,-,1-----· ORIGINAL t,;, '',, I) ·,:.'. ., ...... , ./.. ,... ) ,,..,0'i • l.J) ;I';.i~\1 1,. J. • .;.. FILED BY: .J(;tt!}Soq'.: f'''; ~.. ·v1:I) ..... ;':i• ■'!'.· ...... -- ... --.,t,-_, ., DATE: JGV\\i\CtlZ~') '\£, • .. 'f . -·,··: '. .. ,., ,·,· ·. •,:' ;,, ,,': ,,.., ;.'.: :.(. ,:~· .\ ·},. ",t· ,,,•··~· \M 14 il1 2: I 0 ,:,/:urar1s m•itktbl1iE•N·B·WNiC . '.'\ > '.:' ·.,' !•·': / •\··J :::} y .r .:.:· .'. · , :. ,.w,th,n 1 HOUR, · ·, ··· ; · 1 ,. ;::,_ .-:·'.: :·,- _, ..':" .··, ' :;_, _,.:··,.:,'\\': .; ): ·,:J•"·,.:f. ::.,\:i ;._' '1':' ._\·' ,,[o~R~ 8~rr1cc 'NT DIVISION ,,,· (As per EN BANC Memorandum.·dated Jan':'::22/2013) .!'· EI VE D .D. OJ..1'..JJ JJ.L V J.O.LVli . t~ C.. . \.l~iw, 1 lt 2015
AMADEA.ANGELA K. AQUINO ;6-:1-~ Petitioner, ~...... ---~ -~------~-"•~-. ,,/-··· .,,., ~~;. No. 208912 '\) ( // . '------·"•··-·-·•--" ...... - _.. ... SUPREM''. COURT - versus- Of'F1CE OF THE cu;1u, OF COURT ENDANC RECEIVED JAN RODOLFO C. AQUINO, Respondent, BY: ~ ~ TIME: =1~/'. ~ : x------x G.R. No. 209018 - versus-
•' • r·;, C ·. ,· · 11 1·1· ,<'·. t'" \.,... •• •• .,., ... ", ,, : '! '·1·'1:t1\]1·1·ti:i.. •.ui. 'I! ,1,•~c:•.• ~·1·••\1 !1,iill• , ... ti: \(:{''• T,~T-:•1 \f"J!•;1;1·, I [; • I•. ,,J"/"'-'• • '•/ ,\11,I ,,' '•I I '.srl,.. ~-,.,.~ \~ '' .... ··• \ '°\i' ·)·•. ;• ,' :·,'I I.': i} (i ·, i'.• /_',;._'.• :,,; i.'i '.',. :'\. ·: f.1 .. 1 t1 , ...... -· ··1·· ' ,, '"'( ABDULLAH C. AQUINO, £.OSTED. r~i.•111'.!:ll:•mJ.llrnJ:,Jl;l~~;.,,i:~~!! Respondent, •, x------x ORIGU\fl\~- i\NDJ .• . ,i~-. C.O.PIE' CONSOLIDATED REPLY ' (To Abdullah C. Aquino's Comment dated October 9, 2014 and Rodolfo C. Aquino's Comment dated October 20, 2014)
Petitioner, AMADEA ANGELA K. AQUINO, through counsel, by way of Reply to respondent Abdullah Aquino's Com1nent dated October 9, 2014 and respondent Rodolfo C. Aquino's Comment dated October 20, 2014, respectfully states:
Respondents rely on inapplicable technical rules to deprive petitioner of her status and right as an heir of the decedent, Miguel T. Aquino. :~·~,.. 1. Yet again, respondents emphasize inapplicable technical requirements under the Family Code to persuade this Court that petitioner has not established her status as a ,~~.I I'\ I \AX 11•:
!1!: ,_. ")'"7/' 11 Ii ..-·- '- < 1k --- ., . ..Jltol, 1/;I ! i Ii
.pd of the decedent's son, Arturo C. Aquino (Arturo), and so :1 {not entitled to inherit by right of representation from the :/1
bedent Miguel T. Aquino (Miguel). i1i11 ii : 2. Respondents would stress the purported i' pplicability of Article 1 72 of the Family Code to Amadea ·I ,_1,,,, I: .rigela Aquino (Amadea), but admit that Amadea's father, !)r, (fruro, died before her birth. Notably, Articles 172 and 175 of ·.~:.Family Code respectively provide:
. "Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children 1s I! •(I established by any of the following:
,:,,,, (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a finaljudgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document ii::I "I or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the I! '" parent concerned. ··: Ii" \:I In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate 1;1 ., filiation shall be proved by: ,.!:' 'I i' (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a •[I legitimate child; or Iii (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and (i special laws. l
XXX XXX XXX :1
"Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their · illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on · the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)"
3. Given the circumstance of Amadea's birth vis-a-vis /r father's demise, it is, therefore, unreasonable, illogical, .~d; even absurd to require Amadea to produce a public '\::ument or private handwritten instrument "signed by the .rent concerned" for a dead man cannot plausibly sign a cument to prove the filiation of his child.
4. With more reason, A1nadea cannot be expected to stitute filiation proceedings to establish her posthumous :liation within the period fixed in Article 175 in relation to
2 1 ii Ii!' ,·1l 2?:; !
'/'. /. 1:. 1· 1I• i!, 'I' :),Article 172 of the Family Code, i.e., during the lifetime of /1/ 111 :.Arturo, for obvious reason: the said period had already lapsed 1'1,, ::I even before she was born. I I:· 1 ill1 lfli 5. Clearly, subsumed if not underpinning the second '1!11
:paragraph of Article 172 and Article 175 of the Family Code is I!··11 i.i,I ! 1: the assumption that the named parent was still alive when the 11/1 ·child was born and had continued to live for a period of time. },, ' As Amadea's father died before she was born, the technical 'requirements of Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code are •.. both inapplicable to Amadea's case.
6. Nonetheless, intent on urging this Court to · .. unjustifiably deny Amadea her rights as a child of Arturo, ' , respondent Abdullah points out that, pursuant to Bernabe v. Alejo, 1 Amadea should have had filed an action for recognition · within four (4) years from attaining the age of majority. Yet, respondent Abdullah himself admits that Bernabe was . promulgated only in 2002, or two (2) years after the period ., provided to commence the suit for recognition therein had . already lapsed for petitioner Amadea. As respondent Abdullah , . himself concedes, Amadea attained the age of majority in 1996 · and so only had, following his thesis, until 2000 to institute · the action.
7. The Honorable Court had once held that, in parallel . · with Articles 42 and 8 3 of the Civil Code, its decisions have no retroactive effect and should be applied prospectively, unless : expressly provided otherwise.4 Hence, this Honorable Court's pronouncements in Bernabe are not applicable to petitioner (1·11: '·Iilll , Amadea. Furthermore, in Bernabe the alleged illegitimate I i1 child was born during the lifetime of the alleged father, who died when the alleged illegitimate child was already at least twelve (12) yea.rs old, in the instant case, on the other hand, Amadea's father, Arturo, died before her birth. Thus, the case of Bernabe is not on all fours with the instant case. 1111
8. Without any law or rule in context squat~ 1·. applicable to petitioner Amadea's situation, an illegitimate 1:1 1!1 1,1 1G.R. No. 140500. January 21, 2002. 11' 2 Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the 1i:,\I contrary is provided. 3 Article 8. Judicial laws applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines. 4 Co v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100776 October 28, 1993.
3 2i1(,
.$umous child, the trial court correctly employed the j.ri "' . . . .9Jple of estoppel to the case at bar observing: that "the \heirs did not deny, challenge or qualify any ofthe claims yant Amadea Aquino. They all rely on technicalities 1·ot one of them belied the claims of Amaaea all of ort her nosition that she has , been in :~in:uous possession of the status of an acknowledJ?ed :tura:l child of Arturo Aquino."5 Thus, the dispositive .. hof the RTC Order reads: :-f· ,,. "ACCORDINGLY, Amadea Angela K. Aquino is hereby 1!konsidered and declared an acknowledged natural child or ::legitimated child of Arturo C. Aquino for purposes of determining her share in the estate of her grandfather, Miguel T. Aquino, in representation of her father Arturo C. Aquino and pending the distribution of the residual estate, the Administrator is hereby directed to immediately give her a>:imonthly allowance of P64,000.00 upon the latter's posting a-,bond of Pl00,000.00."
-:i,'',;; ~1,~'.~ndents Abdullah and . dolf<> are now estopped 11\1~' ,;(claiming that Amadea LQb,the daughter of their ''.fiel'.· and a rightful heir ·:~e.:>decedent, Miguel T . !illo·.
To recall, the trial court observed the following:
: "In the Motion to be Included in the Distribution and Partition of the Estate, it is alleged:
"6. It was Arturo Aquino's family, particularly his father Miguel Aquino (grandfather of the movant), who provided for the medical expenses of the yet unborn child of his son.xxx 7. Immediately after she was born, herein movant and her mother lived with the Aquino family at their ancestral home xxx ·
8. xxx one of her godparents was Abdullah Aquino, brother of her father xxx
From the time of her birth until at present, herein movant has been recognized by the Aquino clan as the natural child of Arturo Aquino xxx
, 10. XXX
',i' 5 · RTC Order dated April 22, 2005, p. 2. Emphasis and derscoring supplied.
4 ....,•'j !,~··"!- ,.
11. Miguel Aquino supported herein movant since birth and spent for her education from kinder to college xxx
12. The deceased gave a parcel of commercial lot to the movant xxx
13. XXX 14. The employees of the Aquino clan also know movant to be a member of the Aquino family xxx" These allegations are all admitted by Abdullah C. Aquino in his Comment to the Petition on November 17, 2003. Furthermore, movant was named after her grandmother Amadea C. Aquino, the mother of her late father, Arturo Aquino." (Emphasis supplied)
10. Notably, the foregoing acts alleged by petitioner ,and admitted by respondent Abdullah are the acts of the .·· decedent, Miguel T. Aquino, whose intestate estate is up for distribution among his heirs. The decedent himself recognized .Amadea as his granddaughter, the child of his son, as evinced •· ,by the following events and circumstances: (a) he supported A1nadea even before she was born providing for the medical expenses of her then pregnant 1nother; (b) he provided for her · education from kinder to college; (c) he gave her allowance for . ,her travels abroad; (d) he allowed A1nadea to use his surname; (e) he let her live in his own home; and, (f) before he breathed •. his last, on his deathbed, Miguel in a gesture of affection usually reserved only for im1nediate relatives one leaves behind, included Amadea in his last instruction regarding the ··distribution of the most valuable assets of his patrimony .
11. Parenthetically, the last instructions that the decedent Miguel T. Aquino gave on his deathbed as to who . shall share his assets named only members of ithe Aquino clan and his heirs, not strangers.6 Without a doubt, the decedent
6 Respondent Abdullah in his Comment to the Petition (for the · Intestate Estate) enumerated the properties and recipients named by , his father on his deathbed:
3. On 2 July 1999, shortly before his death and knowing the same was drawing· near, Miguel T. Aquino imparted upon his heirs and/ or devisees and legatees his desire and unqualified intention to have portions of his estate settled and distributed, as follows: • The ½ hectare property beside Rodolfo "Pinley" C. I Aquino's residence shall belong to Rodolfo C. Aquino. · s •)~, 0 ._ - 0
\~i' ,'ss:'; recognized petitioner Amadea as a member of his ~~fhis:granddaughter and heir. ! '!,'' ,,
>1:2. Respondents Rodolfo and Abdullah ti:iemselves, .. ,\tcrthe present controversy, have not challenged the fact }iA.madea enjoyed the continuous possession of.'the status I/child of their deceased brother, Arturo, and the grandchild ~their father, the decedent, Miguel T. Aquino. Consider: they ,111)1~1•1,\,''"wed . petitioner back to the ancestral home i and even ,,,,' ' lemented their father's last instruction to give to Amadea './Jot opposite the LTA building. They should now be '.luded from going against their actions in their unjust uest to exclude their niece from the estate of her father's Miguel. Ii~er'.'W'
13. The recognition of Amadea as his heir made by the edent, Miguel Aquino, and the rest of his family including
• The house occupied by Linda T. Aquino (surviving wife of Miguel T. Aquino's son who predeceased him, the late Wilfredo "Baby" C. Aquino) shall belong to her. i \• The MTA Building along Bolcan and Cabagui Street; shall belong to Irene Aquino (Miguel T. Aquino's second wife) . • The Aquino Coliseum and Cabaguio Hotel shall belong to Abdullah "Nonoy" C. Aquino. . • One ( 1) door of the MTA Building shall belong to Miguel Luis "Miko" Aquino (Miguel T. Aquino's grandson by Abdullah "Nonoy" C. Aquino. • "No man shall enter the Big House" (Miguel T. Aquino's residence). • Irene Aquino shall be refunded all her gasoline expenses. · • The lot in front of the Linda T. Aquino's ("LTA") residence along Bolcan Street, shall belong to Ainadea Angela "Maggie" Kho Aquino. .· • Miguel Luis "Miko" Aquino shall take charge of the administration of the Davao Motel and Annex. • One (PM) Million Pesos shall be given to Tristan Aquino (son of the late Wilfredo C. Aquino's illegitimate daughter
Amparo Milagros T. Aquino). ! The rentals from the Arendain property shall belong to Irene Aquino. . . 4. The foregoing instructions were dictated. by Miguel ;.. T. Aquino on his deathbed to, and duly recorded in writing 1;u:bY, his grandson Miguel Luis "Miko" Aquino in the presence .. :of, and as witnessed by petitioner Rodolfo "Pinky" C. Aquino.
6 ~'?9
\(', ,:, ,the respondents herein, is analogous to the recognition of the nilclren made in Tongoy v. Court of Appeals, 7 viz:
"Both the trial court and the respondent appellate court have found overwhelming evidence to sustain the following conclusions: that Amado P. Tongoy, Ricardo P. Tongoy, Cresenciano P. Tongoy and Norberto P. Tongoy were born illegitimate to Antonina Fabello on August 19, 1910 (Exh, A), August 12,1914 (Exh. B), December 1, 1915 (Exhs. C and C- 1) and August 4, 1922 (Exh. D), respectively; that Francisco Tongoy was their father; that said Francisco . Tongoy had before them two legitimate children by his first wife, namely, Luis D. Tongoy and Patricio D. Tongoy; that Francisco Tongoy and Antonina Pabello were married sometime before his death on September 15, 1926 (Exh. H); that shortly thereafter, Luis D. Tongoy and Patricio D. Tongoy executed an Extra-Judicial Declaration of . Heirs, leaving out their half-brothers Amado, Ricardo, Cresenciano, and Norberto, who were then still minors; that respondents Amado, Ricardo, Cresenciano and Norberto were known and accepted by the whole clan as children of Francisco; that they had lived in Hacienda Pulo with their parents, but when they went to school, they stayed in the old family home at Washington Street, Bacolod, together with their grandmother, Agatona Tongoy, as well as with the Sonoras and with Luis and Patricio Tongoy; that everybody in Bacolod knew them to be part of the Tongoy-Sonora clan; and that Luis D. Tongoy as administrator of Hacienda Pulo, also spent for the education of Ricardo Tongoy until he became a lawyer; and that even petitioners admit the fact that they were half-brothers of the late Luis D. Tongoy."
"The bone of contention, however, hinges on the absence of an acknowledgment through any of the modes recognized by the Old Civil Code (please see Articles 131 and 135 of the Old Civil Code), such that legitimation could not have taken place in view of the provisions of Art. 121 of the same Code which states that "children shall be considered legitimated by a subsequent marriage only when they have been acknowledged by the parents before or after the celebration thereof."8 (Emphasis supplied)
14. Thus, the doctrine on estoppel applied in Tongoy as follows should similarly be made to apply in petitioner ·, Amadea's case:
" ... [E]stoppel should also operate in this case in favor of appellees, considering, as already explained in detail, that ~
7G.R. No. L-45645 June 28, 1983, 123 SCRA 99. 8 Ibid at pp. 125-126.
7 :~BO
. _ have always been treated as acknowledged and egitimated children of the second marriage of Francisco }bngoy, not only by their presumed parents who raised them a:s:'their children, but also by the entire Tongoy-Sonora clan, focluding Luis D. Ton.gay himself who had furnished $Ustenance to the clan in his capacity as administrator of Hacienda Pulo and had in fact supported the law studies of 'appellee Ricardo P. Tongoy in Manila, the same way ·he did y,jth Jesus T. Sonora in his medical studies. As already pointed out, even defendants-appellants have not questioned the fact that appellees are half-brothers of Luis D. Tongoy. S:A.s a matter of fact, that they are really children of Francisco '.-Tongoy and Antonina Pabello, and only the technicality that trieir acknowledgment as natural children has not been fch"malized in any of the modes prescribed by law appears to stand in the way of granting them their hereditary rights. But estoppel, as already indicated, precludes defendants appellants from attacking appellees' status as acknowledged natural or legitimated children of li'rancisco Tongoy. In addition to estoppel, this is decidedly one instance when technicality should give 1way to conscience, equity and justice (cf. Vela. de Sta. Ana ;:vs. Rivera, L-22070, October 29, 1966,18 SCRA 588) [pp . 1196-198, Vol. 1, rec.)."9 (Emphasis and underscoring Jr supplied)
Contrary to respondents' posture, the application of ppel in petitioner's case does not vest in her a new right ,do.oes not own. Instead, the application of the doctrine ··,1c1. do no 1nore than to affirm the status that petitioner had :.fnuously enjoyed as a result of the decedent's and the pohden ts' very acts. f.i('"'·i'. ,•.,.·, ;bndents cannot now
f,,1oduce ,' . evidence that
1.v,.e\. ,.. ·.' not been introduced •·'.i•,: _\,•,\_::,, offered in the trial rt;
16. In a vain attempt to throw a monkey wrench at [:tioner Amadea's legitimate claim, respondent Abdullah 'ended in his Comment a birth certificate purportedly [ed by the National Statistic Office (NSO) showing that Jtioner Amadea was sired by one "Enrique Ho." Clearly, r ,·;.·,iP.·ondent neglect to consider one. of the primary and g .fiyielding principles established by decisional law. /./,.·· . ~·•· . ri,}1'.,,'..
9 Id. at p. 127.
8 ~81
1 7. Time and again, this Honorable Court held that it is liot a trier of facts an.d it is not within its province to review ·and evaluate anew factual matters; this Honorable Court is }not the proper forum for the ventilation and substantiation of fa.ctual issues. 10 Hence, the respondents stepped out of bounds in expecting that this Court should entertain factual matters and consider evidence that had not been analyzed and weighed by both the trial and appellate courts.
.· 18. Indeed, the said birth certificate appended by i,respondent Abdullah was not offered before the trial court. {Hence, it cannot provide any evidentiary weight to sway this :,Honorable Court to rule for or against the petitioner or the :X,espondents. 11 Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is 1 ::: e~plici t:
Sec. 34. Offer of evidence. - The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
19. A proper inquiry into, and evaluation of the veracity and authenticity of, the said birth certificate by the trial court is therefore a prerequisite before this Honorable Court can take cognizance of such evidentia1y matter.
20. In fact, a closer look at the birth certificate ; :purportedly issued by the NSO appended by respondent ,Abdullah juxtaposed with the certificate issued by the Davao .. Doctors Hospital, also so attached by the said respondent, l. readily puts into suspect the authenticity of the birth certificate supposedly issued by NSO.
21. The "late registered" birth certificate indicates that "Maria Angela" was born on October 9, 1978 in the residence of her supposed father at "485 Lakan~bini St." in Caloocan , City. Yet, the certificate issued by the Davao Doctors Hospital
, 10 Titan Construction Corporation v. David, Sr., G.R. No. 16954d / ,March 15, 2010, 615 SCRA 362, 363; Landbank of the Philippines ~\ Spouses Costo, G.R. No. 174647, December 5, 2012; Dihiansan v. Court · of Appeals, 237 Phil. 695, 701-703 (1987); Madrigal v. Court of Appeals, /:. 496 Phil. 149, 156-157 (2005), dting Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. h No. 101680, December 7, 1992, 216 SCRA 224; Far Eastern Surety and ;, Insurance Co., Inc. v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170618, November 20, 2013. 11 Grande v. Antonio, G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014 .
9 282
Fthat petitioner "Angela Amadea/Maggie Aquino" was .y/born or admitted to the hospital as a consequence of ibirth living" from October 9 to 12, 1978. Clearly, '·ner cannot be born twice in different places on the
Notably, the certificate thus issued by the Davao (ts· Hospital serves to corroborate the certificate12 9t1.sly submitted by petitioner Amadea with the trial court Hng that she was indeed born at the Davao Doctors }tal in Davao City, and not Caloocan City. '°'/:'
23. At the very least, the discrepancies contained in the '°' ents attache·d to respondent Abdullah's Comment \:scores the need to have all evidentiary matters brought ',fi.,, e1the trial court and not this Honorable Court.
,eal issue in the present oversy is· the right of llegitimate child to ;ed, by representation, .~gitimate child of the · .ent.
;,As in Suntay v. Suntay, the iron ;i curtain rule is inapplicable in ;the present case.
24. What is readily apparent in the Comments · itted by respondents Abdullah and Rodolfo is their tion to draw a smokescreen in a bid to divert the , , :tion of this Court from the real core issue of this case: :ether an illegitimate grandchild can represent a legitimate 'IcLand inherit from her grandfather.
25. This matter is not altogether novel as it has ,y·i··.ously been settled in In the Matter of the Intestate Estate 13 ar fristina Aguinaldo-Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay. There, this norable. Court allowed the issuance of a letter of Jtiinistration to an illegitimate child of the legitimate r~1•pnng - • of the decedent. Yet, respondents take exception., to ·· applicability of this Court's pronouncements in Suntay i!\ 12 Annex "2" of petitioner's Motion to be Included in the 'tribution and Partition of the Estate. ' 13 G.R. No. 183053, June 16, 2010, 621 SCRA 142.
10 ~-83
contending that the factual milieu thereat differs from that in the present case and that there are peculiar circumstances present in Suntay that are not extant in this controversy.
26. Clearly, respondents have not tal<:en stock of the raison d'etre that moved this Honorable Court to rule in favor of the illegitimate child of the decedent's legitimate son in Suntay. Quoting Ma.11.resa, this Honorable Court held:
"Manresa explains the basis for the rules on intestate success1011:
The law [of intestacy] is founded ... on the presumed will of the deceased... Love, it is said, first descends, then ascends, and, finally, spreads sideways. Thus, the law first calls the descendants, then the ascendants, and finally the collaterals, always preferring those closer in degree to those of remoter degrees, on the assumption that the deceased would have done so had he manifested his last will... Lastly, in default of anyone called to succession or bound to the decedent by ties of blood or affection, it is in accordance with his presumed will that his property be given to charitable or educational institutions, and thus contribute to the welfare of humanity.
Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of intestate succession, i.e., love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The peculiar circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist animosity and antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a deceased."14(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
.. 27. Indeed, what prompted this Court to rule in favor of 1\'the illegitimate E1nilio Suntay III in Suntay is the lack of r, animosity and antagonism between the legitimate and illegitimate members of the decedent's family,· presumed in Article 992 of the Civil Code.
28. Like in Suntay, the decedent, Miguel T. Aquino, in case "did not distinguish between [his] legitimate and
14Jbid at pp. 156-157.
I I :284
"',I jJ,l,egithnate grandchildren" and even raised the status of ip¢titioner Amadea among her cousins when she was one of those especially mentioned, as earlier indicated, in the last '~,'' structions given by the decedent on his deathbed. In short, ce in Suntay, the "iron curtain" rule embodied in Article 992 .[ the Civil Code is inapplicable to petitioner's case as the ason underlying the Civil Code provision is simply non- xistent.
The iron curtain rule or Article 992 may be declared unconstitutional because it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution
29. Worse, the interpretation of the said Article 992 espoused by the respondents that prohibits an illegitimate '·escendant of an illegitimate child from absolutely inheriting ,:9m her legitimate grandparent violates the constitutional , arantee against the equal protection of the law. 15 Consider: ,.hile the illegitimate descendant of an illegitimate child J:n inherit by right of representation as provided by Article 92, 982, 989 and 990 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines, ':amended, 16 the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate )~ld cannot. This classification between these two groups of 1 Jegitimates fail the test of a valid classification under the ,:pnstitution, and so should be struck down as invalid and 6fo. I',·-' i}j{·: ' (-,!\(,,·;' :i\:· 30. For a classification to be valid and compliant with 'al protection, it must be reasonable. And to be reasonable, i\classification must meet all of the following requirements: 1
·1,d l , \rt.902. The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding 'oles are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether timate or illegitimate. \982. The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right · resentation and if any one of them should have died, leaving several , the portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in \portions. (933) ;:989. · If, together with illegitimate children, there should survive Iendants of another illegitimate child who is dead, the former shall 'eed in their own right and the latter by right of representation. (940a) ;990. The hereditary rights granted by the two preceding articles ,:9itimate children shall be transmitted upon their death to their endants, who shall inherit by right of representation from their ased grandparent. (941a) (Emphasis and underscoring Ours).
12 •j ~&' r.:- 1.., i...lJ,,'J
(1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to , existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class. 17 As will be explained the, the classification embodied in the iron curtain rule advanced by respondents does not meet all these requirements.
31. First, there is no substantial distinction between the illegitimate descendants of a legitimate child and the illegitimate descendants of an illegitimate child. Both sets of illegitimate children endure under the same circumstance of having been born to parents outside of wedlock.
32. Second, and 1nost important, the classification embodied in the iron curtain rule is "not germane to the purpose of the law" as there is in fact no purpose, rhyme, or reason to the prohibition set against illegitimate issues of legitimates when illegitimates of illegitimates are not themselves set to suffer the same prohibition.
33. The prohibition cannot plausibly be considered to encourage legitimate family relations as, in fact, the .classification would seem to favor the illegitimates of illegithnates over the illegitimate issues of legitimates. Worse, it is absurd and even facile to assume that legitilnate family relationship will be encouraged by a law that places the condemnation on the innocent child of persons who may have been cruelly deprived of the opportunity to marry by death, as petitioner's parents had been.
34. This Honorable Court cannot allow the continuous construction of Article 992 as establishing the iron curtain rule. The continuous adoption of the iron curtain rule will only unjustly and unreasonably punish a child for the . circumstances of her birth contrary to the universal principle that penalty should be a consequence of one's own wrongdoing, not your parents. More bluntly, no child shoul~d be punished for the sins of her father.
35. Thus, as previously submitted by petitioner, it is high time for this Honorable Court to adopt the fallowing
17Bernas, Joaquin G. THe 1987 Philippine Constitution: A Comprehensive Reviewer, 2006 ed., p. 34 citing People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, 18 (1939).
13 :28C
of Justice Hugo Gutierrez, Jr. in Anselma Diaz, of Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel, all 1iurnamed Santero, : and Felixberta Pacursa, guardian of }ederico Santero, et al., vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and ;Felisa Pamuti Jardin, rn viz:
"I agree that a clear and precise amendment is needed if collateral relatives such as illegitimate children and legitimate uncles, aunts, or cousins or illegitimate siblings and their legitimate half-brothers or half-sisters are to inherit from one another. But I must stress that the barrier is between the legitimate and illegitimate families. I see no reason why we . should include a grandmother or grandfather among those where a firm wall of separation should be maintained. She cannot be a separate "family" from her own grandchildren.
The ancient wall was breached by our Code Commission and Congress in Art. 902 of the Code which provides:
The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding articles are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. (843a)" (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
36. In conclusion, petitioner A1nadea humbly reiterates ~r:·plea that this Court construe the term "relatives" in Article ,, ·:9~ as NOT including the grandparents. Such interpretation is · ,:· i:;:})1~j·ifu.9re consistent with the equal protection guarantee of our , /)/jlitlQ9,~1stitution and the other provisions of the Civil Code on the 'g~ts of illegitimate children to inherit, as it will not tferentiate between the illegitimate children of legitimates ,no.the illegitimate children of illegitimates. 19 l~t/·,.j, ,... :,,, .. ,,. PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner AMADEA
..t{GELA,11i!:1,,, K. AQUINO respectfully prays that this Honorable 10:urt render judgment:
· 1. GRANTING petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration;
:; 2. REVERSING THE AND SETTING ASIDE the Decision · dated January 21, 2013 of the Court of Appeals and reinstating the Orders of the Regional Trial Court,
18 G. R. No.L-6657 4, February 21, 1990 19 See note 16.
14 ',J h,, u'l '.·-,(
Branch 14, Davao City, dated April 22, 2005 a.11.d March 6, 2008;
3. DECLARING petitioner AMADEA ANGELA K. AQUINO ,\'' .' as legal heir of the decedent, Miguel T. Aquino, and ALLOWING her to inherit from the intestate estate of the said decedent by virtue of her right of representation as the child of the decedent's son, the late Arturo C. Aquino, with entitlement to an allowance from the estate in the same amount as the other heirs pending the final settlement of the entire estate of the decedent.
'<~1 :}t. 4. Petitioner prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable under the premises.
Quezon City for Manila, January 14, 2014.
GIZELLE LOU M. C4¥,BAHUG-FUGOSO Counsel for AMADEA ANGELA K. AQUINO Office Address: 58-C, Stephanie Place Road 3, Quezon City Tel No. /Fax No.: 0917-599-5563 Email: [email protected] Roll of Attorney No. 54032 PTR No. 0680482; 01/14/2015; Quezon City IBP Lifetime No. 915014; Quezon City MCLE Compliance No. IV-0010547; 12/20/2012
COPY FURNISHED
COURT OF APPEALS 21 st Division Cagayan De Oro City
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT Branch 16 Hall of Justice Ecoland, Davao City.
15 ~BB
ACCRA LAW Counsel for Abdulla C. Aquino :f 11/F Pryce Tower, Pryce Business Park J.P. Laurel Avenue, 8000 Davao City
,, 'ATTY. LIELANIE C. YANGYANG-ESPEJO .;.):ATTY. JESS ZACHAEL B. ESPEJO •::Counsel.for Rodo{fo C. Aquino ··.· 2nd Floor, Room 5, Babis ta Bldg., ; Palma Gil Street, Davao City .
,::,iHEIRS OF WILFREDO C. AQUINO ;c/ o Mrs. Linda T. Aquino ·J.P. Cabaguio Avenue, Davao Cit.y
,MRS. ENERIE B. AQUINO Cabaguio Avenue, Davao City
EXPLANATION
, ,:/: . In compliance with Rule 13, Section 11 of the Ru.ks of ', ' 11·:1'.. ,,' ...... · .. ;::.:;: i\!Court, Petitioner, respectfully man.ifests that the foregoing ::):i~~i·~~?TI?N FOR EXT~NSION 01:' TIME TO F~LE REPLY is ,;:;;1M)1bemg served by registered mail to the parties because of H,:,j:f ',\1l',' . :/)j;\Jdistance, time constraints and the temporary unavailability of •· ·.. /;f;'.;~ffice messengers making personal service impracticable. t ' I , • , )
GIZELLE LOU M. CABAHUG-FUGOSO
16 •j ,;:.p 0 •-.. LJ '-'J
'':ftigE~UBLIC OF THE PH~LIPPINES ) /:[CITY OF ~~t\KATI err~ )S.S. ·.,,:1.,,:
VERIFIED DECLARATION
I, GIZELLE LOU M. CABAHUG-FUGOSO, Filipino, of , legal age, with office address at 58-C, Stephanie Place, Road 3, , ,.Quezon City, hereby declare that the CONSOLIDATED REPLY /,>dated January 14, 2015, is hereto submitted electronically in , accordance with the Efficient Use of Paper Rule, and in connection with "AMADEA ANGELA K. AQUINO v. RODOLFO ·. C~ AQUINO v. ABDULLAH C. AQUINO", is a complete and true copy of the CONSOLIDATED REPLY dated January 14, 2015 that is being filed with the Supre1ne Court simultaneously with the submission of the attached compact . disc.
GIZELLE LOU M. CASAHUG-FUGOSO
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO Before me this 14th day of January 2015, by GIZELLE LOU M. CABAHUG-FUGOSO, who exhibited to me her Roll of Attorneys No. 54032, and presented the foregoing instrument and signed the instrument in my presence, and who took an oath before me as to such instrument.
Doc. No. ?~9 -0- 0 /i~---- Page No. Jy t\'HJ:ff«nliN~ 'f.N1. Rill\flfilr.i Book No.~ ri/ Notary Pnhlk / l!JnU1i Dec. :.~1, 2016 Series of 2015. 2'7J.4 M. A11rr,,.r.-, "iii., :M.1,k.;.HC:ity DBP N16.1)\~/!;tiitt; f{"t:...21,;,1:5
P'fil'Wl N'O,. M IK'f -'11/Si!/f'J.5ll1/ 1-<:,-L5i i/l,>ftI1,b1lii O~lY ~tdil 1NID. 71.,l'l'iJ./t7!
17 1-...,,',J.9
,t):' 'REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ) ,}l;'\ ::· . . ) S.S. ''i;'; •·. W~IAKAT! cnnr ;)f,; :;,· AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE t/:i(:' ' - J;,\;k,.'t) •·. • I,. JASON PENAFLOR, as Special Liasion Officer/Messenger of ATTY. ·::;:{PIZELLE LOU CABAHUG-FUGOSO with office address at 58-C Stephanie · :~lace, Road 3, Quezon City, after having duly sworn in accordance with law, .~rid pursuant to Sections 3, 4, 5 and 10 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, do ',):hereby depose and state that I served a copy of the following: ,,,,,,1
·Date Pleading/Motion/Paper Case Number & Court/Office Title
Supre1ne Court 14January CONSOLIDATED G.R. No. 208912 2015 REPLY and 209018
Upon the following and in the 1nanner indicated: . · -~-~.~· REGISTRY A~~-~PT PERSON p ~l&~G~~!-!}tJ 212 5 COURT OF APPEALS REGIL . L.13.tteri~~GUEDRlilm _. _· ~ st with : .· './.t;/,il~~lfel3AI Qiifrjl/i'J'~l'}')Vgaffi;·t_J;-,--- J:21 Division ( st . ;f 0 t1j.£ifl'~ Bi'-&~- ~O :t:Cagayan De Oro City return :;f.fr±ire~;~l!i~lll~e'lpt"ro'r rere'ronc~ in case ot inqui days i ·'l · · JAii.J--l4-2.0l.5-- • .··,:,.,, -- •_ •· Pcostmaster/TellerP Reg1st -~- ·. Post C Date:·
/f/lil/!"''' .,;REGIONAL TRIAL COURT I'' .
1 •:Branch 16 :Hall of Justice Regisi Bcoland, Davao City. Post C Date:
i'ACCRALAW /Counsel.for Abdulla C. Aquino /ll /F Pryce Tower, Pryce Regis 'Business Park J.:>ost t .
iJ.P. Laurel Avenue, 8000 Date: f'I,$ 1M. , '-,+;.-.. :Davao Ci · Postmaster/Teller iATTY. LIELANIE C.
1 :.'.YANGYANG-ESPEJO l /ATTY. JESS ZACHAEL B. Regii iESPEJO Post ?Counsel for Rodolfo C. Aauino Date Preserve tlj,t(f~ei~t)r20~enc~~in Case of in'quiry
•~VrL.._.$.,~stmaster/Tell'ii/: . •j 01_-• ,._ 1.....1
·1 1/· . . REGISTRY ~f9,._E~T I . . ·. UUt::129 · Pt;.fil~.~.-.--"'-""'--~- :lijtter/Pil,E'J(Hffl!J}llR'JID __4· '\. em11x-.11a Petl'lai!ll'J'P• , 0 --~--\ , · ii.Ula flDBu-1\tbt•..---:- . ,!,f~sli~t@ffi;tlfl 1EJMiNTFLlRTHER SAYETH NAUGHT. Affiant \ ;.,.,r, ... t -.,~rel{~D AND SWORN to 1ne before this 14th day of January 2015 in · :" ·· 1 i CITY affiant exhibiting to 1ne his Tax Identification No. 450- 'b1~42r,;( · · ,ir_,cl ~v -v ~/~/ ~ ft_ ATY~:;~r,~il ll111;1 Uee. 31, 2!H6 2734 M . .-\uroni St. 1 l\'fot,t::tlCft\ty mp ~,o. 971rn;1,, /C'l/··2lHS f-lrni Mt Ml{.T 47507SJ/'ki-J5 Minknti City lfoH No • .::W!J',rJ' \ I (