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Fake News, Filter Bubbles, Post-Truth and Trust

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Fake News, Filter Bubbles, Post-Truth and Trust Fake news, filter bubbles, post-truth and trust A study across 27 countries FAKE NEWS, POST-TRUTH AND FILTER BUBBLES Public 3 The average person in T Total 65% 25% 1 US 77% 14% [COUNTRY] lives in their 2 India 74% 21% 3 Malaysia 72% 23% own ‘bubble’ on the 4 Sweden 71% 19% 5 Turkey 71% 24% internet, mostly 6 Australia 70% 19% 7 Great Britain 70% 19% connecting with people 8 Mexico 70% 25% 9 Canada 69% 20% like themselves and 10 Serbia 69% 24% 11 Argentina 68% 25% looking for opinions they 12 Chile 67% 29% 13 Hungary 67% 19% already agree with. 14 South Africa 67% 26% 15 Peru 66% 30% 16 South Korea 66% 22% 17 Poland 64% 22% 18 Belgium 62% 22% 19 Spain 62% 24% 20 China 61% 27% 21 Brazil 60% 30% 22 Russia 60% 30% KEY: 23 Saudi Arabia 59% 29% Agree Disagree 24 France 57% 25% 25 Germany 55% 28% 26 Italy 50% 37% 27 Japan 44% 35% Base: 13,500 adults across 27 countries (500 GB) 4 © Ipsos. T Total 34% 56% I live in my own bubble on 1 India 56% 39% 2 China 54% 34% the internet, mostly 3 Malaysia 53% 43% 4 Saudi Arabia 49% 39% connecting with people 5 South Korea 44% 45% 6 Peru 40% 53% like myself and looking for 7 Brazil 38% 52% 8 South Africa 37% 58% opinions I already agree 9 Turkey 37% 58% 10 Chile 34% 60% with. 11 Poland 34% 55% 12 Australia 32% 57% 13 Hungary 32% 57% 14 Russia 32% 62% 15 US 32% 56% 16 Canada 31% 61% 17 Mexico 31% 64% 18 Belgium 30% 57% 19 Great Britain 30% 61% 20 Spain 30% 57% 21 Serbia 29% 64% 22 Japan 27% 53% KEY: 23 France 25% 59% Agree Disagree 24 Italy 25% 62% 25 Argentina 23% 70% 26 Sweden 23% 71% 27 Germany 22% 64% Base: 13,500 adults across 27 countries (500 GB) 5 © Ipsos. We’re much more likely to think others live in filter bubble than admit we do… +/- Net T Total +31 1 Sweden +48 2 Argentina +45 This chart compares what 3 US +45 people say for others and 4 Great Britain +40 5 Serbia +40 what they say for 6 Mexico +39 7 Australia +38 themselves on how much 8 Canada +38 they live in a bubble, from 9 Hungary +35 10 Turkey +34 previous two slides… 11 Germany +33 12 Chile +33 13 Belgium +32 …and shows how many 14 Spain +32 15 France +32 more people think that 16 South Africa +30 17 Poland +30 others live in an internet 18 Russia +28 bubble than admit that 19 Peru +26 20 Italy +25 for themselves 21 South Korea +22 22 Brazil +22 23 Malaysia +19 24 India +18 25 Japan +17 26 Saudi Arabia +10 27 China +7 Public 6 T Total 41% 48% I am confident that the 1 Hungary 69% 23% 2 Malaysia 60% 34% average person in 3 Saudi Arabia 60% 29% 4 China 58% 34% [COUNTRY] can tell real 5 India 55% 39% 6 Spain 54% 27% news from ‘fake news’. 7 Peru 46% 48% 8 Chile 44% 50% 9 Mexico 44% 51% 10 Serbia 44% 49% 11 Russia 40% 49% 12 Turkey 40% 56% 13 Canada 39% 48% 14 Poland 39% 47% 15 Brazil 38% 51% 16 France 38% 45% 17 Argentina 37% 53% 18 South Korea 37% 48% 19 Australia 36% 51% 20 South Africa 34% 59% 21 Belgium 32% 53% 22 Germany 29% 53% KEY: 23 US 29% 62% Great Britain 28% 59% Agree Disagree 24 25 Italy 27% 61% 26 Japan 26% 52% 27 Sweden 26% 64% Base: 13,500 adults across 27 countries (500 GB) 7 © Ipsos. T Total 63% 25% I am confident that I can 1 Turkey 77% 19% 2 Chile 76% 20% tell real news from ‘fake 3 Peru 76% 21% 4 Serbia 76% 15% news’ (entirely made up 5 Malaysia 74% 20% 6 South Africa 73% 20% stories or facts). 7 Argentina 72% 19% 8 Mexico 72% 23% 9 India 70% 25% 10 Saudi Arabia 70% 18% 11 Poland 69% 17% 12 Brazil 68% 22% 13 Hungary 68% 23% 14 Australia 67% 19% 15 Great Britain 66% 21% 16 US 65% 24% 17 Canada 64% 24% 18 Sweden 64% 25% 19 China 63% 26% Belgium 20 60% 27% Russia 58% 31% 21 France 54% 28% 22 Italy 52% 37% KEY: 23 Germany 47% 31% 24 Agree Disagree South Korea 45% 36% 25 Spain 39% 38% 26 Japan 30% 47% 27 Base: 13,500 adults across 27 countries (500 GB) 8 © Ipsos. I can identify fake news but the rest of my country can’t… +/- Net T Total +22 1 South Africa +39 2 Great Britain +38 This chart compares what 3 Sweden +38 people say for others and 4 Turkey +37 5 US +36 what they say for 6 Argentina +35 7 Chile +32 themselves on being able 8 Serbia +32 to identify fake news from 9 Australia +31 10 Brazil +30 previous two slides… 11 Peru +30 12 Poland +30 13 Belgium +28 …and shows how many 14 Mexico +28 15 Canada +25 more people think the 16 Italy +25 17 Germany +18 average person can’t 18 Russia +18 identify fake news 19 France +16 20 India +15 compared with them 21 Malaysia +14 22 Saudi Arabia +10 (except in Spain and 23 South Korea +8 Hungary) 24 China +5 25 Japan +4 26 Hungary -1 27 Spain -15 Public 9 T Total 58% 28% I think I’m better at 1 Turkey 73% 23% 2 Peru 72% 23% spotting ‘fake news’ than 3 Chile 69% 23% 4 Hungary 69% 19% the average person in 5 India 69% 24% 6 Serbia 68% 17% [COUNTRY]. 7 Saudi Arabia 66% 21% 8 Malaysia 65% 26% 9 South Africa 65% 26% 10 Mexico 64% 29% 11 Brazil 62% 28% 12 Poland 60% 22% 13 Argentina 59% 28% 14 Australia 59% 23% 15 US 59% 27% 16 Russia 58% 31% 17 Great Britain 56% 24% 18 Canada 54% 28% 19 Sweden 54% 25% 20 Spain 53% 26% 21 Belgium 52% 29% 22 South Korea 50% 31% KEY: 23 China 49% 36% 24 Italy Agree Disagree 49% 41% 25 France 47% 33% 26 Germany 43% 34% 27 Japan 30% 47% Base: 13,500 adults across 27 countries (500 GB) 10 © Ipsos. T Total 60% 30% The average person in 1 Peru 71% 25% 2 Serbia 70% 25% [COUNTRY] doesn’t care 3 Turkey 69% 27% 4 US 68% 23% about facts about politics 5 Argentina 67% 26% and society anymore, they 6 Great Britain 66% 24% 7 India 66% 30% just believe what they 8 Chile 65% 32% 9 Australia 64% 25% want. 10 Hungary 64% 24% 11 Mexico 64% 33% 12 Poland 64% 23% 13 Belgium 62% 26% 14 Germany 62% 24% 15 South Africa 61% 35% 16 Canada 60% 29% 17 Sweden 60% 31% 18 Malaysia 58% 38% 19 Spain 56% 30% 20 Brazil 55% 36% 21 France 54% 27% 22 Russia 53% 39% KEY: 23 South Korea 53% 37% Saudi Arabia 50% 36% Agree Disagree 24 25 China 49% 44% Japan 26 49% 30% Italy 27 48% 44% Base: 13,000 adults across 26 countries (500 GB) 11 © Ipsos. T Total 59% 29% I am confident I have a 1 Turkey 76% 20% 2 India 75% 20% better understanding of 3 Chile 74% 22% 4 Peru 72% 24% social realities like 5 Mexico 71% 24% immigration levels and 6 China 68% 21% 7 Malaysia 68% 25% crime rates than the 8 Argentina 67% 23% 9 Serbia 66% 23% average person in 10 South Africa 66% 27% 11 Brazil 65% 25% [COUNTRY]. 12 Saudi Arabia 64% 21% 13 Poland 60% 23% 14 Great Britain 58% 27% 15 Australia 57% 28% 16 Spain 57% 24% 17 Hungary 56% 32% 18 US 55% 33% 19 Sweden 52% 35% 20 Canada 51% 35% 21 Belgium 50% 34% 22 Russia 50% 36% KEY: 23 Germany 48% 30% 24 South Korea Agree Disagree 48% 34% 25 Italy 47% 38% 26 France 42% 38% 27 Japan 28% 51% Base: 13,500 adults across 27 countries (500 GB) 12 © Ipsos. FAKE NEWS EXPOSURE AND MEANING Public 14 T Total 60% 28% How often, if at all, do 1 Argentina 82% 16% 2 Serbia 79% 14% you think you see stories 3 Turkey 79% 17% 4 Mexico 77% 21% where news organisations 5 Brazil 73% 19% 6 India 72% 24% have deliberately said 7 Peru 72% 25% 8 Hungary 71% 17% something that isn’t true? 9 Malaysia 69% 24% 10 South Africa 68% 26% 11 Chile 66% 31% 12 Poland 65% 22% 13 US 61% 26% 14 Italy 59% 28% 15 Russia 59% 30% 16 Australia 57% 29% 17 France 54% 26% 18 Great Britain 54% 30% 19 Saudi Arabia 51% 32% 20 Spain 51% 30% 21 Belgium 49% 36% 22 Canada 48% 36% KEY: 23 Sweden 44% 42% Very/Fairly often Not very often/Never 24 China 43% 47% 25 South Korea 39% 52% 26 Japan 36% 41% 27 Germany 30% 42% Base: 13,500 adults across 27 countries (500 GB) 15 © Ipsos. I have falsely believed a T Total 48% 40% 1 Brazil 62% 29% news story was real until I 2 Saudi Arabia 58% 29% 3 South Korea 58% 29% found out it was fake. 4 Peru 57% 39% 5 Spain 57% 29% 6 China 56% 34% 7 India 55% 37% 8 Poland 55% 33% 9 Sweden 55% 29% 10 Chile 54% 41% 11 Mexico 54% 43% 12 Argentina 51% 41% 13 Malaysia 50% 45% 14 South Africa 50% 41% 15 Russia 49% 39% 16 Canada 48% 39% 17 Serbia 48% 39% 18 Australia 46% 39% 19 US 46% 42% 20 Belgium 45% 39% 21 Germany 45% 38% 22 France 43% 40% KEY: 23 Hungary 35% 51% Agree Disagree 24 Japan 34% 46% 25 Great Britain 33% 54% 26 Turkey 33% 63% 27 Italy 29% 62% Base: 13,500 adults across 27 countries (500 GB) 16 © Ipsos.
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