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Title Page Myth and Argument in Plato's Phaedo by Brooke Mclane-Higginson B.A., the Evergreen State College, 2007 M.A., Carneg

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Title Page Myth and Argument in Plato's Phaedo by Brooke Mclane-Higginson B.A., the Evergreen State College, 2007 M.A., Carneg Title Page Myth and Argument in Plato’s Phaedo by Brooke McLane-Higginson B.A., The Evergreen State College, 2007 M.A., Carnegie Mellon University, 2008 M.A., St. John’s College, 2010 M.A., University of Pittsburgh, 2012 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2019 Committee Membership Page UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH DIETRICH SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES This dissertation was presented by Brooke McLane-Higginson It was defended on March 27, 2019 and approved by Jacques A. Bromberg, Assistant Professor, Classics Nicholas F. Jones, Professor, Classics Jennifer Whiting, Distinguished Professor, Philosophy Christian Wildberg, Andrew M. Mellon Professor, Classics Dissertation Director: Christina M. Hoenig, Assistant Professor, Classics ii Copyright © by Brooke McLane-Higginson 2019 iii Abstract Myth and Argument in Plato’s Phaedo Brooke McLane-Higginson, Ph.D. University of Pittsburgh, 2019 This dissertation argues for reading the myth at the end of Plato’s Phaedo as part of the overall argumentative structure of the dialogue. Using the Toulmin method of argument analysis, I analyze each of Socrates’ proofs for the immortality of the soul, as well as the myth and the argument before the proofs. These analyses show that each of Socrates’ arguments rely on the hypothesis of the Forms, and that some of them also employ the hypothesis that the soul is immortal. I then analyze the demonstrative status of each argument, by which I mean how strongly or weakly Socrates claims to have ‘proven,’ ‘shown,’ etc. the conclusion of the argument. The result of this analysis is that the arguments that do not use the hypothesis of the soul’s immortality all have a higher demonstrative status than those that do, suggesting that the hypothesis of immortality leads to somewhat less sure conclusions than the hypothesis of the Forms. I then argue that we should read the argumentative structure of the dialogue as an example of the method of hypothesis as Socrates characterizes it in Phaedo: the hypothesis of the Forms is a higher hypothesis while the hypothesis of the soul’s immortality is a lower hypothesis, and the progression of arguments in the dialogue (including the myth) first ascends from the lower hypothesis used in the preliminary argument to the higher hypothesis used in the proofs of immortality, then descends to the lower hypothesis again through the myth. Finally, I argue that the myth has both a rational persuasive function and a non-rational one. Its rational persuasive function is to show the consequences of the hypothesis of immortality, which should give us iv greater confidence in that hypothesis. Its non-rational persuasive function is to charm away the fear of death and draw its hearers toward a philosophical life. I conclude by identifying several structural and thematic elements of the Phaedo myth that are present also in the myths of Phaedrus and Republic, suggesting that Socrates’ eschatological myths have some structural and thematic consistency across dialogues. v Table of Contents Chapter 1 ....................................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 A General Review of the Current Literature on Myth in Plato ................................. 4 1.1.1 A Brief History of Muthos .................................................................................. 4 1.1.2 Types of Myth in Plato ........................................................................................ 9 1.1.3 Myth as Verifiable ............................................................................................. 12 1.1.4 Myth as Truth-Evaluable ................................................................................. 16 1.1.5 Myth as Argument ............................................................................................ 24 1.2 Review of the Current Literature on Arguments in Phaedo .................................... 28 1.2.1 Delineation of the Arguments .......................................................................... 28 1.2.2 Issues Raised by The Arguments ..................................................................... 30 1.2.3 The Relationship between The Arguments and The Myth ........................... 32 1.3 Definitions of Argument Types ................................................................................... 35 1.3.1 Argument ........................................................................................................... 35 1.3.2 Propositional Argument ................................................................................... 36 1.4 Structure of this Dissertation ...................................................................................... 37 Chapter 2 ..................................................................................................................................... 40 2.1 A Note on Method: The Toulmin Model .................................................................... 40 2.2 Analyses of the Arguments in Phaedo ........................................................................ 48 2.2.1 The Argument for Great Hope (AGH)............................................................ 50 2.2.2 The Affinity Argument (AA) ............................................................................ 58 2.2.3 The Final Argument (FA) ................................................................................. 65 vi 2.3 The Hypothesis of the Forms as Backing ................................................................... 68 2.4 The Argument in the Myth .......................................................................................... 72 2.5 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 77 Chapter 3 ..................................................................................................................................... 79 3.1 The Demonstrative Status of the Arguments ............................................................. 80 3.1.1 The Argument for Great Hope (AGH)............................................................ 81 3.1.2 The Cyclical/Recollection Argument (CRA) .................................................. 85 3.1.3 The Affinity Argument (AA) ............................................................................ 88 3.1.4 The Final Argument (FA) ................................................................................. 94 3.1.5 The Myth ............................................................................................................ 96 3.2 The Role of the Hypothesis of the Forms throughout Phaedo ................................ 103 3.3 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 113 Chapter 4 ................................................................................................................................... 115 4.1 The Contents and The Character of the Myth ........................................................ 116 4.2 The Range of Rationality and Persuasiveness ......................................................... 121 4.3 A Persuasive Function of the Myth: Examining the Lower Hypothesis ............... 125 4.4 A Persuasive Function of The Myth: Charming Away Fears ................................ 131 4.5 The (Infelicitous) Persuasion of Simmias and Cebes .............................................. 140 4.6 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 144 Chapter 5 ................................................................................................................................... 146 5.1 Other Eschatological Myths ...................................................................................... 150 5.1.1 Other Eschatological Myths: Phaedrus ......................................................... 151 5.1.2 Other Eschatological Myths: Republic .......................................................... 158 vii 5.1.3 Other Eschatological Myths: A General Comparison ................................. 164 5.2 Final Remarks ............................................................................................................. 169 Appendix A : Argument Diagrams and Citations ................................................................. 171 A.1 Argument for Great Hope ........................................................................................ 171 A.2 Cyclical Argument ..................................................................................................... 175 A.3 Recollection Argument .............................................................................................. 177 A.4 Affinity Argument ..................................................................................................... 180 A.5 Final Argument .......................................................................................................... 183 A.6 The Myth .................................................................................................................... 185 Bibliography .............................................................................................................................. 187 viii List of Figures Figure
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