Bulletin of Portuguese - Japanese Studies ISSN: 0874-8438 [email protected] Universidade Nova de Lisboa

Mihoko, Oka A great merchant in in . Suetsugu Heizô II and the System of Respondência Bulletin of Portuguese - Japanese Studies, núm. 2, june, 2001, pp. 37-56 Universidade Nova de Lisboa Lisboa, Portugal

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A GREAT MERCHANT IN NAGASAKI IN 17TH CENTURY Suetsugu Heizô II and the System of Respondência Oka Mihoko Research Fellow of the Society for the Promotion of Science, Kyoto University

Introduction

In the last few decades, many articles have been devoted to the study of the Nagasaki merchants and their relationship with ports all over the world. But only few attempts1 have so far been made for other commercial cities in Japan involved in overseas trade, for example and especially Hakata. Hakata is located on the northern top of Kyûshû Island and flourished as an important port for overseas trade with and from ancient times. In the Middle Ages, a group known as Nengyôji, consisting of some elected citizen including great merchants, had an autonomous power in town politics. In other words, Hakata had been “the city of commerce” in Japan. However, in the missionary documents and letters of 16th century and 17th century, the name of Hakata or Facata do not appear as frequently as Nagasaki or Nangasaque, as they were often written then. The first reason is that Hakata did not accept Christianity as much as Nagasaki2, and fewer were living there than in other parts of Kyûshû. However, as mer- chants, people in Hakata must have been interested in the communication with people who were coming from because they knew that it bore a large amount of money. In order to understand the way the merchants in Hakata involved themselves trade with the Portuguese, it is worth examing the life of a merchant in Nagasaki, Suetsugu Heizô, and his strategy of management.

1 See, for example, Okamoto Yoshitomo, Nichiô Kôtsushi no Kenkyû (, Hara Shobô, 1974), João Paulo Oliveira e Costa, Hino Hiroshi (trans.), Portugal to Nippon – Nanban no Seiki – (Lisbon, INCM, 1993). 2 See Takeno Yôko, Hakata no Gôshô (Fukuoka, Ashi Shobô, 1980), pp. 48 – 49. 38 Oka Mihoko

The story of Suetsugu Heizô is one of personal politics in 17th century Japan. Heizô II served as the governor of Nagasaki and was directly involved in mediating trade between Japan and the Portuguese. He capitalized on is position in politics to improve his financial wealth, proving himself to be a shrewd businessman. His personal motives were clear when he switched alle- giances to the Dutch when the economic system of loans to the Portuguese col- lapsed under the weight of respondência or high interests on loans. In spite of the perception of 17th century Japan as a state controlled country, individuals involved in economics and politics still had power to nudge events in their favor. The impact of specific personalities in the history of Japanese foreign trading partners becomes clear. After exploring Heizô II’s identity and rise to power, I will introduce the concept of respondência or high interest loans. Following this, I will explore Heizô II’s investments in Macao as well as the devasting effect the respondência eventually enacted in foreign trade between Japan, Portugal, China and , I will provide a pic- ture of Heizô immediate involvement in the affairs of the time and the per- sonal gains from this.

1. The identity of Heizô II

The name of Suetsugu Heizô is known rather as that of the Nagasaki governor (Daikan3) than that of a great merchant. I should emphasize from the beginning that the name “Heizô Suetsugu” is attributed to four men, Suetsugu Heizô Masanao (I), Suetsugu or Shigefusa Heizô Shigesada (II), Suetsugu or Shigesada Heizô Shigefusa (III), and Suetsugu Heizô Shigetomo (IV). That is, “Suetsugu Heizô” stands for four governors in Nagasaki who were direct descents and this name was taken by them as a hereditary one. Heizô Masanao is known as the usurper of the position of the Nagasaki Daikan from António Tôan (Murayama Tôan4) who was a Christian. Heizô Masanao himself was also a Christian having the baptismal name João5, but he re-converted to buddhism around 1620 and became a persecutor of Christianity which he lead in Nagasaki. Though he abandoned his interests in Christianity he kept intense contacts with Portuguese merchants. Heizô I had

3 setted this position in 1588, Murayama Tôan was appointed the first as non . The Bakufu followed this system, and the main role was levying land tax. 4 He seemed to be a clerk in the house of Suetsugu Kôzen (Masanao’s father). After his independence, he made a fortune in Nagasaki and was appointed to Nagasaki Daikan. For further details of the dis- pute between Tôan and Heizô II, see C. R. Boxer, The Christian Century in Japan, 1549 – 1650 (Manchester, Carcanet Press, 1993, first printed 1951), pp. 333 – 334. 5 On this subject, seem RAM, 9 – 2679, f. 27. Suetsugu Heizô II and the System of Respondência 39 great influence on this trade and his wealth might have been decisive for a smooth ongoing of the commerce between Macao and Nagasaki. He had a strong relationship with Hakata because his father, Suetsugu Kôzen, was from Hakata and Heizô I’s brother Suetsugu Sôtoku was one of the most influential merchants in this city. Without this background, he would not have been successful in Nagasaki. After Heizô I died in 1630, his son succeeded the heritage and started to employ his power in the management of trade. However, when researchers tried to analyze the activities of Heizô II, they were confronted with the pro- blem, “who would be this Heizô II”. The reason why it is so important to make the figure of Heizô II identified is that he worked in the Macao- Nagasaki trade as one of the most important persons. In several local and historical descriptions, such as Nagasaki Zushi6 and Nagasaki Nenpyô Furoku Jûi7, Heizô II appears as Shigefusa8. However, Kawashima Motojirô9 has revealed that according to the record (kakochô) of Shuntokuji Temple10 Heizô II must have been Shigesada. Kawashima’s research can be summarized in the following way. (1) The post mortem name characters of Shigesada (oku- rina) were carved into the bell of Shuntokuji Temple in 1650; (2) Shigesada’s death is inscribed as 1647 in kakochô and on his gravestone at the above named temple; (3) the bell of Suwa Shrine11 was made in 1651 by the contri- bution of Shigesada. Judging from the above points, it is very clear that Shigesada must have been dead before 1650, and in 1651 Shigefusa held the top position at Suetsugu house in Nagasaki. In addition to the arguments shown by Kawashima, the rebuilding of Shuntokuji Temple in 1643 is a good example that illustrates that Heizô II was Shigesada. The articles about this event appear in several historical and local notes such as Nagasaki Zushi12, Nagasaki Jitsuroku Taisei13 and Nagasaki Nenpyô14. In these notes, Shigesada Heizô contributed a part of his wealth to rebuilt the tem- ple. It should be therefore concluded, that Heizô II must be Shigesada.

6 JTN eds. Nagasaki Zushi reprinted edition, Nagasaki, JNT, 1991, p. 154. 7 The author has not seen. 8 About the books supporting this explanation, see Yamamoto Hirofumi Quan – ei Jidai (Tokyo, Yoshikawa Kôbunkan, 1989), p. 49, p. 55. Idem. to Kaikin no Jidai (Tokyo, Azekura Shobô, 1995), p. 61. 9 Shuinsen Bôekishi (Osaka, Naigai Shuppan, 1921), pp. 560 – 561. 10 This temple was reconstructed with the money of a contribution by Suetsugu. Suetsugu had been a representative of supporting members of this temple. 11 Heizô III contributed to construct main building in this shrine. 12 JTN eds. Nagasaki Zushi (reprinted edition, JTN, 1991, pp. 124 – 125. 13 Kyoto University Library, 5 – 15 // na // 23, Vol. 12. 14 Kanai Toshiyuki eds., Nagasaki Nenpyô (Ibun Kaisha, 1988), p. 14. 40 Oka Mihoko

2. The bonds of Respondência and Heizô

Kume Kunitake has collected several maritime financial bonds from the house of descendants of Suetsugu and Shimai in Hakata and assembled them in one library of the Univ. of Tokyo15. These bonds show that the families of Suetsugu and Shimai16 lent out a large quantity of silver to red-seal Ships (licensed ships of early Tokugawa days), junks from China and “the great ships from Macao”. In the Suetsugu Documents, six of these bonds show the debit and credit between Japanese merchants and the Portuguese, and they are written in Portuguese, besides Chinese characters. A letter from a Portuguese to Suetsugu Heizô is also included in this collection. Space constraints pre- clude a discussion of the Shimai Documents, so I would like to concentrate on the Suetsugu Documents (from here, S.D.). An important point to note is these documents had been handed down in the family of Suetsugu in Hakata. In the time of Heizô IV, Shigetomo, the Suetsugu family was destroyed, because of his involvement in smuggling for in 1676. The property was taken away and a part of the family which was involved in this illegal trade was exiled to tiny islands. As this time, a large quantity of documents and bonds were supposed to have been burned or been lost17. Now we can see the traces of flourishment of this family only from several local and historical documents about Nagasaki. And also, S.D. is a precious material to examine the Suestsugu house in Nagasaki.

(1) “Digo eu Rodrigo Sanchez de Paredes cazado e morador em Macao que he verdade que eu tomei a responder ao sor. Suyetçugu Sotucu morador em facata sete mil e quinhentos taes de prata de barras por preço de trinta por cento, os quais vão correndo daqui pera macao, o Risco no navio capitania nossa Senhora da guia a metade, e a outra a metade no navio conceição em que vai o feitor do povo repartido ygualmente e de macao para esta cidade de nangasaque vira o risco repartido ygual- mente em todos os navios em que se fizera viagem seginte que do porto de Macao partirem iuntos em hum dia, e lhe farei ou mandarei fazer pontual pagamento do proprio e respondencia não vindo porque muyer minha fazenda e cargo, e não avendo viagem o anno por algum

15 The Historiographical Institute, The University of Tokyo. 16 This family is famous not only as great merchant, but also as promoter of contemporary culture like tea ceremony (cha no yu). 17 Because of the fire broke out in 1697 in Nagasaki, the mansion of Suetsugu had burnt completely and it is said that all documents had been lost. Suetsugu Heizô II and the System of Respondência 41

acontecimento, lhe pagarei mais a des por cento como he costume e declaro que esta prata vai a entregar a Cidade18 por via de feizodono e que se ella a tomar mandar a fazer este pagamento pello feitor do povo19 com a devida pontualidade, e ficando em meu poder o farei eu como asima me obrigo em fe do que me asinei nesto em nangasaque oje sinco de novembro de seiscentos e vinte e sete annos Ro. Sanchez de paredes [endorsement] Cto.20 De sete mil e quinhentos taes que Ro. Sanches tomou a Responder a Suyetcugu a Rezão de trinta por cento.” 21

Regarding de concept “respondência”22, Takase Kôichirô describes that respondência means “high interest rates beyond proper interest23”. According to the bonds contained in S.D., it is possible to regard this tern as part of the eco- nomic vocabulary in use at that time in the case of debit and credit without hav- ing so strict a meaning. However, I will use Takase’s interpretation and refer to respondência as a care concerning overly high interest rates. These bonds, called the nagegane shômon (bond) in Japan, were written in several languages and have mostly the same written form. This term, nagegane, appears in a histori- ography of Hakata24 and of Sakai25 with some examples bonds. The word is not actually contained in any bonds, but the authors of those historiographies describe that the vocabulary had been used until the middle of the era. Also in some places of Saikaku Ihara’s work, as in Nihon Eitaigura, this term appears with the meaning of “large speculation.” Several articles have been devoted to the origin of nagegane, including the connection with the system of bottomry. However, much still remains to be investigated. It is not the point of question to argue actually whether respondência and nagegane have the same significance.

18 In this term itself, it is not clear that it means Nagasaki or Macao. I interpreted from around sen- tences and the structure of this document. 19 This position means a person next to the Capitão, and he treats negotiation directly at pancada (official market rate of raw silk). 20 Conhecimento. It means bond. 21 This document is contained in Suetsugu Tsurumatu Shi Shozô Monjo (TDSH, 4171 – 91 – 36), ff. 2 – 3. 22 Many articles have been devoted to analyze this system. For example, C. R. Boxer, The Great Ship from Amacon (Lisbon, Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos, 1963), Shiba Kentarô “Nagegane toha Nani, Kaijô Kashitsuke ka Commenda Tôshi ka”, Keizaishi Kenkyû, Vols. 45 – 47 (Tokyo, 1933). Idem. “Nichi – Ô Bun Nagenane Shômon no Kôsatsu”, Keizaishi Kenkyû, Vols. 17 – 1, 17 – 2 (Tokyo, 1937). 23 Takase K., Hino H. (trans.) “Actividades Económicas dos Jesuitas no Extremo Oriente dos Séculos XVI e XVII. Especialmente em torno da Usura”, Ryûtsû Keizai Daigaku Ryûtû Jôhô Gakubu Kiyô, Vol. 2, Nº 2 (Saitama, 1998), pp. 174 – 181. 24 Tsuda Genko, Sekijôshi, (Fukuoka, Chikushi Shidankai, 1921, reprinted edition), p. 126, p. 137, p. 156, pp. 194 – 198. 25 Shigen Kôshi, Zen Sakai Shôshi, (Kyoto, Kôbundô, 1985, reprinted edition), pp. 111 – 113.

42 Oka Mihoko

Let us return to the main subject, the role of Heizô in this kind of debit and credit. In the above document (1), Heizô plays the role of mediator between a Portuguese and a Japanese merchant. Both principle and interest were paid through Heizô. Heizô’s brother Suetsugu Sôtoku invested the original capital, and here we get a first glimpe of the blood relation involved. As to the five other bonds, written in Portuguese, the investors were also relatives of Suetsugu in Hakata. From this point it is not too difficult to conclude that there was indeed a kind of blood-related group organizing investments, and Heizô involved himself into this group. With the exception of document (1), the others were written after 163226, so “Heizô” had changed from Heizô I, Masanao to Heizô II, Shigesada. The investments of Hakata merchants in Portuguese vessels are con- firmed from an earlier time. A document (2) kept in the Arquivo Distrital de Évora gives evidence to this. The text reads:

(2) “[...] he bem notorio e pello conseguinte a V. M. em como nos demos cantidade de dinheiro a responder a fernão Dorrias por então não ser tam prohibido este trato de respondencias como o he oje. E he tambem asas notorio como elle por perdas que teve e a que todos os mercadores estamos sugeitos nos não mandou pagar porque se ve imposibilitado para o poder fazer. Pedimos a V. M. o consinta vir a japão pera asim ter algum remédio e nos esperança de algum tempo sermos pagos, e damos a V. M. nossa palavra de não bulirmos com elle nem lhe pedirmos que nos pague senão quando elle boamente puder, antes o ajudaremos com o que pudermos pera que assi elle seja remediado e nos pagos [...] Nangasaqui a 3 de Abril de 1626 [...].”27

Seven Japanese signatures by Chinese characters have been inserted after these sentences; six are of merchants of Hakata ant the other is one person from Hirado. This document was drafted in 1626, and it is clear that this kind of investment and exchange between Portuguese and Hakata merchants had been utilized frequently. Let us now return to the role of Heizô and look at another document (3) which is supposed to be related with bond (1).

26 The years noted in bonds are 1632, 1637 and 1638. 27 BPADE, Cód. cxvi / 2-5, ff. 274. Suetsugu Heizô II and the System of Respondência 43

(3) ”O Sr. Suyetcugu feizosama [...] Eu determinava passar este anno a Japão servindo a Cidade mas como por sua ordem fui mandado com outros cidadoins ao tutão desta provincia e nos ditenerão a lhe [até?] agora por não se ter dado fim e meio aos negócios que são trabalhosos, não pude fazer a viagem; fico porem com a esperança de pera o ano ir ver a V. M. e servilo como son obrigado, e como eu não tenho amigo de quem possa esperar mais que de V. M. lhe peço me façam de procurar por mim e acudir a minha hon- rra para que a prata que devo ao s.or Sotocodono visto não poder este ano pellos rezoins ditas dar lhe satisfação, e rezao de mim queira que pera o anno lha pague com mais des por cento que será melhor que descobrir minhas faltas, [...] Cantão a 20 de julho de 638 annos de V. M. servidor a) Ro. Sanches de paredes” 28

This is contained in S. D. and its structure of investor: Sôtoku, interme- diator: Heizô, debtor: Rodrigo Sanchez de Paredes is the name as that of docu- ment (1). In this letter, Sanchez asked Heizô confidently for the mediation con- cerning a debt which had not been cleared off. The structure means documents (1) and (2) were related, the debt in 1627 might have been delayed to pay back for more than 10 years. Around the end of the Portuguese trade in Japan, the problem of a large amount of unrepaid silver lent at respondência was consi- derable. This question will be discussed in the next chapter. At any rate, it is obvious that Heizô played an important role in the commerce between the Suetsugu family in Hakata and Portuguese merchants. The direct investment by Heizô is not clear in the S. D. As I have men- tioned before, these documents had been preserved in the Suetsugu house in Hakata. It may seem natural that Heizô’s role is only intermediary in these records, but it seems reasonable to consider hat the merchant who involved himself in others’ investments may have been interested in increasing his own wealthy position.

28 TDSH, Suetsuguke Monjo.

44 Oka Mihoko

3. The investments by Heizô II to Macao

Two variations of the same letters sent by Heizô II to Macao exist in the Real Academia de la Historia in Madrid29 and in the Biblioteca da Ajuda in Lisbon30. C. R. Boxer31 and Takase Koichirô32 have mentioned the letters in the Biblioteca da Ajuda, but I confirmed that they were written copies while the two in Madrid were originals. Unfortunately, when I found out about the documents in Madrid, they were being prepared for restoration, and it was impossible to get a reprint or a microfilme. Consequently I have relied on the manuscripts in the Biblioteca da Ajuda. These letters are initially concerned with the prohibition of the passage of people related to the missionaries or Christianity. They then turn their attentions to the silver which Heizô II had invested in the foregoing years and the quantity of silver for investment in 1634 and 1635.

(4) “[...] Os dez mil taes que mandei por Feitor Agostinho Lobo, dos quais recebi cinco mil taeis empregados em seda conforme o conhecimento e este anno queria mandar tão bem os dez mil taeis do meu Bague, mas por não arriscar em hum navio tanto por isso me determinei de mandar a mestres como de feito mando e assim me farão V. M. merce de entre- gar a Bertolameo da Rocha, em sua auzença a Rodrigo Sanches de Paredes e na de ambos a Antonio de Oliveira Aranha para o emprego. Este anno tive pouco ganho por ser o emprego ruim e estes cinco mil taeis mandarão V. M. a Bertolameo da Rocha que empregue em seda chapi boa, porque não quero nem hum so cate de seda corrente, e este emprego de cinco mil taeis me farão merce de mandar no navio onde vier o Capitão Mor, e o emprego dos cinco mil taeis do anno passado no navio onde vier o Feitor do povo [...].”33

It becomes evident that Heizô II had invested 10,000 taels in 1633, and he received half of the return in silk in 1634. One may speculate about the risk he undertook in 1634 with his total investment of 10,000 taels. What needs attention with this kind of bond is who would take the risk for capital and cargo. The study of the respondência can also be seen from the perspective of insurance studies. In other bonds of Suetsugu, it is the investors who took the

29 RAH, 9 – 7239, f. 145, ff. 169 – 170. 30 BAL, Jesuitas na Ásia, Cód. 49–V–11, ff. 615 – 617, ff. 599v. – 601. 31 C. R. Boxer, The Great Ship from Amacon, pp. 326 – 330. 32 Takase K., “ On the Consignment Trade between Macao and Nagasaki” Shigaku, Vol. 49 – 4 33 BAL – Jesuitas na Ásia, Cód. 49–V–11, ff. 615 – 617. Suetsugu Heizô II and the System of Respondência 45 risk in these negotiations. Assumption of the risk was one of the fundamental elements in the structure of respondência.

(5) “[...] Entreguei ao Feitor sete mil taeis em prata de soma, e trez mil em prata corrente, peço a V. M. que como sempre a mandem entregar a Bertolameo da Rocha, e Rodrigo Sanches comprando como elles seda chali a melhor que houvem ma mandem pelo feitor da viagem seguinte com o risco na galeota igualmente nos dous navios em que vierem o capitão e feitor. Se Bertolameo da Rocha e Rodrigo Sanchez por alguma cauza não puderem comprar a sobredita seda, peço a V. M. a comprem, e ma man- dem em nome dessa cidade. [...] Ainda que acimo escrevo, que mando sette mil taeis em prata de soma, com tudo, porque a não pude haver a mandei em corrente, que monta oito mil seiscentos e cincoenta taeis34 os quais com os outros trêz mil fazem a quantia de onze mil setecentos e cincoenta taeis, peço a V. M. que mos mandem empregar como acima digo. 25 de outubro de 1635.” 35

This letter was written on October 25th 1635, the year following the document (4). The main contents of both do not differ much, but anxiety about the use of the money and expectations for the Macao government to take responsibility for the loan had increased. Here the name of Rodrigo Sanchez appears again, which indicates a confidential relation between Heizô II and him. In addition to the intense commercial relation shown in the docu- ment (3), the above letter indicates the possibility that Sanchez could be a representative of Heizô II in Macao. It is worth asking what was the role of the Macao government. It had worked not only as a medium in charge to treat the silver, but also as the main organizer of the transaction. Figures as Rodrigo Sanchez and Bartolomeo da Rocha were only organs serving Heizô II’s negotiation while the main organ of investment was the Macao government. Heizô II lent silver not to a single person, but the government of Macao, trusting the Portuguese to take respon- sibility in any case of trouble. When we return to the Hakata merchants’ bonds in S. D., this becomes clear. It seems that the Hakata merchants had invested their money in individuals who were supported by the Macao government. The tables 1 and 2 indicate this clearly.

34 We can see the ratio of the value of soma silver and current silver; 1. 2:1. 35 BAL – Jesuitas na Ásia, Cód. 49–V–11, ff. 599v. – 601 V. 46 Oka Mihoko

Table 1: Debtors of Suetsugu Bonds36

Nº Lessees 1 Rodrigo Sanchez de Paredes 2 Agostinho Lobo 3 Tristão Tavares, António Maneio 4 Pedro Fernandez de Carvalho 5 Leonard Ferreira, Pedro de Castro 6 João Pereira

Table 2 : Capitão-mor in Portuguese vessels from Macao in the Quanei Period38

1624 Agostinho Lobo 1625 Agostinho Lobo 1626 Luís Paes Pacheco 1627 No Voyage 1628 António Monteiro 1629 António de Oliveira Aranha 1630 No Voyage *Envoy of Dom Gonçalo da Silveira 1631 Lourenço de Lis Velho 1632 Lopo Sarmento de Carvalho 1633 Lopo Sarmento de Carvalho 1634 Lopo Sarmento de Carvalho 1635 No Voyage *Envoy of Dom Gonçalo da Silveira [sic]37 1636 Dom Gonçalo da Silveira 1637 Dom Francisco de Castelo Branco 1638 Dom João Pereira 1639 Vasco Palha de Almeida

Agostinho Lobo came to Japan as capitão-mor in 1624 and 1625, and in 1632 as feitor. Tristão Tavares had been a secretary in the Macao Parliament and he seems to be a relative of Manuel Tavares Bocarro, who made a big for- tune with weapons. Pedro Fernandez de Carvalho was feitor during the last voyage from Macao to Nagasaki in 1638 and the capitão-mor was Dom João

36 TDSH, Suetsuguke Monjo and Suetsugu Tsurumatu Shi Shozô Monjo. 37 In 1635, there was the voyage to Nagasaki with three galeotas and actually Silveira worked as the Capitão Mor in place of António de Távora Pinto. - C. R. Boxer, The Great Ship from Amacon, pp. 141 – 142. 38 BAL, Jesuitas na Ásia, Cód. 49 – IV – 66, ff. 41v. – 42. Suetsugu Heizô II and the System of Respondência 47

Pereira. The debtors who appear in the bonds are important persons not only in the Macao-Nagasaki trade, but also in the Macao government. In the case of Japanese red-seal Ships and Chinese junks, in both cases contracts were made between individuals. One should then ask why the government was involved in the case of the Portuguese. First, it must be under- stood that the trade with Chinese junks was equivalent to smuggling. The government was out of matters even if it knew actually about the transactions. Second, due to the uncertainty of arriving Portuguese vessels and negotiations in Canton and other ports, it was more suitable to invest in a larger commu- nity than to individuals in order to protect one’s own benefits. In the case of Heizô II, there is another reason for his strong trust in the Macao government. When Heizô II assumed his father’s heritage, an intense relationship between the Portuguese and Suetsugu had already been established39. Furthermore, Suetsugu had been the governor in Nagasaki, a position with the strongest power and was the terminal organization in this city. There were many bene- fits for Macao to maintain good relations with Heizô II, and it is natural to consider that Heizô II’s investments were actually a case of public trade with the Macao government rather than private trade with Portuguese entrepre- neurs. The years when these letters were written marked the end of the Macao- Nagasaki trade. There was not only the strict prohibition of Christianity and the passage of missionaries from overseas, but by now the behaviour of the Portuguese in Nagasaki was regulated. Though the trade business was still working, rumours that this trade would soon come to an end were spreading over the city and other commercial cities in Japan. As a result, the price of raw silk had risen all over Japan, and this caused the price rise of other products, too. In 1635, the price of qualified raw silk was fixed as 260 taels/pico in Nagasaki, but is was traded as 480 taels in Kyoto40. There was the chaos on the Japan market. In 1634 N. Couckebacker, the Chief of the Dutch , mentioned “Portuguese have received loans from Japanese merchants for the past 12 years and the unreturned silver amounts to 150,000 taels. They must pay one third in this year and the rest of the silver has to be paid 2 years from now. The interests on the loans are incredibly high and I do not know how they can pay such an amount of money41.” This description indicates that a

39 The relationship is apparent in the documents of footnote n. 34. 40 TDSH (comp. and trans.), OSN, Vol. 1 –2 (Tokyo UP, 1975, Japanese edition), p. 38, p. 69. Nakamura Tadashi, Kinsei Nagasaki Bôekishi no Kenkyû (Tokyo, Yoshikawa Kôbunkan, 1988), pp. 120 – 121. 41 Ibid., pp. 50 – 51.

48 Oka Mihoko large part of the silver which had been borrowed at respondência (high inte- rest) had not been paid back. In this situation, the rumours about the end of the trade caused some tragedies. In 1637 a group of Japanese merchants attacked the envoy of a Portuguese debtor who was sent to negociate late pay- ment42. The role of Macao government played regarding their responsibility for the debt due to respondência is important. Seeing the wretched situation of the Portuguese in Nagasaki, the Macao authorities had to quickly find solution to the large debt of the Portuguese.

4. Respondência and the Macao Government

As I mentioned above, it is clear that the Macao government involved itself in the economics at respondência between Japanese and Portuguese. The authorities were forced to consider the best way to make up for the ruin in this trade which was caused by debtors. Although the best way to repair good rela- tions would have been to pay off the total amount of debt, the Macao government hesitated to carry out such a plan, because there were conflicts around the respondência problem. In 1610 the Vice Roy of India, Ruy Lourenço de Távora ordered Portuguese officials not to accept any silver at respondência from Japan for Macao. This order declared that those who received silver under these terms from Japanese merchants would be punished with excommunication.

(6) “Trata da prata dos Japoes que elles costumão mandar a Macao [...] o assento que tomou ao Reverendo Bispo da China D. Fr. João Pinto sobre se tornara mandar a seos donos os cabedaes que vierão de Japão a Macao que lhe forão denunciados por excomunhão e que as que sobre elles ... [sic] tomadas, desembargos que forão feitos se levantão e os ditos cabedaes se enviem a seos donos a Japão sem se fazer emprego algum no proprio din- heiro em que vierão de Japão. Notifico assim todas as justiças de Sua Magestade da cidade de Macao para que cumprão e guardem e a todos os mais capitães das viagens, officiaes e pessoas a que pertencem e lhes mando que assim cumprão, e guardem, e promptamente fação cumprir e guardar de maneira que se neste contem, sem duvida, nem embargo algum [...]”.43

42 Ibid., Vol. 3 –1, pp. 90 – 92. 43 BAL, Jesuítas na Ásia, Cód. 49–V–3, f. 28, Cód. 49–V–5, ff. 84 – 85.

Suetsugu Heizô II and the System of Respondência 49

Okamoto44 describes the reasons for these instructions as follows. The first reason was to protect the benefits of fazenda real (the national treasury of Portugal) by official trade and the second reason was to prevent Japanese merchants from intervening in the negotiations directly. Though this strict order had been passed to the Macao government from the Vice Roy in Goa the receipt of silver from Japan still continued and we can confirm these transac- tions, for 1613, 1615 and 1617.45 The reason why this system was continued is closely related to the position of the receivers in Macao. As we have seen above, people involved in the respondência were situated at the top of the Macao government and had important roles in the China – Japan trade. Connection to private trade might be one of the most “useful” ways to make a fortune. After all, this situation had not been changed since 1623 when Dom F. Mascarenhas was sent from Goa to legitimate Macao’s administration. It is clear that there was a conflict between the Macao governors con- cerning respondência as the following letter illustrates. Mascarenhas sent it to the King of Portugal informing him of trouble in Macao after his arrival.

(7) “Sendo informado, como nestes navios tinha vindo muita prata de Japões a responder, e do muito danno e perjuizo que era ao bem comum desta terra, tirei com V. M. huma devassa do cazo, e por ella me consta que Dominguos Carvalho feitor que foi da ditta viagem, avia trasido a dita prata a responder, a quoal devassa tenho mandado ao senhor Visorrei da India, e té sua resposta não poderá o dito Dominguos Carvalho entrar em officio algum da cidade, por estar creminoso de que avizo a V. M.. E jun- tamente dos des adjuntos convem a saber, Ponceanno de Abreu, Pedro Fernandes de Carvalho, Pedro Correa Craveiro, António Monteiro Pinto, Pedro Rodrigues Teixeira, Lionel de Sousa de Limma, Manuel Pacheco de Limma, Rafael Carneiro de Siqueira, Rodriguo Sanches de Paredes, Heitor da Mota [Caldeira ?] , os quoais todos se asinarão em hum protesto que me fizerão e intimarão por dous escrivães em que me tinhão deposto do carguo de Capitão Geral. E tras elle tornarão as armas contra sua Magestade com os mais exssessos de que tenho dado conta ao dito senhor Visorrei, e a Relação. [...] 28 de dezembro de 1624 annos, a) Dom Francisco Mascarenhas.” 46

44 Okamoto Yoshitomo, “Nagegane ni Kansuru Tokushu no Siryô”, Shakai Keizai Shigaku, Vol. 5 – 6, (Tokyo, 1935), pp. 87 – 89. 45 For a discussion of these events, see, C. R. Boxer “Notes on the Portuguese Trade in Japan during the Kwanei Period (1624 – 1643)”, Shigaku, Vol. 12 – 2, (Keiou Gijuku UP., 1933), Valdemar Coutinho, O Fim da Presença Portuguesa no Japão, (Lisbon, Sociedade Histórica da Independência de Portugal, 1999), Takase Kôichirô, “Nihon Iezusukai no Zaisei to Nagenane”, Shigaku, Vol. 43 – 1/2 (Keiou Gijuku UP., 1970). 46 BPADE, Cód. cxvi / 2-5, f. 238. 50 Oka Mihoko

It is notable here that the top governors in the Macao administration had planned to expell Mascarenhas with reasons based on the respondência pro- blem. This rebellion was amply concerned with the suppression of receiving silver from Japanese merchants and we can see the governors had much inte- rest in this silver trade. We must pay attention that the respondência problem had become an official one rather than a private one at this point. As we can see in the document (7), the Feitor, a position held by an accomplished Portuguese politician/merchant, was the recipient of Japanese funds. If a ruler would abolish this system, he would have to reform the whole political consti- tution of Macao, which had a cozy political economic relationship. In order to separate politics from economics, the Portuguese authority sent a person to Macao. In the next year, 1625, Mascarenhas gave orders prohibiting the receipt of silver at respondência again47 and it was stricter than ever, stating that the punishment of disobedience was imprisonment in Goa. Though these strict orders were put up repeatedly, carrying silver into Macao did not cease. Even the people who took part in the rebellion against Mascarenhas still continued to work in the trade in important positions, as Rodrigo Sanchez de Paredes and Pedro Fernandez de Carvalho.48 These wealthy merchants were necessary to run these trading activities because they knew how to manage the commercial voyage and how to establish a good rela- tionship with Japanese governors and merchants. Next, we should notice the uncertainty of securing sufficient operating funds in Macao as a mediating port. The Canton market had been unstable for the delay of payments by Chinese and the difficulties of acquiring sufficient products like raw silk and textiles to export. Futhermore, the route from Goa to Macao was constantly under the peril of attack by the Dutch fleet and they had to secure their own financial means without support from Portugal or India. The silver even at respondência was the most useful and ready cash. Portuguese entrepreneurs were not the only ones interested in preserving the respondência system. This is clear in document (2)49. Several Hakata merchants required Macao to con- tinue to accept silver from Japan, at least till the Portuguese debt would be cleared off. From the reasons above it seemed to be difficult to give up handling sil- ver in official trade. However, at the declining epoch of the Macao - Nagasaki trade, the problems around respondência had increased, and Portuguese had

47 See Ibid., f. 237. 48 He worked as a Feitor during the voyage from Macao to Nagasaki in 1638. 49 See footnote n. 27 above. Suetsugu Heizô II and the System of Respondência 51 to grapple with the question how to pay back the loan or to ease the ill feel- ing of Japanese merchants. While various embarrassing situations came up concerning Christianity and South West European people in Japan, the Macao authorities decided to send Dom Gonçalo da Silveira in the fanction of Capitão-Mor as envoy in 1635. He had already visited Japan in 1630 and had been detained in Nagasaki with the Capitão-Mor, Oliveira de Aranha, till 1634. The aim of the visit in 1635 was the same as in 1630: ease the Bakufu’s attitude towards Portuguese trade. He took the role of Capitão-Mor from the already appoint- ed António de Távora Pinto. The next quotation from a letter in 1636 from Manuel Ramos to the Vice Roy in India may help to understand the reason for his coming to Japam again.

(8) “[...] se ellegeo o anno passado a Dom Gonçalo da Silveira para hir por Capitão Mor na viagem de Japão, assy por sua callidade, talento, e partes, como pella muita experiencia, que tem daquele reino, foi sua hida de grande importancia para os japõens, pello grande respeito que lhe tem, por elle saber autorizar muito, como taobem pera os mesmos portugueses, que como lhe conhecem a natureza, se não atreverão a continuar em alguas dezordens, que intentaram [...] se conssiderou a grande utilidade, que seria pera a fazenda Real tornar elle a Japão, em dito de Sua Magestade, reputação do nome Portugues e maes segurança deste Comercio [...].”50

Taking into consideration that Silveira was acquainted with Japanese customs and the severe condition in Nagasaki for 4 years, it was natural that he was elected as the head of the voyage. Additionally, his nobility and status in India were elements that enabled him to gain the confidence of the Japanese. It may be true, that he was trusted by the Japanese and the necessi- ty for his coming was expressed best by Heizô II when he says “Dom Gonçalo como esteve tantos annos em Jappão sabe muito bem os costumes desta terra, seus costumes, e modos de proceder são dignos de muito louvor,”51 in his 1635 letter. Heizô II mentions his pains to get Silveira back to Macao in 1634.

(9) “[...] Essa cidade deve de folgar com a hida de Dom Gonçalo de Silveira e António de Oliveira e para ida dos quaes trabalhei na Corte mais de trez annos como elles dirão a V. M.. Havendo couzas que sejão do serviço dessa cidade farei com muito gosto e ao diante o que se offerecer não deixarei de o fazer com a mesma vontade [...].”52

50 IAN/TT, Livro das Monções, Livro 38, ff. 197v. 51 BAL, Jesuitas na Ásia, Cód. 49–V–11, f. 601. 52 BAL, Jesuitas na Ásia, Cód. 49–V–11, f. 616v. 52 Oka Mihoko

The quotation above indicates that Heizô II still had been greatly inte- rested in the trade with Macao and been eager to improve and keep the rela- tion. Nevertheless, when the envoy of Dom Francisco de Castelobranco, in place of Silveira, went to Edo to greet the Court, the broke out in 1637 and they were imprisoned. The situation surrounding the Portuguese was only getting worse, and at this moment Heizô II settled on his new strategy towards future associates.

5. The Strategy of Management by Heizô II

Heizô II decided to switch from trading with the Portuguese to trading with the Dutch before the Shimabara Rebellion. Around 1634 he started to rebuild relations with the Dutch Factory which had been harmed by Heizô I in the affair of Peter Nuits,53 Heizô II told an interpreter for the Dutch “the worst relation between our house and the Dutch has finished, and I will end this problem.”54 In the same year, he revealed the different position from his father to N. Couckbacker.55 Before these statements the Factory decided to sell the Erasmus, which was the ship concerning the affair of Peter Nuits, decla- ring “to forget the bad memory about Suetsugu family.” Though both appa- rently started to come close, it is uncertain from his letter to Macao in 1635 whether Heizô II had already made up his mind to leave the Portuguese as his trading partner. As the regulations of overseas matters by the Bakufu were get- ting worse for the Portuguese, the relationship between Heizô II and the Dutch became stronger. In 1635 three galeotas (small ) led by Gonçalo da Silveira arrived at Nagasaki and the price of raw silk was decided at public rate (pancada). While the price of the high quality silk was 305 taels/pico, and the second was 280 taels/pico, the ordinal was 240 taels/pico. The price of raw silk brought by Dutch remained around 260 ~ 290 taels/pico.56 It was normal that raw silk from Batavia was sold at a lower price than Portuguese silk and F. Caron, a Dutch East Indiaman, asked Heizô II if it was “possible to rise the price of raw silk on Dutch vessels by your power.” Heizô II replied “yes, it is possible, but

53 In 1626, the crew of the red–seal Ship dispatched by Heizô I, Masanao, and the Dutch quarrelled about tariffs and some Japanese shipmen died in . For revenge, Yahei Hamada, the captain of that ship visited Taiwan again; they took hostages each other after the fight. The trade between two stopped for four years because Masanao killed those Dutch hostages by his arbitrary decision. Though Peter Nuits was dispatched from Batavia to repair the relation, he had been caught by 1636. 54 TDSH (comp. and trans.), OSN, Vol. 1 – 2, Japanese edition, p. 37. 55 Ibid., pp. 45 – 46. 56 Ibid., pp. 170 – 171, Nakamura Tadashi, Kinsei Nagasaki Bôekishi no Kenkyû (Tokyo, Yoshikawa Kôbunkan, 1988), pp. 120 – 121. Suetsugu Heizô II and the System of Respondência 53 you, the Factory have to supply more silk than ever to me secretly.”57 As proof of this fact, the amount of raw silk given to Heizô II from the VOC changed suddenly from 30 pico to 50 pico in 1636.58 While the Portuguese silk could be sold only for the selected merchants of five cities (gokasho shônin), Dutch could conduct business with everyone they wanted, almost freely. It was obvi- ous that Japanese merchants would necessarily concentrate on Dutch raw silk after the corruption of the Macao trade. This transaction demonstrates the foresight of Heizô II. Furthermore, to slow how close the relation between Heizô II and the Dutch Factory became in this period, it is useful to refer to Heizô II’s lists of goods brought by Portuguese galeota to the Factory. Initially, the Factory required Heizô II to provide the lists, but after the first year allowed him to submit them volun- tarily. He passed these lists to the Dutch in the autumn always after the vessels had arrived, in 1636, 1637 and 1638.59 In 1639, the list contained the goods and their prices brought by Chinese junks.60 It is clear that the Dutch utilized these lists when they purchased goods to import from Batavia for the next year. Heizô II’s attempt could have been influenced by the intention of the Bakufu, because of the Bakufu demand that Dutch ships would bring more products than before. Heizô II must have thought the Dutch were better partners than the Chinese because of the uncertainty of season they came, their number of ships, and the quantity of products brought by them. It was important that Heizô II played the role of intermediater in the con- nection between the Bakufu and the Factory. There are many articles which Heizô II acted as an agent transmitting demands from the Dutch to representatives of the Bakufu in Nagasaki (Nagasaki Bugyô). Although Heizô II’s position, the Nagasaki Daikan, was under the Nagasaki Bugyô, two authorities dispatched from the Bakufu depended on Heizô II to govern Nagasaki. He was accustomed to dealing with local matters in Nagasaki while the Bugyô were replaced each a few years. While the Factory needed Heizô II, the Nagasaki Bugyô also made use of him when communicating with the Dutch. As is well known, the Bakufu required the Dutch to cooperate in the attack on peasants during the Shimabara Rebellion. Heizô II took an impor- tant part in informing Bakufu’s intention to the Dutch Factory. This rebellion broke out in Shimabara, led by ex–retainers of Konishi Yukinaga who had been ruined at the decisive battle between the Toyotomi and the Tokugawa in

57 Ibid., pp. 186 – 187, Nagazumi Yôko, “Hirado Oranda Shôkanchô Nikki o Tôshite Mita Pancado”, Nihon Rekishi, Vol. 260 (Tokyo, 1970), pp. 84 – 85. 58 Nakamura, loc. cit. 59 TDSH (comp. and trans.), OSN, Vol. 2 – 1, Japanese edition, pp. 164 – 166, Vol. 2 – 2, p. 130, Vol. 3 –2, p. 197. 60 TDSH (comp. and trans.), OSN, Vol. 4 – 1, Japanese edition, pp. 183 – 188.

54 Oka Mihoko

Osaka in 1615, in November 1637 and the rebel army spread to another dis- trict of northern Kyûshû. At first the Bakufu sent a large force commanded by General Shigemasa Itakura to suppress, but he died in the attack in January 1638 and the authorities were ordered to concentrate on suppressing the rebellion as quickly as possible. On January 18th 1638, the Dutch informed to Heizô II that they would cooperate if the governors required.61 Nine days after Heizô II sent a messenger requesting six barrels full of gunpowder, the Factory complied. On February 9th, Heizô II told the Dutch “supplying arms and powders is the best way to show your loyalty at this time and you should comply with everything the Bakufu wants”. Five cannons were taken apart from the ship called De Lyp and sent to Arima the next day. On February 18th, Heizô II ordered this ship to stay at Hirado port, instead of returning to Batavia. The next day, the Bakufu officialy commanded this ship to sail to the battlefield. As we have seen above, the Dutch Factory cooperated with the Bakufu voluntarily, but it is obvious that their participation was planned by Heizô II. Dutch and Heizô II perceived that the Portuguese would be compelled to leave Japan and give up their trade. After the suppression of the rebellion, the Factory received a monopol right of possession in the Japan trade and Heizô II was rewarded by the Bakufu in 1640.62 To be honoured by the top of the public hierarchy means that Heizô II transcended his status as a private governor of Nagasaki and he became an officially recognized politician in the end. We may say that he was successful in business and in raising his status due to his intelligence, while his father got the position of the Daikan by force. It should be concluded, from what has been said above, that Heizô II constructed his status and made a for- tune by his sense of business and ability for politics. Although his title was that of a politician, it seems to me that he was a man of business rather than of politics. It may not be too much to say that the political power was only a means for increasing his wealth. He seemed to enjoy planning his strategy as a merchant involved in the difficulties of overseas trade. Therefore, it was pos- sible to take advantage of the speculation to foreign shipping for him. His sharp business sense was based on a clear recognition of the world situation. It is notable that he was also a trader who dispatched many red–seal ships abroad to Taiwan, Siam, Cambodia, and other parts os Asia. His views towards other countries were sharper than that of contemporary

61 Most of the material treated in this section is derived from TDSH (comp. and trans.), OSN, Vol. 3 1, Japanese edition. 62 Kuroita Katsumi (ed.), Tokugawa Jikki (Tokyo, Yoshikawa Kôbunkan, 1930, reprinted edition), p.182. Suetsugu Heizô II and the System of Respondência 55

Japanese politicians. During the national isolation, the Bakufu developed the market and controlled the domestic economy. The beginning of the 17th cen- tury may be the last brilliant time when the great merchants could freely uti- lize their powers and one could suddenly come into wealth in pre–modern ages. Heizô II was one of the wise men who survived in such decades.

[Abbreviations]

BAL – Biblioteca da Ajuda, Lisboa. BPADE – Biblioteca Pública e Arquivo Distrital de Évora. INCM - Imprensa Nacional – Casa da Moeda. IAN/TT – Instituto do Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo. JNT – Junshin Joshi Tanki Daigaku, Nagasaki Chihô Bunkashi Kenkyûsho RAM – Real Academia de la Historia, Madrid OSN – Oranda Shôkancho Nikki (Diaries kept by the heads of the Dutch Factory in Japan) TDSH – Tokyo Daigaku Shiryô Hensanjo. (The Historiographical Institute, The University of Tokyo). 56 Oka Mihoko

Abstract

This article is an analysis of a structural aspect of the 17th century Macao-Japan trade. Focusing on the figure of a Nagasaki merchant, who is known under the name of Suetsugu Heizô, the structure of respondência and its importance in this trade will become clear. The system of investment had made some Japanese mer- chants wealthy, especially merchants originating from Hataka and Nagasaki on the Kyûshû islands, because of the high rate of interest which lay around 30%. But the character of Macao as na inter- mediate port brought more profits to the Portuguese in this trade because of the value of silver in China and the countries under the control of the Chinese empire. In this article becomes indicated the nonpayment of Portuguese debt by certain bonds left in Japanese mer- chant’s houses. And actually this problem created confusion in the Macao administration in the 1630’s because it could be one reason for the decision taken by Japanese authorities to fade out the commerce. I touch only the surface of this economic system and its periphery, but this system can be one indicator to measure the eco- nomic structure of the Portuguese seaborne empire in Asia.

Resumo

Este artigo analisa um aspecto estrutural do comércio entre Macau e Nagasaki no século XVII. Atentando na figura de um mer- cador de Nagasaki, que é conhecido pelo nome de Suetsugu Heizô, o sistema da respondência e a sua importância neste comércio torna- se claro. Este sistema de investimento enriqueceu alguns comerciantes japoneses, especialmente cidadãos de Hakata e de Nagasaki, na ilha de Kyûshû, devido aos juros elevados que cobravam e que atingiam 30%. O papel de Macau com o um porto intermediário trouxe mais proveitos aos Portugueses neste negócio, por causa do valor da prata na China e nos países sob o controlo do Celeste Império. Este artigo mostra as dívidas que os Portugueses não pagaram, através de documentos que ficaram nas casas de mercadores nipónicos. Este problema criou dificuldades à administração de Macau na década de 1630-40 e pode ter sido uma das razões que levaram as autori- dades japonesas a por fim ao comércio. Analiso apenas aspectos superficiais e periféricos deste negó- cio, mas este pode ser um indicador para avaliar a estrutura económica do império marítimo dos Portugueses na Ásia.