THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD GERMANY SINCE THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE 9- t A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF ATLANTA UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT CF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS BY LEROY R. JOHNSON, II DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE ATLANTA, GEORGIA JANUARY, 1952 TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER Page PREFACE i I INTRODUCTION 1 Background of United States Policy 1 Big Three Agreements at Teheran and Yalta 7 Agreements at the Yalta Conference 9 The Potsdam Conference Convenes 13 The Potsdam Agreements 15 SUMMARY 17 II FROM THE POTSDAM DECLARATION JULY, 1945, TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT DECEMBER, 1946 19 Provisions of the Potsdam Declaration 20 General Eisenhower 1s Governorship of Germany.. 20 The Allied Control Council 21 The Governorship of General Joseph T. McNarney 27 Secretary of State Byrnes' Stuttgart Speech... 30 The Governorship of General Lucius Clay During Crisis 36 The Secretary of State, George Marshall, Pro¬ poses the European Recovery Program 41 SUMMARY 47 III FROM CIVIL GOVERNMENT IN 1946 TO THE PARIS CON¬ FERENCE OF 1951 50 The Establishment of Civil Government 50 Steps Leading to the Establishment of the Germ¬ an Federal Government in the West 53 The European Recovery Program 62 The North Atlantic Pact » 63 The Petersberg Protocol 65 The Schuman Plan. 68 The Paris Conference of 1951 74 IV CONCLUSION 80 BIBLIOGRAPHY 84 PREFACE America's foreign policy toward Germany has been severe¬ ly criticized and changed since the Potsdam Conference. Many who were responsible for these criticisms were not aware of the reasons for the change in policy from the principles laid down in the Potsdam Agreements to one of expediency; or, they were critical for the sake of being so. A report and analysis of the relations with Germany since Potsdam and the implica¬ tions from President Franklin D. Roosevelt's quarantine speech of 1937 will give adequate support for the changes in the pol¬ icy of the United States toward Germany since Potsdam. This study is designed to aid one in understanding the activities of the United States in Germany since the Potsdam Conference by indicating the trends, circumstances, and con¬ ditions which gave rise to our foreign policy, the primary purpose of it being the establishment of a unified democratic Germany. For a more detailed and extensive analysis of the foreign policy of the United States toward Germany, the writer recommends James K. Pollock's Germany Under Occupation and Lucius D. Clay's Decision in Germany. The writer wishes to express gratitude to those persons who have unselfishly extended invaluable assistance in the writing of this paper. These persons are Dr. William Boyd, Political Science Department, Atlanta, University; Dr. J. li Errol Miller, Political Science Department, Lincoln Univer¬ sity (Missouri); and Dr. Robert Brisbane, Political Science Department, Morehouse College. L.R.J., II CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION BACKGROUND OF UNITED STATES POLICY The rise of Germany under Adolph Hitler between 1933- 1940 and her vicious scramble for world domination created conditions which accelerated the coming of World Was II. President Franklin D. Roosevelt foresaw the impending con¬ flict. It was in his "Quarantine" speech on October 5, 1937 in Chicago that he cited the political situation of the world as being critical, and thus, a threat to all peace-loving na¬ tions. He stated that: The peace, the freedom and the security of 90 per cent of the population of the world is being jeop¬ ardized by the remaining 10 per cent who are threat¬ ening a breakdown of all international order and law. Surely the 90 per cent who want to live in peace under the law in accordance with moral stand¬ ards that have received almost universal accept¬ ance through the centuries, can, and must find some way to make their will prevail. It was from this speech that suspicion and doubt entered into American foreign policy toward certain European Govern¬ ments. Examples of such can be seen in the three following statements by the President. First, on October 12, 1937 in a speech made by the President to the American people, he 1 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Roosevelt's Foreign Policy, 1953- 1941 (New York, 1942), p. 129. 1 2 stated that "as we plan for the creation of higher standards of living for the people of the United States, we are aware that our plans may b e most seriously affected by events in 1 the world outside our borders." The President felt that the development of peace in the world was dependent upon the ac¬ ceptance by nations of certain fundamental decencies in their relations with each other. Ultimately, he hoped that each nation would accept the fact that violations of tnese rules of conduct were detrimental to the well-being of all nations. Second, in a letter written by the President to Edward T. Tay¬ lor, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee on Decem¬ ber 28, 1937, the President expressed a growing concern for national defense. He stated that previous estimates for Nav¬ al armaments had to be increased because of his growing sus- 2 plcion and fear of world events. And third, in the Presi¬ dent's Annual Message to Congress on January 3, 1938, he stated that in spite of the desire of this nation for peace, "certain European nations were moving in a direction which 3 would jeopardize that peace." Thus, the attitude of Roose¬ velt, as exemplified in the above statements, indicates the ex¬ tent to which he believed in the possibility of a European wTar which would jeopardize the security of the United States.4 _ Roosevelt, op clt., op. 132. 2 Ibid., 135 3 Ibid., 138 4 5 In many quarters Roosevelt was castigated as a war monger. John E. Miller, running on an anti-Roosevelt platform, de¬ feated Governor Carl E. Bailey of Little Rock, Arkansas, in a special senatorial election held on October 18, 1937, in Little Rock, Arkansas. During the campaign, Miller asserted that the President was playing politics with the world situ¬ ation. He said, also that the President was creating hys¬ teria among the people toward a war which was not likely to come.'*' Miller was joined in his criticism of Roosevelt by Senator Arthur Vandenberg. Senator Vandenberg, speaking be¬ fore a joint meeting of community and luncheon clubs in Grand Rapids, Michigan on October 28, 1937, declared that the Roose¬ velt Administration was a "preview to chaos." He asserted that the implication from Roosevelt's speech might provoke war. He warned of "benevolent dictators" and "scored reck- 2 less and over-night decisions" on important world matters. These politicians were of the opinion that the President was disturbing the peace, under the guise of protecting the se- 3 curity of the United States. Likewise, press reaction to the President's speech was one of condemnation. The New York Herald Tribune stated that the President advocated "a policy - "Governor Bailey Beaten in Arkansas Senatorial Election" New York Times, October 19, 1937, p. 1. 2 "Senator Warns of Dangers in New Deal Attitude," New York Times, October 29, 1937, p. 1. 3 Roosevelt, op cit., p. 130. 4 of aggression,1,1 the London Times regarded Roosevelt's speech with skepticism and charged that the President was defending an attitude and not a program. It advocated the need for a 2 real program to assure peace. In 1939 however a war began in Europe from which the United States could not hold herself aloof, because the spread of a European war would place in Jeopardy "the American way 3 of life." Thus, by January, 1941, thé United States, though not directly involved in war, assisted those forces which were actively engaged in the fight against the Nazi menace. Such help was administered through a lend-lease program es¬ tablished for this purpose. Under the lend-lease program, small combat ships, food, agricultural surpluses, and ammu- 4 niton were provided for allied countries. Likewise, increased credit funds which sought to provide aid to allied countries 5 were immediately approved by Congress. The President had now begun to shape a policy of firmness toward Germany. He opposed Germany's utilization of manpower 1 "A Review of the President's Quarantine Speech," New York Herald Tribune, October 10, 1937, p. 2. 2 "Roosevelt Defends Attitude Not Program," London Times, October 8, 1937, p. 1. 3 Henry Morgenthau, Germany is Our Problem (New York, 1945) p. 97. 4 United States Department of State, Department of State Bulletin, (January 9, 1942), o. 20. 5 Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 3d sess., (January 3, 1941), p. 13972. 5 for war purposes. When several attempts to negotiate peace between Germany and other European nations had failed, the President advocated that the following steps be taken: First, that Congress should immediately approve an increase in the / financing of exports of agricultural surpluses and manufac¬ tured products to Finland and other countries for aid against an aggressive Germany. Secondly, he urged the Congress to appropriate immediate funds for the purchase of strategic war machinery. Thirdly, on February 9, 1940, the President in¬ structed Under Secretary of State Sumner Wells to go to Italy, France, Germany and Great Britain solely for the purpose of . getting an on-the-spot view of conditions in those countries. Fourthly, by June 15, 1940, Roosevelt had promised more non- 2 military aid to France. Roosevelt's policy of firmness toward Germany rested upon his desire to seek peace, economic pros¬ perity and political harmony for the freedom-loving peoples of 3 the world. To maintain this peace meant that German military advance¬ ments had to be checked—a condition which was not accomplished.