U_seof forlg Standar.dsfor pSeceOf$cers D

iby: SusanOuo.*^y,4r"rf$t Counrf Attomey

Introduction T'bisitttelligence brie,f addresset; the legal standards applied by the courtsin useof forceclairns broughtby ment.irllyor emotionallydisturbed threats against law enforcementor correctionsdeputies. Duringtlie lastf(,w years the courtshave becorne increasingly concemed about law enforcementand conectionsoffict,:rs using for,:e to controlthe actions of emotionallyancl mentally disturbed arrestees and-inmates, Although the cr:ufts have not yetmandated that law enforcementagencies implement differentuse of li;rcepolicier; for dealingwith mentallyill arresteesor inmatesthan the policiesused for de-alinggenerally with arrest,:resor inmates, the courts have indicated that the mentdl state of thethreat is oneof ths factorsthat must tre considered under a totalityof tlie circumstancestest, Forpurposes of this menlo,tlueats have been categorized b),thlee stages in thecriminal justice pr{)cess each of whichcarries its own respectil'r:constitutional rights: (l) thethleat on thestreet in an arrestsiruation, (2) the threatin custodypost-anest, but pre-a.r:raignment, and (3) thetlueat post-an'aignrnent, either pre-or post conviction.Gene,r6lly, the saLme legal standard applies on the streetand during post-arrest, pre- anaignmentcustody, that is, lawful forceis thatforce which is objectivelyreasonable fl'om the peace officer'sperspective at thetime the forceis use

tionallv D ts: On the Str and Arraisnment TileNintir Circuithas not adopteda per serule establishing two differentclassifications of suspects:mentall'/ disabled persons and serious criminals, Nor hasthe Ninth Clircuitadopted a requirementfor t\v'odifferent use of forcepolicies for thosetwo classifications.lnstead, the Ninth Circuithas mphat ized that lv,[tere it is or shouldbe apparentto the officersthat the individual involvedin a rtserf forceis r:nentallyor emotionallydisturbecf the threat's mental or emotionalstate is a factorthat ntust b': considered.in determining'rxtthe.reasonableness of the forceemployed." (Emphasis added)Deorle v. ,t\utherfdyd,'272F.3d1Z7Z,l2B3 (9th Cir. 2001). TheCourt reasoned ttrat while pliysicalcontrol tactics can be successfullyused in subduing criminalthreats, ,e,motionally disfurbed threats might become more agitated with the useof thosesame tactic;s:

PLAINTIFF'S .clt EXHIBIT I Ig (u-ro.r3sB. Ma I rlJse Page2 of force:,. Emotionailyor MentalryDisturbed rtu.eats 'l'he problem.sposed by, and thus the tactics to be employedagainst, an unamted,errrotionally distraught individual wlro is creatingu disrurbun.. cr resistinganest are ordinariiy different frorn those involved in law , tlnforcementefforts to subduean armedand dangerous criminal who has rocentlycommitted a seriousoffense. In theformer instance, increasing tlteuse of forcemay, in somecircumstances at least, exacerbate the srituation; in drelatter, a heighteneduse of less-than-lethalforc;e will ttliuallybe helpfulin bringinga dangeroussituation to a swift end.ln the crseof mentrillyunbalanced persons, the use of officersand others frained irr the.art_ofc,ounseiingis ordinarily advisable, where feasible, and may lri ovidethe bestmeans of endinga crisis.(citation omifted) Deorle,272F'3c:l at 1282-1283.Theref,rre, using physical control on an ernotionaliydisfurbed person whpis displafrL,r; static,active, or ontinouslevJs oiresistance(in a forcecontinuum) without an imminentthreat r:f physical.harrn may be unreasonable. Moreover, the Deorlecase indicates that peace officersshould ei.therhave s'ome skills ,ceveloped for dealingwith mentallyand e,notionatty distur-bed threats,other tharrthe use of'physical crlntrol iactics, or shouldhave ready access to persons,e.g., counselors,who lo havesuch skills. Of course,,where a split seconddecision must be made clue to a threatposed by an emotionally disturbedpersont, the normaluse of f

ional turbed Post-ar rnent:Pre-sent Convic mates Auseofflr>rcethatsh.cckstlreconscienceis..condu.ti@'thut camot justifie,,J ***" be by anygo'r'emment interest basedon thetotality of the circumstancesat the time' Countyof {i,tcramentov. Lewis,523U.S. 833,849 (1986). Two excessiveforce claims that exist in ajail seftingare a FourteenthAmendment substantive due procrrs claim by pre-triaidetainees, and an Eighth Amendmt:,ntcruel and unusual punishment claim by inmates.The legalstandard for bothclaims is a shocks-the-ccnscience standard. The legal sigrrificance of themental or emotionalstate of a post- anaignmentdeta:iliee is lessenedby the government'sstrong interest in jail securiry,. Page3 (Jseof force., Emotionallyor MentailyDisturbed rhreats

In a use'f for:ceclaim broughtby a post-anaignmentdetainee, the Ninth circuit hasfound that "Fc'rc€ doesnot amountto a constifutionalviolation iiit is appliedin a goodfaith effon to rest're discipline.andotder 'maliciously Tdlgl andsadistically foi ihevery purpose of causingharm.,,i Clgmentr. QsTn:p2,298F.3d 898, 903 19'h Cir, 2002)(ciiingWittey-v.-Al|ers,475 U.S. ltz,lzo-zt (1986)). Besider;the use of fbrcecontinuum elements, addltional factors affecting whether the use of forcewas constirutional include:

a the extenlof injury inflicted*** a whetherthe useof fcrrcecould plausibly have been thought necessary, *:** theextent of thetlueat to thesafety of staffand inmates, as reasonably perceivedby theresponsible officials on thebasis of the factsknown ., to them, and n at'y efforLsmade to temperthe severify of a foreefulresponse.. Witl ey,47:t U.S. zrt32.1 o Thereis :noclear direction from the Ninth Circuitor the SupremeCourt on exactlyhow the mentalor emotionalstate of a ttrreatcould affect legal analysis under the "shocks-the-conscience" standard,if at ali I-Iowever,given the l.linth Circuit'sgrowing concern with the mentalstate of an'estees, it is failto assumethat the emotionalor mentalstate of a threatcould be consideredby a court jury or to be a fac'torin evaluatingthe good faith of theuse of for'ceby peaceofficers. This is especially fruein light of th,t:fact that emotionally disfurbed, pre-sentence detainees have a right to restorative freatment.or. Aa'vocacyCtr, v. Mink,322F.3d1101, I lzz (gthCir. 2003)("Becauie incapacitated criminaldefendants have not beenconvicted of anycdme, they liave an inierestin fi-eedomfrom incarceration.Tb.t:y alsohave a libertyinterest in receivingresiorative ffeatment lto restoreto competencya per,son lbund unfit to proc:eedwith theirlegal defense].")(Citations ,rmitted)). Giventhe Ninth Circuit'sruling in Mink.using physical force against an emotionallydisturbed tbreatwho has nr: t receivedrestorative heatment could be determinedto-be "shoctring" if alternatives suchas counselin;g or persuaclingthe threat to voluntarilysubmit to prescribedpsychJropics were available,coui