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Software Bug Bounties and Legal Risks to Security Researchers Robin Hamper

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Software bug bounties and legal risks to security researchers Robin Hamper (Student #: 3191917) A thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Law by Research Page 2 of 178 Rob Hamper. Faculty of Law. Masters by Research Thesis. COPYRIGHT STATEMENT ‘I hereby grant the University of New South Wales or its agents a non-exclusive licence to archive and to make available (including to members of the public) my thesis or dissertation in whole or part in the University libraries in all forms of media, now or here after known. I acknowledge that I retain all intellectual property rights which subsist in my thesis or dissertation, such as copyright and patent rights, subject to applicable law. I also retain the right to use all or part of my thesis or dissertation in future works (such as articles or books).’ ‘For any substantial portions of copyright material used in this thesis, written permission for use has been obtained, or the copyright material is removed from the final public version of the thesis.’ Signed ……………………………………………........................... Date …………………………………………….............................. AUTHENTICITY STATEMENT ‘I certify that the Library deposit digital copy is a direct equivalent of the final officially approved version of my thesis.’ Signed ……………………………………………........................... Date …………………………………………….............................. Thesis/Dissertation Sheet Surname/Family Name : Hamper Given Name/s : Robin Abbreviation for degree as give in the University calendar : Masters of Laws by Research Faculty : Law School : Thesis Title : Software bug bounties and the legal risks to security researchers Abstract 350 words maximum: (PLEASE TYPE) This thesis examines some of the contractual legal risks to which security researchers are exposed in disclosing software vulnerabilities, under coordinated disclosure programs (“bug bounty programs”), to vendors and other bug bounty program operators. On their face, the terms of these programs are purported to offer an alternative to security researchers to publicly disclosing or selling discovered bugs, which have significant value and potential for harm if used maliciously, to purchasers who do not intend to use them in order to fix the underlying issues in software. Historically, vendors have deployed a range of legal measures to discourage or eliminate such disclosure. This thesis examines the terms of three popular bug bounty programs (Google, Department of Defence (hosted on HackerOne) and Facebook and considers their effect in the Australian jurisdiction. It examines issues including the application of unfair contracts legislation and unconscionability. It further examines three key case studies in which vendors have sought, or threatened to seek, legal remedies against researchers who have discovered and disclosed vulnerabilities to them under their programs or directly to them in the absence of one. It concludes that while bug bounty programs somewhat advance the previous uncertainty and potentially onerous legal regime, the terms remain asymmetric, largely non-negotiable and vendors may be able to depart from them in certain circumstances. In this context, a range of reforms are suggested in the concluding Chapter which may improve certainty for security researchers, impose greater responsibility on software vendors and, ultimately, create more secure software. Declaration relating to disposition of project thesis/dissertation I hereby grant to the University of New South Wales or its agents the right to archive and to make available my thesis or dissertation in whole or in part in the University libraries in all forms of media, now or here after known, subject to the provisions of the Copyright Act 1968. I retain all property rights, such as patent rights. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis or dissertation. I also authorise University Microfilms to use the 350 word abstract of my thesis in Dissertation Abstracts International (this is applicable to doctoral theses only). …………………………………………………………… ……………………………………..……………… ………7/9/2019.……………………...…….… Signature Witness Signature Date The University recognises that there may be exceptional circumstances requiring restrictions on copying or conditions on use. Requests for restriction for a period of up to 2 years must be made in writing. Requests for a longer period of restriction may be considered in exceptional circumstances and require the approval of the Dean of Graduate Research. FOR OFFICE USE ONLY Date of completion of requirements for Award: Page 1 of 178 Rob Hamper. Faculty of Law. Masters by Research Thesis. School of Law Originality Statement I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge it contains no materials previously published or written by another person, or substantial proportions of material which have been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at UNSW or any other educational institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by others, with whom I have worked at UNSW or elsewhere, is explicitly acknowledged in the thesis. I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, except to the extent that assistance from others in the project's design and conception or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged.’ Signed: Date: Page 3 of 178 Rob Hamper. Faculty of Law. Masters by Research Thesis. INCLUSION OF PUBLICATIONS STATEMENT UNSW is supportive of candidates publishing their research results during their candidature as detailed in the UNSW Thesis Examination Procedure. Publications can be used in their thesis in lieu of a Chapter if: • The student contributed greater than 50% of the content in the publication and is the “primary author”, ie. the student was responsible primarily for the planning, execution and preparation of the work for publication • The student has approval to include the publication in their thesis in lieu of a Chapter from their supervisor and Postgraduate Coordinator. • The publication is not subject to any obligations or contractual agreements with a third party that would constrain its inclusion in the thesis Please indicate whether this thesis contains published material or not. ☒ This thesis contains no publications, either published or submitted for publication Some of the work described in this thesis has been published and it has been ☐ documented in the relevant Chapters with acknowledgement This thesis has publications (either published or submitted for publication) ☐ incorporated into it in lieu of a chapter and the details are presented below CANDIDATE’S DECLARATION I declare that: • I have complied with the Thesis Examination Procedure • where I have used a publication in lieu of a Chapter, the listed publication(s) below meet(s) the requirements to be included in the thesis. Name Signature Date (dd/mm/yy) Rob Hamper 7/9/2019 Postgraduate Coordinator’s Declaration I declare that: • the information below is accurate • where listed publication(s) have been used in lieu of Chapter(s), their use complies with the Thesis Examination Procedure • the minimum requirements for the format of the thesis have been met. PGC’s Name PGC’s Signature Date (dd/mm/yy) NA Page 4 of 178 Rob Hamper. Faculty of Law. Masters by Research Thesis. Table of Contents Chapter 1 - Introduction ................................................................................................................. 9 1.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 9 1.2 Research Question ................................................................................................................ 11 1.3 Introducing Software Vulnerabilities, Bugs and their Source ............................................... 11 1.4 Research Methodology ......................................................................................................... 14 1.5 Thesis Structure .................................................................................................................... 16 Chapter 2 – History, Themes and Literature Review .................................................................... 18 2.1 Vulnerability Disclosure: History and Literature Review ...................................................... 18 2.2 Bug Bounties: History and Literature Review ....................................................................... 29 2.3 Legal Framework: Overview and Literature Review ............................................................. 38 2.4 “Hacker” Ethics: History and Literature Review ................................................................... 42 2.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 45 Chapter 3 - Why Software Matters ............................................................................................... 46 3.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 46 3.2 Why Software Matters .......................................................................................................... 46 3.3 Mobile Devices .....................................................................................................................
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