DOCSLIB.ORG

Preliminary Observations on the Niigata-Chuetsu Oki, Japan, Earthquake of July 16, 2007

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Preliminary Observations on the Niigata-Chuetsu Oki, Japan, Earthquake of July 16, 2007 EERI Special Earthquake Report — September 2007 Learning from Earthquakes Preliminary Observations on the Niigata-Chuetsu Oki, Japan, Earthquake of July 16, 2007 Three days after the Niigata-Chuetsu EERI), Stephen Dickenson (also numerous ground failures as far Oki earthquake, EERI and GEER with GEER), Curt Edwards, Anshel away as the Unouma Hills, located (Geo-Engineering Earthquake Re- Schiff, Alex Tang, and Yumei Wang. approximately 50 km inland. connaissance) deployed a joint The ASCE team received assistance In Niigata prefecture, the JMA seis- team of engineers and emergency from the Japanese Society of Civil mic intensity was 6+ (IX in MMI) in management experts to document Engineers (JSCE). The JSCE team Kariwacho, Kashiwazaki City, and geotechnical effects; the perfor- members included Jorgen Johans- Nagaoka City; it was the same in mance of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa son and Hiroyuki Yanagawa. Ohzuna-machi in Nagano prefec- nuclear power plant; the perfor- The EERI-GEER team and the pub- ture. The downtown Kashiwazaki mance of other structures, bridges, lication of this Learning from Earth- City K-NET site recorded a PGA of ports and harbors, and lifelines; and quakes report were supported by 0.67g. The earthquake resulted in the response and recovery. The the National Science Foundation 11 fatalities and nearly 2,000 injur- EERI-GEER team, with the assis- through Grants #CMII-0323914 and ies. Close to ,00 residential struc- tance of the Japanese Association #CMII-0131895. A greatly expanded tures collapsed — almost exclusive- for Earthquake Engineering (JAEE), companion web report can be found ly old bamboo and stuccoed post- was led by Robert Kayen of the at www.eeri.org or www.gees.usc. and-lintel structures with heavy U.S. Geological Survey and Santi- edu/GEER. Readers of this report kawara tile roofs. Many of these ago Pujol of Purdue University, and can download a linked dynamic collapses were associated with dis- included Brian Collins of the USGS; Google Earth map file at http:// placements on the slopes of sand Scott Ashford, Stephen Dickenson, walrus.wr.usgs.gov/infobank/n/ dune deposits or with liquefied and Yohsuke Kawamata of Oregon nii07jp/html/n-ii-07-jp.sites.kmz to ground. There was damage to gas, State University (with partial support view sites discussed below, includ- water, and electricity infrastructure from the Pacific Earthquake Engi- ing many additional photos. and to the world’s largest nuclear neering Research Center); Scott J. power plant, the Kashiwazaki- Brandenberg of UCLA; Norm Abra- Introduction Kariwa facility. The power plant was hamson, Lloyd Cluff, Joseph Sun, in a region of high isoseismal inten- and Ben Tsai of PG&E; Haruo Hay- The M6.6 Niigata-Chuetsu Oki earth- sity, as inferred from the observed ashi, Norio Maki, and Laurie John- quake struck at 0:3 am local time damage patterns in the area. son of Kyoto University; Mark Yash- on July 6, 2007, along the west insky of Caltrans; with contributions coast of Honshu Is- from Peter Yanev; Renee Lee of land, Japan. It was Arup; Kit Miyamoto of Miyamoto followed by a se- International; Yasuo Tanaka and quence of after- Hidetaka Koumoto of Kobe Univer- shocks that were sity; Kohji Tokimatsu of Tokyo Insti- felt during the en- tute of Technology; Toshimi Kabeya- tire time of the re- sawa, Kim Yousok, Kazuo Konagai, connaissance ef- Toshikazu Kabeyasawa, and Toshi- fort. The event had nori Kabeyasawa of Tokyo Univer- a shallow focal sity; Nanako Marubashi and Toshi- depth of 0 km and katsu Ichinose of the Nagoya Insti- struck in the Japan tute of Technology; Keiko Tamura of Sea immediately Niigata University; and the staff of offshore from Kari- the Research Center for Urban Safe- wa (see Figure ). ty and Security (RCUSS). The team The quake affected also coordinated lifelines investiga- an approximately tions with a team from the American 00 km-wide area Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) along the coastal Technical Council on Lifeline areas of southwes- Earthquake Engineering (TCLEE), tern Niigata prefec- Figure 1: Location and aftershock map of Niigata in-cluding Mark Yashinsky (also with ture and triggered Chuetsu Oki event. EERI Special Earthquake Report — September 2007 of which were within 50 km. The accelerograms obtained at station NIG08 (close to the fault plane and within the area where damage was more severe) show low-frequency content, suggesting features associ- ated with liquefaction in foundation soils below the instrument. Whereas there was no observed sign of lique- faction at the ground surface, the spiky trace of the acceleration rec- ord is consistent with the known be- havior of sandy soils undergoing cy- clic mobility in undrained loading. Acceleration response spectra com- puted for a damping coefficient of 5% are shown in Figure 2. The seven-unit Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant is located about 6 km from the epicenter determined Figure 2: Acceleration response spectra for a damping coefficient of 5%. From by the Japan Meteorological Agency top to bottom: NIG016, NIG017, NIG018, NIG019. The left panel is the EW com- (JMA) for this event and was instru- ponent, the middle panel is the NS component, the right panel is the Z compo- mented at 99 locations. The motions nent. The horizontal axes represent frequency, in Hz, and the vertical axes at 33 locations with a new sensor represent absolute acceleration as a fraction of the acceleration of gravity. system were recorded, but the re- cordings at the other 66 older instru- The team recorded the spatial posi- cific plates). The moment magnitude ment locations, including two free- tion and severity of ground failure of the mainshock of this event was field down-hole arrays and most of and structural damage using digital estimated to be 6.6 using teleseis- the structural arrays, were lost with mapping techniques. GPS data, mic data (USGS) and 6.7 using re- the exception of the peak values. site logs, and digital pictures are gional data. The Japan Meteorologi- The ground motion data on the old archived in a Google Earth database cal Agency assigned a magnitude of system could not automatically mentioned in the preface; it contains 6.8 to the mainshock. transmit due to communication con- a comprehensive explanation of gestion, and aftershocks triggered The Niigata earthquake was a bur- each site for use as a supplement to the recorders and overwrote the buf- ied reverse-slip earthquake, with a this newsletter insert. The database fer containing the mainshock record- hypocenter estimated at a depth of was constructed as the reconnais- ings. The 33 recordings of the new 8 km (NRI ESDP, 2007). Two po- sance progressed, and proved use- system included 27 from a majority tential planes of faulting are unre- ful for planning visits to unexplored of the reactor and turbine buildings solved, as aftershock locations fell areas. Niigata Prefecture has built a and one 4-depth free-field array at on both planes. The rupture length 3D buildings layer for Kashiwazaki the service hall (see Figure 3). The is estimated to be 30 km and the City in Google Earth that was useful data indicate a large range in the down-dip fault width is estimated to for identifying critical facilities. High- foundation motions for the EW com- be 22 km for both planes. The in- resolution laser-mapped data sets ponent, with PGA values ranging ferred location of the hypocenter is of the most significant structural and over a factor of two (322-680 gals). at the northeast end of both planes, geotechnical damage features were The NS component shows more and the rupture is inferred to have also collected for preservation using similar values (267-311 gals). The progressed from the northeast the USGS’s terrestrial LiDAR (light large variation in the EW component toward the southwest. Slip models detection and ranging) system. values cannot be explained by sim- for both rupture planes show a sin- ple -D site effect differences. Re- gle strong asperity in the western cordings from aftershocks show a Seismological Aspects end of the rupture. The maximum large variation in the site response, Niigata is located in a subduction computed slip is 3.5m. with larger motions for the northern zone near the boundary between the The Japanese nationwide strong units (5,6,7) for some aftershocks Amur plate and the Okhotsk plate motion network, K-NET, recorded and larger motions for the southern (two relatively small plates that lie the earthquake at 390 stations, 20 units (, 2, 3, 4) for other aftershocks. between the larger Eurasia and Pa- 2 EERI Special Earthquake Report — September 2007 Figure 3: Peak accelerations (cm/sec/sec) in and around Unit 1 (source: TEPCO, 2007). The observed varia- general settings: riverbank deposits, tion in the PGA am- beach deposits, dune sand, and plification is corre- placed fill. Along the Sabaishi River, lated with epicentral azimuth, indi- liquefaction and lateral spreading cating that strong 3-D wave propa- features were observed over ap- gation effects are contributing the proximately 5 km from the river large variability of the ground mo- mouth. River deposits near the sea Figure 4: Pipe breaks due to sep- tions over short distances. The large liquefied and settled severely at the aration of two halves of Kashiwa- range of PGA values on the EW Kashiwazaki wastewater treatment zaki Wastewater Treatment Plant. component shows the need for multi- facility separating two plant build- ple recordings at NPP sites to reliably ings (Figure 4). Upriver, liquefaction determine the input ground motions resulted in settlement of the levee damage, all of it within one kilometer for the structures. embankment near the Kai-Un Bridge, of the mouth of the river.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Introduction and Main Conclusions Introduction
    INTRODUCTION AND MAIN CONCLUSIONS INTRODUCTION At the request of the government of Japan, an IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) of international experts visited units 6 and 7 of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station from 29 June to 13 July 2015. The purpose of the mission was to review operating practices in the areas of Leadership and Management for Safety, Training and Qualification; Operations; Maintenance; Technical Support; Operating Experience; Radiation Protection including Post Accident Sampling; Emergency Planning and Preparedness and Severe Accident Management. In addition, an exchange of technical experience and knowledge took place between the experts and their plant counterparts on how the common goal of excellence in operational safety could be further pursued. Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power station is located almost at the centre of Niigata Prefecture between Kashiwazaki City and Kariwa Village on the coast of the Sea of Japan. The site covers an area of around 4.2 million square metres and is encircled by a hilly area of pine forest. Kashiwazaki city, to the south, has a population of approximately 92000 and Kariwa village, to the east, approximately 5000. There are seven units on the site; all operated by the Tokyo Electric Power Company (Tepco), Units 1 to 5 are 1100 MWe BWR5 Reactors. Unit 1 has a Mark II containment vessel, units 2 to 5 have Mark II advanced containment vessels. Units 6 and 7 are 1356 MWe Advanced BWRs in ABWR containments. Units 1 to 5 were commissioned between 1985 and 1990, Unit 6 entered commercial operation in 1996 and Unit 7 in 1997.
    [Show full text]
  • USGS Open File Report 2007-1365
    Investigation of the M6.6 Niigata-Chuetsu Oki, Japan, Earthquake of July 16, 2007 Robert Kayen, Brian Collins, Norm Abrahamson, Scott Ashford, Scott J. Brandenberg, Lloyd Cluff, Stephen Dickenson, Laurie Johnson, Yasuo Tanaka, Kohji Tokimatsu, Toshimi Kabeyasawa, Yohsuke Kawamata, Hidetaka Koumoto, Nanako Marubashi, Santiago Pujol, Clint Steele, Joseph I. Sun, Ben Tsai, Peter Yanev, Mark Yashinsky, Kim Yousok Open File Report 2007–1365 2007 U.S. Department of the Interior U.S. Geological Survey 1 U.S. Department of the Interior Dirk Kempthorne, Secretary U.S. Geological Survey Mark D. Myers, Director U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia 2007 For product and ordering information: World Wide Web: http://www.usgs.gov/pubprod Telephone: 1-888-ASK-USGS For more information on the USGS—the Federal source for science about the Earth, its natural and living resources, natural hazards, and the environment: World Wide Web: http://www.usgs.gov Telephone: 1-888-ASK-USGS Suggested citation: Kayen, R., Collins, B.D., Abrahamson, N., Ashford, S., Brandenberg, S.J., Cluff, L., Dickenson, S., Johnson, L., Kabeyasawa, T., Kawamata, Y., Koumoto, H., Marubashi, N., Pujol, S., Steele, C., Sun, J., Tanaka, Y., Tokimatsu, K., Tsai, B., Yanev, P., Yashinsky , M., and Yousok, K., 2007. Investigation of the M6.6 Niigata-Chuetsu Oki, Japan, Earthquake of July 16, 2007: U.S. Geological Survey, Open File Report 2007-1365, 230pg; [available on the World Wide Web at URL http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2007/1365/]. Any use of trade, product, or firm names is for descriptive purposes only and does not imply endorsement by the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Press Release
    Press Release Press Release （This is provisional translation. Please refer to the original text written in Japanese.） October 22, 2020 Policy Planning Division for Environmental Health and Food Safety, Food Inspection and Safety Division, Pharmaceutical Safety and Environmental Health Bureau To Press and those who may concern, Cancellation of Instruction to restrict distribution based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, direction of Director-General of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters Today, based on the results of inspections conducted until yesterday, the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters has cancelled its Instruction of restriction of distribution for Governors of Ibaraki and Niigata as follows: （1）Bamboo shoot produced in Hokota-shi, Ibaraki prefecture. （2）Bear meat obtained after capturing in Tokamachi-shi and Joetsu-shi which are controlled under the policy for shipment and inspection set by Niigata prefecture. 1. With regard to Ibaraki prefecture, the restriction of distribution of Bamboo shoot produced in Hokota-shi is cancelled today. (1) The Instruction of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters is attached as attachment 1. (2) The application of Ibaraki is attached as attachment 2. 2. With regard to Niigata prefecture, the restriction of distribution of Bear meat obtained after capturing in Tokamachi-shi and Joetsu-shi which are controlled under the management policy set by Niigata is cancelled today. (1) The Instruction of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters is attached as attachment 3. (2) The application of Niigata is attached as attachment 4. 3. The list of Instructions on the restriction of distribution and/or consumption of food concerned in accordance with the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness is attached as reference.
    [Show full text]
  • TEPCO Will Do Anything to Maintain the 'Unforseeable' Theory - the 'Simulation Analysis' Deception Technique
    TOKYO July/Aug. 2011 No. 143 NUKECitizens' Nuclear InformationINFO Center Akebonobashi Co-op 2F-B, 8-5 Sumiyoshi-cho, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 162-0065, JAPAN Phone: +81 3 3357 3800 Fax: +81 3 3357 3801 URL: http://cnic.jp/english/ e-mail : [email protected] TEPCO will do anything to maintain the 'unforseeable' theory - The 'simulation analysis' deception technique - photo released by TEPCO Highly likely LOCA in Reactor Unit 1 power plants NPPs will be forced to undergo a If they possibly can, what the Japanese state fundamental review and it may become impossible and Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) ever to resume the operation of Chubu Electric would like to see buried once and for all is the Power Company’s (CEPCO) Hamaoka NPP. notion that the critical equipment at TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station However, the facts cannot be suppressed Reactor Units 1, 2, and 3 (1F 1-3) sustained forever. Judging from the various kinds of data serious damage from seismic motion unrelated to released by TEPCO thus far, there is an extremely the ‘unforeseeable’ giant tsunami. The reason is high probability that an LOCA occurred in the that if it becomes known that even in one of the reactor piping in at least Unit 1 at the time the three reactors critical piping was damaged in the seismic motion and that a ‘loss of coolant accident’ Contents (LOCA), where coolant gushes out from a damaged pipe into the containment vessel, occurred, then Fukushima: Deception by Simulation 1~5 the grave issue of ‘earthquake vulnerability of the Fukushima: Lax
    [Show full text]
  • 1054 ABWR Operation Experience at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa
    ABWR Operation Experience at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS Tatsuro KOBAYASHI1*, Kimitoshi YAHAGI2, Masumi ISHIKAWA3, and Hideya KITAMURA4 1, 2, 3Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station, TEPCO, 16-46 Aoyama-cho, Kashiwazaki-shi, Niigata 945-0393, Japan 4Tokyo Electric Power Company, 1-3-1 Uchisaiwai-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-8560, Japan The world’s first advanced boiling water reactors (ABWR), Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS unit 6 and 7 of twin 1,356 MWe, have continued safe and reliable operation contributing to not only supplying the Tokyo metropolitan area with electricity but also securing energy resources and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The ABWR, which was jointly developed by GE, Toshiba, Hitachi and TEPCO based on the construction and operation experiences of conventional BWRs, could be integrated with various features, such as enhanced safety, reliability, improved operability, maneuverability, economy, reduced occupational radiation exposure and radioactive wastes. Those features have been demonstrated as expected through operation and outage experiences since 1996. Although we had experienced several unplanned shutdowns in unit 6 and 7, the root causes of these shutdowns were almost due to the conventional problems, such as the failure of electrical instrument, plant auxiliary system, or fuel failure. Thus, we will make every effort to continue excellent operation and we hope that the experience obtained at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa unit 6 and 7 is used for future development of the ABWR. KEYWORDS: ABWR, RIP, RCCV, Digitalized Main Control Room I. Introduction In Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS (Fig. 1), located 220 km northwest of Tokyo, 7 units of BWR have been in service since the start of commercial operation of unit 1 in 1985 (Fig.
    [Show full text]
  • Impacts of the Niigataken Chūetsu-Oki Earthquake to the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant, Post-Earthquake Response, and Lessons Learned: U.S
    Impacts of the Niigataken Chūetsu-Oki Earthquake to the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant, Post-Earthquake Response, and Lessons Learned: U.S. Perspective for Design Basis Earthquakes and Beyond Design Basis Earthquakes James J. Johnson1, Antonio R. Godoy1, Aybars Gürpinar1, Roger M. Kenneally2 1James J. Johnson and Associates 2Independent Consultant “2016 Natural Phenomena Hazards Meeting and Training Session” 18-19 October 2016 Germantown, Maryland Abstract Over the years, a number of nuclear power plants (NPPs) in Japan have experienced earthquake shaking and some have experienced shaking in multiple earthquakes. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has identified a need to better understand the seismic performance of Japanese NPPs and to determine if any important lessons should be applied to NPPs in the United States (U.S.). On July 16, 2007, a strong earthquake, the Niigataken Chūetsu-Oki (NCO) earthquake, with a moment magnitude (M) of M6.6 occurred approximately 16 km north of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant (KKNPP). KKNPP has seven NPP units that experienced the NCO earthquake ground motions. Numerous seismic instruments located at the KKNPP recorded motions from the NCO earthquake in the free-field, on foundations, and in-structures. The recorded motions showed that the NCO earthquake motions significantly exceeded the plant design basis earthquake ground motion response spectra. Although no safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs) experienced damage, non-safety-related SSCs experienced significant damage. This presentation reviews the effects of the NCO earthquake on the KKNPP, with the objective to assess whether the potential for similar behavior (both positive and negative) is expected of U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Referendum at Kariwa Village: a Strong “No” to MOX Program
    TOKYO July/August 2001 NUKE INFO � Citizens' Nuclear Information Center No. 84 3F Kotobuki Bldg., 1-58-15, Higashi-nakano, Nakano-ku, Tokyo 164-0003, JAPAN URL: http://www.cnic.or.jp/ e-mail : [email protected] Referendum at Kariwa Village: A Strong “No” to MOX Program Future strategies are discussed at first meeting of local residents since the referendum. (Akata District Community Hall, 30 May 2001. Photo by Kazuyuki Tekemoto. Photos from the Kariwa referendum can be viewed on our web-site http://www.cnic.or.jp/english/) A referendum on the use of MOX fuel at the time came to lodge an application for Kashiwazaki-Kariwa 3 was held on 27 May 2001 approval to use the fuel, TEPCO finally sought at Kariwa Village, Niigata Prefecture. There were agreement from Niigata Prefecture, Kashiwazaki 1,925 votes against the use of MOX fuel, 53% of City, and Kariwa Village, and the Governor and the total votes and far exceeding the 1,533 votes cast in approval of the plan. The villagers have CONTENTS clearly expressed their opposition to the plu-thermal Referendum at Kariwa Village 1-2 program － a Japanese term for burning MOX JCO Court Case 3-5 fuel at commercial light water reactors. Data: Incidents at Nuclear Facilities 6-7 In April 1995, the operator of Kashiwazaki- Data: Japan's Radio-waste and Spent Fuel 8 Kariwa 3, Tokyo Electric Power Company Opposition to Kaminoseki Plant 9-12 (TEPCO), placed an order to the Belgian compa- Anti-Nuke Who's Who: The Association for ny Belgonucleaire for MOX fuel for the plant the Preservation of Nagashima's Nature 13-14 without any explanation to local residents.
    [Show full text]
  • Preliminary Observations on the Niigata Ken Chuetsu, Japan, Earthquake of October 23, 2004
    EERI Special Earthquake Report — January 2005 Learning from Earthquakes Preliminary Observations on the Niigata Ken Chuetsu, Japan, Earthquake of October 23, 2004 EERI organized a field investigation significant earthquake to affect Japan more than 100,000 people into tem- team led by Charles Scawthorn of since the 1995 Kobe earthquake. porary shelters, and as many as Kyoto University, which included Forty people were killed, almost 10,000 will be displaced from their Scott Ashford, University of Califor- 3,000 were injured, and numerous upland homes for several years, if nia San Diego; Jean-Pierre Bardet, landslides destroyed entire upland not permanently. Total damages are University of Southern California; villages. Landslides were of all types; estimated by Japanese authorities Charles Huyck, ImageCat Inc.; Rob- some dammed streams, creating at US$40 billion, making this the ert Kayen, U.S. Geological Survey; new lakes likely to overtop their new second most costly disaster in his- Scott Kieffer, Colorado School of embankments at any moment and tory, after the 1995 Kobe earth- Mines; Yohsuke Kawamata, Univer- cause flash floods and mudslides. quake. sity of California San Diego; and Landslides and permanent ground Rob Olshansky, University of Illinois, deformations damaged roads, rail The epicenter was in northwestern Urbana/Champaign and Visiting lines and other lifelines, resulting in Honshu, about 80 km south of Professor, Kyoto University. Paul major economic disruption. The nu- Niigata City (population 500,000), Somerville, URS Corporation, and merous landslides resulted, in part, well-known as the place liquefac- Jim Mori, Kyoto University, covered from heavy rain associated with tion was first systematically stud- the seismological aspects, but were Typhoon Tokage.
    [Show full text]
  • Niigata Brewers Association
    Tax Free Shop Kanto-Shinetsu Regional Taxation Bureau Tax Free Shop Brewery available for English website shop consumption tax telephone consumption tax tour English Brochure Location No. Breweries Mainbrand & liquor tax number As of December, 2017 ※ Please refer to SAKE Brewery when you visit it, because a reservation may be necessary. Niigata Brewers Association http://www.niigata-sake.or.jp/ ❶ Taiyo Sake Brewery Co., Ltd. TAIYOZAKARI 0254-53-3145 Yuzawa Shirataki Sake Brewery Jyozen Mizunogotoshi 025-784-3443 Murakami ❷ Miyao Sake Brewing CO., LTD. SHIMEHARITSURU 0254-52-5181 Uonumashuzou Kabushikikaisha TENJINBAYASHI 025-752-3017 Tokamachi ❸ Ichishima Sake Brewery Inc. ICHISHIMA 0254-22-2350 Matsunoishuzoujyou Corporation MATSUNOI 025-768-2047 KANEMASU SAKE CO., LTD 0254-22-3131 Naebashuzo Corporation NAEBASAN 025-765-2011 ❹ Brewery & Distillery KANEMASU Tsunan Shibata Tsunanjozo Corporation KIRINOTOH 025-765-5252 ❺ Kikusui Sake CO., LTD. KIKUSUI 0254-24-5111 KATOSHUZOU CO., LTD. KIYOMASA 025-548-3765 ❻ Fujinoishuzou Corporation FUJINOI 0254-41-3165 Kubiki Sake Brewery Co., Ltd. Koshijino Kobai 025-536-2329 Echigozakurashuzo Joetsu 0250-62-2033 ❼ Corporation ECHIGOZAKURA Koyamashuzouten Limited Partnership ECHIGOJIMAN 025-534-2022 Koshitsukanoshuzou Jouetsushuzou Corporation KOSHINOWAKATAKE 025-528-4011 Agano 0250-62-2011 ❽ Corporation KOSHINOAJIWAI Hakuryushuzou Sake- 0250-62-2222 Awashima ❾ brewing CO., LTD. HAKURYU Echigoshuzojo Corporation KOSHINOHAPPO 025-387-2008 ❿ Awashimaura Kita-ku ⓫ Echigodenemon Corporation DENEMON 025-388-5020 ⓬ ＤＨＣ shuzo Co., Ltd. KOSHINOBAIRI 025-387-2025 ⓭ Imayo Tsukasa Corporation IMAYO TSUKASA 025-244-3010 Chuo-ku KOSHINOHANASHUZOU Murakami Niigata 025-241-2277 ⓮ Corporation KOSHINOHANA Sado Island Konan-ku ⓯ Ishimoto Sake Brewery CO., LTD. KOSHI NO KANBAI 025-276-2028 ●❷ ⓰ Shiokawa Sake Brewery Co., Ltd.
    [Show full text]
  • Major Business Combination Cases in Fiscal Year 2017 June 6, 2018 The
    Attachment 2 Major Business Combination Cases in Fiscal Year 2017 June 6, 2018 The Japan Fair Trade Commission For the purpose of ensuring the transparency of reviews undertaken by the Japan Fair Trade Commission (hereinafter referred to as “JFTC”) on business combination cases, and for the purpose of improving the predictability of the JFTC’s reviews on cases, the JFTC has published “Guidelines to Application of the Antimonopoly Act concerning Review of Business Combination (May 31, 2004, JFTC. Hereinafter referred to as the “Business Combination Guidelines”)”in applying the Antimonopoly Act (hereinafter referred to as the “AMA”) to the JFTC’s reviews on business combinations. In addition, the JFTC has also published the results of the reviews of major business combination cases each fiscal year. This year, the JFTC also publishes the results of reviews of major business combinations in fiscal year 2017. The JFTC sincerely hopes that companies planning business combinations will make use of the published outcomes of the JFTC’s reviews of major business combination cases, as well as the Business Combination Guidelines. 1 Major Business Combination Cases in Fiscal Year 2017 Case 1 Acquisition of shares of JCR Pharmaceuticals Co., Ltd. by Medipal Holdings Corporation Case 2 Acquisition of shares of Santoku Corporation by Hitachi Metals, Ltd. Case 3 Acquisition of shares of NXP Semiconductors N.V. by Qualcomm River Holdings B.V. Case 4 Integration of Broadcom Ltd. and Brocade Communications Systems, Inc. Case 5 Acquisition of shares of Fujitsu Client Computing Limited by Lenovo International Cooperatief U.A. Case 6 Acquisition of shares of AH Brake Co., Ltd.
    [Show full text]
  • Field Triptrip Guidebookguidebook Date: October 20, 2010
    8th U.S./Japan Natural Resources Panel on Earthquake Research FieldField TripTrip GuidebookGuidebook Date: October 20, 2010 Autumn Color in Nagaoka City 地震調査研究推進本部ホームページより転載 画像提供：新潟見どころナビ（http://www.naviu.net/） Nagaoka City Fireworks Festival, Summer ShakeMap for Sierra El Mayor Earthquake courtesy of the U.S. Geological Survey 画像提供：長岡市観光課（http://nagaokamatsuri.com） 南行軌道 2009/03/09 - 2010/01/25 19˚00′ 近づく Near 遠ざかる Far ( 隆起、東向) ( 沈降、西向) 余震（M4以上，USGS) -11.8 -5.9 0 5.9 11.8 衛星－地表視線方向の変位量 LOS[cm] Port-au-Prince Léogâne 18˚30′ Provided by National Research Institute for w M 7.0 視線方向 Earth Science and Disaster Prevention Enriquillo Fault 3-D Models of the San Francisco Bay Region courtesy of the U.S. Geological Survey 衛星進行方向 Provided by Earthquake Research 20 km Analysis by GSI from ALOS raw data (c)JAXA,METI Institute, University of Tokyo -73˚30′ -73˚00′ -72˚30′ -72˚00′ 北行軌道 2007/10/11 - 2010/01/16 19˚00′ 近づく Near 遠ざかる Far ( 隆起、西向) ( 沈降、東向) 余震（M4以上，USGS) -11.8 -5.9 0 5.9 11.8 衛星－地表視線方向の変位量 LOS[cm] Port-au-Prince Léogâne 18˚30′ 衛星進行方向 視線方向 Mw7.0 Enriquillo Fault 20 km Analysis by GSI from ALOS raw data (c)JAXA,METI -73˚30′ -73˚00′ -72˚30′ -72˚00′ 30-year probabilities courtesy of the U.S. Geological Survey Landslides caused by the Mid Niigata earthquake in 2004 Nagaoka, Niigata, Japan UJNRUJNR October 20-22, 2010 Field Trip Guidebook for the 8th U.S./Japan Natural Resources Panel on Earthquake Research Printed by the Japanese secretariat of the UJNR meeting 国土交通省 (Geospatial Information Authority of Japan) 国土地理院 Geospatial Information Authority
    [Show full text]
  • An Investigation of Road Bridge Maintenance System in Japan in Developed Society
    AN INVESTIGATION OF ROAD BRIDGE MAINTENANCE SYSTEM IN JAPAN IN DEVELOPED SOCIETY Mari NAKASHIMA, Kohei NAGAI The University of Tokyo ABSTRACT: The road assets in Japan have peak of construction in high economic growth period around 1970s. At that time, maintenance was not considered enough. After many bridges in the United States without maintenance were rapidly deteriorated and caused tragic accidents, Japan started to establish a countermeasure to prevent to be "Japan in ruins." Because most municipalities had not even inspected bridges although they are in charge of more than half of bridges in Japan, central government decided to subsidize local governments who inspect bridges and make plans for maintaining them for long term by “preventive maintenance”. After this policy, most managers have inspected and made their own manuals. The plans should fit to each government’s capacity to manage sustainably. However, some plans are made without considering its own circumstances. This research assess the plans from the perspective of physical conditions, potential of managers, and social conditions using indexes to propose the proper way to manage bridges in municipalities. KEYWORDS: road bridge deterioration, maintenance management, municipality 1. INTRODUCTION is 100 thousand, and of municipality is 521 thousand, which means 77 percent of bridges are managed by Many bridges in the United States constructed in local government (Annual Report of Road Statistics New Deal felled down with loss of lives for 2011). National government tries to support the local inappropriate maintenance. From the accidents, we governments which made their own sustainable learned that there is huge economical loss once an maintenance plan by grant.
    [Show full text]