel was to launch one big invasion from the west alone.^ The Teheran Conference ended successfully when the Allies accomplished their objectives as outlined in the purposes of the conference. As the Conference came to a conclusion Eng¬ land's Prime Minister Winston Churchill stated that the great¬

est contribution to peace was "the unity and good will that «2 exist among the major powers." Likewise, the major powers agreed on a subsequent meeting which was to be held fifteen 3 months later at Yalta in the Crimea. At this conference

the Allies were to agree on a joint program for controlling

Germany. Agreement at the Yalta Conference

When the Yalta Conference convened February 4-12, 1945 4 the Allies were unified in their objectives. They establish¬

ed, three months before the collapse of the Hitler's regime in

May 1945,the major lines of policy which were adopted at the

- Roosevelt, As He. Saxy It, p. 170.

2'' Hansard, Parliamentary Debates (fifth series), Vol. 407h 11944-45), 973. 3 iMda, p. 975 4 Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York, 1950) p. 862. 10

Potsdam Conference, held in July 1945. They proclaimed their inflexible purpose to demilitarize and denazify Germa¬ ny, to bring all war criminals to justice, to exact repara¬ tions and to destroy Germany's industrial war potential while leaving her people a means of achieving an average standard 2 of living. 3 Among the issues discussed at Yalta, three have never ceased to disturb the subsequent meetings of the Council of 4 Foreign Ministers. These issues are: First, the question of reparations from Germany, centering on a statement made by

President Roosevelt in the course of the conference. In es¬ sence the President stated that the Reparations Commission, to be established following the meeting, should consider the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of rep¬ arations be twenty billion dollars and that 50 per cent of 5 this should go to the Soviet Union. The second controversial issue dealt with the western boundary of Poland. The heads of each of the three governments considered that the eastern 6 frontier of Poland should follow the Gurzon Line. . with devl-

1 Pollock, 0£. clt., p. 1. 2 Byrnes, op. cit., p. 24. 3 See Chapter II. 4 Sherwood, op. clt., p. 143. 5 Pollock, ojo. clt., p. 114. 6 The Curzon Line is a provisional eastern frontier for Poland, drawm at the instance of the Marquess Curzon, British 11 atlon from it in some regions of five to eight kilometers in favor of Poland. However, the final delimitation of the west- 1 ern frontiers of Poland should await the peace conference.

Stalin was not in agreement with the proposals concerning the

Gurzon line, and the referral of this question to the peace conference xiras viewed by the Soviet leaders as a desire on the part of the western allies to extend the Polish western front- 2 iers to the Neisse River. Finally, it was at Yalta that the crucial decision was made to divide Germany into four separate zones of occupation. These zones were to be coordinated by an 5 allied control commission in Berlin. Unanimity was required, but in case of disagreement, each partner felt free to act in 4 his own zone independently. It is Interesting to note, how¬ ever, that President Roosevelt had initially favored unified control and administration for occupied Germany on all levels 5 without a division of zones.

Foreign Minister, by the Supreme Council of the Allies in Paris on December 8, 1919, and excluding from the Polish state ter¬ ritories inhabited mainly by non-Polish populations, for the most part Ukrainians, White Russians and Lithuanians. At the partitioning of Poland by Germany and Russia in 1939, the Cur- zon Line was revived with a few local deviations, to mark the boundary between the German and Russian spheres of occupation. See Hyamson, Dictionary of International Affairs (Washington, D. C., 1947), p. 75. 1 Stettlnus, op. clt., p. 271. 2 Byrnes, 0£. clt., p. 30. 3 Winston S. Churchill, Victory, (Boston, 1946), p. 40. 4 Pollock, ojo. clt., o. 3. 5 Cf Elliot Roosevelt, ojo. clt. , p. 238; see also Byrnes, op. cit. , p. 21. The Yalta Conference reached a successful conclusion when the Allies had made agreements which were to aid In bring¬ ing a defeated Germany back into the good graces of the family

of nations* The issues agreed upon werel the demilitariza¬ tion of Germany; the kind and amount of reparations to bo ex¬ acted; the destruction of Germany's Industrial war potential; 1 and the dlviai n of Germany Into zones of occupation* A fin¬

al decision concerning Poll all boundaries was delayed until a peace conference was called* These results were viewed favor- 2 ably by all allied nations* For example* the British House of

Commons overwhelmingly accepted a report on the Conference giv- 3 en by Prime Minister Winston Churchill* In addressing the House of Commons» Prime Minister Churchill urged that the House

approve the declaration of tho Joint policy agreed to by the three great powers at the Crimean Conference and* in particular»

welcome their determination to maintain unity of action, not

only in achieving the final defeat of the common enemy, but thereafter in peace as in war* American public opinion, as expressed through the press, was especially enthusiastic over tho result of tho Yalta Con¬ ference* The New York Herald Tribute declared that “the over-

r'X'T' l1T“U",n,, ™* n',‘ "™ m“ " Clay, olt. » p* 36* 2 Byrnes, SL& fill,* » P* 45* 3 Hauoard, Parliamentary Debat en (fifth series), Vol. 400 (1944-45), 1267, 4 , p* 1370, 13 riding fact is that the conference has produced another great proof of allied unity, strength and power of decision."1 2 3- 4

And the New York Times asserted: "All doubts about the Big

Three’s ability to cooperate in peace as well as in war seem 2 now to have been swept away."

The agreements reachéd at the Yalta Conference were to serve as a point of departure for the Allies in their next meeting at Potsdam, where a firm policy for postwar Germany was to be drafted.

The Potsdam Conference Convenes

At the Potsdam Conference, which was held from July 17th to August 2, 1945, the Allies met to agree on policies which 3 were to be used to control postwar Germany. The delegation from the United States at this conference included President

Truman, Secretary of State Byrnes, and Admiral Leahy; from 4 the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Churchill, Foreign Minis-

1 "Major Powers Agree at Yalta," New York Herald Tribune February 14, 1945, p. 1. 2 "Big Three Gets Together" New York Times, February 13, 1945, p. 1. 3 Clay, ojo. clt. , p. 42. 4 It is necessary to explain the position of Prime Minis¬ ter Churchill at this conference because 1945 was an election year in England. Prime Minister Churchill, realizing the pos¬ sibility of the Conservative Party's being defeated and re¬ placed by the Labor Party, whose leader was Mr. Attlee, thought it was wise to have Mr. Attlee accompany him to Potsdam. Prime Minister Churchill's foresight proved to be valid, for when the two leaders returned to England for the election, the Eng¬ lish people repudiated the Conservative Party. Mr. Attlee then returned to Potsdam Conference as Prime Minister. See Byrnes, op. clt., p. 69. 14 ter Eden and the British Labor Party leader, Mr. Attlee; From the Soviet Union Generalissimo Stalin, Foreign Minister Molo- tove, and Mr.Gromyko, the Soviet Ambassador to the United States.'1 2 3 4 5’ When the conference convened Generalissimo Stalin suggested that President Truman be made chairman. Upon assum¬ ing chairmanship, President Truman presented for consideration 2 several proposals he had prepared prior to the meeting. These proposals were: (1) the establishment of the Council of For¬ eign Ministers,*^ (2) the kind of reparation to be exacted from Germany, and (3) implementation of the Yalta Declaration con- 4 cerning a liberated Europe. Most of these proposals met with stiff opposition from the Soviet delegates. Disagreement on the first proposal centered around the composition of a Coun¬ cil of Foreign Ministers! The Soviet Union was opposed to the admission of France to the ranks of the great powers. Sim¬ ilar disagreements arose over a claim of $10,000,000*000 for g reparation by the Soviet Union. Even though there itfere dif¬ ferences of opinion among the Allies, they were able to elimi¬ nate the disagreements before the Conference ended through a series of compromises. This action permitted the Protocol to

1 Byrnes, 0£. cit., p. 68. 2 Ibid., p. 70. 3 It had been agreed at Yalta that there should be regular meetings of the Foreign Ministers to deal with the difficulties which would arise after the war. See Byrnes, op.cit., p. 70. 4 Ibid. 5 Clay, ojo. cit., p. 41. 15 be signed on August 2, 1945.'*'

The Potsdam Agreements

Briefly stated, it can be said that the Potsdam Protocol did little more than elaborate on and reaffirm the Yalta Decla¬ ration. ^

The Potsdam Protocol reasserted the supreme authority of the four commanders-ln-chief to act in unanimous consent for

the whole of Germany, and separately in their respective zones of occupation. In the interest of security, it was agreed that demilitarization and disarmament were to be complete, and

industry having major war potential was to be eliminated. The

Nazi Party was to be disbanded and its laws abolished. Nazi leaders were to be arrested and interned. All active Hitler¬ ites were to be banned from holding public office and places

of prominence in private undertakings. To speed up the pro¬ cess of democratic growth, it was proposed that education be

controlled and the judicial system revamped. The entire po¬

litical structure was 10 be decentralized to encourage the de- 3 velopment of greater local responsibility. In the field of

economics, excessive concentrations of economic power were to be broken up and cartels disbanded. Agricultural production and the peaceful domestic industries were to be maximized.

Germany was to be treated as a single economic unit and, com-

_

Pollock, 0£. clt., p. 22. 2 United States Department of State, Department of State Bulletin (September 8, 1945), p. 13. 3 Ibid., p. 15. 16 mon policies were to be made applicable in all zones for min¬ ing and production, agricultural products, wages, prices, and rations.^ These agreements which were reached at Potsdam were to be executed by the military governor or his representative in the respective zones. In the American zone, General Dwight 2 D. Eisenhower served as the first military governor. In Oc¬ tober, 1945, General Eisenhower received Directive 106? from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (herein referred to as J.C.S. 1067) setting forth the objectives of American foreign policy in

Germany. They were: (l) centralization of the German politi¬ cal and administrative agencies and, (2) complete separation 3 of Germany from Austria. J.C.S./1067 was to serve only as a temporary guide for postwar policy, and it was changed after two years of operation. The reason for the long existence of the first order was that it gave the United States Commander- 4 in-Chief supreme authority. Changes that occurred in American policy as it developed from the Potsdam Declaration to the Conference of Foreign Min¬ isters in Paris, 1951, will be dealt with in the following chapters. r Ibid., p. 15. 2 Pollock, op. clt., p. 76. 3 Clay, OP. clt., p. 17. 4 Ibid. SUMMARY

As a result of Franklin D. Roosevelt's Quarantine"

speech in 1937, American foreign policy became highly criti¬ cal of European governments. Roosevelt stated in his speech that 90 per cent of the peoples of the world wanted peace, but the remaining 10 per cent sought to jeopardize that peace, and therefore, should be quarantined so that the will of the ma¬

jority might prevail. This speech brought unfavorable reac¬ tions from many people in the United States and abroad. How¬ ever, the war which began in Europe in 1939 and which the

United States entered in 1941, vindicated the wisdom of Roose¬ velt 1s beliefs.

Though the United States was not directly involved in war until December 8, 1941, her participation was quite evi¬ dent as early as January of the same year. Credit funds and

Lend-lease were approved by Congress for Allied nations. The

United States, England and Russia, who were Allies in the war, became the "Big Three".

Conferences between the "Big Three" on military strategy for the conquest of German and postwar occupation began at Te¬ heran and Yalta. At the Teheran Conference the Allies demanded

"unconditional surrender" from the enemy. And at Yalta the

Allies proclaimed their inflexible purpose to demilitarize and denazify Germany, to bring all war criminals to justice, and to destroy her industrial war potential so that she might be

17 18 re-admitted into the family of nations. It was also at Yalta that the crucial decision to divide Germany into zones of oc¬ cupation was made. The agreements reached at Yalta were placed first on the agenda for further consideration at Potsdam.

The Potsdam Conference was held from July 17 to August 2, 1945. The Allies at Potsdam reaffirmed the Yalta Declaration and produced a document which was to serve as a common direct¬ ive for the control of Germany. It was agreed at Potsdam that the supreme commanders of the United States, Great Britian,

France and Russia, functioning by unanimous decisions, would be the supreme occupation authority, and that Germany would be treated as a single economic unit.

The agreements reached at Potsdam were to be executed by the Military Governor or representative in his respective zone. General Dwight D. Elsenhower served as the first Mili¬ tary Governor in the American zone, followed by General Joseph

T. McNarney in November, 1945. CHAPTER II

FROM THE POTSDAM DECLARATION, JULY, 1945, TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT,

DECEMBER, 1946

The Provisions of the Potsdam Declaration During the early years of German occupation the United States sought to implement, to the letter, T;he three main provisions of the Potsdam Protocol. These provisions dealt with (1) the establishment of a control machinery for Germany, (2) the treatment of Germany as a single economic uhit, and (3) the dmocratization of the German people.'*’ In accordance with the provision on control machinery in Germany, supreme au¬ thority was exercised by the commanders-in-chlef of the United

States, Great Britain, Rissia and the Republic of France, each in his own zone, and also jointly in matters affecting Germaày 2 as a whole. A control council was established, composed of representatives from the four powers listed above, to super¬ vise the complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, and to eliminate all industry that could be used for military 3 production. In accordance with the provision to treat Germany as a single economic unit, common policies were established in

Ï United States Department of State, United States Policy at Potsdam (October 9, 1946), p. 59. 2 Ibid. 3 Byrnes, ojo. clt. , p. 29.

19 20 regard to: (1) mining and industrial production and allocations

(2) agriculture, forestry, and fishing; (3) transportation

and communication; (4) currency and banking, central taxation

and customs; (5) reparation and removal of industrial war po¬

tential; and (6) import and export programs for Germany as a whole.^ In accordance with the provision to democratize the German people, local self-government was restored throughout 2 Germany by December, 1946, through democratic free elections. Further tangible evidence of the attempt of the United States

to implement the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration is re¬ vealed in the assignment of military directives by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the military governors.

General Eisenhower's Governorship of Germany

General Dwight D. Eisenhower was the first United States Military Governor in Germany. He served for only a short

time. His major task therefore centered around the interpre¬ tation of military directives which were to aid in governing

Germany. The Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a directive in Oc¬ tober, 1945, to General Dwight D. Eisenhower* This directive was known as JCS./1067. Its provisions were: (l) the Mili¬ tary Commander was given sovereign power based upon uncondi¬

tional surrender and his participation in the Allied Control

Council; (2) German political structures were to be iramedl-

- Pollock, op. clt., p. 19. 2 United States Department of State, United States Policy at Potsdam, p. 66. 21 ately destroyed; and (3) all ties between Austria and Germany 1 were to be disconnected. JCS/1067 became a major controver¬ sial issue between the western powers and Russia, and later 2 among the western powers themselves. Military leaders of the

United States went further and included many provisions from the Potsdam Declaration in the hope that Germany would be oc¬ cupied according to international agreements. Such inclusions were: (l) the control of the German economy; (2) the dissolu¬ tion of the Nazi Party and its agencies; (3) the disbandment of the German military and naval forces; (4) the destruction of German arms and ammunition; (5) the arrest of war criminals and harmful suspects; (6) the taking into custody of officials of the Nazi Youth and Woman's groups, the SS or Hitler's Elite 3 Guard, and the SA or Storm Troopers because of their positions.

These were direct stipulations lifted from the Potsdam agree¬ ment and issued to General Eisenhower immediately after World

War II by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, General Eisen¬ hower's authority was limited because Germany was controlled by an Allied Control Council on which General Eisenhower served as the American representative.

The Allied Control Council

The Allied Control Council was to control Germany, though

1 Clay, o£. clt., o. 17. 2 Ibid. 3 United States Department of State, United States Econom¬ ic Policy Toward Germany (November 15, 1948), p. 31. 22 it met with many difficulties because of the rule of unani¬ mity.^ This rule was one which required a favorable vote by each member of the Council on matters concerning Germany as a whole. It was because of this rule of unanimity that a high degree of disagreement and dissension arose during the proceed¬ ings of the Council and prevented the western powers from re¬ pealing Nazi laws affedting the churches and from establish¬ ing a "strong drastic law" controlling the employment of form- 2 er Nazi officers.

$he Allied Control Council was composed of representatives from the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom 3 and the then Provisional Government of the French Republic.

Even though France was not represented at the Potsdam Con¬ ference, on June 5, 1945, the four powers listed above issued a statement on "zones of occupation" which declared that Germ¬ any, "within her frontiers as they were on December 31, 1937, would for the purposes of occupation, be divided into four zones." One was to be alloted to each power as follows: (l) an eastern zone to Russia; (2) a north-western zone to the

United Kingdom; (3) a south-western zone to the United States; 4 and (4) a western zone to France. Each of the four powers was

Ï Clay, pjD. clt., p. 384. 2 Ibid. 3 Pollock, OJD. clt., p. 13: also see chart on page 23. 4 Ibid. GERMANY: ZONES OF OCCUPATION PLATE II 24 to have supreme authority in her zone.^ Under the Control Council, there was a permanent Co-ordination Committee com¬ posed of a representative of each of the foir commanders-in- 2 chief, and a control staff. The functions of the co-ordinat¬ ing committee and the control staff were to advise the Control

Council and to carry out its decision. The administration of the "Greater Berlin" area was to be directed by the Inter-Al¬ lied Governing Authority, which operated under the general di¬ rection of the Control Council, having four commandants, each g of whom would serve in rotation as chief commandant.

The major stumbling block for allied unity at the Control Council level proved to be the question of economic unification as envisioned at Potsdam. When the deadlock over economic uni¬ fication in the Control Council during the early months of 1946 prevented Germany from being treated as an economic unit as the

Potsdam agreement provided, Secretary Byrnes proposed on July 12, 1946, the establishment of the central administrative agen¬ cies necessary to effectuate that objective." The function of the central administrative agencies was to arrange for the ex¬ change of products between zones and for a balanced program

- United States Department of State, Department of State Bulletin (December 15, 1946), o. 1092. 2 See Chart on Page 25 for structural organization of the Allied Control Council. 3 Pollock, Op. Cit., p.36. 4 United States Department of State, Department of State Bulletin (December 15, 1946), p. 1102. 25

PLATE I

ALLIED CONTROL AUTHORITY

Source: Pollock, ojo. cit., p. 16. 26 of imports and exports.1 When the French and Soviet Govern¬ ments did not respond favorably to Bylines' proposal, he in¬ structed General McNarney, who succeeded General Eisenhower as Governor of Germany, to join with any or all of the other three occupying powers for the treatment of their respective 2 zones as an economic unit. On July 29, 1946, the British

Government accepted the American invitation for the economic fusion of the two zones. Thus, the first real step in the 4 economic unification of Germany was taken.

Negotiations between the British and the United States

Government were retarded by British concern over their fi¬ nancial responsibilities. London felt that the United States should assume a greater share of the expenses. Thus.,; on Novem¬ ber 29, 1946, the principle of a fifty-fifty contribution was finally established, and on December 2, 1946 Secretaries Byrnes and Bevin signed, the official statement on the merging of the »

United States and British Zones, to be effective January 1, 5 1947. The two zones were to be treated as a single area for all economic purposes. The aim of the two governments was to

Ï Ibid. 2 United States Department of State, United States Econom¬ ic Policy Toward Germany (October 15, 1948), p. 35. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid., p. 36. 5 Pollock, op. clt., p. 222. 27 achieve by the end of 1949 a self-sustaining economy for the area.-*- The Governorship of General Joseph T. McNarney When General Joseph T. McNarney succeeded General Ei¬

senhower in November of 1945 a more concerted effort was made to implement the United States' objectives. The basic objec¬ tive of the United States in Germany was to prepare that coun¬ try for complete cooperation and eventual participation with- 2 in the family of nations. The essential aim in the achieve¬ ment of these ends rested upon the creation of a democratic 2 order through the implementation of the Potsdam agreements.

General McNarney was instructed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the American economic policy included unification and

cooperation in industry, finance, transportation, foreign trade and communications. Such was necessary in order to make possible the attainment of a balanced economy throughout Germ¬ any by joining with other zones for the treatment of Germany as an economic unit.4 The United States political policy re¬

quired that the German people be permitted increasingly to govern themselves through the establishment of local self-gov¬ ernment with emphasis upon the development of a deep sense of r Ibid., p. 168. 2 United States Department of State, American Policy in Occupied Area-s (March 9, 1947), p. 3. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid., p. 4. 28 local responsibility*. The elections held in the United States' Zone on November 24, and December 1,1946, and the constitutions subsequently adopted were implementations of this policy. German civil government in the American Zone was built on the principle stated by the Military Governor,

General Joseph T. McNarney, that "the way to learn democracy is by applying it.

In November and December of 1946 the States of Bavaria, Württemberg-Baden, and Greater Hesse, in the American Zone, adopted constitutions which the popularly elected assemblies had drawn up and the American Military Government had approv- 2 ed. Approval by the Military Government was necessary in order to be certain that they had provided for the mainte¬ nance of a democratic system of government. It was the aim of the United States to withdraw military control as soon as the Germans proved able to govern themselves democratically. Nevertheless, certain controls had to be maintained in order to enforce occupation agreements. There were controls over demilitarization, treatment of displaced persons, over repa¬ rations and war criminals. Denazification had to be kept un- 3 der military government supervision.

- — Ibid., p. lo. 2 James K. Pollock, Change and Crisis in European Govern¬ ment (New York, 1947), po. 167-93. 3 United States Department of State, American Policy in Occupied Areas (March 9, 1947), p. 11. 29

In the main, the above constitutions of Bavaria, Wurt- temberg-Baden and Greater Hesse were greatly influenced by American's foreign policy in that each provided for a decen- 1 tralized democratic government. In addition,this provision placed strong emphasis on the protection of individual human rights. Thus, each constitution included a bill of rights guaranteeing freedom of speech, assembly, press, religion, and the right of judical protection and equality before the law.a The requirements which had to be met before the Military Gov¬ ernment would consider any government as being decentralized were stated by General McNarney. The requirements were: (l) to grant power primarily to the states and only in specifical¬ ly enumerated and approved instances to a federal government; (2) to reserve powers of basic political implication (e.g.; the assessment of taxes and police powers) for the states; (3) to reserve all "residual powers for the people except as the people may delegate them to the states;" and (4) to deleg gate a substantial number of functions of the states to the 3 counties and communities. Each state was to have the status of a republic and was to be governed by a legislative assembly. There was to be a minister-president whose cabinet was to be appointed by him. All power of the state came from the people and was subject to their immediate control by popular election.

_ James K. Pollock, Change and Crisis in European Govern¬ ment, p. 193. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 30

General McNarney was setting forth a policy which sought to decentralize the German political structure and at the same time encourage the development of local democratic re¬ sponsibilities. The American State Department concurred with him. A summary of Secretary Byrnes' Stuttgart speech in September of 1946, will show that, though the military forces were governing Germany, the State and Military Depart¬ ments were working closely together for the purpose of ex¬ tending to the German people throughout Germany, under prop¬ er safeguard, the primary responsibility for self-govern- 1 ment by encouraging participation on the local level. Secretary of State Byrnes' Stuttgart Speech

Secretary Byrnes, on September 6, 1946, speaking before an audience of American soldiers and one hundred-fifty German officials, made the most potent declaration of United States policy toward Germany since the Potsdam Declaration of July, 1945. Mr.Byrnes declared that the United States had invited all four zones to establish a central provisional government powerful enough to implement the peace terms with which the 2 German people should be immediately acquainted. The princi¬ ple objective of American policy was to establish a just and lasting peace. To effeftt this aim Mr. Byrnes outlined the steps to be taken. They were: (1) a peace settlement was

- Ibid., p. 18. 2 "Secretary Byrnes "Stuttgart Speech," New York Times September 7, 1946, p. 1. (Note; Mr. Byrnes wanted a federated central government with delegated powers from the state. 31 needed to bring unity to denazified and demilitarized Germany first, by economic unification and secondly, by the establish¬ ment of a central government,'1' (2) the Koenigsberg area would be given to Soviet Russia and (3) parts of eastern Germany would be assigned to Poland as was agreed at Potsdam. He pointed out with emphasis that the then present border along the Oder and Neisse Rivers was temporary. He also stated that the settlement would give France the Saar for two purposes:

(a) to reduce reparations, and (b) to maintain the separation of Germany and Austria. The Rhineland and Rhur would remain a part of Germany subject to all other regulations imposed 2 upon Germany. The Secretary further intimated the joint co¬ operation of the War and State Departments when he stated that the United States felt that the Gerran people should be given 3 primary responsibility over their own affairs. In explain¬ ing his government's point of view, Byrnes advocated a pro¬ visional government set up in the form of a German National

Council composed of the Minister-Presidents and other chief 4 officials from the States and provinces of all zones. He proposed that this Council draw up a constitution guarantee-

Uriited States Department of State, Department of State Bulletin (October 13, 1946), o. 688. 2 "Secretary Byrnes' Stuttgart Speech," OJD. clt., p. 1. 3 United States Department of State, Department of State Bulletin (Seotember 15, 1946), o. 499. 4 Secretary Byrnes' "Stuttgart Speech" OJD. cit., p. 1. 32 lng democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms in a new Germany. Mr.Byrnes stated that the Government of the United

States would stand by the Potsdam agreement to transfer Koe- nigsberg and the joining area to the Soviet Union. He point¬ ed out that Silesia was given to Poland for administrative purposes and, in spite of the United States' approval of such action, final decision must await a peace settlement by the Allies.'*’

The Speech made by Mr. Byrnes in September of 1946 was 2 a statement of policy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff immediate¬ ly issued another directive which replaced all other directives issued by the Supreme Staff* It, in the main, proposed to create a force powerful enough to maintain a just and lasting peace, to continue efforts at disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, and to keep United States troops on German soil as long as other armies of occupation were present and to seek means whereby the American Government could guarantee politi¬ cal, economic and moral conditions in Germany that would be conducive to the development of a stable Europe. This di¬ rective sought to maintain a high degree of efficiency in ad-

- Ibid* 2 Ibid. 3 United States Department of State, Directive Regarding •che Military Government of Germany (July 11, 1947), p. 1. 4 Ibid., p. 2. 33 ministration for the United States zone of occupation by clarifying and strengthening occupation policies.^

In Paris on October 3, 1946, Mr. Byrnes re-emphasized his plea for the establishment of a central government with 2 delegated powers for the American Zone. The purpose was to prevent at any future date the establishment of a strong cen¬ tral government dominating the German people, instead of one being responsible to their democratic will. Mr. Bycnes ad¬ vocated the development of competitive political parties through which the German people could participate in the es- ta.blish.ment of such a government? He stated that all politi¬ cal parties were to be composed of volunteer groups of citi¬

zens whose leaders were responsible to the members, and whose programs and activities were to demonstrate their allegiance 4 to democratic principles. Each party would have the right

to elect its own slate of candidates to run for offices. How*

ever, the Military Governor was charged with the responsibil¬

ity of denying this privilege and forfeiting all right to any

group that adopted or advocated undemocratic practices or

1 United States Department of State, Department of State Bulletin (November 11, 1947), p. 745. 2 Ibid., D. 746. 3 United States Department of State, American Policy in Occupied Areas (March 9, 1947), p. 5. 4 United States Department of State, Directive Regarding the Military Government of Germany, p. 5. 34

ideas.1 2 3 4 5 The Military Governor, General McNarney, was in ac¬

cord with Mr. Byrnes on the matter of developing political 2 parties. Nevertheless, he realized that he was to remain

in Germany for only a short time and could only "initiate"

such a program. He stated that his successor, who was to be

General Lucius Clay, would have to assume responsibility for 3 the final results.

The Governorship of General Clay During The Crisis

General Lucius D. Clay succeeded General McNarney as

American Military Governor in Germany on March 15, 1947. His

immediate objectives were: (l) to prevent a rebirth of Nazism

in the German courts; and (2) to re-emphasize the economic 4 and cultural objectives of the United States. In the first

order issued to General Clay by the Joint-Chiefs of Staff

on April 13, 1947, provisions were made for restrictions over

German courts to prevent the rise of National Socialist doc¬

trines, and to protect the citizens against discrimination 5 because of race, creed, nationality and political ideas.

General Clay was prohibited from dictating to the courts in

order to allow freedom of interpretation of the laxvs in order

1 Ibid. 2 Ibid., o. 19. 3 Ibid. 4 United States Department of State, Department of State Bulletin (November 10, 1948), p. 861. 5 Ibid. 35 to enhance the respectability of the Germany judiciary. Suf¬ ficient Military Government courts were maintained to try per¬ sons accused of offenses involving the safety and security of the United States and of Allied Personnel, and all cases in 2 \tfhich the interest of the Military Government was paramount.

The jurisdiction of civilian courts were to be extended to all cases which did not involve the interest of the Military Gov- 3 ernment or persons under its protective care. The German people were to have freedom of decision as to the type of legislation they needed as long as it did not conflict with the objectives of the Military Government. The economic ob¬

jectives were: (l) to eliminate industry used for war pur¬ poses; (2) to determine the kind of reparations to be exact¬ ed; and (3) to help the German people to reconstruct a self- 4 supporting State. No efforts were made by the United States to exact more in reparations than had been agreed to at Pots- g dam. Inasmuch as the American Government was interested in German economic unity and speedy German recovery from the ruins of war nothing was done to impose upon the German peo- pie any financial burden too heavy for them to pay.

1 Ibid., p. 862. 2 United States Department of State, Directive Regarding the Military Government of Germany, o. 6. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid., p. 10. 5 Ibid., p. 11. 6 Ibid., pp. 11-18. 36

The Government of the United States deemed re-education a most vital step in making Germany a democracy. General Clay was instructed to cooperate with the occupying powers to make the cultural objectives effective in the cause of peace.^ Such objectives were;(l) the re-education of the German peo¬ ple; (2) the continued assurance of freedom of religion; (3) the protection and preservation monuments and historic archives*; and (4) the encouragement and assistance in the development of the Germans media of public information de- 2 signed to advance these objectives.

American policy in Germany was in accordance with the

Potsdam agreement for it was designed to maintain a just peace and speedy recovery of the German people. But American poli¬ cy was made after a conflict had occurred in Germany.

The Berlin Crisis and The London Conference The Berlin Crisis, which began in 1945, was brought about by the attempt on the part of Russian soldiers to inspect 2 trains going from the Western sector into Berlin. General

Clay protested. As a result, he secured an agreement that Russian would not attempt to inspect western trains. It last¬ ed until 1948.4

- Ibid., p. 21. 2 United States Department of States, Directive Regarding the Military Government of Germany (Dent, of State Publication No. 2913, July 11, 1947.) p. 23. 3 Clay, oo. clt., p* 115. 4 Ibid. 37

The interference with transportation was temporarily stilled after the agreement hut there were other incidents which gave rise to greater tension in Germany. One of these incidents was the tremendous effort of General Clay to secure permission from the Co-ordination Council to remove dead Ameri¬ can soldiers from the Berlin Area. He received permission to go only into marked areas; hence, as of 1948, many Americans still lay buried in the Soviet Zone; another was that no agree¬ ments on electrical power could be obtained, nor could the Americans and Russians agree on the functioning of nation-wide political parties."** The Soviets favored a proposal saying that the Allies should not raise obstacles to German demo¬

cratic parties by allowing them to be formed on a national all-German basis. When the discussion came up about the kind

of obstacles that nation-wide political pa.rties would raise,

the Russians refused to listen and the question still remains unanswered. The Americans, however, contended that as long as political parties were set up according to zones, German political leaders would be able to exploit differences in re- 2 spect to the administration of the severa.1 zones. Tension

developed again when the American delegation made an unsuc¬ cessful effort to establish more effective quadri-partite con¬

trol of information services by replacing a powerless sub-

— - Ibid., p. 119. 2 United States Department of State, Directive Regarding the Military Government (Department of State Publication No. 2913, July 11, 1947), p. 7. 38 committee with a committee reporting directly to the Co¬ ordinating Committee in order to obtain a more effective 1 control of Germany as a single unit.

The atmosphere of disagreement which ensued from the above incidents led to the promulgation of policy statements by the Western powers. Thus, a conference of the Western powers was called in London on June 1, 1948, for the purpose of adopting common policies. These policies, which Included the agreements listed below, were to make it possible for the Western powers to discharge their responsibilities for the

organization of German administration and for the degree of German economic recovery that was essential for the welfare 2 of Europe as a whole. It was agreed that the bizonal area of Britain and America, merged in 1947, and the Frenish Zone would be coordinated and merged. This, then, marks the be¬ ginning of trizonal areas. The objectives were: that western nations participate fully in the European Recovery Program; that an international authority for the Ruhr be created for

the purpose of regulating and allocating coal, coke and steel to all cooperating nations; that the Germans establish a pro¬ visional democratic government which must be federal in charac¬ ter founded upon a constitution of German creation; and that

the government established be subject to an occupation statute.^

-

Clay, 0£. cit., pp. 115-119. 2 United States Department of State, Department of State Bulletin (May 8, 1949), p. 21 3 Ibid. 39 There were also provisions for Western Allied coopera¬ tion in the event German militarism showed evidence of re¬

surgence. Allied armed forces would rema.in in Germany until

the peace of Europe was secure. The powers created a security

board with authority to inspect and to issue long-term meas¬ ures of demilitarization to be agreed upon before the occupa- 1 tion terminated. At this time, the spring of 1948, the “Berlin Crisis"

was gaining momentum. Soviet Russia contended that her ac¬ tions restricting communications, transport and commerce

between Berlin and Western Germany were justified because

O of technical difficulties. Russia maintained that currency

reforms in the Western zones made it necessary for her to

blockade Berlin. The Western mark, or Peutschemark, was initiated in the West after a quardripartite meeting of

financial and economic advisors was called in Berlin. The

purpose was to discuss currency. The Soviet Union con¬ tended that there should be no currency for Berlin which would be different from that in areas surrounding the Soviet

Zone. She would not agree to the four-power control of currency for Berlin. But upon adjournment of the confer¬

ence Russia issued orders for currency reforms, and the

— Ibid., p. 3. 2 United States Department of State, Department of State Bulletin (September 9, 1948), p. 4. 3 Ibid., p. 5. 40

Ostmark or East Mark was introduced in the Zoviet Zone and

all of Berlin. The Western powers then announced that the new Western mark would be introduced in their zones and sec¬ tors of Berlin* On June 24, 1948, Russia issued orders re¬

stricting passengers and freight traffic into Berlin.'*’ Oh July 6, 1948, the Americans delivered a note to

the Soviet government saying that the government of the United States regarded the blockade as a "clear violation of existigg

international agreements concerning the administration of Berlin by the four powers.The United States considered

the blockade a violation of international agreements,because she was entitled to enter Berlin as one of the principal al¬ lies. This assertion was based upon the fadt that the United

States had helped to bring Germany to terms of unconditional

surrender. The last communique between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning the blockade was on July 16,

1948. It xtfas agreed that the American forces would be with¬ drawn from the borders if free access to Berlin by rail and 4 air was given to the United States forces. However, Russia did not lift the blockade and America had to feed her sector

of Berlin by air.

_ Ibid. 2 Pollock, o£. cit., o. 217. 5 Ibid. 41

Because of the Berlin crisis end the slow readjustments being made by Germany, Secretary of State Marshall foresaw the necessity of doing something positive toward Germany's recovery. He advocated the need for American aid to Europ¬ ean countries.'*' Secretary of State Marshall Proposes The

European Recovery Program Secretary of State George C. Marshall, in a commencement address before the June 5, 1947 graduating class of Harvard University, declared that the countries of Europe should get together and decide upon their needs for economic rehabili¬ tation so that further United States aid could be provided 2 upon and "integrated instead of a piecemeal basis". It was pointed out with great emphasis that "Recovery has been re¬ tarded. .. . after the close of hostilities because a peace 3 settlement with Germany and Austria has not been agreed upon."

Marshall stated that the recovery of Europe would require more than the negotiators had anticipated at that time. He con¬ tended that they had overlooked the condition of the German farmers, which was more than critical. The German farmers had lost the initiative to produce because there were no mark¬ ets for their goods from which they could get money to buy the other necessities of life. The farmers had begun to feed

_ "A Cure For Ills," New York Times, June 6, 1947, p. 1. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid., p. 6. 42 grain to cattle in order to have a food supply for themselves.

Europe's need for food, Marshall pointed out, far exceeded her ability to pay. He advocated giving Europe the necessary assistance in order that there would be no social, economic, and political destruction. In concluding his speech, Marshall assured the audience that if any nation stood in opposition to recovery it would not receive any assistance from the United States and that if Europe expected to recover the ini¬ tiative must come from her."^ Secretary State Marshall pointed out in his speech the methods by which European nations would receive aid from the

United States. Thus, future plans to aid Europe become known 2 as the Marshall Plan. The objective of the Marshall Plan is to achieve lasing economic recovery for Western Europe-recovery in the sense that after this aid has terminated, the European countries will be able to maintain themselves by their own ef- forts on a sound economic basis.' Assuming the maximum of self- help and mutual help on the part of the participating European countries, the program aims to provide these countries until the end of June 1952, with those portions of their essential imports from the Western Hemisphere which they themselves can

1 Ibid. 2 "Nations in Paris Open E.R.P. Parley," New York Times July 7, 1947, p. 1. 3 George C. Marshall, Assistance to European Economic Recovery (Department of State Publication No. 3022, February 1948), p. 3. 43 not pay for.1 These essential imports include not only the food, fuel, and other supplies but also equipment and materi¬ als to enable them to increase their productive capacity. The program called for 6.8 billion dollars to be spent during the first 15 months. The estimated cost of the program as of 2 1948, was between 15, and 17.8 billions.

Shortly after the program was enunciated by Secretary

Marshall, European nations immediately began to hold confer¬ ences seeking to envolve a joint program which would be ac¬ ceptable to the United States in return for Marshall Plan aid.

Accordingly, on July 6, 1947, sixteen nations met in Paris and pledged their utmost effort to achieve unity with the Western

Powers. The purpose of the conference was stated by Mr.

Ernest Bevin, Britain's Foreign Minister, as one which sought to establish a Europe "to stand on it's own feet and cease to 2 be a claimant on the taxpayers of any other country]" Mr.

Bevin also proposed that the German zone of occupation should be represented at the conference. Mr. Bidault of France con- courred with Mr. Bevin and asked for German participation, real¬ izing that the European Recovery Program could not succeed without the raw materials and finished products which only a 4 revived German economy could contribute.

_ Ibid. , p. 4. 2 Ibid., p. 5. 3 "Nations in Paris Open E.R.P. Parley," New York Times, July 7, 1947, p. 7. 4 Ibid. 44

The report of this conference, which included a program whereby Europe could be made self-supporting, was submitted to the Congress of the United States by President Harry S.

Truman in December of 1947. President Truman, in his message to Congress on December 19, 1947, pointed out that no economy not even ours, could prosper while there remained a world of want." The President told Congress that sixteen European Nations met in July to determine what was needed for European recovery. As a result of this conference the nations submitted to the Government of the United States a report stating what would be needed over a period of four years to make the con¬ tinent reasonably self-supporting. Four basic points were in¬ cluded in the program: (l) a strong production effort by each of the participating countries; (2) creation of internal fi¬ nancial stability by each country; (3) maximum and continued cooperation among each of the participating countries; and (4) a solution to the problem of the participating countries' trad¬ ing deficit with the American continent, particularly by in- 2 creasing European exports.

The President explained to Congress the basic considera¬ tions contained in this plan. After stating that European recovery was possible over a definite period of time, he re¬ vealed that the program would make for more effective use of

- Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), p. 11769. 2 Ibid. 45

of the money sent by the United States. Moreover, he con¬ tinued, the program was designed with due regard for conserv¬ ing the physical resources of the United States and minimiz¬

ing the impact on our economy of furhishlng aid to Europe.

Also, it was designed to be consistent with all other inter¬ national commitments of America. Finally, its purpose was to carry out most effectively the primary objedtives which 1 were proposed.

Congress received the report from the President stating

the necessity for aiding Europe. But no action was taken un- 2 til April, 1948. It took the European Recovery Program ten months to develop from the bare suggestion known as the Mar¬

shall Plan to the detailed legislative project signed by Pres- 3 ident Truman on April 4, 1948. The bill provided for one

million dollars to be allocated by the Reconstruction Finance

Corporation for European Aid until Congress passed the neces¬ sary appropriation. It authorized the expenditure in the next twelve months of $6,098,000,000 to provide economic assistance to the sixteen nations of Western Europe along with Western 4 Germany. The European Recovery Program, which was designed

to provide aid to Europe, called for an American administra¬ tor. Averell Harriman was nominated by President Truman and

1 Ibid., p. 11750. 2 "Aid Bill Signed By Truman," New York Times. April 5, 1948, p. 1 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid., p. 3. 46 1 confirmed by the Senate on April 21, 1948 for this position. Thus, the first gigantic step toward positive aid to Europe 2 was taken by the United States.

1 "Ha.rriman Name Aid Chief Abroad, " New York Times, April 22, 1948, p. 1. 2 Ibid. SUMMARY

CHAPTER II

At the Potsdam Conference the Allies based their objec¬ tives on the three basic provisions of the Potsdam Declara¬ tion. They provided for (l) the establishment of a control machinery for Germany, to which end the Allied Control Coun¬

cil was established to govern Germany through the democratic process in the hope that local self-grovernment could eventu¬

ally be restored, based upon democratic principles; (2) the economic unification of Germany so that she would be treated

as a single economic unit, the result being that many policies were adopted designed to make the raw materia.ls, and natural

resources of Western Germany available to all zones; and (3) the democratizing of the German people. To achieve this goal

local self-government was established in three of the states in the American Zone as early as December, 1946.

These were the objectives of the United States. They

were directed stipulations lifted from the Potsdam Declara¬ tion. However, the Allied Control Council which had been es¬

tablished to control Germany, has not functioned effectively

because of its rule of unanimity. This rule required unani¬ mous a.ction by the Allies in matters concerning Germany as a

whole. Consequently, Germany was governed by representatives from the United States, Great Britain, Frauice and Russia

through their respective zones. In the American zone, General

47 48

Dwight Eisenhower, Joseph McNarney and Lucius Clay served as military governors during the early years of German occupa¬ tion. Each received directives from the Joint-Chief of Staff outlining the United States'course of action in that area. General Eisenhower received the first of such directives in October, 1945, which gave our military commander sovereign power to control our zone, based upon unconditional surrender of the German state.

The aim of the Unitéd Stares in Germany was to prepare that country for complete participation and eventual coopera¬ tion among the democratic family of nations. Accordingly, Secretary of State Byrnes recommended the establishment of a federated central government with delegated powers from the various German states. Likewise, he advocated the develop¬ ment of competitive political parties through which the Germ¬ an people could participate in the establishment of such a government. General McNarney, the military governor, agreed with Secretary Byrnes and began to set forth a policy which sought to decentralize the German political structure and simultaneously encourage the development of a deep sense of local democratic responsibility among the German People.

When General Clay succeeded General McNarney as Military Governor, he was confronted with a situation which later became known as the "Berlin Crisis." The Berlin Crisis really began in 1945, when the Soviet Union sought to embarrass the West by having western trains inspected as they entered Berlin. 49

After negotiations failed and the Soviet Union refused to lift the blockade, the United States had to feed her sector by air.

As a result of the conflict in Berlin the allies met at the London Conference and reafQrmed their faith in the estab¬ lishment of a German state based upon democratic principles.

The establishment of such a government would therefore fa¬ cilitate economic assistance from the United States through the European Recovery Program. CHAPTER III

FROM CIVIL GOVERNMENT, DECEMBER, 1946 TO THE PARIS CONFERENCE, APRIL, 1951

The Establishment of Civil Government Civil government was begun in Germany in December, 1946, with the formulation of constitutions by three states, Bavaria,

Greater Hesse, and Wuerttemburg-Baden. These constitutions 1 were subsequently ratified by the people. Each constitution provided for a republican form of government responsible to 2 a legislative assembly which elected the Minister-President.

The chief duties of the Minister-President were to direct and to plan the affairs of state. He also appointed the cab¬ inet whose members (state secretaries) were responsible to the Landtag or House of Representatives. These governments were established in each state upon the premise that as soon as the German people showed themselves ready for self-govern¬ ment the American Military Government would relinquish its 4 controls. In this same connection it may be noted that ac-

1 United States Department of State, American Policy for Occupied Areas, p. 10. 2 1 2 3 4 Pollock, OP.clt., p. 128; Article 44,Cons t of Bavaria; Article 70, Cons't of Wurtemberg-Baden; Article 101 Cons't of Greater Hesse. 3 Pollock, Change and Crisis in European Government, po. 182-84. 4 Ibid.

50 51 ceptance of democratic constitutions by the separate states in the United States Zone marked the end of American military occupation of Germany.1 2 3 4 5 Shortly afterward, the American Zone sought to join the British, French, and Soviet zones in an attempt to form a 2 central federal government for Germany. At the Conference of Foreign Ministers in London in late 1947 the Western powers tried to establish a quadripartite control over Germany, but the Soviets rejected such an idea charging that the Western occupying powers were attempting to split Germany.' When it was apparent that the hopes for a true quadripartitie contol had been shattered, France's Bidault agreed to an early three- power discussion which would lead to the formation of a West

German government. This announcement was made on January 20, 4 1948. A conference was to convene in London on February 23,

1948, to discuss German affairs of mutual interest to the 5 French, British, and the United States.

When the conference met on February 23, 1948, the French government refused to discuss the formation of a West German government unless economic and security measures were dis-

1 United States Department of State, American Policy for Occupied Areas, p. 10. 2 United States Department of State, Department of State Bulletin (February 18, 1948), p. 213. 3 Ibid., p. 215. 4 Clay, 0£. clt., p. 394. 5 Ibid., p. 395. 52 1 cussed simultaneously. In addition to the evolution of the political and economic organization of the three zones the agenda included the following: the relationship of Western Germany to the European Recovery Program, the role of its economy in the European economy and control of the Ruhr, se¬ curity against Germany, the amount of reparations to be ex- 2 acted, and the provisional territorial arrangements.

Though all of the participating governments sup¬ ported the establishment of a federal structure of government, there were minor differences which had to be reconciled. For example, the British representatives wanted the federal gov¬ ernment to have strong central powers; the United States repre¬ sentatives wanted a federal structure which was more nearly a confederation of loosely-knit states with many limited powers vested in the central government. However,it was agreed in principle by the Western powers that "a federal form of gov¬ ernment, adequately protecting the rights of the respective states but at the same time providing for sufficient central authority,was best adopted for the eventual re-establishment of German unity. This conference did not produce any defi¬ nite agreements. Instead, It served as a preliminary ex¬ change of views, ideas and attitudes in order to develop basic principles and differences for consideration by governments

- Ibid., p. 395. 2 Ibid. 3 United States Department of State, The Current Situation in Germany (January 9, 1949), p. 32. 53 and for approval in more detailed form in a later conference.1 2 3 4

This conference was to be held in April after their govern¬ ments had studied their differences in viewpoint. On April 20,1948, representatives from the three West¬ ern powers met in London. They issued a memorandum calling

for the several states to convene a constitutional assembly not later than September 1, 1948,to prepare a constitution

for ratification by the participating states. Each state was

to select delegates to the assembly on the basis of one dele¬

gate to approximately 750,000 persons. Selection of delegates 2 was Irft to the discretion of the states. This action was in accord with the United States foreign policy toward Germany in that the ultimate goal was to establish a democratic Gov¬

ernment for that state.

Steps Leading to the Establishment of a German

Federal Government in the West On September 1, 1948, a German Parliamentary Council

(constitutional assembly) met at Bonn to draft a federal con- 3 stitution. A resolution was adopted by the Western powers wdiich stated, in part, that the purpose of the meeting was

to draft a democratic constitution which would establish a 4 federal type of government for the participating states.

1 Ibid., p. 34. 2 Ibid., p. 37. 3 United States Department of State, ConstitutIon-Making at Bonn (October 24, 1948), p. 21. 4 Ibid., p. 22. 54

The constitution when adopted would require ratification by two-thirds of the states in order to be binding upon all.^

The delegates at the assembly were divided mainly be- 2 tween the two major political parties. They were the Christ¬ ian Democratic Union led by Dr. Konrad Adenauer, and the

Social Democratic Party led by Dr. Kurt Schumacher. Dr. Kon¬ rad Adenauer was elected President of the assembly. Committees were appointed to carry out the detailed work of the council.

A Committee was appointed to prepare an Occupation Statute, for the purpose of defining the powers which were to be retained by the occupying authorities upon the establishment of a Germ¬ an Federal Government. The Occupation Statute was toobe pro¬ mulgated concurrently with the approval of the constitution and was to precede its submission to the states for ratifi¬ cation. 1 2 3

1 Ibid. . p. 22. 2 The Christian Democratic party is a combination of Cath¬ olics and Protestants founded on the belief that "all Christ¬ ians should band together against the rise of communish." Its strength is derived principally from the rural districts. It opposes socialism but believes that the capitalistic system should be modified by having governments participate together with private capital in the ownership of major industries. It is considered slightly to the right, and supports a true fed¬ eral structure of Government. The Social Democratic Party, the oldest of the two parties,derives its be.sic strength from in¬ dustrial workers. It advocates the socialization of means of production and distribution by peaceful end legal methods. It Cpposes 'nationalization—that is.’v ,ownership by the central government. It is considered slightly to the left, and sup¬ ports a strongly centralized government and proportional rep¬ resentation. See Clay, oo. clt. , p. 92. 3 United States Department of State, Constitution—Making at Bonn., P. 37. 55

The Minister-Presidents and the leaders of the political parties expressed approval of the Occupation Statute and iffi-- mediately advocated its ratification.1 However, they did not want control of the Ruhr placed in this statute. They also 2 asked for the removal of all restrictions of foreign trade.

The Occupation Statute,in its finished form conveyed

full legislative excutive and judicial powers to the federal

state and the participating states except in the fields of

disarmament and demilitarization, international controls such

as the Ruhr Authority, foreign affairs and displaced persons,

control over foreign exchange, and control of prisoners con- 2 fined by the occupying authorities.

A constitution could not be drafted until the Military

Governors agreed on the extent to which the government for

Germany should be federalized. The French position was op¬

posed to giving any powers of taxation or any real police

jurisdiction to the central government. They favored a na¬

tional legislature in which both houses would be composed of

representatives of the states, elected by the state legisla¬

ture.4

There was little difference between thé British and

American points of view. Both were in favor of a central

- Clay, op. clt., p. 402. 2 Pollock, ojc. clt., p. 209. 3 United States Department of States Department of State Bulletin (March 25, 1949), 712. 4 Ibid., p. 60J. 56 government with powers of taxation limited to the raising of revenue required to carry out its task. However, they differed as to the powers to be entrusted to the central government. The British supported a wider range of func¬ tions than the Americans thought was necessary.1 Both agreed on a bicameral form of government. The upper house was to be composed of members representing the several states and the members of the lower house were to be elected on a national 2 basis. Despite these differences, a final decision was made to establish an economically self-sustaining Western 2 Germany under a central government with delegated powers.1 The German people expressed approval over the establish¬ ment of a government which permitted Germans to administer 4 their own affairs. Questions, however, were raised by Germ¬ an delegates as to whether or not the finished product of the 5 Council should be called a constitution for Western Germany.

They were even dubious about the establishment of a “Western

German"1 government. The reason given for these expressed fears was that such action might widen the rift between East and West. Consequently, the German delegates proposed a ref-

1 Ibid. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid., p. 603. 4 United States Department of State, Constitution—Making at Bonn, o. 41. 5 Clay, OD. clt., p. 394. 57 erendum which would give the weight of a national constitu¬ tion to what they preferred to call a "basic law.The referendum was accepted later.

The Bonn Constitution or "Basic Law" for Western Germany created a government of four main divisions: (l) Bundestag,

(2) Bundesrat, (3) Federal President, and (4) Department of 2 Justice. The Bundestag was to be elected by the people in universal, free and secret elections. Immunity was granted 3 the deputies of the Bundestag. The Bundestag was given the power to review elections of its members, and to demand the presence of any member of the federal government to appear be- 4 fore them. Each Lander was given the right to participate in the making of federal lav; through the Bundesrat. Members of the Bundesrat were appointéd by the Lander and recalled by them. It was also constructed that two Laender could con¬ vene the Bundesrat at any time. Members of the federal gov¬ ernment could participate in the debates of the Bundesrat and Q its committees at any time.

1 Ibid. 2 United States Department of State, Bonn Constitution (July, 1949), Section II, Artical 28, o. 9. 3 Ibid. Sec. Ill Art., 46, p. 15. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. Sec. IV, Art., 51, p. 17. 6 Ibid., Art 52. 58

An eledtion of the federal president is to be held every five years. He shall be elected by the federal convention which is composed of members of the Bundestag and an equal number of members elected by the states from proportional representation.1 The office of federal president and chancel¬

lor, constitutes the executive branch of government. The

chancellor is also elected, without discussion by the Bunde¬

stag on the proposal of the federal president. His duty is

to generally supervise the Department of Federal Ministers, 2 which is an integral part of the Federal government.

In the Department of Justice judicial authority was vest¬

ed in the judges. This authority was exercised by the Fed¬

eral. Constitutional Court and the Suprement Federal Court. These

courts are provided for in the 3a.sic Law, and in the courts of

the Laender. The authority of these courts and form of pro¬

cedure greatly resembled that of the Supreme Court in America

in that they too have final jurisdiction over any questions

arising from controversy between States or citizens or branches 4 of government. Thus, in Germany was laid a constitutional

foundation for a central federated government as Secretary

Byrnes had hoped for. The "Basic Law" or the Constitution for

Western Germany was adopted at Bonn by the Parliamentary Coun-

_ - : Ibid., Sec. V, Art., 54, p. 18. 2 Ibid., Sec. VI, Art., 65, p. 22. 3 Ibid., Sec. IX, Art., 92, p. 33. 4 Ibid., Art. 93-96, pp. '33- -35. 59 cil on May 8, 1949.^ Although the constitution was adoptécl on May 8 by the Parliamentary Council, it did not become effect¬ ive until two-thirds of thé participating states had ratified it. Consequently, the Constitution was not proclaimed until

May 23, 1949.1 2 3 4 5 6 In spite of the fact that the new Constitution had been proclaimed as the basic law for Western Germany, there were

areas of administration which this government could not con- 3 trol* This being true, a form of machinery had to be set up.

Hence, the three powers, the United States, England and France, 4 established the Allied High Commission. John McCloy on May 15, 1949, succeeded General Clay and became the United States High 5 Commissioner in Germany.

The Allied High Commission was established on June 20, 1949, with the signing of the Charter by the United States

secretary of State and the foreign ministers of France and Eng- 6 land. According to the charter, the Commission was created to

exercise Supreme Allied Authority over the Federal Republic of

Germany. Each of the powers was to be represented on the Com-

1 Pollock, op. cit., p. 306. 2 Clay, op. cit., p. 439. 3 United States Department of State, American Policy for Occupied Areas, o. 20. 4 United States Department of State, Department of State Bulletin, (Department of State Publication/ No. 498), o. 1. 5 Clay, o£. cit. , p. 444. 6 United States Department of State, Charter of Allied High Commission for Germany (September, 1949), p. ~ 60 mission, , which would give this body a membership of three.

All of the functions formerly exercised by the commanders-fn- chief were now transferred to the High Commission.^ It vms composed of the Allied General Secretariat, Committees, Com¬ mittee staffs and subordinate groups, Laender Commissioners,

International Authority for the Ruhr, and United Nations Or- 2 ganizations in Germany.

The High Commission was charged with enforcement of the Occupation Statute. Occupation authority v/as reserved to the

High Commission in(l) disarmament and demilitarization which included controls over scientific research as well as restric¬ tions on civil aviation and industry; (2) economic controls over the Ruhr, restitutions, reparations, non-discrimination in trade matters and foreign interests; (3) foreign relations including all international agreements made in the interest of

Germany; (4) displaced persons and immigration; (5) respect for basic lav; and constitutions of the States; and (6) only those controls over internationl affairs that would insure rapid economic recovery.^ There was another clause in the Occupa¬ tion Statute which gave the High Commissioners authority to do any and everything necessary to preserve peace. But before they could act the appropriate German authorities were to have been advised of the decision and the reason why it was made.^

Members of the High Commission were bound to respect the civil

- Ibid. 2 Ibid, pp. 1-8. 3 Pollock, op. cit., p. 294. 4 Ibid., p. 295. 61 rights of all persons, against “arbitrary arrest, search or seizure without a fair and prompt trial."'*'

The control mechanism for Germany was now fully estab¬ lished. The Federal Constitution had been adopted, the Oc¬ cupation Statute approved, the Commission set up, and the new

State proclaimed. The Bundesrat was elected on August 18, 2 1949. Its total membership was four hundred a.nd two members.

Forty-five persons, the complete membership of the Bundestag, met on the sarnie day in Coblenz. On September 12, 1949, a Fed¬ eral Assembly composed of eight hundred and four members whihh included the Bundesrat, met and appointed Dr. Konrad Adenauer 4 as Chancellor of the German Federal Government. Dr. Ade¬ nauer's first request was that the new government be consult¬ ed on matters of defense since it had so much at stake.^

The establishment of a West German Government was symbol¬ ic of progress for the Western powers and a clear indication of their efforts toward the political unification of Germany based on democratic principles. On May 28, 1949, Secretary of State, Dean Acheson stated that the United States sought to aid the free people of Europe in their efforts toward re-

Ibid. 2 "Germans to Organize Parliament on September 7," New York Times, August 26, 1949, o. 8. 3 Ibid., o. 8. 4 Pollock, oo. clt., o. 296. 5 Ibid. 62 covery and reconstruction.~ Accordingly, Aciieson pointed out that the United States was providing temporary economic as¬ sistance through the European Recovery Program, and military 2 assistance through the North Atlantic Pact. Germany was to be included in both of these programs. The European Recovery Program The European Recovery Program was designed to aid needy European countries. Paul Hoffman, President of Studebaker Corporation, was chosen by President Trumah on April 6, 1949 to serve as Economic Cooperation Administrator in charge of 3 the European Recovery Program. Hoffman stated that with the establishment of the German Federal Republic, funds provided by the United Stales Government to the German economy would be made available through the Economic Cooperation Adminis- 4 t rat ion. He stated that the German federal republic would, execute a bilateral E.C.A. agreement with the United States

Government, and "would likewise become a party to the con¬ vention for European Economic Cooperation and participate as a full member in the Organization for European Economic Coop- eration. 11 The question now arose as to whether or not Germ-

' ~~ n ~ ~ ~ " "Acheson Address Newsoaoer Publishers," New York Times May 28, 1949, p. 1. 2 Ibid. 3 "Paul Hoffman to Head E,R,P." New York Times, Aoril 6, 1949, p. 1. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 63 any should be permitted to participate in the North Atlantic program.

The North Atlantic Pact The North Atlantic Pact is a program designed to pro¬ vide a common and collective defense of the North Atlantic

Area by the member nations.'1' Secretary of State Acheson stated that the North Atlantic Pact was designed to preserve 2 the peace. He said that the United Sta/tes has three objec¬ tives for supporting the Atlantic Pact: (1) to preserve the peace, (2) to promote happier living conditions for free Europeans, and (3) promote the "Civilization of values and institutions necessary for the complete restoration of the continent." The third item Mr.Acheson thought would provide for a closer and more "organic contact" of Germany with its 4 Western neighbors. The United States spea.r-headed the eco¬ nomic and political unification of Europe through participa¬ tion in these two programs. However, before the United States became a party to the North Atlantic Pact, adequate discussion was given to this matter by the Congress. Senator Tom Connally (Democrat,

Texas) reporting from the Committee on Foreign Relation, said that it was the unanimous conclusion of that body, that the

T United States Department of State, Department of State Bulletin (August 22, 1949), p. 265. 2 "Acheson Bids West Add Bonn to Groups for Greatest Test, New York Times, May 11,1949,p. 1. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 64 treaty was a vital step toward the maintenance of world peace. It was the 'best way to channel constructive assistance to Europe.^ Senator Connally contended that it was legal be¬ cause the United Nations1 Charter provided for regional ar¬ rangements for defense purposes. He held that the treaty made clear the intention of the United States to preserve p international security. Considering the same matter, Sena¬ tor Authur Vandenberg (Republican, Michigan) stated that "the

Atlantic Pact was the best available instrument to discour¬ age armed aggression." It would, in his estimation, stop war before it started. There was no international agreement into which the Treaty would not fit because it stood in the way 3 of armed aggression and oppression. This debate in the Sen¬ ate led first to the adoption of a Senate Resolution No.. 239, which expressed the views of the Senate, stating that the Pact would be positive, not a negative influence for peace, and its influence would be felt not only in the area it specifi¬ cally covers but throughout the world. It called for an agreement among the nations who were to sign it, to abide by the peaceful principles of the United Nations..to maintain 4 friendly relations and to seek greater economic cooperation.

Ï Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st Session, (1949), o. 8984. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid., p. 8985. 4 "Atlantic Pact Approves," New York Times April 5, 1949, p. 1. 65

Article 9 of the treaty called for the establishment of a North Atlantic Council.1 2 3 4 5 The task of the council is to as¬

sist the Parties in implementing the treaty and particularly in attaining its basic objectives. That objective is to as¬ sist, in accordance with the Charter, the maintenance of in- 2 ternational peace and security. Acheson, Secretary of State, thought that this of course eould not £e realized without

considering Western Germany as vital to the entire program. Though Western Germany was not among the signatories of the Pact, it was implicit that the nations considered her posi¬

tion important in the strategic defense of that area. This was considered particularly true of France because of geogra¬ phical and physical proximity to the German State.* The nations that subscribed to the treaty's basic prin¬

ciple (article 5), that an armed attack on one member would be regarded as an attack on all, were the United States and

Canada, in North America, Denmark, Ideland, and Portugal, which govern three strategic islands in the North Atlantic;

and Britain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Belgium 5 and Luxemburg in Western Europe. ^ Dr. Adenauer asked for

1 Ibid. 2 Ibid. 3 "Acheson Bids West Add Bonn to Group for Greatest Test," New York Times May 11, 1949, t>. 1. 4 "Atlantic Pact Approved," New York Times April 5, 1949, p. 1. 5 Ibid. 66

German participation in the Pact.'1' He felt that if war came, forty-five million Germans would undoubtedly be affected, to no lesser extent than the allies, and for that reason, Germ- 2 any should enter into the defense discussions. Germany was assuming a role unlike that of a defeated nation. She was now asserting herself, in that her leaders constantly kept Germany's interest before the allies, with the possible thought that she might be influenced to except 3 communism. Dr. Adenauer's diplomacy counted its first vic¬ tory in the Petersberg Protocol of November 22, 1949.

The Petersberg Protocol The Petersberg Protocol revealed that allied intention was to "ease the path of the German Federal Government," and to help establish it on a firm basis in Germany. In the

Petersberg Protocol, the dismantling program was modified, re¬ strictions on German shipbuilding was relaxed and Germans were given the right to initiate a gradual re-establishment of consular and commercial relations with those countries where such relations appeared advantageous^ These conces¬ sions were made beca.use they were "dictated by the exigencies

1 "Germany Ask Atlantic Pact Bid," New York Times August 24, 1949, Tj. 1. 2 Ibid. 3 "Bonn Leaders Warns the West," New York Times May 11, 1940, o. 6. 4 "New Germany Status," New York Times May 14, 1950, p. 5. 67 of the European situation," then recently complicated by the establishment in the Soviet zone of the German Democratic

Republic as a rival to the Bonn Government.! The West German government was noxtf, indeed, bargaining with the west. Dr. Adenauer had scored one victory, and was embarking upon the second. He announced that on May 6,1950, O he would ask the West for defense. Dr. Adenauer declared that his request for defense would amount to Western protec- tion of German frontiers. It was further stated that Germany could not remain neutral in case of conflict nor would she adhere to any Russian philosophy. He wanted the West to let Germany participate more in the defense of Western Germany by permitting the establishment of a federal foreign ministry 4 for the Bonn Government. A proposal was made by the Chancel¬ lor to give Germany the same export privileges as other coun¬ tries under the Marshall Plan. Adenauer's plea for a foreign ministry and trade privileges were not granted but Russia's activities in the East made the Western Allies think more of 5 the Ruhr. Though the Western Powers were trying to create unity in Europe they would turn away from any suggestion to

1 Ibid. 2 "Adenauer to ask West for Defense," New -^ork Times May 7, 1950, p. 1. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 "West Aims to Keep Soviet out of Ruhr," New York Times March 8, 1950, p. 4. 68 place Russia on the International Authority for the Ruhr.

Yet, there was the fear that Russia might get a place on the

Military Security Board if a four-power body were reborn in Germany. Russia lost her opportunity to serve on the Inter¬ national Authority when she opposed economic unity of Germ¬ any. The Ruhr Authority did not function as well as was an¬ ticipated by the allies. Its major function was to allocate coal, steel and coke. France became somewh t skeptical of the effedtiveness of the authority and submitted a plan of 2 her own.

The Schuman Plan

T|ae French proposal which was initiated by Foreign Min¬ ister Schuman advocated complete cooperation between France and Germany in the allocation of steel and coal. Premier

George ,Bidaultjhowever, wanted a plan broad enough to include not only France and Germany but all of the Western powers, but did not want the word "Atlantic" in it. France then, pro¬ posed the Council of Europe, and extended an invitation to Germany. This was an attempt to make war between France and Germany impossible by making them leaders in the Council of ft Europe. The German Cabinet accepted the bid to join the Council of Europe as associate members, bee use of the belief

- - _ Ibid. 2 "France Proposes a Coal-Steel Pool with C-e many in it," New York Times May 10, 1950, p. 1. 3 Ibid. 69 that no single state in Europe was powerful enough to stand by itself, between the United States end the Soviet Unionl1

The plan came to be known as the Schuman Plan. It called for a common authority to deal with coal allocations. An ar¬ biter was provided for in the proposal. A United Nations representative would be attached in order to give first hand reports. France held that a decision of the council should be binding on France and Germany as well as.any other partici¬ pating powers. The authority would have a few basic functions

1. To make sure that modern production techniques would always be employed, 2. Supplying coal and steel under identical condi¬

tions to France and Germany, and 3. Development of exports and equalization of"liv¬

ing conditions of workers in the two industries"^

The Schuman Plan was presented to the Council of Foreign 3 Ministers for allied approval on May 14, 1950. Schuman pre¬ sented his plan in outline form. In essence it stated that:

(1) French and German coal and steel production would be op¬ erated by an international authority, (2) the supra-authority would be composed of member governments and a United Nations representative would be attached for the purpose of making pub lie reports, (3) the authority would make improvements in pro-

_ "Bonn Cabinet Votes to Accept Bid to Join European Coun¬ cil," New York Times, May 10, 1950, o. 1. 2 Ibid. 3 "Pooling Plan of Paris Important at London," New York Times, May 14, 1950, p. 3.

* 70 duction of the supply of coal and steel, and supply products

to French and German markets as well as to others participa¬

ting without double pricing, and (4) a treaty making possible

this plan was to be drawn up and ratified by the nations who were parties to the Schuman Plan.^ Foreign Minister Schuman had put France on record as favoring French-German cooperation.

Mr. Acheson hailed the Schuman Pian as a concrete step o toward the unification of Europe. The Soviets rejected the proposal on the basis that the plan would create a giant arm¬ ament ring, dominated by the United States.^The British gov¬

ernment also viewed the program with skepticism. They felt that they should have been consulted prior to the announce¬ ment of the plan. However, Mr. Schuman contended that the plan had to be formulated in secrecy and by France alone, in 4 order to enhance the chance of German-French approval. France felt that Britain should declare publicly her intentions to

enter the discussion on the Schuman Plan, since the proposal

called for a coal-steel pooling under international super- g vision. Instead, Britain refused to enter into any of the

1 "Double Pricing," New York Times, May 14, 1950, Sec. IV, p. 1. 2 "Acheson Hails Schuman Plan," New York Times May 17, 1950, p. 2. 3 "U. S. S. R. Refuse to Gain Plan," New York '-I'lmes, May 25, 1950, p. 10. 4 "Great Britain to Study Plan," New York Times, May 12, 1950, u. 3. 5 "Basic Terms of Schuman Plan," New York Times, June 3, 1950, p. 6. 71 discussions on the plan. The reasons were that: (l) Brit¬ ain's coal production was nationalized and to unite it with the coal and steel production of France and Germany, would bring Britain closer to economic integration with the conti¬ nent than with the commom^ealth, (2) integration of Britain would place all of her hopes for economic self-sufficiency on the continuance of edonomic planning and controls with the economies of Western Europe, and (3) The Schuman Plan called for an international control which meant relinquishing of

sovereignty by participating powers over the big industries.

Thus, it may be noted that Britain opposed the plan because of the fact that it required the surrender of some of her au¬ thority to an international bodyj^

The negotiations on the Schuman Plan proceeded without

Britain, betx^een France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the

Netherlands and Luxemburg. Accordingly, the French agreed that the British G-overnment would be kept informed of the ne¬ gotiations so that she might enter at a later date if she 2 wished. During the interval, however, between the proposal of the Schuman Plan and its ratification, growing concern was

exhibited by the allies and west Germany over the defense of

Europe. As early as August, 1950, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer urged the Allies to create a West German defense force equal

T "Big Three Drawn together Despite Differences," New York Times May 14, 1950, p. 5. 2 "Six Nations to Hold Pool Talk Leaving Door Open to Britain," New York Times August 3, 1950, p. 1. 72 in size and strength to the powerful People's Police army 1 in the Soviet zone. He also asked for the immediate en¬ largement of the United State military establishment in

Europe. Chancellor Adenauer's demands were based upon the belief that Russia was building up her military forces in

East Germany, and that a demonstration of Western powers and 2 preparedness could forestall Soviet aggression. His plea for defense included the creation of a strong German de¬ fense force, which could actively participate in the pro- 2 posed Western European army. The importance of this matter brought forth a statement from John J. McClay, United States

High Commissioner, that "the defenses of Western Germany, as well as the rest of Western Eupope will be strengthened in a A joint effort requiring German cooperation. The United States' position concerning the creation of a German army was favorable.

As tangible evidence of such, Secretary of State Acheson pro¬ posed the use of German troops in the western allied army at the meeting of Foreign Ministers in New York, September 11-15, 5 1950. He not only stated that it was obvious and proper that

1 "Bonn Chief Calls For Defense Force," New York Times August 18, 1950, TO. 1. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid., p. 10. 4 "Socialist Leader For German Role in European Army," New York Times August 24, 1950, D. 1. 5 "Acheson Supports Bonn Defense Role," New York Times September 12, 1950, p. 1. 73 the strength of Western Germany be brought into the defense program for Western Europe, but also that "an appropriate way would have to be found to integrate Western Germany into the effort being made to secure the whole area, of which the „1 German Federal Republic was a part."

The British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, differed with Secretary of State Acheson in that the former would support Western Germany's request for an armed police force but opposed any suggestion for the creation of a Western 2 German army and West German rearmament. The British thought that it would be calamitous to allow the Bonn Government to establish a regular army or to begin the manufacture of arma- ments. However, they favored the idea of German contribu¬ tion to the general rearmament of Western Europe, in the form of raw materials and non-military industrial products.“ To solve the question of German rearmament the French Foreign Ministers, Robert Schuman advocated merging the Con¬ tinental European forces into a single army and by similarly unifying the armament production of the western part of the 5 continent. The projected continental army, composed of

1 Ibid. 2 "British Oppose German Army," New York Times, Septem¬ ber 13, 1950, p. Ï. 3 Ibid., p. lo. 4 Ibid. 5 "Schuman Urges Arms Output Unity," New York Times October 20, 1950, p. 15. 74 troops of continental members of the North Atlantic Treaty- plus the Western Germans, would form a single entity within the European theatre of the Atlantic defense system, along

side the entities formed by the United States, British and Canadian troops under their own commanders.^

This continental defensive unity would be developed parallelled with a corresponding economic unity, toward which the first steps would be the merger of defense industries and the amalgamation of the coal and steel resources under the 2 Schuman Plan. The final disposition of the allies at the conclusion of the Foreign Minister's meeting was one of in¬ decision.

The Paris Conference of 1951 In November, 1950, the French Ministry announced that g the Marshall Plan aid would not be denied the Schuman Plan.

The United States regarded the Schuman Plan as a most signif- 4 leant step toward European economic unity. If the plan ne¬ cessitated any changes the ECA was prepared to make them. In such a change ECA was prepared to even grant permission to g sell ERP goods to participating countries. It was thought

Ï Ibid, 2 Ibid. 3 “ERP Aid for Schuman Plan,11 New York Times September 19, 1950, p. 4. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 75 by the Schuman Plan opponents that the Plan would be adopted by January, 1951.1 2 3 4 5 But It was not until three months later, at the Paris Conference on April 18, 1951, that the Foreign

Ministers of the six participating countries signed the treaty whichg^ve effedt to the Schuman Plan to create a single market for the coal and steel production of France, 2 West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg.

Theoretically, the treaty is to be submitted to the parlia¬ ments of the respective countries for approval.

The signature on behalf of the six governments was con¬ sidered a major step toward achieving unity in Western Europe 3 through the gradual merging of its national economies. It was pointed out that the assembly to be set up to represent the six nations will be the first international or supra- 4 national body of its kind to acquire actual power. It was agreed that the Saar, economically annexed to France, would be included in the Schuman Plan by virtue of the signature of R France which acted for the Saar in foreign affairs. Never¬ theless Dr. Adenauer, in a letter to Mr. Schuman, stated that in signing the Schuman treaty the Bonn Government did not

1 "France Hoped Plan to be Adopted," New York Times January 9, 1951, p. 13. 2 "Pool Pact Signed for Six Countries," New York Times, April 19, 1951, p. 18. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid., p. 21. 76 thereby recognize the present status of the Saar, which the

Germans contended should be returned to Germany. Mr. Schuman in answering Dr. Adenauer stated that the French Government had no intention that the Schuman Plan should prejudice the question of the Saar’s future which is to be decided by a q peace treaty with Germany."-

The signing of the Schuman treaty was backed by Secre¬ tary of State Acheson on April 18, 1951, and defended by the

United States High Commissioner in Germany, John McClay, on

April 23, 1951, as being a tangible act of the European na- p tions to cooperate in the rebuilding of Western Europe.

Germany now had been permitted to enter the community of nations as a full fledged member. The United States had hoped that Germany would find her way into the assemblies of peace loving democratic peoples. American endorsement of the Schuman Plan placed Germany on a plane of equality with

France and England.

1 "The Present Status of the Saar," New York Times April 20, 1951, p. 7. 2 "Schuman Treaty Signed Hailed by U. S.," New York Times April IS, 1951, p. 18; also "McCloy Defends Treaty, 11 New York Times, April 23, 1951, p. 8. SUMMARY

Civil Government began in the United States Zone of

Occupation in December,1946, with the drafting of consti¬ tutions by three states, Bavaria, Greater Hesse, and Wuert- temberg-Baden. Each state was to have the status of a Re¬ public, governed by a legislative assembly. As the German people approached the realization of self-government the Military Government wa.s to relinquish its controls.

As a concrete act exhibiting the sincerety of the Allies to restore self-government to the German people, each state or Laender was invited to send delegates to a constitional con¬ vention, to draft a national constitution for the West German

State. The states complied with the Allied communique and the constitutional assembly convened on September 1, 1948.

The two major political parties, the Christian Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Party, constituted a large number of the German delegates. Though there were differences of opinion as to the kind of government that should be estab¬ lished, the final and prevailing point of view was that a federated central government with delegated powers to the states, adequate enough to protect their respective inter¬ ests, would be best suited for the German State.

77 78

On May 8, 1949 the constitution was adopted by the as¬

sembly, but was not proclaimed at Bonn until May 23, 1949.

Likewise, approval was given to an Occupation Statute, pro¬

claimed on May 12, 1949. This statute reserved certain pow¬

ers beyond the boundaries of the constitution to the Military

Government for security purposes.

The trend of events was now moving favorably for Germany.

The establishment of an Allied High Commission to control

those areas not covered by the constitution, and to interpret

the Occupation Statute was further evidence of the Allies in¬

tentions to govern Germany democratically. Recognizing this,

the Germans began to make certain demands of the West. Such

demands centered around the inclusion of Germany in inter¬

national meetings concerned with the recovery and the defense

of Europe.

Shortly afterwards, Germany was included in the European

Recovery Program and the North Atlantic Pact. Similarly,

France extended an invitation to Germany to become an asso¬

ciate member of the Council of Europe, and later announced

plans advocating French-German cooperation in the pooling of

major industries. Germany accepted the invitation to join

the Council and simultaneuely hailed the French Government

for the plan to internationalize their major industries. This

plan was later called the Schuman Plan. Other European coun¬

tries interested in the French proposal xirere invited to join.

After months of debate, at the Paris Conference on April

18, 1951, the foreign ministers of the six participating 79 countries signed the treaty which gave the Schuman Plan the power to create a single market for the coal and steel pro¬ duction of France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Nether¬ lands and Luxemburg. The signatures on behalf of the six governments were considered a major step toward the economies unification of Western Europe. Approval of the Schuman Plan by the United States was forthcoming. Secretary of State

Acheson placed the United States stamp of approval on the Schuman Plan on April 19, 1951, and, by so doing elevated the status of the West German Government to one that equaled her neighbors. CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

On May 8, 1945 when the Allies forced G-ermany to accept terras of unconditional surrender, the German state, de .lure,

ceased to exist. It was up to the Allies to determine what

should be done with German military machines, party officials, wrecked industrial capacity, civil postwar public administra¬ tion, war torn homes, displaced persons, national debt and ruptured international relations which were created by the

Nazi Government.

Allied military strategy began at the Teheran and Yalta Conferences for the defeat of Germany and postwar occupation. It was decided by the Allies at these conferences that waging war against Germany meant the complete destruction of the Germ¬

an military machine. The United States was represented at each of these conferences by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his advisors. The President made it known at Teheran that

American interest was primarily in a speedy victory. There was that climate of opinion which led America; to believe that So¬ viet Russia, an ally in was, was going to be an ally in peace.

Hence, American diplomatic concentration was upon two major ob¬ jectives: (1) mailing sure that Germany would never again put world peace in jeopardy, and (2) establishing an internal

German Central Government th t could deal peaceably v:ith

other powers in order that Germany could be readmitted into

the family of nations.

80 81

These tv;o fundamental facts of American foreign policy toward Germany since Potsdam have grown because of, and by international agreements made at, the Crimea, Teheran, Yalta, Potsdam, Paris and Washington conferences as well as by the differences over policy implementation between the Allies

over currency reforms in Berlin; deployment of occupation armies; security zones; transportation into Berlin; establish¬ ment of German Civil governments; free nationally operated

German politidal parties based upon free expression and re¬ sponsibility to voters; separation of Austria from Germany

and the enforcement of international decrees; and the entire program of disarmament, denazification and demilitarization. Events embracing these took place from Potsdam to the present.

Considering the first objective of American policy, the prevention of German jeopardy to world peace, the United States pursued legal courses of punishment for war crimes.

Nazi Party officials and all auxilliaries of the party were convicted of crimes against humanity or declared dangerous, and ordered locked up until they were cleared of suspicion.

Ail American occupation forces were maintained to preserve order and to assist in carrying out international decisions.

No German diplomatic corps was permitted to intervene in for¬

eign relations. German industrial plants of war potential were partially dismantled. All necessary minute details of

state were dealt with leading to the eventful establishment of a central government. 82

The German Central Government was founded at Bonn in September, 1949, after state governments and constitutions had come into existence as early as 1945. At Bonn the pro¬ posals for a federated government were accepted. They were based upon delegation of authority from the people and form¬ erly well established state republican governments. There were checks and balances to avoid a power concentration into the hands of an executive official. To make sure that the government established should perform the functions to which

it was dedicated, a high commission was created. It had con¬

trol over German foreign affairs, demilitarization, denazi¬

fication and immigration. Further, it was to serve as a watchdog over German internal affairs. The American Govern¬ ment in its attempts to put Germany back into the family of nations, encouraged the unification of European economy for the rehabilitation of its people. As a result of such en¬ couragement, a conference of European nations met and determ¬

ined their common needs. The Marshall Plan came into exist¬

ence as the implementative weapon of their proposals.

Germany was included in these considerations. She par¬ ticipated in the rehabilitative program and moved rapidly through the pooling of resources of Europe to the Schuman Plan wherein Germany was admitted to be treated on an equal footing with France. The United States approved of the cooperative venture of international allocations of German-French coal-

steel resources 83

Each of these movements, giving purpose to the two fundamental objectives of American foreign policy toward Germany, was opposed by Russia. However, the American Govern¬ ment has become somewhat certain that Germany will not put world peace in jeopardy because of a decision to keep an Ameri¬

can army of occupation on German soil. Nevertheless, a cen¬ tral government was established whose chancellor has spoken out even against the United States in the interest of Germ¬

any. That central government had, as of April 1951, placed

Germany back into the family of European nations on a limited basis. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Boch, Julian S. American's Germany: An Account of the Ocu- oatlon. New York: Random House, 1946.

Byrnes, James F. Sneaking; Frankly. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1947. Churchill, Winston S. The Gathering Storm: Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1948. Churchill, Winston S., Victory. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946.

Clay, Lucious D. Decision in Germany. New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1950. Hyamson, A. M., Dictionary of International Affairs. Wash¬ ington, D. C. : Public Affairs Press, 1947.

Morgenthau, Henry Jr., Germany is our Problem. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1945.

Moulton, H. G., and Marlia, The Control of Germany and Japan. The Brookings Institution, 1944.

Otto, D. Talischu, They Wanted War. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock Co., 1942.

Pollock, James K. Change and Crisis in European Government. New York: Renehart & Co., Inc., 1947.

Pollock, J. K. and Meisel, J. H. and Bretton, H. L. Germany Under Occupation. 2nd Ed. Ann Arbor, George Wahr Co., 1949.

Price, Hoyt, and Schorske, Carl E. The Problem of Germany. Duell, Sloan & Peance, 1945. Rauschning, Hermann, The Voice of Destruction. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1942. Roosevelt, Elliot. As He Saw It. New York: Duell, Sloan & Peance, 1946.

84 85

Roosevelt, Franklin D., Roosevelt's Foreign Policy, 1955-1941. New York: Wilfred Funk, Inc., 1942.

Ropke, Wilhelm. The Solution of the German Problem. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1947.

Sayer, Michael* The Plot Against the Peace. New York: Dial Press, 1945. Sherwood, Robert E. Roosevelt and Hopkins. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948.

Stettinius, Edward. Roosevelt and the Russians. New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1949. Stolper, Gustove. German Realities. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1948.

Warbung, James P. Germany-Bridge or Battleground. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1947.

White, William L. Report on the Germans. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1947. Zink, Harold. American Military Government In Germany. New York: Macmillan Co., 1947. Public Documents

Congressional Record. 76 Congress, 3rd Session. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1941.

. 80th Congress, 1st Session. Washing¬ ton, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1949.

Hansard. Parliamentary Debates. (fifth series). Vol. 407-8 (1944-45). Department of State. Satellite Protests Against Bonn, Govern¬ ment Echoes Soviet Views. Washington : Government Print¬ ing Office, 1949.

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. Our German Problem. Washington: Govenn- ment Printing Office, 1949.

. Constitution-Making at Bonn. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948. 86

. The Current Situation in Germany. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949. . American Policy in Occupied Areas. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947. . East German Government Established Through Russian Flat. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949. . Western Germany Begins New Phase of Self-Government. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949.

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Military Government of Germany, Washing¬ ton: Government Printing Office, 1947.

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London Times, October 8, 1937. wj.4

February 24 ATLANTA UNIVERSITY MOREHOUSE COLLEGE Maroh 1 SPELMAN COLLEGE 19 5 2

Sunday, February 24

9100 a • si* Morehouse College Chapel, Sale Hall - Sacred Music by Morehouse Choir 9t00 a. m. Spelman College Sunday School, Howe Memorial Hall 3:00 p. m* Spelman College Vesper Service, Sisters Chapel -Dr» David J» Evans, Gordon Street Baptist Church, Speaker 7: 15 p. m. Spelman College Hail Meetings

Monday, February 25

8*00 a» m. Spelman College Chapel, Sisters Chapel 9i00 a, m. Morehouse College Chapel, Sale Hall - Music under tire Direction of Pro¬ fessor Kemper Harreld

Tuesday, February 26

8i00 a» m» Spelman College Chapel, Sisters Chapel 9|00 a, m. Morehouse College Chapel, Sale Hall - Reverend John B, Falconer, Super¬ visor, National Baptist Mission, West Africa, Speaker

Wednesday, February 27

8»00 a. m. Spelman College Chapel, Sisters Chapel 9:00 a. m» Morehouse College Chapel, Sale Hall - Observance of National Negro News¬ paper Week, Sponsored by Maroon Tiger - Mr» Emory 0» Jackson, Edi¬ tor, Birmingham World, Speaker

Thursday, February 28

8:00 a* m» Spelman College Chapel, Sisters Chapel 9:00 a. m. Morehouse College Chapel, Sale Hall - Mr» Robert Johnson, Atlanta Daily World, Speaker 6j45 p» m» Spelman College grayer Meeting, Howe Hall - Miss Jane D» Jones, Leader

Friday, February 29

8:00 a. m» Spelman College Chapel, Sisters Chapel 9:00 a» m. Morehouse College Chapel, Sale Hall - Panel - "Problems Involved in Publishing Collegiate Newspapers" - Discussants: Representatives from Emory Wheel, Georgia Tech Technique, Clark Panther, and More- house Maroon Tiger

COMING EVENTS Maroh 2 - Morehouse College Chapel Speaker - Religious Emphasis Week - Rev. Kenneth R. Williams, Winston-Salem, North Carolina 2 - Vesper Speaker - President John H» Lewis, Morris Brown College 3 - Dr. Louis Warren, Lincoln Biographer - In a Discussion of "Books About Abraham Lincoln" (Opening of Book Review Program) 8 - Dr. Franz J» Polgar - Memory, Miracles and Mind Reading 12 - University Convocation - William Vogt 12 - Atlanta University Forum - Dr. Everett S» Brown, University of Michigan