GAO-21-288, HIGH-RISK SERIES: Federal Government Needs To
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT of GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION in Re
Case 1:17-md-02800-TWT Document 739 Filed 07/22/19 Page 1 of 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION MDL Docket No. 2800 In re: Equifax Inc. Customer No. 1:17-md-2800-TWT Data Security Breach Litigation CONSUMER ACTIONS Chief Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr. PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO DIRECT NOTICE OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENT TO THE CLASS Plaintiffs move for entry of an order directing notice of the proposed class action settlement the parties to this action have reached and scheduling a hearing to approve final approval of the settlement. Plaintiffs are simultaneously filing a supporting memorandum of law and its accompanying exhibits, which include the Settlement Agreement. For the reasons set forth in that memorandum, Plaintiffs respectfully request grant the Court enter the proposed order that is attached as an exhibit to this motion. The proposed order has been approved by both Plaintiffs and Defendants. For ease of reference, the capitalized terms in this motion and the accompanying memorandum have the meaning set forth in the Settlement Agreement. Case 1:17-md-02800-TWT Document 739 Filed 07/22/19 Page 2 of 7 Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of July, 2019. /s/ Kenneth S. Canfield Kenneth S. Canfield Ga Bar No. 107744 DOFFERMYRE SHIELDS CANFIELD & KNOWLES, LLC 1355 Peachtree Street, N.E. Suite 1725 Atlanta, Georgia 30309 Tel. 404.881.8900 [email protected] /s/ Amy E. Keller Amy E. Keller DICELLO LEVITT GUTZLER LLC Ten North Dearborn Street Eleventh Floor Chicago, Illinois 60602 Tel. 312.214.7900 [email protected] /s/ Norman E. -
BEST PRACTICES for UTILITY CYBERSECURITY Prepared by Doug Morrill, Associate Director and Sam Crawford, Phd, Managing Consultant, Navigant Consulting, Inc
ENERGY BEST PRACTICES FOR UTILITY CYBERSECURITY Prepared by Doug Morrill, Associate Director and Sam Crawford, PhD, Managing Consultant, Navigant Consulting, Inc. May 2017 GENERAL DISCLAIMER: This presentation was prepared by Navigant Consulting, Inc. (Navigant) for informational purposes only. The term “best practices” is used to reference practices which the authors currently believe to be generally accepted and recommended practices, and the views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of Navigant. Further, Navigant does not make any express or implied warranty or representation concerning the information contained in this presentation, or as to merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose or function. The intended audience for this guide includes network engineers, cybersecurity professionals, cybersecurity program managers and others that are interested in a general overview and comment on the highlights of cybersecurity for the utility industry. It assumes a reasonable level of general network architecture and administration as well as basic understanding of the major components of electric utility information and operations technology. The guide is not meant to be comprehensive or to be used as the foundation for a robust and complete cybersecurity program.1 1. This paper includes a high-level overview of best practices from various existing standards and includes Navigant’s unique, informed analysis and interpretation of the frameworks in the context of current security threats in the industry and future technologies. These standards include the North American Electrical Reliability Corporation (NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) requirements, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), and others. -
DOE Cybersecurity Strategy and Implementation Plan to Improve the Cybersecurity and Resilience of the Department’S Networks and Systems
U.S. Department of Energy CYBERSECURITY STRATEGY 2018-2020 U.S. Department of Energy Cybersecurity Strategy 2018 - 2020 MESSAGE FROM THE DEPUTY SECRETARY Advancing cybersecurity is a core priority for the Department of Energy (DOE). Our Department is approaching the cybersecurity challenge as an enterprise effort, incorporating assets and capabilities from across our programs and National Laboratories. This DOE CybersecurityStrategy will focus attention on our critical cybersecurity mission of protecting our Federal systems and networks. This Strategy, in concert with the recently-published DOE Multiyear Plan for Energy Sector Cybersecurity, is a significant step toward achieving better coordination of key cyber operations across the Department. In my role as chair of the DOE Cyber Council, I have had the privilege of meeting and working with IT and cybersecurity policy and technical leaders across the Department to advance an enterprise-wide approach to cybersecurity. This Strategy and Implementation Plan reflects the outcome of our efforts and identifies the steps we will take to ensure that cyber resources are allocated across DOE as effectively as possible. It is a crucial roadmap for how to translate our cybersecurity priorities into action to protect the Department's most valuable assets. This plan lays out a number of specific things we must do - or continue to do - in order to ensure the enterprise wide success of our collective cybersecurity mission: • Sharing cyber threat data in near-real time, as well as mitigating those threats by expediting and elevating the analysis of that data using U.S. intelligence assets. • Developing common identity services to allow better collaboration and visibility. -
Common Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities in Industrial Control Systems
Common Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities in Industrial Control Systems May 2011 DISCLAIMER This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the U.S. Government. Neither the U.S. Government nor any agency thereof, nor any employee, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for any third party’s use, or the results of such use, or any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed in this publication, or represents that its use by such third party would not infringe privately owned rights. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Trent Nelson, Project Manager, Idaho National Laboratory; May Chaffin, Cyber Researcher, Idaho National Laboratory iii iv EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Cyber Security Division’s Control Systems Security Program (CSSP) performs cybersecurity vendor assessments, ICS-CERT operations, and asset owner cybersecurity evaluations with the Cyber Security Evaluation Tool (CSET) evaluations for industrial control systems (ICS) to reduce risk and improve the security of ICS and its components used in critical infrastructures throughout the United States. ICS differs from other computer systems because of legacy-inherited cybersecurity weaknesses and the significance of the impact of potential exploitation to the U.S. In 2009,a report titled “Common Cyber Security Vulnerabilities Observed in DHS Industrial Control Systems Assessments” compiled common vulnerabilities identified during 15 security assessments of new ICS products and production ICS installations from 2004 through 2008. Three additional ICS product assessments were performed in 2009 and 2010. This newer, 2010 version is an update to the 2009 version and has been developed to proactively create greater awareness within the ICS community. -
A PRACTICAL METHOD of IDENTIFYING CYBERATTACKS February 2018 INDEX
In Collaboration With A PRACTICAL METHOD OF IDENTIFYING CYBERATTACKS February 2018 INDEX TOPICS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 OVERVIEW 5 THE RESPONSES TO A GROWING THREAT 7 DIFFERENT TYPES OF PERPETRATORS 10 THE SCOURGE OF CYBERCRIME 11 THE EVOLUTION OF CYBERWARFARE 12 CYBERACTIVISM: ACTIVE AS EVER 13 THE ATTRIBUTION PROBLEM 14 TRACKING THE ORIGINS OF CYBERATTACKS 17 CONCLUSION 20 APPENDIX: TIMELINE OF CYBERSECURITY 21 INCIDENTS 2 A Practical Method of Identifying Cyberattacks EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW SUMMARY The frequency and scope of cyberattacks Cyberattacks carried out by a range of entities are continue to grow, and yet despite the seriousness a growing threat to the security of governments of the problem, it remains extremely difficult to and their citizens. There are three main sources differentiate between the various sources of an of attacks; activists, criminals and governments, attack. This paper aims to shed light on the main and - based on the evidence - it is sometimes types of cyberattacks and provides examples hard to differentiate them. Indeed, they may of each. In particular, a high level framework sometimes work together when their interests for investigation is presented, aimed at helping are aligned. The increasing frequency and severity analysts in gaining a better understanding of the of the attacks makes it more important than ever origins of threats, the motive of the attacker, the to understand the source. Knowing who planned technical origin of the attack, the information an attack might make it easier to capture the contained in the coding of the malware and culprits or frame an appropriate response. the attacker’s modus operandi. -
The Future of the Internet (For PDF)
TODAYS PREDICTIONS FOR TOMORROWS INTERNET JOSH PYORRE (SECURITY RESEARCHER) ▸ Cisco Umbrella ▸ NASA ▸ Mandiant THE WORLD IS A MAGICAL PLACE THE INTERNET IN THE 70’S THE INTERNET IN THE 70’S SMALL MAPPING OF ASN’S TO THEIR IPS TO GET A SENSE OF SCALE INTERNET SIZES TODAY INTERNET SIZES TODAY POODLE OCTOBER 14, 2014 BUG IN SSL VERSION 3.0 MITM 256 SSL 3.0 REQUESTS < 1 BYTE ENCRYPTED DATA HEARTBLEED APRIL 7, 2014 BUG IN OPENSSL BUFFER OVER-READ CLIENTS AND SERVERS POST DATA IN USER REQUESTS SESSION COOKIES/PASSWORDS PRIVATE KEYS YAHOO, IMGUR, STACK OVERFLOW, DUCKDUCKGO, PINTREST, REDDIT, AKAMAI, GITHUB, AMAZON WEB SERVICES, INTERNET ARCHIVE, SOUNDCLOUD, TUMBLR, STRIPE, ARS TECHNICA, SPARKFUN, PREZI, SOURCEFORGE, BITBUCKET, FREENODE, WIKIPEDIA, WUNDERLIST, LASTPASS AND A LOT MORE REVERSE HEARTBLEED AFFECTS MILLIONS OF APPS CAN READ CLIENT MEMORY HP SERVER APPS, FILEMAKER, LIBREOFFICE, LOGMEIN, MCAFEE, MSSQL, ORACLE PRODUCTS, PRIMAVERA, WINSCP, VMWARE PRODUCTS, DEBIAN, REDHAT, LINUX MINT, UBUNTU, CENTOS, ORACLE LINUX, AMAZON LINUX, ANDROID, AIRPORT BASE STATIONS, CISCO IOS, JUNIPER FIRMWARE, IPCOP, PFSENSE, DD-WRT ROUTER FIRMWARE, WESTERN DIGITAL DRIVE FIRMWARE… AND A LOT MORE SHELLSHOCK SEPT 14, 2014 BASH IS USED IN INTERNET-FACING SERVICES CGI WEB SERVERS OPENSSH SERVERS DHCP CLIENTS BASH IS USED IN INTERNET-FACING SERVICES PROCESSES REQUESTS ATTACKER CAN SEND EXTRA DATA SECURE HASHING ALGORITHM 3B260F397C573ED923919A968A59AC6B2E13B52D = I HOPE THIS PRESENTATION ISN'T BORING SHA-1 ▸ Dates back to 1995 ▸ Known to be vulnerable to theoretical -
Effective Crisis Response Communication and Data Breaches: a Comparative Analysis of Corporate Reputational Crises
Michael Schonheit s2135485 Master’s Thesis 02/10/2020 Effective Crisis Response Communication and Data Breaches: a comparative analysis of corporate reputational crises Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management Table of Contents 1 1 Introduction 2 Literature Review 2.1 Placing data breaches within the cybersecurity discourse 6 2.2 Paradigm Shift: From Prevention to Mitigation 10 2.3 Data breach by Hacking: A Taxonomy of Risk Categories 12 2.4 Economic and reputational Impact on organizations 15 2.5 Theoretical and empirical communication models for data breaches 16 3 Theoretical Framework 3.1 Organizational Crises: An introduction to framing and perceived responsibility 21 3.2 Attribution Theory and SCCT 23 3.3 Crisis Types and Communication Response Strategies 24 3.4 Intensifying Factors: Crisis Severity, Crisis History, Relationship Performance 25 3.5 Communication Response Strategies 27 3.6 SCCT Recommendations and Data Breaches 30 3.7 SCCT and PR Data Breaches by Hacking 32 4 Methodology 4.1 Operationalizing SCCT in the Context of Data Breaches 35 4.2 Stock Analysis and News Tracking: Assessing cases on varying degrees of reputation recovery 36 4.3 Refining the Case Selection Framework and the Analysis Process 40 4.4 Intra-periodic Analysis and Inter-periodic Analysis 43 5 Analysis 5.1 Narrowing the Scope: Building the Comparative Case Study 44 5.2 Statistical Recovery: Stock and Revenue Analysis 49 5.3 News Media Tracking and Reputation Index Scores 58 6 Discussion 6.1 Intra-periodic Analysis: Assessing Organizational Responses 72 6.2 Inter-periodic analysis: Verifying the Initial Propositions 74 7 Conclusions 77 8 Appendix 79 9 Bibliography 79 1. -
Cybersecurity: Are We Ready in Latin America and the Caribbean?
OBSERVATORY CYBERSECURITY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN Cybersecurity Are We Ready in Latin America and the Caribbean? 2016 Cybersecurity Report www.cybersecurityobservatory.com Organization of American States Organization of American States Copyright © 2016 Inter-American Development Bank. This work is subject to Creative Commons Attribution-NonCom- mercial-NoDerivs IGO 3.0 (CG-IGO 3.0 BY-NC-ND)(http://crea- tivecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/legalcode) and may be reproduced for any non-commercial use providing the respective recognition of the IDB and the OAS. No derivative works allowed. Any disputes regarding the use of the work that cannot be re- solved amicably shall be submitted to arbitration under the UNCITRAL rules. Use of the name of the IDB and/or the OAS for any purpose other than the respective recognition and use of the logo of the IDB and/or OAS are not authorized by this CC-IGO license and require an additional licensing agreement from the corresponding organization. Note that the URL link includes additional terms and condi- tions of this license. The opinions expressed in this publication are of the au- thors and do not necessarily reflect the point of view of the Inter-American Development Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent, or the Organization of American States or the countries that comprise it. Inter-American Development Bank Organization of American States Luis Alberto Moreno Luis Almagro President Secretary General Project Coordination Project Coordination Miguel Porrúa Belisario Contreras e-Government Lead Specialist Cybersecurity Program Manager Global Cyber Security IDB-OAS Technical Team Capacity Centre University of Oxford Kerry-Ann Barrett Prof. -
Software Bug Bounties and Legal Risks to Security Researchers Robin Hamper
Software bug bounties and legal risks to security researchers Robin Hamper (Student #: 3191917) A thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Law by Research Page 2 of 178 Rob Hamper. Faculty of Law. Masters by Research Thesis. COPYRIGHT STATEMENT ‘I hereby grant the University of New South Wales or its agents a non-exclusive licence to archive and to make available (including to members of the public) my thesis or dissertation in whole or part in the University libraries in all forms of media, now or here after known. I acknowledge that I retain all intellectual property rights which subsist in my thesis or dissertation, such as copyright and patent rights, subject to applicable law. I also retain the right to use all or part of my thesis or dissertation in future works (such as articles or books).’ ‘For any substantial portions of copyright material used in this thesis, written permission for use has been obtained, or the copyright material is removed from the final public version of the thesis.’ Signed ……………………………………………........................... Date …………………………………………….............................. AUTHENTICITY STATEMENT ‘I certify that the Library deposit digital copy is a direct equivalent of the final officially approved version of my thesis.’ Signed ……………………………………………........................... Date …………………………………………….............................. Thesis/Dissertation Sheet Surname/Family Name : Hamper Given Name/s : Robin Abbreviation for degree as give in the University calendar : Masters of Laws by Research Faculty : Law School : Thesis Title : Software bug bounties and the legal risks to security researchers Abstract 350 words maximum: (PLEASE TYPE) This thesis examines some of the contractual legal risks to which security researchers are exposed in disclosing software vulnerabilities, under coordinated disclosure programs (“bug bounty programs”), to vendors and other bug bounty program operators. -
A Survey of Consumer Protections Throughout North Carolina's Identity Theft Protection Act
Campbell Law Review Volume 42 Issue 1 Winter 2020 Article 7 2020 Protecting Personal Data: A Survey of Consumer Protections Throughout North Carolina's Identity Theft Protection Act James H. Ferguson III Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr Recommended Citation James H. Ferguson III, Protecting Personal Data: A Survey of Consumer Protections Throughout North Carolina's Identity Theft Protection Act, 42 CAMPBELL L. REV. 191 (2020). This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Campbell Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law. Ferguson: Protecting Personal Data: A Survey of Consumer Protections Throug Protecting Personal Data: A Survey of Consumer Protections Throughout North Carolina's Identity Theft Protection Act ABSTRACT "Data is the pollutionproblem of the information age, andprotecting privacy is the environmental challenge."' You trade it every day. In a technologically-evolved world, our per- sonal data has become a form of currency in the digitalmarketplace. Who is responsiblefor protecting that data? What happens when it is compro- mised? This Comment conducts a descriptive assessment of North Caro- lina's data breach notification law, exploring the legislative history of the Identity Theft Protection Act and comparing the consumer protections found therein to those offered in other states' statutory schemes. Addition- ally, this Comment evaluates the extent to which a statutorily requiredrea- sonable security standard comports with consumer protections, and their competitive interplay with businesses' economic interests. A B STRAC T ...........................................................................................19 1 IN TRO DU CTION ....................................................................................192 I. -
Examining How System Administrators Manage Software Updates
Keepers of the Machines: Examining How System Administrators Manage Software Updates Frank Li Lisa Rogers Arunesh Mathur University of California, Berkeley University of Maryland Princeton University [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Nathan Malkin Marshini Chetty University of California, Berkeley Princeton University [email protected] [email protected] ABSTRACT While prior studies have investigated how end users deal with soft- Keeping machines updated is crucial for maintaining system secu- ware updates [18,19,22,30 –32,35,40,45,46,49,50], there has been rity. While recent studies have investigated the software updating less attention on system administrators, whose technical sophisti- practices of end users, system administrators have received less at- cation and unique responsibilities distinguish them from end users. tention. Yet, system administrators manage numerous machines for Industry reports and guides on administrator patching exist (e.g., their organizations, and security lapses at these hosts can lead to Sysadmin 101 [41]), but these lack peer-review and transparent rig- damaging attacks. To improve security at scale, we therefore also orous methods. Prior academic work on system administrators is need to understand how this specific population behaves and how to often dated and focuses on aspects of administrator operations other help administrators keep machines up-to-date. than updating (e.g., on general tools used [11]) or specific technical (rather than user) updating aspects. Given the critical role that sys- In this paper, we study how system administrators manage software tem administrators play in protecting an organization’s machines, updates. We surveyed 102 administrators and interviewed 17 in- it behooves us to better understand how they manage updates and depth to understand their processes and how their methods impact identify avenues for improved update processes. -
Information Provided by DHS Regarding Russian Scanning Was Incorrect Date: Wednesday, September 27, 2017 12:49:59 PM
From: (b) (6) To: (b) (6) Subject: FW: Information Provided by DHS Regarding Russian Scanning was Incorrect Date: Wednesday, September 27, 2017 12:49:59 PM From: Secretary of State, Press Sent: Wednesday, September 27, 2017 2:58:05 PM To: Secretary of State, Press Subject: Information Provided by DHS Regarding Russian Scanning was Incorrect AP17:073 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE September 27, 2017 CONTACT: Jesse Melgar or Sam Mahood (916) 653-6575 Information Provided by DHS Regarding Russian Scanning was Incorrect SACRAMENTO – California Secretary of State Alex Padilla issued the following statement. “Last Friday, my office was notified by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that Russian cyber actors 'scanned' California’s Internet-facing systems in 2016, including Secretary of State websites. Following our request for further information, it became clear that DHS’ conclusions were wrong.” “DHS confirmed that Russian scanning activity had actually occurred on the California Department of Technology statewide network, not any Secretary of State website. Based on this additional information, California voters can further rest assured that the California Secretary of State elections infrastructure and websites were not hacked or breached by Russian cyber actors.” “Our notification from DHS last Friday was not only a year late, it also turned out to be bad information. To make matters worse, the Associated Press similarly reported that DHS has reversed itself and 'now says Russia didn’t target Wisconsin’s voter registration system,' which is contrary to previous briefings.” epic.org EPIC-17-03-31-DHS-FOIA-20180416-Production-1 000001 NPPD 000650 “The work of our intelligence agencies is critical in defending against cyber threats.