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Cybersecurity Concerns for the Roaring 20S

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Cybersecurity Concerns for the Roaring 20S Cybersecurity Concerns for the Roaring 20s David Trepp, MS/Partner Fast Facts 2 David Trepp Partner, IT Assurance . US Army veteran . MS Geochemistry . Serial tech entrepreneur 30+ years . Personal interests . Rock climbing . Bicycle touring . Information science . Thermodynamics 3 Today’s Presentation . I’m not a futurist . We will not discuss things like . Fusion reactors . Expeditions to Mars . I do track cybersecurity trends though . We will discuss both near and longer term trends . Technical topics will be presented with as little techno-babble as possible . Housekeeping . Questions and comments are encouraged . Feel free to use Q&A to pose questions 4 Content . Brief Review of Threat Sources . Top Cybersecurity Threats of the Roaring 20s . Safe Computing Tips 5 Brief Review of Threat Sources Threat Sources Threat Sources Examples Motivation/Impact • (2016) Panama Papers legal document release Hacktivists • (2019) UK Labor Party DDoS attack Digital vigilante justice • (2019) German politicians dox’ed • (2010) Stuxnet attack on Iranian uranium centrifuges • (2016) Democratic National Committee espionage Foreign Nation-State • (2016) Electrical grid attack on Ukraine’s power grid Espionage Sponsored Entities • (2017) Equifax data breach affecting145M North Disruption of critical services Americans Political influence • (2019) Triton, i.e., Trisis, industrial sabotage malware attack on Saudi Arabian infrastructure Corporate fraud • (2008) Heartland Payment Systems Credit card fraud • (2011) Sony PlayStation Accounts Identity theft • (2012) US Office of Personnel Management Tax fraud • (2013) Target Cybercriminals Extortion • (2014) eBay Intellectual property theft • (2016) Uber Records tampering • (2019) Capital One, MS O365, Box • (2008) City of SF former employee locked out network access • (2008) Former Cox Communications employee shut Employees, Vendors Negligence down service in three states & Contractors Poor training • (2013) Edward Snowden leaked classified NSA Retaliation (i.e., insiders) information Extortion • (2016) Air Force whistleblower leaked classified data on election interference 7 Many Hackers Already Practice Social Isolation 8 Worsening Threat Landscape . Releases of sophisticated, formerly secret hacker’s tools into the public domain are rampant, e.g. Equation Group . Hacking Team . Criminals and hacktivists have figured out that cyber crime is low risk, high reward, so their numbers are growing . Darkweb “storefronts” provide packaged tools and hackers no longer have to be technically savvy, so their numbers are growing . Foreign nation-state sponsored entities have immense resources at their disposal and they’re now targeting all types of US organizations . The Internet of Things continues to increase the Internet’s attack surface area . New vulnerabilities are being released at a dizzying rate 9 Top Cybersecurity Threats of the Roaring 20s Cybersecurity Threats in the Roaring ‘20s . Ransomware 2.0 . Phishing 2.0 . Attacks Against Critical Infrastructure . Expanded Tax Fraud . Defeating Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA or 2FA) . Cloud & Cross-Boundary Attacks . The Drone Wars . AI Aided Deep Fakes . Other Attacks on Truth & Our Confidence in Institutions . Obsolescence of Modern Encryption 11 Ransomware 2.0 . Mobile-device enabled Ransomware . Dormant until no one is around . Sunday morning 1am . Not just denial-of-service anymore, also sensitive data releases . No hacking skills required: ransomware as a service . Encrypt your boss’ drive on the way out the door 12 Typical Ransomware Message 13 Ransomware 2.0 14 Phishing 2.0 . Targeted, with prior reconnaissance for: . Name drops . Business-specific subjects . “Trusted” banners and security assurances . Multi-step, email followed by call, text, or email lacking an attachment . Did you receive my important email yesterday? . Taking advantage of current events . Multi-media . Phishing (email) . Vishing (Voice) . Smishing (Text) 15 Phishing 2.0: “I’m From A Trusted Source” . Mobile-device enabled 16 Phishing 2.0: The CEO Needs You…Now! 17 Phishing 2.0: Check Out My Totally Legit Resume 18 Phishing 2.0: The Bank Has Your Back 19 Phishing 2.0: Targeting Tech Firms 20 Phishing 2.0: Targeting CPA Firms 21 Phishing 2.0: Exploiting Current Events 22 Phishing 2.0: Improved Voice and Text Attacks . Emergency . “It’ll cost you $ to get out of this bind, but I’ll accept a gift card” . Routine . “This is a totally non-malicious request for PII or system access” . Customer Service . “I’m from Customer Service at Acme Company, and I saw the negative Google review you posted. Tell me what went wrong then I’ll send you a gift certificate for your trouble (I’ll just need a little PII first).” 23 Phishing 2.0: Exploiting Current Events 24 Phishing 2.0: Attacks Targeting Organizations . Detailed Reconnaissance . Annual Reports . Press Releases . Tech Support Forums . LinkedIn & Lead Sites . Calls to Reception & Others . Sophisticated Scripts . Name Drops . Relevant Topics . Multiple Attack Vectors . Email, text, phone, in person . Significant Impact . Persistence . Escalation 25 Attacks Against Critical Infrastructure . Systems that Provide . Electricity . Water . Sewage . Communications . Etc. Attacks . Reconnaissance . Find Weaknesses . Lie Dormant . Coordinated Future Attacks 26 Expanded Tax Fraud . Attacking accounting firms . Impersonate clients to harvest sensitive information, . Commandeer accounting firm websites, document portals, and mail systems to impersonate the firms . Attacking individuals who are filing . Target consistent high-earners and file fraudulent returns early, with large refunds . Impersonate accounting firms (see above) to get clients to download fraudulent documents or mobile applications. These attacks can be very effective, as the malicious payloads are often industry-standard remote access tools (which pass muster with anti-virus) or sophisticated mobile banking malware . Attacking firms that distribute key tax documents e.g. W2s & 1099s . Impersonate these firms and send out emails contain fraudulent forms purporting to be legitimate W2s or 1099s, or links to portals to login and access such documents 27 Defeating Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA or 2FA) . Help desk attacks . Convince them to switch the phone # . Backdoor access that doesn’t require MFA . Exchange Web Services (EWS) . Exchange modern encryption . Ask the user for their one-time code . “We’re from the bank’s security department, and there’s been some suspicious activity with your account; but before we go any further, we need you to verify it’s you. Please read me the code you were just sent.” . The code was sent by your legitimate financial institution, who sent it to you because the fraudster just entered your (stolen) username and password. Now the fraudster is calling you to request the MFA one-time code. SIM card swaps . If your phone suddenly tells you it has “No Service” or provides you an “access code” you weren’t anticipating, contact your cell provider right away and ask them if there’s been any activity on your account, e.g. a SIM swap 28 Defeating MFA: Continued . Password Guessing . Hijacking Home/Mobile Devices . Logging all your keystrokes . Viewing your screen . Intercepting cookies/session IDs . Necrobrowser . Modlishka . Impersonating Tech Support to Teleworkers . “IT has me calling everyone to make sure all our company teleworks have the critical new Adobe patch.” 29 Cloud & Cross-Boundary Attacks Typical Information Systems Have Various Levels of Connectivity with Numerous “Integrated Entities” . Internal Departments & Devices . HR, Finance, Ops, etc. Shadow IT . BYOD . IoT . Internal (Segmented) Subnets . DMZs . Industrial Control Systems/SCADA . Cardholder Data Environment (CDE) . WiFi Networks . Remote Branches/Offices/Employees 30 Cloud & Cross-Boundary Attacks Continued Typical Information Systems Have Various Levels of Connectivity with Numerous “Integrated Entities” . Vendors . Product/Application Vendors . Support Vendors . Hosting/Cloud Vendors . Government/Industry Agencies . Reporting . Data Sharing Consortiums . Councils of Government . Emergency Response Groups 31 Cross-Boundary Attack Example: Target Breach 2013 . HVAC Vendor Identified & Breached . Via Phish . Target Provided Remote Access For Vendors . Billing, Contract Submission, and Project Management . Alleged Attack Steps (After Compromising HVAC Vendor) . Exploit vulnerable (unpatched) php instance in vendor web app “document upload” feature and establish local host admin . Pull NTLM password hashes from LSASS . Exploit “pass-the-hash” for DA account privileges . Use DA privileges to ransack PoS systems & steal 40 million credit cards . Deliver them across the Internet to criminal hosts via DNS exfiltration . Target Network Lacked Sufficient Controls . No multi-factor authentication . Inadequate patch management . Inadequate vendor server segmentation . No Cardholder Data Environment (CDE) segmentation . No SMB (digital) signing controls . Inadequate information flow controls, specifically network egress controls 32 Cross-Boundary Target Breach, continued Source: Breaking the Target: An Analysis of Target Data Breach and Lessons Learned https://arxiv.org/pdf/1701.04940.pdf 33 The Drone Wars Drones used for both law enforcement & attackers: . Wifi . War flying . Hi-Res video . Capture phone pin . Upper story office windows . Sensitive audio . Phone purchase credit card # . Movement Habits/Favorites . Spend your $ at the same places you do, so no fraud alerts triggered . Disabling
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