Liberal Nationals Since the Liberal Nationals first divided from the official Liberals and eventually merged with the Conservatives, they have often been regarded as Tory cuckoos in the Liberal nest. Nick Cott re-evaluates their role. ToryTory cuckooscuckoos inin thethe LiberalLiberal nest?nest? The case of the Liberal Nationals: a re-evaluation
he Liberal Nationals under Sir John Simon This significance was enhanced after the departure Tbroke away from the Liberal Party led by from the Government of the independent Liberals Herbert Samuel in October . This followed fif- under the leadership of Herbert Samuel in . Sup- teen years of intra-party feuding within the Liberal port for Neville Chamberlain and appeasement cost Party dating back to the fall of H.H. Asquith as the Liberal Nationals influence during the period of Prime Minister in December , and the subse- Churchill’s premiership (–), and after the Sec- quent rivalry between Asquithians and supporters of ond World War, they became even more reliant on the Lloyd George which left many Liberals feeling disaf- Conservative Party for their electoral prospects. In fected. More immediately, there were concerns over , the organisations of the two parties were fused the future of Liberalism, with many aspects of the together under the Woolton–Teviot agreement (the Liberal creed having been assailed, and the desire for Liberal National party being renamed the National a National Government in the wake of the troubled Liberal party), permanently ending their independ- domestic and international scene of the early s. ence, and making them appear indistinguishable from The position taken by the Liberal Party in giving the Conservative Party. Joint associations were not Labour its general support (in return for possible formally wound up until , although by then most concessions such as electoral reform) was also being of them had disappeared anyway. questioned, due to the Labour Government’s inad- equacy in dealing with the crisis. Liberal dissatisfac- I tion was expressed in the – session, which The Liberal National party is perhaps the most inac- saw Liberal divisions over governmental legislation, curately and unfairly treated of all forces in twentieth most notably the Kings’ Speech, when a small group century British political history. Until recently, the of rebels under Sir John Simon and Sir Robert party was dismissed as a mere adjunct of the Con- Hutchison voted for a Tory amendment. The divi- servatives. This view rests on the facts that the party sive nature of Lloyd George’s policy towards the at its conception started its own organisation and in- Government came to a head in June , when Si- dividual members seemed prepared to compromise mon resigned the whip. It was clear that this position on essential aspects of Liberal identity, and in the post- commanded much support amongst the Liberal war era, the party’s ever closer relations with the Con- ranks and this provided Simon with the confidence servatives. However, such views now have to be re- to go it alone in October. evaluated since recent investigations have reached Founded to support a coalition, the Liberal Na- very different conclusions, outlining an essentially tionals were a significant part of the National Govern- Liberal basis for Liberal National politics. From my ments, –, under Ramsay MacDonald (– own research, I have detected a similarly Liberal ele- ), Stanley Baldwin (–) and Neville Cham- ment within the party, and in this article I will hope to berlain (–), fighting two elections in conjunc- add to work already done in exploring some new an- tion with Conservative and National Labour allies. gles. Discussion will focus on the origins of the party,
24 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 where I hope to show that the Liberal Liberal centrism seems to have been tionist-leaning measures were enacted Nationals can be slotted within a ‘Liberal born in the later nineteenth century, by Lloyd George during his time at the centrist’ tradition, which was essentially when high politics was dominated by a Board of Trade, where his flexibility to- pragmatic, consensual and coalitionist in fear of Britain’s relative economic and wards party dogma was displayed attitude. This suggestion will be seen to physical decline as seen through the through his patents legislation. Coop- remove from the Liberal Nationals the poor physical health of its citizens. eration with the Conservatives was charge of defection and puts their ac- These fears culminated in the desire for sought after , when new conditions tions on a much more honourable foot- National Efficiency, a movement of so- made it almost essential both for the na- ing. This article will examine other rea- cial imperialists who advocated more tional interest and the Liberal pro- sons for the split in , which will be government intervention in the gramme. The constitutional crisis of seen to lie in intra-party conflicts economy and in social welfare provi- –, precipitated by the House of stretching back at least as far as the First sion. All this impacted on the Liberal Lords’ rejection of the Budget, led World War. Party, with challenges to its social, eco- to fears of the possible imminent col- nomic and imperial policies. lapse of the constitution and more per- II Perhaps the most significant challenge sonally speaking for Lloyd George, the The origins of the Liberal National came from the imperialist and social re- collapse of his National Insurance pro- party can be traced back to a centrist former, Joseph Chamberlain, whose posals, which depended on the extra strand of thinking in Liberal high poli- casual approach to Liberal doctrine and revenue outlined in the Budget. Frus- tics, dating from the later nineteenth clashes with the Gladstonian leadership trated by the inability to reach a com- century, which was pragmatic, consen- led him and others to leave the party in promise, Lloyd George engaged in secret sual and coalitionist in orientation. to form the Liberal Unionists and coalition talks with the Conservatives. In Whilst Liberal centrists may have dis- cooperate with the Conservatives. This a memorandum he circulated to Arthur played different attitudes over time as deprived the Liberal Party of one of its Balfour and other Opposition chiefs, he political contexts changed, what re- greatest reformers, with many shattered expressed his feeling that ‘some of the mained consistent was the desire for a Liberals contemplating their future in most urgent problems awaiting settle- ‘nationalised’ politics to meet particular the party. Some of those dissatisfied ele- ment, problems which concern inti- crises facing the country which party ments did stay and grouped together as mately the happiness and the efficiency politics could not address, since it was the Liberal Imperialists in the s un- of the inhabitants of these Islands, their by nature adversarial and self-interested. der the leadership of Lord Rosebery. strength and influence can only be suc- Such sentiments were not consistently The group included H. H. Asquith, Sir cessfully coped with by active co-opera- applied by individual Liberals, since Edward Grey, R. B. Haldane and the tion of both the great parties in the National politics was often only seen to later Liberal National Walter Runciman State.’ He was also willing to consider be necessary in times of national uncer- amongst its ranks, and there were non- the fiscal question, taking the tainty, such as wartime, periods of eco- committed sympathisers such as David Roseberyite view that an inquiry should nomic decline or where there was a Lloyd George. Whilst this group cer- be conducted to examine the case. perceived threat to Britain’s parliamen- tainly had an imperialist agenda, it ex- The period – could possibly tary traditions or to its Empire. The pressed its centrist tendencies in the de- be seen as a period of triumph for Lib- theory was that during such times a se- sire for greater cooperation, calling for eral centrism, since during this time Lib- ries of reforms to avert danger could be an ‘unbroken front’. Also, there may erals cooperated with Conservatives in speedily enacted, restoring confidence have been some flexibility towards free government to win the First World War and stability, since decisions could be trade. Chamberlain’s growing accept- and then the peace. In so doing they made on a consensual basis. It follows ance of protection as a means to finance were prepared to implement protection- then, that co-operation meant depar- measures of social reform could have ist measures such as the McKenna Du- tures from orthodox viewpoints, and been influential since evidence exists ties of , the Paris Resolutions of this can be detected, particularly re- that the issue was tentatively explored. , and the Safeguarding of Industries garding the issue of trade. In theory, However, the boldness of Chamberlain’s Act , despite the fact they were alien Liberals were free traders, but even on Tar iff Reform campaign of was to orthodox Liberalism. Through pur- this issue a certain centrist flexibility beyond the acceptance of most Liberal suing a pragmatic agenda, Liberals had can be detected, although this has not Imperialists. Other ways of meeting de- now set aside one important tenet of really been characterised as a continu- sires for social reform were being con- Liberalism, although it is unclear ous element by historians. Liberal cen- sidered by Liberals which seemed just as whether such Liberals wanted the free trists can also be seen to have schismatic adequate and less controversial, leaving trade system swept away forever, or tendencies. Coalition and coalition in- only Rosebery to argue for an all-party whether this situation was envisaged as a trigues drew politicians away from conference on the issue. temporary one. Certainly, Liberals in the party doctrines and the party tribe and The period of Liberal government s presented themselves again as free towards those in other parties, particu- from –, despite being riddled traders, although this may have been due larly the Conservatives, who shared with party controversies, also saw Liberal to opportunistic electoral considerations, similar anxieties. centrism at work. A number of protec- since free trade was one of the few issues
Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 25 to separate them from the Conservatives would carry the country.’ His ultimate accordance with their traditional fiscal after the war. They were also unable to aim seems to be the eventual leadership principles. I do not see how direct taxa- separate themselves from a romantic at- of Cecil himself. tion can be increased …’ However, it tachment to the Gladstonian era, which With so many attempts to bring to- was not just future Liberal Nationals ex- prevented even pragmatists exercising gether opposing forces in the interests of pressing such views. Malcolm Baines has more forethought about policy. national unity, it seems hard to under- drawn attention to the fact that there In the early twenties, many Liberals stand why the Liberal Nationals have re- was little to separate the future Liberal viewed National politics as the best way ceived such a bad press for essentially Nationals from the independent Liberal of securing Liberal goals in domestic and adopting the same pragmatic course. Party. Lord Lothian, in his pamphlet imperial legislation, as they lost faith in These moves seem quite consistent with Liberalism in the Modern World, suggested Liberalism’s ability to succeed independ- the view of Walter Runciman that: ‘the ‘the possibility of a world system of ently after the war. This led to the desire problems with which we are now faced complete free trade has gone and will for even greater integration of Liberal are not whether it shall be Conservatives probably never return.’ Herbert and Conservative forces, with Lloyd or Liberals who occupy the Treasury Samuel and his colleagues were playing George and higher ranking Coalition Bench … and dominate the policy of the role of campaigners for ‘freer’ trade, a Liberals in particu- Whitehall, it is modified definition of free trade, which lar being keen on Important to Liberal rather whether reluctantly accepted the need for tariffs the idea of creating British democracy in a hostile climate, but this was exactly a single centre party Nationals was the desire and the British con- the same position as the Liberal Nation- — an objective to retain their Liberal stitution shall sur- als. Runciman summed up his party’s known as ‘fusion’. vive the fate which feeling fairly well in when he said: Winston Church- identity, but they felt has overpowered ‘I do not love subsidies, and I think that ill’s view is typical that Liberal measures democracies of the subsidy system has always been a bad in his assertion that were only achievable other European element in foreign competition. The ‘a united appeal un- countries’. The only reason we have for using subsidies der your (Lloyd through compromise. desire for coopera- now is to fight subsidy with subsidy, and George’s) leader- tion was mild com- by these means hope, ultimately, to in- ship … would secure a Parliament capa- pared to that of the early s, since duce all subsidising countries to stop ble of maintaining the Empire & restor- there were no calls for fusion, and coop- their subsidising simultaneously.’ ing Prosperity …’ Frederick Guest eration was originally intended as short In acknowledging the similar views called for the ‘formation of the Central term (although circumstances altered regarding protection between the two Party and for the establishment of the the position later). Important to Liberal Liberal wings, the actions of the Liberal great triumvirate.’ These views are Nationals was the desire to retain their Nationals can be seen as essentially Lib- those of later defectors, whose own un- Liberal identity, but they felt that Liberal eral, since the majority of high-ranking certainties about their position within measures were only achievable through Liberals agreed with the modification the party might have led them to see the compromise. Important Liberal Na- of free trade. As a result of these simi- creation of new party as a means to tionals such as Runciman had previously larities in , both sides were pre- abandon Liberalism without losing face. participated in the wartime coalition pared to come to electoral arrange- However, similar sentiments were ex- and so it also seems strange that he, as the ments with Tory protectionists and to pressed amongst those who remained author of the Paris Resolutions, has not work with them in government. This within the Liberal Party and this suggests been chastised by historians for his illib- can be seen in fiscal enactments such as that the idea was close to Liberal prag- eral intentions in –. the Import Duties Act, which matic instincts. This position was paral- Whilst Liberals had largely returned provided for a % revenue tax with leled, although to a lesser degree, in the to their free trade traditions in the s, imperial preferences to be put in place. Asquithian wing of Liberalism. Michael the protectionist argument had gained However, the Samuelites were never Bentley has drawn attention to this in his weight by the end of the decade, as other quite so publicly committed to such claim that moves were afoot to mould a nations started to impose greater tariffs measures as their Liberal National col- party under the leadership of Lord Grey, on British goods. Also, social insurance leagues and this eventually led to their the former Liberal Foreign Secretary, expenditure was putting pressure on the departure from the government in Sep- bringing in a progressive Tory element Treasury and practical measures were tember , although it should be under Sir Robert Cecil. Not all of the needed to address the deficit. Liberals pointed out it took over a year for them ‘conspirators’ intended that there should again started to voice concerns about to actually ‘cross the floor’. Their pub- be a new party created, but this does free trade in response. As Sir John Simon, licly lukewarm attitude had been ac- seem to have been the intention of the future leader of the Liberal National commodated through an ‘agreement to some, particularly Gilbert Murray, Cecil party put it: ‘Free traders will have to differ’ policy which let them avoid the and Runciman. As Murray put it, the face the possibility of filling up the gap convention of collective responsibility combination ‘would give a united Lib- in the revenue of this year and the next and to campaign against this position if eral Party plus the RC group and I think by some form of taxation which is not in necessary. This agreement was vital to
26 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 the Samuelites for pragmatic reasons perialist sentiments, so the new Labour war, when the Labour Party began to rather than principle. Whilst they were Government, which wanted India to overtake the Liberals in parliamentary offering general support to the govern- have self-government, bypassed it by an- importance and there was a perceived ment, and were privately sympathetic nouncing that India should make consti- threat from Bolshevism. Many Liberal de- to changes to the fiscal system, they had tutional progress towards Dominion sta- fectors expressed unhappiness in the to appease their rank and file, whose tus. After this snub, Simon’s anger towards s at so-called Liberal concessions to views were much less accommodating Labour never subsided. Imperialists like socialism in foreign affairs, by favouring to even short-term protectionist meas- Simon saw India as the crown jewel of Bolshevik Russia, and in Lloyd George’s ures. Liberal Nationals could afford to the Empire and saw any attempt to alter social policies. However, those who de- be more bold since they could guaran- its status as a threat to the entire Empire. fected were not unrepresentative of the tee Conservative support in the event This view may certainly have been in the rest of Liberalism. Despite accusations of of haemorrhaging Liberal support. minds of other Liberals, including Lloyd his socialist intent, Lloyd George spoke of George, who rejected the government’s the ‘very grave consequences’ for the III conclusions regarding India, although un- ‘whole order of society’ of the socialist It is not only in the approach to politics like Simon, for them it was not a resigna- movement. Fellow Coalition Liberal T. J. where there are similarities between the tion issue. Simon’s stance is, however, evi- Macnamara feared socialists wanted to two sides in . Individual Liberal Na- dence of the emotional pull of the India bring the whole parliamentary system tionals shared an outlook with other Question for Liberals. Some imperialist ‘about our ears’. Liberals who did not later join. The first former Coalition Liberals also departed Anti-socialism was not just about the of these is a sense of imperialism, which with Simon. It would be interesting to fear of a socialist government or Bolshe- links individual Liberal Nationals with discover whether, like Simon, they too vik revolution in the s. It was also the imperialist section of the Liberal were disaffected by their party’s position motivated by the frustration that Liberals Party. This sentiment was in a sense illib- on the issue. felt in their inability to define a course eral in the desire to promote British The other main area of continuity lies separate from Toryism or socialism. Liber- power interests, often by force and in its in the attitude towards socialism. Fear of als often referred to the ‘middle way’ de- paternalistic view that colonial subjects the rise of socialism provoked anti-social- fined sometimes as a ‘… move away from were unfit to govern their own affairs. ist attitudes. The starting point is with … rigid individualism … to broader and Feeling of this sort developed in the at- nineteenth century social imperialists, deeper conceptions of national responsi- mosphere of the late nineteenth century many of whom were seeking ways to buy bility and of international relationships; when Liberals felt uncertain about Brit- the support of the working classes but this is a very different thing from ain’s future global strength, but did not through concessions moving towards the really find expression as part of a govern- to demands for so- The frustration that acceptance of the mental programme until the establish- cial welfare legisla- not less rigid collec- ment of Lloyd George’s Coalition. This tion, often referred Liberals felt in their tivism of the Social- era set a precedent, since it was the first to as ‘semi-social- inability to define a ist creed … Be- government in which Liberals made an ism’. This, it was course separate from tween those two ex- active imperialism the centre of foreign hoped, would stem tremes there is, we and imperial policies. They were thus the tide of socialism. Toryism or socialism ... believe, a via media drawn away from traditional Liberal sen- Some such meas- Liberals often referred to which liberal- timents which stressed the ruler’s role in ures were carried the ‘middle way’. minded men and educating and devolving responsibilities out by the Liberal women who form to colonial subjects, as Edwin Montagu Government of the majority of the found during his time as India Secretary, –, but perhaps these policies were electors of this country anxiously desire –, when he was derided for con- motivated more by an elitist view of the to pursue …’ However, this muddled demnation of the Amritsar Massacre. Empire than by the genuine concern for thinking was not enough on which to Sir John Simon’s view of Britain’s role working-class issues that their New Lib- build support. The growth of class politics in India was an issue which contributed eral rhetoric suggested. Behind the leg- in the s showed the possibility of to his departure from the Liberal Party, islative programme of these years and the politics without a Liberal Party. Since the since in the months before his resignation, compact with Labour there was a fear of Liberal Party was a moderating force in it supported a Labour Government creeping socialism. The fact that Lloyd society and a pillar of the British constitu- which wanted to give India the self-gov- George was willing to seek a coalition tion, many Liberals resented the rise of ernment which he and Liberals before with the Tories in suggests that he class as an issue which might lead to its him had opposed. Simon’s particular in- feared the consequences of constitutional destruction. They derided socialists for terest in the India Question had arisen deadlock would come in the form of a their irresponsibility in appealing to class from the Statutory Commission on socialist advance. loyalties. As E. D. Simon put it, ‘both the India, which he had chaired. By , it As socialism became more successful, general strike and the coal strike have was anticipated that the Commission’s the Liberal attack on it became more in- shown us … “The Two Nations” … If the findings would be much in line with im- tense. This is particularly the case after the Liberal Party disappeared, the division of
Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 27 political parties would … become a class tions were so bitter that they could be enemies and allowed him to rise to the division. This would be a long step to- characterised as civil war. However, Lib- leadership by . This created a sense wards the greater danger that faces this eral politics during the First World War, of discomfort and isolation for the sup- country, the danger of class war.’ or even before, may also have played porters of Asquith. Many felt that Lloyd Future Liberal Nationals were con- their part. These strains affected future George’s Political Fund, which he had tributors to anti-socialist tendencies in Liberal Nationals, some of whom saw gathered through the sale of honours, the Liberal Party. They were amongst themselves at the centre of party feuding, was allowing him to buy support. Many the most vocal critics of Lloyd George’s so it is likely that these factors were im- either went into isolation or joined overtures to Labour, as a socialist party, portant in the eventual decision to leave. like-minded individuals setting up after , and although their detach- Many of the difficulties in the inter- groups to counter the Lloyd George ment from Lloyd George was leading war period were the result of the feud- influence. The Radical Group was them to formal separation from him, ing between supporters of Asquith formed in for this purpose and in there is little in substance to differenti- (some of whom were later Liberal Na- this was superseded by the Liberal ate them from mainstream Liberal tionals) and those of Lloyd George. The Council. The latter even developed its opinion. Sir John Simon’s assertion that problem had begun during the war, with own set of policies, in effect making it a ‘Socialism … is a poisonous doctrine’ the replacement of Asquith by Lloyd party within a party. because it ‘seeks to substitute for the George as Prime Minister in December Since there were a number of Gladstonian principle that money is . Asquith’s supporters felt that Lloyd former Asquithian elements repre- best left to fructify in the pockets of the George was responsible for his fall, ac- sented in the Liberal National party in people the wholly different principle cusing him of conspiring with the Con- , it seems likely that the decision to that the State will manage money bet- servatives. Relations were further soured leave was influenced by the wartime di- ter than we shall’ even identifies him by the compact Lloyd George agreed vision which had left a legacy of dis- with old-fashioned Liberal orthodoxy. with the Conservatives for the trust which could only be resolved Whilst this might suggest his likely de- election which signalled preference for through ultimate dissociation from the fection from such a party, which in his Coalition Conservative candidates over Liberal Party. This conclusion can be view meant ‘nothing more than being a Asquithian Liberals. For them, this sig- drawn from the earlier careers of Lib- mere variant of Socialism,’ and a move nalled a lack of principle and Lloyd eral Nationals, particularly Sir John Si- towards the Conservatives, who were George’s determination to remain in mon. His problems with the Liberal opposed to socialism in its entirety, it power at whatever price. An almost irra- Party and, in particular with Lloyd cannot be used to suggest that he was a tional loathing of Lloyd George devel- George, began even before the – Conservative since many other Liberals oped, which was reinforced by the cor- Liberal split, over the naval estimates for agreed with him and might well have ruption scandals of the Coalition. –. Simon saw dangers in the na- taken the same course had a Lib-Lab The two elements seemed less than val race with Germany and in Cabinet coalition been formed in . happy to be reunited in , when advocated a reduction in naval ex- Liberal reunion brought supporters of penditure. In theory, Lloyd George IV Asquith and Lloyd George back under was on the same side, since he origi- Party conflicts are a key factor in ex- the same banner, and this contributed nally opposed increases in line with the plaining why defections occurred in the to the electoral collapse in . For public image he chose to present as a inter-war period. Many Liberals found it Lloyd George this seems to have been Liberal radical. Privately he was more in difficult to remain in a party where rela- beneficial, since the election knocked tune with Churchill’s desire for in- tions between key individuals and fac- out many of his erstwhile Asquithian creases in expenditure and sought to broker a compromise. This is likely to have annoyed Simon since he was sup- Grey addressing a meeting of the Liberal Council. posedly the greatest radical heavy- weight capable of convincing Asquith of the radical case, and it is imaginable that this soured his feelings towards Lloyd George. However, it was during the war that Simon’s bitterness really came to the surface. Lloyd George’s early advocacy of conscription defied all Liberal principles as far as Simon was concerned. He sought to expose what he saw as Lloyd George’s insincere radi- calism, bringing the two into conflict. Simon’s resistance to conscription eventually led to his exit from Asquith’s coalition in December , for which
28 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 he blamed Lloyd George, since his was damaged by a number of factors. not impress. He saw within the radical opinion seemed to have the greatest in- Amongst these was the South Wales proposals the wasteful expenditure of fluence on the direction of policy. coal dispute in the summer of . the Coalition years and the state com- This personal bitterness coloured Whilst at the Board of Trade, pulsion of land and industry he had dis- the relationship between Lloyd George Runciman attempted to broker a com- liked during the war. However, since he and Sir John Simon in the s. Simon promise between the miners, who and other Liberal Council members was amongst Lloyd George’s most wanted permanent wage increases and were able to go into the election high-profile critics and Lloyd George the employers, who were prepared only supporting the Lloyd George pro- did everything possible to obstruct his to concede war bonuses. The failure to gramme (at least in public), it is unclear career. During the Spen Valley by-elec- reach a settlement led to Lloyd George how seriously the criticisms should be tion in February , Lloyd George stepping in and finding a solution taken. Sheer spite, rather than real put up a Coalition Liberal to obstruct which granted the miners virtually all policy disagreements, may have had Simon’s chances of election. The Coali- their demands. This infuriated more to do with it, particularly since tion tried to smear Simon with the Runciman, who must have felt his po- before the war Runciman had been claim that he was unpatriotic and had sition undermined. Another factor was broadly progressive and in favour of tried to mount a legal challenge to the the divergence over war strategy. Like state intervention in the economy. war in . In the later s, Simon Simon, Runciman Lloyd George’s did not involve himself much with battled with Lloyd former Coalition Asquithian co-ordinated efforts to George over con- Since the Liberal Party Liberal supporters counter Lloyd George, but he was very scription, but his was a moderating force were also present in critical of Liberal policy under him. pragmatism meant the ranks of the The earlier career of Walter it was never a resig- in society, many Liberals Liberals Nationals, Runciman is also of interest since his nation issue. Nev- resented the rise of class so they cannot alto- position in the party had often been far ertheless, he as an issue which might gether be seen as from harmonious. As a Liberal Imperial- strongly opposed the resting place of ist in the s he came into conflict the total mobilisa- lead to its destruction disaffected with the leadership under Sir Henry tion of resources Asquithians. These Campbell-Bannerman, affecting his for the war effort by the state, and this Coalition Liberals, however, had reasons chances of being selected for the put him under constant pressure from to resent Lloyd George also. In , for Dewsbury by-election in . His Lloyd George and other compulsionists example, Lloyd George had asked views also brought him into conflict in the cabinet, who looked to ways of Clement Davies to draft amendments with nonconformist elements later at circumventing the Board of Trade. His to Labour’s Coal Bill, but in the end, he the Board of Education, –, where horror at the level of national debt led U-turned and supported the Labour his attempts to impose public control to his resignation in . Bitter at the Government, in what was seen as a cyni- over state-funded schools were not ap- strategy compulsionists were forcing on cal ploy to win concessions. Davies re- preciated. Nevertheless, Runciman’s re- the Cabinet, Runciman went into op- sented Lloyd George for his opportun- lationship with Lloyd George was prob- position to attack them and to cam- ism and became disillusioned with Lib- ably more significant in causing disaffec- paign for a negotiated. peace. Much of eral politics. tion, since these other problems were this attack was to be directed against the Lloyd George’s character and meth- ones of the moment rather than longer- Lloyd George Government, whose ir- ods were generally unpopular. Sir term antagonism. responsibility he wanted to expose. Henry Morris-Jones, for example, later As was the case with Simon, the ori- Like Simon, he blamed Lloyd George spoke of his qualified support for him, gins of poor relations with Lloyd for forcing him out, and for putting un- even during the Coalition years. This George dated back before the war, dur- due pressure on Asquith to accept shows that distaste for Lloyd George ing the time he spent at the Board of compulsionist policies. was not a sectional issue, but something Education. His troubles there were The circumstances of Asquith’s fall which affected the entire Liberal Party compounded by lack of extra financial and the election were important and may have later contributed to a support from the Treasury. This provides in adding to Runciman’s hatred of move towards the Liberal Nationals on the background to poor relations dur- Lloyd George, and set the tone for his both sides of the party. ing the war, since this decision angered relationship with him in the s and Runciman who may have suspected early s. Runciman was arguably V that the supposed Welsh radical had the leader of the Asquithian element af- This article has argued that, far from the sneaking sympathy with his noncon- ter , chairing the Radical Group Liberal Nationals being an adjunct of formist critics and therefore tried to and later the Liberal Council. the Conservative Party in the s, the make his period at Education deliber- Runciman used the Liberal Council to party was part of a tradition within the ately difficult. campaign against Lloyd George’s poli- Liberal Party stretching back fifty years. During the war the relationship be- cies as well as his influence. Lloyd The reasons for leaving the Liberal tween Runciman and Lloyd George George’s renewed progressivism did Party appear in many cases to have been
Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 29 personal difficulties with individuals that Churchill disliked Simon’s ambition National politics can only work inside more than policy, particularly poor rela- and tried to keep him at arms’ length, so government; out of government it is tions with Lloyd George, who had alien- it is unclear whether Churchill himself meaningless. ated up to half the party’s MPs by . really wanted fusion. Nick Cott is a research student at Newcastle This would not, however, be an appro- The National Liberal party can be University. priate place for ending the discussion. seen to be a party which took Liberal After all, in the National Liberals centrism to its logical conclusion, in 1Particular works of this sort include: Roy Doug- were effectively swallowed up by the fusing itself with another force (even if las, The History of the Liberal Party (London 1971), Robert Skidelsky, Politicians and the Conservative Party, although the name this was not a fusion of equals and the Slump, 1929–31 (London 1967), and Trevor National Liberal was preserved until Conservative element was bound to Wilson, The Downfall of the Liberal Party, . What was it, then, which led to an predominate). Attempts by Liberals to 1914–35 (London, 1966). 2 See David Dutton, ‘John Simon and the post- essentially Liberal party being subsumed undertake similar tasks in the s had war National Liberal Party: an historical post- by Conservatism after the war, when this failed, partly because there were signifi- script’, Historical Journal, 32, 2 (1989), pp. 357– did not occur in the arguably more un- cant differences, more in tradition than 367, Graham Goodlad, ‘Communications — The Liberal Nationals, 1931–1940: the prob- certain situation of the s? This is dif- actuality, between the Liberals and lems of a party in ‘partnership government,’’ ficult to ascertain without more detailed Conservatives. Cooperation with the Historical Journal, 38, 1 (1995), pp. 133–143, investigation. The only substantive study Conservatives over a number of years and Jonathan Wallace, ‘The political career of in existence is that by David Dutton, and had shown Liberal Nationals that these Walter Runciman, 1st Viscount Runciman of Doxford (1870–1949)’, Newcastle Ph.D., 1993. even this can only been seen as a pre- differences were not of much substance. 3The idea of a Liberal centrist tradition has been ap- liminary analysis, but this study and However, this form of fusion was not plied in discussion of various Liberals particularly other sources I have examined can be inevitable. Had the Liberal Nationals in the case of Lloyd George. See work by Martin Pugh, especially Martin Pugh, ‘Left in the Centre? used to suggest probable answers to the not been so enthusiastic in the desire to Lloyd George and the Centrist Tradition in British question. pursue National politics, they might Politics’, in Judith Loades (ed.), The Life and Times It seems that the long period of coop- have detected a swing of the pendulum of David Lloyd George (Bangor, 1991), pp. 17–27. It has recently been used in discussion of the Lib- eration between the parties in govern- back to party politics, which started in eral National Walter Runciman. See Jonathan ment, of fourteen years, had shown the and resulted in a Labour landslide Wallace, ‘The political career of Walter Runciman, two forces that they could cooperate in a in . The recognition of these 1st Viscount Runciman of Doxford (1870–1949)’, changed post-war world from , changes led to some Liberal Nationals University of Newcastle Ph.D. thesis, 1995, p. 20. 4The Liberal Imperialists advocated imperial ex- since the old battles seemed irrelevant. returning to the Liberal Party. How- pansion, particularly in South Africa and domes- However, the Liberal Nationals had not ever, most did not recognise the elec- tic reforms in line with National Efficiency. accepted Conservatism, just as the Con- toral shift and remained where they 5 H.H. Asquith, The Times 12th October 1899 in H.C.G. Matthew, The Liberal Imperialists: The servatives had not accepted Liberalism. were, still seeing themselves as being Ideas and Politics of a Post-Gladstonian Elite The two forces had gradually moved good Liberals, although some later re- (Oxford, 1973), p. 43. closer together so that by , it seemed gretted the course they took. The 6 G. Searle, Country Before Party – Coalition and the Idea of ‘National Government’ in Modern to those Liberals and Conservatives co- logic of fusion was to leave Liberalism Britain, 1885–1987 (London, 1995), p. 63. operating with each other that there was behind, but the party still tried to assert 7 H.C.G. Matthew, The Liberal Imperialists: The little to separate them. They could per- a Liberalism of its own into the s, Ideas and Politics of a Post-Gladstonian Elite haps be said to have met half-way, form- even if this amounted to little other (Oxford, 1973), pp. 100–102. 8Kenneth Morgan, Lloyd George (London, ing a liberal-conservatism. Stanley than the defence of civil liberties and 1974), p. 59. Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain had anti-socialism — something which the 9 Lloyd George Papers C/6/5/1 hoped for the fusion of sympathetic lib- Conservative Party was capable of do- 10 Lloyd George Papers C/6/5/1. 11 For a justification of all these measures see The eral elements with Conservatism, but it ing without its cooperation. Fusion can Lloyd George Liberal Magazine Vol. 1 June was not under their leadership that this be seen to have been accomplished re- 1921 No. 9. fusion actually occurred. The unification luctantly and many felt it had contrib- 12 Churchill papers 2/121: 27th February 1922 – Churchill to Lloyd George. of Liberal and Conservative elements uted to Liberal decline after . 13 Lloyd George papers F/22/3/37 16th January happened under Churchill, the former National politics had been essen- 1922 – Guest to Lloyd George. Liberal free trader, an advocate of fusion tially pragmatic before . The ac- 14 See the view of H.A.L. Fisher in John Campbell, in the s. Taking this factor into con- tions of the Liberal Nationals in Octo- Lloyd George – The Goat in the Wilderness (London, 1977), pp. 25–33. sideration, the ultimate victory can be ber of that year converted it into a 15 Michael Bentley, ‘Liberal Politics and the Grey seen to be that of Liberal centrists rather principled stance. In doing so, they cut Conspiracy of 1921’, Historical Journal, 20 2 than Conservatives, although such out an escape route for themselves. (1977), pp. 461–478. Conspirators included Gilbert Murray, Walter Runciman, Sir Robert claims must be tempered by evidence of Whilst they continued to be a liberal- Hudson, Herbert and Henry Gladstone, Donald an uneasy relationship between Church- ising force when in government, out Maclean, Arthur Murray, J.A. Spender, H.W. ill with Simon. Simon had opposed of power this principle amounted to Massingham and Lord Cowdray. 16 Runciman papers WR 185 January 31st 1920 Churchill during the First World War in little. The Liberal National party’s Gilbert Murray to Walter Runciman. his desire for total war, and he had sup- brand of National politics could not 17 Runciman papers WR 185 January 31st 1920 ported appeasement during the s. support a socialist government, nor Gilbert Murray to Walter Runciman. From a personal point of view, it seems was that support sought. Principled concluded on page 51
30 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 A failure of leadership who was preoccupied with social reform 5 Elibank memorandum, 2 October 1918 — should not slide into the Labour Party, or Elibank papers 8804, fos. 193–6, National Li- continued from page 23 brary of Scotland. why a Liberal who was preoccupied with 6Figures are variously given. The present author many Liberals to Labour, so did their ap- the dangers inherent in socialism should has made a detailed analysis in A Classification parent leanings towards Labour in not slide into the Conservative Party. In of the Members of Parliament elected in 1918, Bull Inst. Hist. Res. Xlvii, No.115 (1974), 74–94. drive many Liberals to the Conserva- both cases, some defectors acted for cyni- 7 Dictionary of National Biography: Missing Per- tives. Neither set of defections occurred cal reasons of personal advantage but sons. Oxford 1993, pp 475–6. exclusively during the critical period; most seem to have been motivated, at 8A J A Morris: C P Trevelyan: Portrait of a Radi- each one continued for long afterwards. cal. Belfast 1977, pp 139–141. least in part, by an honest judgement of 9They were: C R Buxton, brother of Noel Buxton The – revival failed partly be- what would conduce to the public good. and briefly an MP in 1910; J King; R C Lambert; cause it came too late and partly because On balance, the main blame for the de- H B Lees-Smith; R L Outhwaite; A Ponsonby; C Lloyd George – the only man could fections must lie not with the defectors P Trevelyan; A V Rutherford; Col. J Wedgwood — Liberal Magazine 1920, p70. possibly inspire and lead it – was pro- but with the inept leadership provided. 10 David Butler and Jennie Freeman, British Politi- foundly mistrusted not only by other cal Facts 1900–1960 (London 1963) p213 give Roy Douglas is Emeritus Reader, Univer- politicians but by a large section of his 62 National Liberals and 54 Liberals. Michael sity of Surrey. He is author of The History Kinnear, The British Voter (London 1968) p94 own party. That mistrust, in its turn, of the Liberal Party –, Land, gives 47 Lloyd Georgeites, 40 Asquithians and traces back inescapably to the compro- ‘29 ‘prefixless’ MPs who were evenly divided People and Politics, several books on inter- mises of the Coalition period. between Asquith and Lloyd George’. national relations and four books in interna- Defections could take place so easily 11 They were: C R Buxton, Noel Buxton, E G tional cartoons. Hemmerde; H B Lees-Milne; A Ponsonby and J C either to Labour or to the Conservatives Wedgwood. Perhaps, technically, we should add essentially because positive Liberal policy 1 Sally Harris, Out of Control: British Foreign an eighth, Frank Hall, elected as a Lib-Lab in 1906. was obscure. For a large part of the period Policy and the Union of Democratic Control, 12 The Times 18 January 1924; given in Martin Gil- 1914–1918, Hull 1996, p.27. bert, Winston S Churchill Vol V companion considered here, it must have been diffi- 2 At the time they called themselves Unionists. (London 1979) pp 94–97. cult for an outsider to perceive what the 3This matter is discussed by the present author in 13 Listed in Liberal Magazine 1924, p124. Liberals would do with power if they got The History of the Liberal Party 1895–1970 Lon- 14 Gilbert, op cit p113. don 1971, pp.113–5. 15 Benn to Asquith, 11 January 1919. Asquith pa- it, or how they would differ from the 4 Guest to Lloyd George, 20 July 1918, LG F/21/ pers, Bodleian Library, 18, fo 41. other parties if they were in government. 2/28 — Lloyd George papers, Beaverbrook Li- 16 Liberal Magazine 1929, 1–2, 76, 264, 341.
There seemed little reason why a Liberal brary collection, House of Lords.
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30 Geoffrey Searle, ‘The Edwardian Liberal Party ing News and Mercury February 2nd. 1931 in Tory cuckoos in the and Business’, English Historical Review, XCVIII Reading papers MSS Eur F118 32–5. Liberal nest? (January 1983) 28–60 pp. 40 & 47. 43 Jonathan Wallace, ‘The political career of Walter 31 Gladstone-MacDonald Pact of 1903 — an elec- Runciman, 1st Viscount Runciman of Doxford continued from page 30 toral arrangement between the Liberal and La- (1870–1949)’, University of Newcastle Ph.D. bour parties lasting until 1914. thesis, 1995, p. 39. 18 Runciman papers WR 215 undated 1932. 32 For examples see the Churchill papers 5/22 — 44 Runciman papers WR35 19th February 1910, 19 Sir Henry Morris Jones, Doctor in the Whips’ 16th February 1920 Churchill to Sir George Walter Runciman to David Lloyd George. Room (London, 1955), p. 82. Ritchie; Lloyd George papers G/20/14/21 Feb- 45 Jonathan Wallace, ‘The political career of Walter 20 Geoffrey Shakespeare, Let Candles Be Brought ruary 19th 1926, Hilton Young to Lloyd George; Runciman, 1st Viscount Runciman of Doxford In. (London, 1949), p. 125. Lloyd George papers G/14/5/8 25th Septem- (1870–1949)’, University of Newcastle Ph.D. 21 Reading Papers MSS Eur F118 38–39: 2nd ber 1924, Sir Alfred Mond to Lloyd George. thesis, 1995, p. 201. March 1931 — Simon to Reading. 33 Lloyd George papers F/3/5/3 19th February 46 Five Simonite MPs were former Coalition Lib- 22 Malcolm Baines, ‘The Survival of the British Lib- 1920, Lloyd George to Balfour. eral MPs, 1918–22: Sir Henry Fildes, Sir eral Party, 1932–1959’, Oxford D.Phil., (1989). 34 T. J. Macnamara in The Liberal Pioneer May Malcolm MacDonald, J. I. Macpherson, 23 Extract from Lothian’s Liberalism in the Modern 1925 No. 4 Vol. 1 Geoffrey Shakespeare, E.A. Strauss. World in Malcolm Baines, ‘The Survival of the 35 Lloyd George Liberal Magazine Vol. 2 June 47 Davies was never a Coalition Liberal MP, but British Liberal Party, 1932–1959’, Oxford D.Phil., 1922 No. 9. had been a supporter of the Coalition. 1989, p. 16. 36 E.D. Simon in The Forward View January 1927. 48 D.M. Roberts, ‘Clement Davies and the Liberal 24 Runciman papers WR 360 5th July 1934 37 For an example see Robert Bernays in The For- Party, 1929–56’, University of Wales MA Runciman to Sir Walter Runciman, Bt. ward View October 1929. (1974), p. 21. 25 The issue they chose to go on was the outcome 38 Sir John Simon speaking to the Western Morn- 49 Colin R. Coote, Editorial: The Memoirs of Colin of the Ottawa Conference, which recom- ing News and Mercury February 2nd. 1931 in R. Coote (London, 1965), pp. 96–7 and p. 112. mended that a general tariff should be applied. Reading papers MSS Eur F11832–5. 50 David Dutton, ‘John Simon and the post-war 26 Robert Scally, The Origins of the Lloyd George 39 Including eight who were Asquithian Liberal National Liberal Party: an historical postscript’, Coalition: The Politics of Social-Imperialism, MPs, 1918–22: Sir Colin Barrie, Geoffrey Historical Journal, 32, 2 (1989). 1900–1918 (Princeton, 1975), pp. 195–196. Collins, A. Harbord, G. Lambert, J.D. Miller, 51 David Dutton, ‘John Simon and the post-war 27 Colin R. Coote, Editorial: The Memoirs of Colin Walter Runciman, Sir John Simon, J.S. Holmes. National Liberal Party: an historical postscript’, R. Coote (London, 1965), p. 81. 40 29th January 1914 — Lord Beauchamp, C. Historical Journal, 32, 2 (1989), pp. 359–364. 28 David Dutton, Lloyd George, ‘John Simon and Hobhouse, R. McKenna, Walter Runciman & John 52 Most notably Clement Davies. the Politics of the Liberal Party, 1918–31’ in Simon to H.H. Asquith (John Simon’s handwrit- 53 Geoffrey Shakespeare, Let Candles Be Brought Judith Loades (ed.), The Life and Times of ing) in Randolph Churchill, Winston S. Churchill In (London, 1949), p. 125; Sir Henry Morris David Lloyd George (Bangor, 1991), p. 86. Vol. 2: Companion, (London), pp. 1857–1858. Jones, Doctor in the Whips’ Room (London, 29 Viscount Simon, Retrospect: The Memoirs of the 41 Liberal Monthly, February 1920. 1955), p. 87. Rt. Hon. Viscount Simon (London, 1952), p. 150. 42 Sir John Simon speaking to the Western Morn-
Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 51