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Table 7 Evaluation of Faults Which Does Not Consider in the Anti-Earthquake Design (Faults Around the Site) Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station

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Table 7 Evaluation of Faults Which Does Not Consider in the Anti-Earthquake Design (Faults Around the Site) Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Table 7 Evaluation of Faults which does not Consider in the Anti-earthquake Design (faults around the site) Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Distance from the No. Name Area Length Reason which Denies Activeness of the Fault Remark Site3 Erosion land, No displacement and ① Hosogoe Fault On-shore 7 km1 15.5 km Figure 2 and Attachment 12 transformation in Kume layer No displacement and transformation in Yasuda ② Madonosaka Syncline On-shore 11.5 km2 1.5 km layer, Ohminato sand layer and Tefla layer Figure 2 and Attachment 13 distributed in Yasuda layer 1：Length described in the past documents, 2：Length identified by the geological survey, 3：Distance between the center of power station site and the center of the fault Table 8 Evaluation of Faults which does not Consider in the Anti-earthquake Design (Inside the site) Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station No. Name Reason which Denies Activeness of the Fault Remark Table 9, Figure 3 and ① α・β Faults The fault exists in only the low angle small fault in Yasuda layer. The fault does not extend to the upper part. Attachment 14 There is no displacement in the boundary between Yasuda layer and Nishiyama layer. The fault does not extend to Table 9, Figure 3 and ② V System Fault Yasuda layer. Attachment 15 The fault gives some displacement in the upper face of Nishiyama layer. However, the displacement disappears Table 9, Figure 3 and ③ F System Fault when it comes in Yasuda layer. F system fault and V system fault are crossed each other. Attachment 16 It is a land sliding fault and there is no displacement in the boundary between Yasuda layer and Nishiyama layer. Table 9, Figure 3 and ④ ①・② Fault The fault does not extend to Yasuda layer. Attachment 17 Table 9, Figure 3 and ⑤ L1・L2 Fault The fault does not extend to Yasuda layer. Attachment 18 No. Name Sado City Sado Island Shelf East ① Hosogoe Fault Madonosaka Niigata City ② Syncline Sado Island Shelf East Legend Legend Tokyo Electric Power Company Tokyo Electric Power Company Nagaoka Plane East Edge Fault Zone Reverse Fault Madonosaka Syncline Saphenous Fault Nagaoka Plane West The Headquarters for Earthquake Promotion (2005) Active Anticline Sado Island Southend Active Fault (activity certain after late Quaternary) F-B Fold Zone Active Flexure edge Fault Zone Active Fault (activity uncertain after late Quaternary) Northern Sado Island Sea Bed Geological Map (1995) Active Fault Detailed digital Map (2002) Southern Sada Island Sea Bed Geological Map (1994) F-D Fold Zone Active Fault (incl. estimated fault) Eastern Noto Peninsula Sea Bed Geological Map (2002) New Edition Active Fault in Japan (2002) Reverse Fault (dash line saphenous) CertaintyⅠ Gravity Fault (dash line:saphenous) Takada Offshore Fault CertaintyⅡ Non Segmented Fault CertaintyⅢ (fuzzy side: descent side, dash line: saphenous) Kashiwazaki Kariwa NPS Quaternary Reverse Fault Atlas (2002) New Edition Active Fault in Japan (1991) Fault location certain Active Fault (relative elevation more than 200m) Fault location uncertain Active Fault (relative elevation less than 200m) Displacement not visible Estimated Fault (relative elevation more than 200m) Estimated Fault (relative elevation less than 200m) Active Structure Niigata (1984) Around Japan Sea Area Quaternary Construction Map (2001) Active Fault Estimated Active Fault Reverse Fault Tookamachi Jouetsu City Fault, not considered its activity, No. Fault Zone Figure 2 Map of Faults and Lineament around the Site of KK Nuclear Power Station Table 9 List of Layers in the Site Era Bed Name Major Facies/Lithological character Younger Stage Upper: gray colored small to medium sand Helocene Layer of Sand Lower: brown colored small to medium sand, humic matter contained Banjin layer of Sand Gray to red rust colored harsh sand Oominato Bister to yellow bister colored medium to layer of Sand harsh sand, includes thin layer of shilt Late Quaternary Sand covered surface Pleistocene A layer 4 Cray to shilt, clip many sands Yasuda layer Clay to shilt, clip many sands A layer 3 Streaky clay, organic matter, sandy shell fossil Clay to shilt, clip many sands A layer Middle 2 Sand, thick sand gravel, organic matter Clay to shilt, clip many sands A layer 1 Sand, thick sand gravel Early Haidsume layer Tuffaceous mudstone, tuffaceous sandstone, tuffaceous rock Sandy mudstone N layer Nishiyama layer 3 Sandstone, tuffaceous rock, clip nodjule shell Pleiocene the Neocene the fossil Late Shilt mudstone N layer Streaky mudstone, tuffaceous rock, many 2 nodjule Shilt to clay mudstone N1 layer Sandstone, tuffaceous rock, clip nodjule Early siliceous sponge fossil Sandstone, Sandstone-mudstone layer, clip Miocene Suitani layer granule rock Late Teradomari layer Black mudstone, sandstone-mudstone layer Middle nonconformity interfinger No. Name Legend Late Pleistocene Yasuda layer ① α・β Fault Haidzume layer Early Pleistocene Nishiyama layer (N member) Pliocene 3 Nishiyama layer (N2 member) Nishiyama leyer (N1 member) ② V System Fault 3u Reactor Building 4u Reactor Building Fault (dash line : estimate) Tuffs Banded mudrock ③ F System Fault Cleavage band 1u Reactor Building 2u Reactor Building Boring point Eng : pit name Horizontal boring ④ ①・② Fault Vertical boring Boring location (for the year 2007, 2008) ⑤ L1・L2 Fault (a) Horizontal Cross Section Diagram of Geological Features around Unit 1 to 4（At －40m elevation） Area of Horizontal Cross Section Diagram of Geological Features around Area of Horizontal Cross Section Unit 1 to 4 Diagram of Geological Features around Unit 5 to 7 7u Reactor Building 6u Reactor Building Legend 5u Reactor Building Late Pleistocene Yasuda layer Pliocene Nishiyama leyer (N1 member) Manmade rock Fault (dash line : estimate) Tuffs Boring point (Eng : pit name Horizontal boring) Boring location (for the year 2007, 2008) (b) Horizontal Cross Section Diagram of Geological Features around Unit 5 to 7 （At －25m elevation） Figure 3 Distribution Map of Fault within the site Attachment 12 Faults, etc. around the Site ① Hosogoe Fault Items Research Method Research Results Remarks [New] Active Faults in Japan（1991）： Length: Approx. 7km, Likelihood: , Activitiy: Class B Attachment 1Figuire Literature search ― Detailed Digital Maps of Active Faults（2002）: N/A 12－1 Active Structure Map- Niigata（1984）: N/A Geomorphological Aerial Photographic Attachment Figure 12 Lineament ： Length Approx. 2, Direction: NE-SW, Category: LC・LD Research Interpretation －2 - A part of lineament is erosive. Surficial geology Ground Surface - North-western upper flexure structure on the Haizume layer is identified In the south-east side of the fault shown Attachment Table 12 research Exploration in the literature. However, the Kume layer widely distributing on the ground surface with the same structure has almost flat structure. ○ A part of lineament is erosive. Comprehensive ○ North-western upper flexure structure on the Haizume layer is identified in the south-east side of the fault shown in the literature. However, the Kume layer widely evaluation distributing on the ground surface with the same structure has almost flat structure. ○ It is judged from the above that it has not been active at least after the sedimentation of the Kume layer. ※：Terrain which has geomorphological deformation or its possibility Attached Table 12 List of Geological Layer around the Site Era Bed Name Major Facies/Lithological character Tephra Helocene Alluvium/Younger Stage Layer of Sand Gravel, Sand, Shilt, Cray, small to medium sand LⅡ face sediment Gravel, Sand Banjin LⅠ face sediment Gravel, Sand layer of Sand Medium sand Late MⅡ face sediment Gravel, Sand Oominato Quaternary layer of Sand Medium sand MⅠ face sediment Gravel, Sand Pleistocene Yasuda layer Shilt, Cray, Sand H face sediment Shilt, Cray, Gravel, Oomegawa layer Sand Gravel, Sand Middle Wakinocho layer, Wajima Layer, Kume layer, Ootsubo layer, Shilt, Cray, Gravel, Sand Komanoma layer etc Sand/Gravel/Mud rock layer Uonuma layer Early andesite volcanic extrusion Haidsume layer Sand/Mud rock layer, Sandy mud rock, tuffaceous mud rock Pleiocene Late Early Nishiyama layer Mud rock, sand rock/mud rock layer the Neocene Suitani layer Sand rock/mud rock shale rock layer Andesite volcanic rock Late Miocene Black shale rock, Sand/shale rock layer Teradomari layer Andesite volcanic rock Middle Shichitani layer Hard shale rock, Sand rock, Gravel rock Early Green tuffaceous rock, Andesite rock, Green tuff Dacite, Rhyolite Granite rock, Paleogene Substratum Ultrabasic rock ※Yoneyama volcanic neck Index tephra (andesite volcanic extrusion) Discordance *For Wanatsu layer, northern part was included in Haidsume layer, south in Uonuma Layer. Heterotophic facies Legend ★” Niigata(1984)”,Active Fault “New Japan Edition (1978)”, Active “Active Fault Japan(1991)”,Structure of Shinetsu and Yoshioka Area(1979)”, etc(1987) “Active structure- ★★ Active fault Note) ContourNew is Editionfrom 1/200,000 Active topographical Fault Japan(1991) map Geographical Survey Institute Estimated Active fault Linearment suspicious for active fault ★ ★ ★★ Kashiwazaki Kariwa NPS G Kam a i yone ult n yam t fa k a fau as a lt a E i am f ay a kut u Ka l t Niigata City Kashiwazaki City Jyoyakuji fault (west end fault of chuo-kyuryou) H os mi fault oe Sakata Tsubame City tsu fa ult slope i river Torigoe faults(Kehinomiya fault) baish Minakamii f on Sa ault rment Linea Sanjyo City ultKamitomi asawa fa oka fault Oy Shinano River Linearment on Shibukawa river slope Nagaoka City Mitsuke City ault ma f Katagai fault uya ukyu Detailed digital map of active
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