The National Museum of Ti If Pacific War Center For
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THE NATIONAL MUSEUM OF TI IF PACIFIC WAR (Niinitz fVIuseLIIn) CENTER FOR PACIFIC WAR STUDIES Fredericksburg, TX 78624 Interview with JOHN H. HOAG LAND U. S. NAVY ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW JOHN H. [IOAG LAND This is Stanley Jensen. Today is Friday, September 17, 2004, and I am interviewing Dr. John [loagland. This interview is taking place at the Admiral Nimitz Museum offices in Fredericksburg. Texas. This interview is in the support of the Center for Pacific War Studies, archives for the National Museum of the Pacific War, Texas Parks and Wildlife, for the preservation of historical information related to this site. Doctor, if you want to start off and tell US where you were born and something about your parents, your family. DR. [IOAGLAND: Okay, thank you. I was born in Woodhaven, New York, which is part of New York City now, I think the Queens. Soon after that, moved to Columbus, Ohio, grew tip around Columbus, Ohio, until my junior year of high school when I moved to Washington, D. C.. gradtiated from high school Washington, interesting experience. For example we had free street car passes and in the summer between junior and senior year high school we’d usually go down to the senate two or three times a week because that’s the only air conditioned place we could get to, so we saw a lot in those days. I went to college at Oberlin College, graduated in history and economics in June ‘41 , was active in various campus activities, started working making machine guns and airplane propellers at Frigidaire Division, General Motors until I enlisted in the navy. I went in the navy becatise I didn’t want to go in the army. But meanwhile I crammed in an awful lot of engineering at University of Dayton and then Ohio State before being called up to active duty. [took the navy seriously and had a fairly big voice and gave a good “here, sir” to the first roll of us scared midshipmen. Company commander said that was the way he wanted to hear it and my neck got stuck out. I didn’t pull it back and ended tip being battalion commander of our midshipman class, second in my class out of, oh, thirteen or sixteen hundred or something like that; had a choice of duty and was going to go to submarines but my fiancée, now wife, talked me out of it, so I ended tip going to something secret at that time, radar school. Navy sent me to 1-larvard and then MIT and then to the radar maintenance school in Pearl Harbor; wanted me to stay there and teach and I suggested no, send me forward so I can see what this is like in action. So I went forward in late August of ‘44. 1 had chosen a ship that just happened to have Halsey’s name on it, a destroyer, and turned out I was on special assignment with Admiral Halsey’s staff. I was a specialist in radar on a three-man team. The other two men were fighter directors. Basically we were to take over control of aircraft if the carriers weren’t there or had been knocked otit. We were to control the aircraft, and as long as my equipment was working I couldl usually station myself where I wanted. I seldom stood watch. Our three-man team was never a part of ship’s company, and we may never haven even appeared on Halsey’s staff. We served first on the destroyer LEWIS HANCOCK, then the destroyer NEW JERSEY and then on the USS BRUSH. We went on that on December 1944, and set up the first picket ship with the advanced fleet to beat the karnikazes. On the LEWIS 1-IANCOCK we escorted Halsey’s NEW JERSEY from Pearl 1-larbor to Mantis. One of the interesting things that happened was that the NEW JERSEY wanted to test its guns so they sent us out on the horizon and said we’ll shoot at you; we’ll put an offset into our computer. It was a very calm, nice day. We could see them over there on the horizon, the guns fire, we could see the shells coming, and we hoped that offset was there, but I can tell you its guns were very accurate because they landed right in the middle of our wake of the destroyer. That is the only time that I know of that the NEW JERSEY fired its 7 gulls as long as I was associated with it. So anyway we got transferred to the battleship NEW JERSEY. I usually helped my two olhcers who were fighter directors. We served usually in the combat information center on the NEW JERSEY , we had all the information coming into us with a big plexiglass screen in front of us and radars nearby and communications. I usually worked with them. MR. JENSEN: What were fighter directors? DR. HOAGLAND: Fighter directors were ones who control aircraft. MR. JENSEN: Like an air traffic control man? DR. HOAGLAND: You could call them that. For example, if we were away from the carriers and we had combat air patrol tip above, we would control them, tell them what we wanted and that sort of thing. A very interesting thing, when we would break port, the three of us (I was an ensign to start with, Ens.j.g. and the other two were jgs, Lt.jgs.), we would have the same orders as Admiral Halsey from what I understand. They would be in blond paper wrappers, sealed. We’d break port, we’d open them up, they may have been a half inch, three quarters inch thick. fascinating reading. They told us what we expected the Japanese to do and what we were expected to do. Halsey, as far as I’m concerned, has been very much maligned for his actions that he took in the battle of Leyte Gulf. I never bothered to read much about this because I was there, but this spring there was a TV program by Oliver North on Leyte Gulf, and I felt it was wrong. There is a recent well-written new book on that last battle of the tin cans or something that involved the battle of Leyte Gulf and Halsey, and I felt it was wrong. I felt it was time I told the navy historians some of the things that I knew. So when I called up, it turned out that this program here was coming up and they asked me to participate. That’s the reason I’m here — because I think I know a lot of things that have not been made clear about the battle of Leyte 9 2 Gulf, if you want me to get into that... MR. JENSEN: Yes, I’d like to know. DR. IIOAGLAND: All right, I think what happened is, I may have mentioned this, the official military historian appointed by Roosevelt was Samuel Elliott Morrison. I think he was a good writer but in lily estimation a bad historian. I have always tried to teach my graduate students in business that I taught for many years how to do historical research. You go for the facts and try. if the facts are published by somebody else, what’s the bias of the person publishing them. But look for the basic facts and then add your biases. I think Morrison started with his biases and then distorted the facts because many people — and since accepting this I read a fair amount on what people said about Leyte Gulf — and none of them have it right. I think Morrison’s the one that led them astray, and I’m interested in checking with people. The Third Fleet was the attack fleet, the advance fleet, and from tile time I knew him, let’s say September to December ‘44. we were in action a great deal of the time. We attacked Ryukyus, Formosa, Okinawa, Luzon. We were in battle an unusual amount of time. What people don’t realize — and then the key battles were battles with the Center Fleet and then when 1-lalsey went north to get the carriers. Incidentally, I happened to be in Halsey’s flag plot, probably October 23d, rechecking on some radar that I had repaired. And I saw a very unique chart, oh, about the size of a desk top, with a black line coming out of Borneo. I asked an adjacent commander if I could look at it and he said, “Oh, sure, we’re on the same team.” I just asked him what is that black line, and he said, “That’s the Japanese coming out of Borneo.” Our submarines gave us that information. Now, whether it’s just the dancer and darters Iprobably means Dace and Darterl or whatever they were with the submarines or the more — I don’t know. But we had information 4 24h• they were coming. The Third Fleet struck the Central Fleet solid hard on October We stink many ships including super battle ships. I listened to the pilots all day long as they attacked. We did turn them around. Now, there is a Japanese program called Sho—Go or something like that in which they planned to come through with a Southern Fleet, Central Fleet and Northern Fleet to attack us. People don’t look at when that plan was devised and what the Japanese conditions were when they exectited it because they, I think, were all going to try to all hit at the same time and stop the landing on Leyte.