The Paradox of Interactive Fiction A New Approach to Imaginative Participation in Light of Interactive Fiction Experiences Thesis submitted for the degree of doctor in Philosophy at the University of Antwerp to be defended by Nele Van de Mosselaer Faculty of Arts – Department of Philosophy Supervised by prof. dr. Arthur Cools & prof. dr. Erik Myin Antwerp 2020 De paradox van interactieve fictie Een nieuwe benadering van verbeelding in het licht van interactieve fictie-ervaringen Proefschrift voorgelegd tot het behalen van de graad van doctor in de Wijsbegeerte aan de Universiteit Antwerpen te verdedigen door Nele Van de Mosselaer Faculteit Letteren en Wijsbegeerte – Department Wijsbegeerte Promotoren: prof. dr. Arthur Cools & prof. dr. Erik Myin Antwerpen 2020 Acknowledgements “My friends are my power!” – Sora, Kingdom Hearts (Square Enix 2002) Writing this dissertation on our interactions with the fictional worlds, characters, and objects represented in videogames was in many ways a fun endeavor. This is the case not only because it involved some actual videogame play, but also because I learned a lot in the last three years. I sincerely hope this dissertation also provides its readers with interesting insights, and helpfully contributes to the philosophy of fiction, which still has a remarkable focus on non-interactive works of literature, theatre, and film. At least in that way, my fearful encounters with zombies, stressful rescue missions of aliens, and countless deaths also gain some relevance outside of the respective fictional worlds in which they occurred. Although my interactions with videogame characters often inspired me to criticize established philosophical ideas on emotions, actions, and desires towards fiction, these characters were particularly unhelpful when it came to philosophical discussions, moral support, and constructive feedback on my manuscripts. Luckily, I could count on many actual people supporting and inspiring me during this project. The advice, feedback, and insights of a great many people were invaluable. First of all, I want to thank my supervisors, Arthur Cools and Erik Myin, for their helpful comments, constructive discussions, and unwavering trust in my work. I am also grateful to my friends and fellow academics Stephan Tulkens, for reading my very first papers and giving me the courage to submit them to conferences and journals; Al Baker, for our many virtual conversations about videogame actions and the fictional relevance of Tetris; and Stefano Caselli, for advising me on my views about imaginative desires. I also want to thank those whose work inspired my own and who took the time to discuss it with me. I thank Daniel O’Shiel, for explaining to me what Sartre would likely say about the imaginative experience of virtual worlds; Daniel Vella and Gordon Calleja, for discussing with me the position players take on within game worlds; and Nathan Wildman, for the useful conversations on the (Waltonian) fictionality of videogames, and for reminding me that writing should be fun, and that it is OK to choose your research subjects in function of this. Lastly, special thanks goes to Kendall Walton. His enthusiastic reaction to my idea of investigating an application of philosophical theories of fiction to videogames was especially encouraging to me when I was only just starting this project. The influence of his workMimesis of Make-Believe is evident both in the contents and the cover of this thesis. I also want to thank many other fellow academics who contributed to both this project and to the creation of the pleasant research environment in which it was car- ried out. At the university of Antwerp, special thanks goes to Leen, Marco, Sebastian, and Martha, for their comments on my endeavors and for joining me on the quest to visualize these in poster format. I also want to thank the people I have met during con- ferences, workshops, and summer schools in the course of this project. I am indebted to the academic communities of the philosophy of fiction and the philosophy of computer games for their constructive feedback to and confidence in my work. I would also like to thank the lecturers and students I met during my research stay at the Institute of Digital Games in Malta, for offering me a glimpse of the game design process and for reminding me of the less theoretical ways of engaging with videogames. I want to thank the jury members who will read and scrutinize my work in advance for their willingness and time. I would also like to express my gratitude to the Research Foundation – Flanders (FWO), for supporting this project financially. I would like to apologize to my friends for the unholy hours at which I sometimes flung philosophical theories at them in the form of far-too-long Facebook messages, and thank them for reading them and helpfully reacting to them anyway. Michiel, in particular, I want to thank for his interest in my work, and for accompanying me to the workshop on the philosophy of fiction in Uppsala which I perceive as the very start of this project. I want to express my appreciation to my family, especially my parents and sister, for supporting me in stressful times, and not asking too many questions about my progress when I decided to focus on so-called practical research by playing videogames. I also thank the family members who went on ski holidays with me during the last weeks of this project, for relating their fiction and videogame experiences to me, and letting me work in peace to the point of me not noticing when their shoulders got dislocated. Lastly, I want to express my deepest gratitude to Stefano, for the unflappable sup- port, the invaluable conversations during beautiful hikes, and for being generally quite great, for a primate. Kendall Walton has reminded us of the logical oddities of our relations with fictional characters. For example, we can talk of them affecting us but not, in any straight- forward way, of us affecting them. They seem to be able to induce in us sorrow, fear, contempt, delight and embarrassment. But we have no comeback with them. We cannot thank them, congratulate them or frighten them, or help, advise, rescue or warn them. There is a logical gap between us and them and those who think that fiction and reality are inextricably mixed should reflect on just how wide this gap is. Exploring the nature of the gap will be at the heart of this investigation. (Lamarque 1981, 292) 11 Table of Contents Introduction . 15 1. The Fictional Experience of Videogames . 21 1.1 Defining Fiction: An Overview . 23 1.1.1 Kendall Walton: Fiction and Make-Believe . 27 1.1.2 Definitions Based On Authorial Intention . 31 1.2 Videogames and Fiction(ality) . 36 1.2.1 Uninformed, Naïve, or Tricked Consumers . 40 1.2.2 The Case of Videogames . 43 1.3 Videogames as a (Waltonian) Fiction Experience . 50 1.4 Concluding Remarks . 55 2. Imagination and Videogames. 57 2.1. Derek Matravers on Imagination and (Visual) Fiction . 58 2.2. Geert Gooskens on Imagination and Immersion . 64 2.3. Kathleen Stock: the Principle of Associated Imaginings. 69 2.4. Concluding Remarks . 74 3. Videogames and The Paradox of Fiction . 77 3.1 The Paradox of Fiction. 79 3.1.1 The Illusion Theory . 82 3.1.2 The Make-Believe Theory . 84 3.1.3 The Thought Theory . 89 3.2 Videogame Emotions and the Paradox of Fiction . 94 3.2.1 The Interactive Green Slime . 95 3.2.2 The Solutions to the Paradox of Fiction Revisited . 98 3.2.3 A Paradox of Gameplay Emotions?. 101 3.3 Concluding Remarks . 108 12 4. A Paradox of Interactive Fiction . 111 4.1 A Paradox of Fictional Actions . 112 4.1.1 It is Impossible to Act on Fictional Objects . 113 4.1.2 Videogame Objects are Fictional . 118 4.1.3 Players Act on Videogame Objects . 121 4.1.4 The Paradox . 125 4.2 Solutions to the Paradox of Interactive Fiction . 126 4.2.1 Videogame Objects are not Fictional . 126 4.2.2 Players Fictionally Act on Videogame Objects . 134 4.3 Concluding Remarks . 140 5. De se Imagination, Fictional Actions, and Imaginative Desires 143 5.1 Half-Real Appreciators . 144 5.1.1 Being Present in Virtual Worlds . 146 5.1.2 The I-in-the-Gameworld . 148 5.1.3 Self-Involving, Interactive Fiction Experiences . 149 5.2 Fictional Actions . 151 5.2.1 Against a Waltonian Framework. 151 5.2.2 A New Definition of Fictional Actions . 153 5.2.3 Conclusion . 160 5.3 I-Desires . 161 5.3.1 Narrative-External and Narrative-Internal Desires . 162 5.3.2 I-Desires and Fictional Actions . 165 5.3.3 Gameplay Desires and Immersion-Fuelled I-Desires . 166 5.3.4 Conclusion . 171 5.4 Concluding Remarks . 171 6. Conclusion . 173 6.1 Summary . 173 6.2 Imaginative Participation and Experiences of Fiction . 176 6.3 Suggestions for Further Research . 180 13 Bibliography . 185 Ludography. 195 Abstract . 199 Samenvatting . 201 14 15 Introduction I cannot have a feeling of impotent anger that I can do nothing to stop Mercutio’s death, as I might have if I were physically prevented from intervening in a real fight. I cannot feel ashamed at my cowardice in doing nothing, since fear cannot prevent me interfering on Mercutio’s behalf. And so on. The reason I can do nothing to save Mercutio has nothing to do with my capacities, or physical or temporal position, but has everything to do with the kind of reality Mercutio has. – Michael Weston on the paradox of fiction (1975, 84) I failed to save Solaire.