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Zimbabwe Election Support Network Report on the 31 July 2013 Harmonised Elections

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Zimbabwe Election Support Network Report on the 31 July 2013 Harmonised Elections DISTRIBUTED BY VERITAS WITH PERMISSION FROM ZESN Veritas makes every effort to ensure the provision of reliable information, but cannot take legal responsibility for information supplied. Zimbabwe Election Support Network Report on the 31 July 2013 Harmonised Elections © 2013 Zimbabwe Election Support Network . ZESN Report on the 31 July 2013 Harmonised Elections Table of Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................ 6 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................... 10 ABOUT ZESN .......................................................................................................................................... 10 METHODOLOGY .................................................................................................................................... 11 Political Context .................................................................................................................................... 12 THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ELECTIONS IN ZIMBABWE .................................................................... 16 Constitutional Guarantees ................................................................................................................ 17 Conduct of the Elections ................................................................................................................... 20 Election Dispute Resolution Mechanisms ......................................................................................... 21 ELECTION MANAGEMENT ..................................................................................................................... 23 THE PRE-ELECTION PERIOD ................................................................................................................... 25 Political Environment ........................................................................................................................ 27 Voter registration .............................................................................................................................. 28 The Voters’ Roll ................................................................................................................................. 31 Nomination of Candidates ................................................................................................................ 35 Special voting .................................................................................................................................... 38 Postal Voting ..................................................................................................................................... 42 Voter Education .................................................................................................................................... 42 Media Coverage .................................................................................................................................... 44 Campaigning ......................................................................................................................................... 50 Political Party Financing .................................................................................................................... 53 Use of State Resources ..................................................................................................................... 54 Women and Elections ........................................................................................................................... 55 Election Observation ......................................................................................................................... 56 ELECTION DAY ....................................................................................................................................... 58 Polling stations set-up ....................................................................................................................... 59 Voting ................................................................................................................................................ 60 Critical Incidents on Election Day...................................................................................................... 63 Counting of ballots at polling stations .............................................................................................. 65 Tabulation of Results ........................................................................................................................ 65 2 ZESN Report on the 31 July 2013 Harmonised Elections Announcement of Results ................................................................................................................. 66 Analysis of results ............................................................................................................................. 70 Post-election ..................................................................................................................................... 73 LESSONS LEARNT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................................................................... 73 FINAL ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 77 APPENDICES .......................................................................................................................................... 81 Appendix 1: Critical Incidents during voting process ........................................................................ 81 Appendix 2: ZESN’s Preliminary Statement issued on 1 August 2013 .............................................. 88 Appendix 3: 31 July Press Release .................................................................................................... 94 Appendix 4: Results of the House of Assembly 31 July 2013 ............................................................ 96 3 ZESN Report on the 31 July 2013 Harmonised Elections LIST OF ACRONYMS AIPPA Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act ACTIONS Access, Control, Transformation, Initiative, Organisation, New technologies and Sustainability AKE Alliance Kumbula Ekhaya ART Agenda for Real Transformation AU African Union CCDZ Centre for Community Development Zimbabwe CEO Chief Elections Officer CIVNET Civic Education Network Trust COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa COPAC Parliamentary Select Committee COTRAD Community Tolerance Reconciliation and Development CPF Citizen Participation Forum CSOs Civil Society Organizations DSTV Digital Satellite Television ECF Electoral Commissions Forum FZC Free Zimbabwe Congress GEDT Gweru East Development Trust GNU Government of National Unity GPA Global Political Agreement IDASA Institute for democracy in Southern Africa IYWD Institute for Young Women Development JOMIC Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee JUICE Jobs Upliftment Investment Capital and Ecology MDC M Movement for Democratic Change – Mutambara MDC N Movement for Democratic Change – Ncube MDC T Movement for Democratic Change –Tsvangirai MISA Media Institute of Southern Africa MKD Mavambo Kusile Dawn NANGO National Association for Non-Governmental Organisations NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations NYDT National Youth Development Trust ONHRI Organ of National Healing Reconciliation and Integration PDUFF People’s Democratic Union Freedom Front PEMMO Principles for Election Management Monitoring and Observation PIMZ Progressive and Innovative Movement of Zimbabwe POSA Public Order and Security Act RAU Research and Advocacy Unit RDC Rural District Council RGV Registrar General of Voters SADC PF Southern African Development Community SST Student Solidarity Trust UMD United Movement for Democracy UMDP United Movement for Democracy Party UNDP United Nations Development Programme VOP Voice of the People YAT Youth Agenda Trust ZANU Ndonga Zimbabwe African National Union Ndonga ZANU PF Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front ZAPU Zimbabwe African People’s Union 4 ZESN Report on the 31 July 2013 Harmonised Elections ZBC Zimbabwe Broadcasting Cooperation ZDF Zimbabwe Development Forum ZDP Zimbabwe Development Party ZEC Zimbabwe Electoral Commission ZESN Zimbabwe Election Support Network ZPM Zimbabwe People’s Movement ZPP Zimbabwe Peace Project ZTV Zimbabwe Television 5 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY On 31 July 2013 Zimbabwe held harmonised elections for the Presidency, the National Assembly, the Senate and local authorities. ZESN deployed 7 099 observers to every province and constituency in the country on 31 July 2013, set at the ‘Election Day’. Reports from observers during the election and throughout the entire process, demonstrated that the credibility of the 2013 harmonised elections was compromised by a systematic effort to disenfranchise many voters. ZESN observers reported on the opening, voting and closing and counting of votes and reported on any critical incidents witnessed in the course of their observation. Zimbabwe’s harmonised elections were highly anticipated because they came at the end of a period of political uncertainty and were expected to lead to a more stable political era for the country. The elections were the culmination of a political process that started with the signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) following the 2008 disputed harmonised
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