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Election Committee Strategic Plan

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Election Committee Strategic Plan ELECTION COMMITTEE STRATEGIC PLAN Chair: Secretary Connie Lawson | Co-Chair: Beth Dlug September 2018 Indiana Executive Council on Cybersecurity Election Committee Plan IECC: Election Committee 1 Contents Committee Members .................................................................................................................... 6 Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 8 Executive Summary .................................................................................................................... 10 Research ....................................................................................................................................... 13 Deliverable: Statewide Voter Registration System (SVRS) Cybersecurity Enhancements . 20 General Information .................................................................................................................. 20 Implementation Plan ................................................................................................................. 21 Evaluation Methodology ........................................................................................................... 24 Deliverable: SVRS Network User Access Control Enhancement .......................................... 26 General Information .................................................................................................................. 26 Implementation Plan ................................................................................................................. 27 Evaluation Methodology ........................................................................................................... 31 Deliverable: Election System Physical and Logical Security Controls .................................. 34 General Information .................................................................................................................. 34 Implementation Plan ................................................................................................................. 35 Evaluation Methodology ........................................................................................................... 38 Deliverable: Post-Election Risk Limiting Audit Standards and Pilot Program ................... 40 General Information .................................................................................................................. 40 Implementation Plan ................................................................................................................. 41 Evaluation Methodology ........................................................................................................... 46 Deliverable: Cyber Threat Awareness and Training for County Election Administrators 48 General Information .................................................................................................................. 48 Implementation Plan ................................................................................................................. 49 Evaluation Methodology ........................................................................................................... 52 Deliverable: Election Day Cybersecurity Tabletop Exercises ................................................ 55 General Information .................................................................................................................. 55 Implementation Plan ................................................................................................................. 56 Evaluation Methodology ........................................................................................................... 59 Deliverable: Indiana Best Practices Manual for the Operation of Election Equipment ...... 61 General Information .................................................................................................................. 61 Implementation Plan ................................................................................................................. 62 IECC: Election Committee 2 Evaluation Methodology ........................................................................................................... 66 Deliverable: Election Day Cybersecurity Emergency Preparedness Plans ........................... 68 General Information .................................................................................................................. 68 Implementation Plan ................................................................................................................. 69 Evaluation Methodology ........................................................................................................... 72 Deliverable: Election Day Cybersecurity Monitoring and Rapid Response Technical Support ....................................................................................................................................... 74 General Information .................................................................................................................. 74 Implementation Plan ................................................................................................................. 75 Evaluation Methodology ........................................................................................................... 78 Deliverable: Election Cybersecurity Public Education and Awareness ................................ 80 General Information .................................................................................................................. 80 Implementation Plan ................................................................................................................. 81 Evaluation Methodology ........................................................................................................... 84 Deliverable: Election Cybersecurity Incident Response and Communications .................... 86 General Information .................................................................................................................. 86 Implementation Plan ................................................................................................................. 87 Evaluation Methodology ........................................................................................................... 90 Deliverable: Catalog and Summaries of Best Election Cybersecurity Reports and Guides 92 General Information .................................................................................................................. 92 Implementation Plan ................................................................................................................. 93 Evaluation Methodology ........................................................................................................... 96 Supporting Documentation ........................................................................................................ 98 Center for Internet Security (CIS) Handbook for Elections Infrastructure Security ................. 99 Department of Homeland Seucirty (DHS) Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) ISAC Pilot for Eelction Infrastructure................................................... 174 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) Common Cyber Security Language ........................................ 193 Election Assistance Commission (EAC) Glossary of Common Cybersecurity Terms .......... 201 Election Assistance Commission (EAC) U.S. Election Systems as Critical Infrastructure Addendum I: Glossary of Key Terms and Acronyms .......................................................... 209 Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center Campaign Cybersecurity Playbook......................... 222 Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center Election Cyber Incident Communications Coordination Guide ............................................................................................................... 249 IECC: Election Committee 3 Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center The State and Local Election Cybersecurity Playbook ............................................................................................................................... 284 National Association of Elections Officials Election Center Elections Cybersecurity Checklist ............................................................................................................................... 357 Voting System Technical Oversight Program at Ball State University (VSTOP) Indiana Best Practices Manual for the Operation of Election Equipment ................................................. 366 Voting System Technical Oversight Program at Ball State University (VSTOP) Risk Limiting Audit (RLA) Pilot ................................................................................................................. 395 Voting System Technical Oversight Program at Ball State University (VSTOP) Risk Limiting Audit (RLA) Pilot Report ..................................................................................................... 454 IECC: Election Committee 4 Committee Members IECC: Election Committee 5 Committee Members Name Organization Title Committee/Workgroup IECC Position Membership Type Connie Secretary of State Secretary of State Chair Voting Lawson Beth Dlug Allen County Elections
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