Commentaries
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Commentaries Can Turkey and Iran Lead the Muslim World? Joseph A. Kéchichian Senior Research Fellow King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies December, 2020 No empire was ever reborn after its demise and chances are excellent that both the Safavid and Ot- toman empires will never resuscitate. Still, leaders in both Iran and Turkey dream of the grandeur that their predecessors once enjoyed, even if the world has changed permanently since the eighteenth century. Chances are excellent that neither the Mullahs in Tehran nor the Islamists in Ankara can re- invent the monarchical authorities that existed over the centuries, especially now that their respective revolutionary systems of government have replaced empires with republics and, in doing so, ushered in a false semblance of democratization. Times have changed, though what surprises students of both societies is the quest for “empire,” ironically by Islamists who rely on religion, to impose raw nation- alist agendas. Turkish and Iranian officials, led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and ‘Ali Khamene’i, covet hegemony over the Muslim world, or at least parts of it, and it is fair to ask whether such aspirations are realistic. Both men believe they are legitimate contenders, one pretending to represent Sunnis,(1) challenging Egypt and Saudi Arabia in the Arab world, and non-Arab Muslim powerhouses elsewhere, including Paki- stan, India, and Indonesia. For its part, Tehran seems determined to seek revenge on the Arab succes- (1) Marwa Maziad and Jake Sotiriadis, “Turkey’s Dangerous New Exports: Pan-Islamist, Neo-Ottoman Visions and Regional Instability,” Middle East Institute, April 21, 2020, https://www.mei.edu/publications/turkeys-dangerous-new-exports-pan- islamist-neo-ottoman-visions-and-regional. Commentaries Can Turkey and Iran Lead the Muslim World? 1 sors to the ‘Umayyad Empire (661–750 AD), allegedly to avenge the “martyred” family of the Caliph ‘Ali, especially his son Hussein. Ironically, Sunni Persia converted to Shi‘ah Islam under the Safavids (1501–1736) nearly 1,000 years after revelation, ostensibly because the Safavids loathed the Ottomans and wished to prevail on a purely nationalistic level. Equally perplexing is the folklore that was carefully woven around the martyrdom of Hussein, a grandson of the Prophet through his daughter Fatimah and son-in-law ‘Ali. Hussein is revered by Shi‘ah Muslims as an imam but also because he married Rabab, a daughter of Imra-al-Qays bin ‘Adi, the leader of Kuza‘ah tribesmen who engendered leaders of the Ab- basid Empire. What these details reveal is that religion was a useful instrument(2) in the hands of pseudo- nationalists then, just as it is in the minds of extremists today. To add another dimension, Hussein is equally revered by Sunnis who also revere the rest of the Prophet Muhammad’s progeny, although they don’t give them divine attributes, as do Shi‘ahs. Of course, and though it may appear not to be the case, similarities abound between Turkey and Iran. Just like the Mullahs ended modernization with their Islamist revolution in 1979, under Erdoğan, Tur- key, which used to be both modernizing and moderate, espoused extremism and, in the process, threat- ened the stability of the entire Middle East. The fact that Ankara aspired to join the European Union and served as a critical NATO pillar was even more perplexing since Turkish policies literally threatened Europe, perhaps even the United States. How Erdoğan’s Turkey emulated Iran was not so evident since Turkish society was still relatively secu- larized, though the Islamist leader(3) gradually and systematically wished to radicalize his country. For starters, Ankara distanced itself from basic freedoms, topped by the cherished freedom of the press. In fact, Erdoğan has consolidated control over the news media and muzzled the press by imprisoning jour- nalists, transforming Ankara according to Reporters Without Borders,(4) into “the world’s biggest jailer of professional journalists.” According to the Stockholm Center for Freedom, 172 journalists(5) were serving various prison sentences in 2020, despite the lifting of the state of emergency in 2018. In addition to this egregious development, Erdoğan’s economic policies led to serious shortcomings that witnessed sharp declines in exports and, even more troublesome, significant drops in the value of the Turkish Lira. A few weeks ago, in September 2020, Moody’s lowered the Turkish credit rating to B2,(6) the lowest at which it has been measured during the past three decades, which will certainly not encour- age fresh foreign direct investments. (2) Einat Wilf, “The Battle for Hegemony in the Middle East,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, May 2017, https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/ASPI-SR106_ Middle-East-hegemony.pdf. (3) “Recep Tayyip Erdogan: Turkey’s Pugnacious President,” BBC News, October 27, 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ world-europe-13746679. (4) “Turkey: World’s Biggest Prison for Journalists,” Reporters without Borders, December 19, 2012, https://rsf.org/en/news/ turkey-worlds-biggest-prison-journalists. (5) “Turkish Court Orders Seizure of Exiled Journalist Can Dündar’s Assets,” Stockholm Center for Freedom, October 8, 2020, https://stockholmcf.org/turkish-court-orders-seizure-of-exiled-journalist-can-dundars-assets/. (6) Moody’s, Investors Service, September 11, 2020, https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-downgrades-Turkeys-rat- ings-to-B2-and-maintains-negative-outlook--PR_431146. 2 Can Turkey and Iran Lead the Muslim World? Commentaries An economy that recorded real growth a decade ago was replaced by deficits, which Ankara explained away by military commitments in Syria that definitely drained available resources. Even more heinous was Ankara’s decision to recruit Syrian mercenaries—estimated at between 2,000 and 4,000 by various sources(7)—to fight alongside Azeri forces in Nagorno-Karabakh. Earlier, Turkey dispatched Syrian re- cruits to Libya, which alarmed Western decision-makers since few understood what motivated Erdoğan to act unilaterally while pretending to remain a reliable NATO partner. Since Syrian mercenaries were duly paid by Turkey—to the tune of $2000 per month(8)—how has this egregious step advanced NATO interests? Remarkably, when he embarked on his adventures in Qatar and Libya, few objected to Erdoğan even if no one understood what motivated him, though what irked NATO partners was Ankara’s decision to enter into a putative alliance with Russia. Erdoğan irritated Washington further and jeopardized its par- ticipation in the F35 Joint Strike Fighter from which it was jettisoned after he purchased the S-400 air defense system(9) from Moscow, which led some to ask whether the Turkish president was being reck- less or, more likely, exercising brazen hegemony? Some even wondered whether he actually believed he could spite partner-countries without a response. Still, it was critical to ask why NATO allies were turning a blind eye, unwilling to take Ankara to the proverbial woodshed. What does that say about the world’s premier military alliance? In short, if despotic Turkish policies have upset traditional allies and outraged nearly all the country’s neighbors, why isn’t he paying the price? Of course, and except for Azerbaijani and Qatari officials, few trusted Erdoğan in 2020, though Ankara still tries to champion Hamas and the government of Fayez al-Sarraj in Tripoli, although both will ditch him the moment a better consort appears to rescue the Pal- estinians and the Libyans. Similarly, and after four decades in power, the Mullahs in Iran have not done much better, even if Persian hegemonic aspirations predated the 1979 Islamic Revolution. There was, naturally, a desire to acquire economic, military, and political power on account of the country’s history and geography. For 3,000 years, Persians co-existed with numerous peoples, including the Kurds, Lurs, Tajiks, Turkmens, Azeris, Balushis, Zazas, Arabs, and many others, which produced violent as well as peaceful moments. Over time, various dynasties emerged, ranging from the Achaemenids to the Sassanians, Safavids, Afshars, Zands, Qajars, and the Pahlavis, but what the Mullahs added to the equation was a fresh “Islamizing” feature that topped Safavid arrogance. (7) “Syrian Mercenaries Sustain Turkey’s Foreign Policy,” DW, n.d., https://www.dw.com/en/turkey-syrian-mercenaries- foreign-policy/a-55098604; Ron Synovitz, “Are Syrian Mercenaries Helping Azerbaijan Fight for Nagorno-Karabakh?” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, October 15, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/are-syrian-mercenaries-helping-azerbaijan- fight-for-nagorno-karabakh-/30895331.html. (8) Bethan McKernan and Hussein Akoush, “Exclusive: 2,000 Syrian Fighters Deployed to Libya to Support Government,” The Guardian, January 15, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/15/exclusive-2000-syrian-troops-de- ployed-to-libya-to-support-regime. (9) Joyce Karam, “US Deprives Turkey of F-35s after Ankara’s Russian Missile Purchase,” The National, July 21, 2020, https:// www.thenationalnews.com/world/mena/us-deprives-turkey-of-f-35s-after-ankara-s-russian-missile-purchase-1.1052641. Commentaries Can Turkey and Iran Lead the Muslim World? 3 For Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as for his successor, what mattered was the stability of the regime and the export of the Islamic Revolution. Those key features, the Islamist leader articulated, required that the conservative Arab Gulf monarchies be eliminated.