CHAPTER FIVE

EVALUATING THE TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR DIVINE ACTION

Wesley J. Wildman

1. Introduction

1.1. Divine Action and Evolutionary Th ere are many ways to conceptualize divine action in nature and history, ranging from attribution to of natural-law suspending miracles or natural-law conforming activity, to virtual identifi cation of the laws and processes of nature with the initiating creative act of God or with the divine nature itself. It must be recognized from the outset that some of these conceptions cannot possibly profi t from insights drawn from the natural , including evolutionary biology. One example is Rudolf Bultmann’s assertion that divine action occurs only in the realm of existence and leaves no traces in history and nature; this depends upon a dualism of being or language. Another is John Locke’s reliance on the miraculous as a mode of special divine action. To the extent that miraculous and various forms of dualistic theories of divine action are defensible—and I think they are if the right approach is taken—a theory of divine action that is independent of considerations from the natural sciences, including evolutionary biology, is still feasible. Th eories of divine action that take the natural sciences to have something crucial to off er, however, have much better chances of achieving the virtues of specifi city and plausibility. If we accept this, then we will be inclined to try to establish sub- stantive connections between theories of divine action and all kinds of scientifi c theories, including evolutionary biology. One type of con- nection begins with the appearance of purposes or ends in nature and attempts to construe this as evidence of the reality of divine action by means of the argument that such apparent ends indicate genuine teleology in natural objects and processes, and that this teleology (in any of a number of possible forms) is the mode of God’s action. I shall 142 wesley j. wildman call this argument “the teleological argument for divine action.” Th e English divine William Paley appealed to the teleological argument for divine action when he drew his famous analogy between a watch and the wondrous structures and processes of nature: both demand a designer.1 Likewise, Alfred Russel Wallace, co-discoverer with Charles Darwin of the principle of , found the complexity of some features of biology so amazing that he invoked an active designer God to explain it.2 Th is peculiarly aggressive form of the teleological argument for divine action (the so-called design argument) is comparatively rare in our day because evolutionary biology has made impressive advances in explaining how complex organs and biological systems developed from simpler forms. Th at has made it exceedingly diffi cult to attempt to move from the products of biological to divine action by means of the argument that the beauty and functionality of those products is so wonderful as to demand a divine mind whose intention they are; or from the process of biological evolution to divine action by means of the argument that the evolutionary process requires occasional divine moderation, adjustment, acceleration, or specifi c directing to account for the forms of life that exist. Th e theory of evolution is increasingly well justifi ed in asserting that wonderful forms of life result from the evolutionary process regardless of what any mind intends, and that this process is automatic, in need of no occasional, special adjustments.3 Th e argument from design has been thoroughly undermined as a result. Th e teleological argument for divine action, however, has more mod- est, more viable forms. One is driven by the question of the signifi cance and possible “ultimate purpose” of the evolutionary trajectory that has produced human life.4 Another fi nds a congenial starting point in one of the intuitions guiding neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory, namely, that increases in biological complexity probably occur at diff erent speeds

1 William Paley, Natural Th eology—of Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity Collected from the Appearances of Nature (Oxford: J. Vincent, 1802; 2nd ed., 1828). 2 Th is is so according to Michael Shermer, Why People Believe Weird Th ings (New York: W.H. Freeman, 1997), who cites an article of Wallace in Quarterly Review (April, 1869). 3 For marvelous descriptions of many particular case studies, see , Th e Blind Watchmaker (New York, London: W.W. Norton, 1986), and even more impressively, Climbing Mount Improbable (New York, London: W.W. Norton, 1996). 4 See, for example, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Th e Phenomenon of Man (London: Collins, New York: Harper, 1959; tr. from 1955 French ed.), and Man’s Place in Nature (London: Collins, New York: Harper, 1966; tr. from 1956 French ed.).