S12568 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE October 14, 1998 and use the word ‘‘kidnapping’’, but it has REMARKS OF THE HONORABLE DONALD RUMS- Dr. William Graham, former Science Advi- been the practice of the United States not to FELD, CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY, OCTO- sor to President Reagan. Bill Graham has consider the term to include parental abduc- BER 7, 1998 done a superb job. Thank goodness we had tion because these treaties were negotiated Chairman Ed Meese, distinguished Mem- the benefit of his technical experienced and by the United States prior to the develop- bers of the House and Senate, public offi- knowledge. ment in United States criminal law de- cials—past and present—ladies and gentle- Dr. William Schneider, former Undersecre- scribed in paragraphs (3) and (4); men. Good evening. tary of State for Security Assistance in the (6) the more modern extradition treaties to I see so many here who have served our Reagan Administration. Bill kept us sane which the United States is a party contain country with distinction in so many impor- with his unfailing good humor, penetrating dual criminality provisions, which provide tant ways—Senators Cochran, Kyl and Wal- as it is, and challenged by his keen insights. The members of the Commission spent an for extradition where both parties make the lop, Secretaries Jim Schlesinger and Al enormous number of hours, over six months offense a felony, and therefore it is the prac- Haig, and many others. And there is Dr. and received over 200 briefings. Not surpris- tice of the United States to consider such Fritz Kraemer. There is a true ‘‘keeper of the ingly, given our different backgrounds and treaties to include parental abduction if the flame.’’ It is a privilege as well as a pleasure experiences—military, technical, policy ori- other foreign state party also considers the to be with you all. ented, but all with decades of experience act of parental abduction to be a criminal of- Frank—my congratulations to you for dealing with the Intelligence Community fense; and your ten years of contributions to our coun- and its products—we started out with a vari- (7) this circumstance has resulted in a dis- try’s security. You and your associates at ety of viewpoints. As we proceeded, each parity in United States extradition law the Center deserve, and have, our apprecia- time we seemed to be diverging in our views, which should be rectified to better protect tion. We all know and respect the energy, we called for more briefings and focused the interests of children and their parents. persistence and patriotism that you have back on the facts. SEC. 203. INTERPRETATION OF EXTRADITION brought to the national security debate and After extensive discussion and analysis, we TREATIES. are grateful for it. arrived at our unanimous conclusions and a For purposes of any extradition treaty to Senator Thad Cochran, I thank you for unanimous recommendation. As General which the United States is a party, Congress your generous words. As you know, your Welch said, the facts overcame our biases authorizes the interpretation of the terms Committee’s very useful ‘‘Proliferation and opinions and drove us to our unanimous ‘‘kidnaping’’ and ‘‘kidnapping’’ to include Primer’’ was given to each of our Commis- conclusions. And in this city, unanimity is parental kidnapping. sion members at our first session. You have remarkable, especially on a subject as heat- made important contributions on these key ed as this. f subjects, and I congratulate you for them. Given that so few people will be able to * * * * * read our classified final report of some 307 ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS I find since I first arrived in Washington, pages, with several hundred additional clas- D.C., to work on Capitol Hill back in 1957, sified pages of working papers and technical fresh out of the Navy, that while we went analysis, and that the unclassified executive back home at regular intervals, I seem to summary was only 36 pages, that our conclu- THE RUMSFELD COMMISSION keep finding myself back here on some sions were unanimous makes them consider- REPORT project or another for over several decades ably more persuasive. During the course of our deliberations, al- ∑ Mr. KYL. Mr. President, as you now. I must say that this most recent assign- ment, the Ballistic Missile Threat Commis- most every week there was an event some- know, over the past year there has sion, has been particularly interesting, be- where in the world related to ballistic mis- been a great deal of discussion in Wash- cause the subject is so important. siles or weapons of mass destruction—wheth- ington about the growing ballistic mis- This evening I want to talk a bit about our er the Ghauri missile launch by Pakistan, sile threat to the United States and report, first because it is a message that the Indian and Pakistani nuclear explosions, our forces and friends abroad. Although needs to be heard, and, second, because continued stiff-arming of the U.S. and the Members of Congress and the Adminis- there’s no group who has done more and can U.N. inspectors by Iraq, the Shahab 3 missile tration have not always agreed on how do still more to carry that message. firing in Iran, and more recently North Ko- rea’s Taepo Dong 1 three-stage launch. The to best respond to this growing threat, As you will recall, the U.S. Intelligence Community’s 1995 National Intelligence Esti- pace of these significant events, while dis- I think we can all agree that the Com- mate caused quite a stir in the national se- turbing to be sure, provided a vivid backdrop mission to Assess the Ballistic Missile curity community for a number of reasons. for our work. Threat to the United States, chaired by As a result, the Congress established our * * * * * former Secretary of Defense Donald Commission to provide an independent as- It is clear the Gulf War taught regional Rumsfeld, has made an indispensable sessment of the ballistic missile threat to powers that they are ill-advised to try to contribution to the debate. The bipar- the United States—including Alaska and Ha- combat U.S. or Western armies and air tisan, nine-member commission in- waii. Our charter was not to look at other forces. They can neither deter nor prevail threats or possible responses. against those vastly greater conventional ca- cluded many of our nation’s most As one of our Commissioners put it, our prominent experts on national security pabilities. That being the case, it’s not sur- task was to find out, Who has them? Who is prising that they week asymmetrical advan- affairs. Due to Don Rumsfeld’s leader- trying to get them? When are they likely to tages and leverage to enable them to change ship, this diverse group with divergent succeed? Why do we care? and, When will we the calculations of Western nations and ways views on many policy issues, came to- know? to threaten and deter them as well as their gether and produced an outstanding re- Thanks to Speaker Gingrich and Minority neighbors. port that unanimously concluded that Leader Gephardt for the House, and Senate They have several cost effective options. the ballistic missile threat to the U.S. Leaders Lott and Daschle, the members of Terrorism is one. Cruise missiles are also an our bipartisan Commission were truly out- is greater than previously assessed, increasingly attractive option in that they standing. They included: Dr. Barry are both versatile and relatively inexpensive. that rogue nations like Iran could de- Blechman, the former Assistant Director of At some point they may well become a weap- velop long-range missiles capable of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency on of choice. reaching the U.S. in as little as five in the Carter Administration; Retired four- And, third, there are ballistic missiles. It years, and that we might have little or star general Lee Butler, former Commander is not happenstance that some 25–30 coun- no warning that such a threat had de- of the Strategic Air Command/ Dr. Richard tries either have or are seeking to acquire veloped. Garwin of IBM, a distinguished scientist; ballistic missiles. They are very attractive, At an event last week, the Center for General Larry Welch, former Chief of Staff and relatively inexpensive when compared to of the Air Force, and CEO of the IDA; Paul Security Policy honored Don Rumsfeld armies, navies, and air forces; second, like Wolfowitz, former Undersecretary of Defense cruise missiles, they can be launched from by presenting him with the ‘‘Keeper of for Policy, former Ambassador to Indonesia, land, sea or air and have the flexibility of the Flame’’ award for his outstanding and Dean of the Nitze School at Johns Hop- carrying chemical, biological or nuclear war- leadership as chairman of the Commis- kins University; and James Woolsey, former heads; and third, they have the compelling sion to Assess the Ballistic Missile Director of the CIA in the Clinton Adminis- advantage of being certain to arrive at their Threat to the United States. It was a tration. Also with us this evening is Dr. destinations—since there are no defenses well deserved honor. For the benefit of Steve Cambone, currently the Director of against them. those who were not able to attend the Research at the National Defense University. Those of us from Chicago recall Al Steve did a superb job as Staff Director for Capone’s remark that ‘‘You get more with a award ceremony, I ask that Mr. Rums- the Commission. kind word and a gun than you do with a kind feld’s remarks at the event be printed Two of our Commissioners are here this word alone.’’ We can substitute ‘‘ballistic in the RECORD. evening, and I’d like them to stand and be missile’’ for ‘‘gun’’ and the names of some The remarks follow: recognized for their important work. modern day Al Capones. October 14, 1998 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S12569 The term ‘‘rogue countries’’ is an unfortu- indigenous ballistic missile development pro- corrosive. Leaders have to create an environ- nate phrase, since it suggests that their be- gram since Robert Goddard. The countries of ment that is hospitable to the truth—wheth- havior might be erratic. While unusual to us, interest are helping each other. They are er it is bad news or good news—not an envi- their actions are rational for them and not doing it for a variety of reasons—some stra- ronment that forces subordinates to trim, unpredictable. To say that such countries tegic, some financial. But, be clear—tech- hedge, duck and, as the President said, would be deterred or dissuaded from using nology transfer is not rare or unusual, it is ‘‘fudge.’’ terrorist attacks, cruise missiles or ballistic pervasive. * * * * * missiles with weapons of mass destruction, The intelligence task is difficult. There are The recent TD–1 space launch vehicle test because of the vastly greater power of the more actors, more programs and more facili- is an object lesson and also a warning. Many U.S. and the West, is to misunderstand. As ties to monitor than was the case during the were skeptical for technical reasons that the Lenin said, ‘‘the purpose of terrorism is to Cold War. Their assets are spread somewhat TD–1 could fly at all. It had been the conven- terrorize.’’ these are terror weapons, and thinly across many priorities. Methodologi- tional wisdom that ‘‘staging’’ and systems they work. cal adjustments relative to collecting and integration were too complex and difficult Having these capabilities in the hands of analyzing evidence is, in our view, not keep- for countries such as North Korea to accom- such countries forces a different calculation ing up with the pace of events. We need to plish in any near time frame. Yet North on the part of the U.S. and any nation that remember Baldy’s Law: ‘‘Some of it (what we Korea demonstrated staging twice. has interests in their regions. see), plus the rest of it (what we don’t see) The likelihood that a TD–2 will be success- equals all of it.’’ Or, as Dr. Bill Graham fre- fully tested has gone up considerably since * * * * * quently reminded us, ‘‘The absence of evi- The Commission’s unanimous conclusions the August 31st flight. The likelihood that a dence is not evidence of absence.’’ TD–2 flight could exceed 5,000 to 6,000 kilo- were these: Specifically, Russia and China have China and Russia continue to pose threats meters in range with a nuclear payload has emerged as major suppliers of technology to gone up as well. And, the likelihood that we to the U.S., although different in nature. a number of countries. There is the advent Each is on an uncertain, albeit different, will not know very much in advance of a and acceleration of trade among second-tier launch what a TD–2 will be capable of con- path. With respect to North Korea and Iran, powers to the point that the development of tinues to be high. we concluded each could pose a threat to the these capabilities may well have become Now, the TD–1 launch was interesting with U.S. within five years of a decision to do so, self-sustaining. Today they each have var- respect to North Korea, but given the reality and that the U.S. might not know for several ious capabilities the others do not. As they of technology transfer, what happens in years whether or not such a decision had trade—whether it’s knowledge, systems, ma- North Korea also is important with respect been made. Given that UNSCOM sanctions terials, components, or technicians—they to other countries, for example, Iran. We can and inspections are unlikely to be in place it benefit from each other and are able to move be certain that North Korea will offer that is increasingly clear that Iraq has to be in- forward on separate development paths, all capability to other countries, including Iran. cluded with North Korea and Iran. of which are notably different from ours or That has been their public posture. It has We concluded unanimously that these that of the Soviet Union. And, they are able been their private behavior. They are very, emerging capabilities are broader, more ma- to move at a more rapid pace. very active marketing ballistic missile tech- ture, and evolving more rapidly than had To characterize the programs of target na- nologies. In addition, Iran not only has as- been reported, and that the intelligence com- tions as ‘‘high-risk’’ is a misunderstanding of sistance from North Korea, but it also has munity’s ability to provide timely warning the situation. These countries do not need assistance from Russia and China, which cre- has been and is being eroded and that the the accuracies the U.S. required. They do not ates additional options and development warning time of deployment of a ballistic have the same concerns about safety that paths for them. missile threat to the United States is re- the U.S. has. Nor do they need the high vol- duced. Finally, we concluded that under umes the U.S. acquired. As a result, they are * * * * * What does this all mean by way of warn- some plausible scenarios, including re-basing capable of using technologies, techniques ing? Well, it powerfully reinforces our Com- or transfer of operational missiles, sea- and and even equipment that the U.S. would mission’s conclusions that technology trans- air-launch options, shortened development have rejected as too primitive as much as fer is pervasive and that deception and de- programs that might include testing in a three decades ago. But let there be no nial work. I’ve mentioned ‘‘surprises,’’ which third country, or some combination of these, doubt—they are successfully and rapidly de- of course go to the issue of warning. When do the U.S. might well have little or no warning veloping the capabilities necessary to we know something? Put another way—when before operational deployment. threaten the United States. is what we do know sufficiently clear that it As I mentioned, we considered a series of * * * * * becomes actionable? ways nations can shorten the missile devel- One important reason is that the emerging Roberta Wohlstetter’s brilliant book Pearl opment process and, therefore, warning time. powers are secretive about their programs Harbor, and the foreword to it, compellingly They include launching shorter-range mis- and increasingly sophisticated in deception argue that: ‘‘. . . we were not caught napping siles by air or sea, by placing them in an- and denial. They know considerably more at the time of Pearl Harbor. We just ex- other country, by missile testing in another than we would like them to know about the pected wrong. And it was not our warning country, by the turn-key sale of entire bal- sources and methods of our collection, in no that was most at fault, but our strategic listic missile systems to other countries, or small part through espionage. And they use analysis. We were so busy thinking through some combination. that knowledge to good effect in hiding their some ‘‘obvious’’ Japanese moves that we ne- These approaches have been characterized glected to hedge against the choice they ac- programs. as ‘‘unlikely.’’ But each has been done. They We concluded that there will be surprises. tually made.’’ are not new, novel, high-risk or unlikely. It is a big world, it is a complicated world, It may have been a somewhat ‘‘improb- As Jim Woolsey pointed out, making able’’ choice, but it was not all that improb- and deception and denial are extensive. The ICBMs was like the old 4-minute mile bar- surprise to me is not that there have been able. We provided the undefended target, and rier. It seemed impossible until Roger Ban- if we know anything from history, it is that and will continue to be surprises, but that we nister broke it. Today it’s relatively easy. are surprised that there are surprises. We weakness is provocative. Weakness entices don’t, won’t, and can’t know everything. We * * * * * others into adventures they otherwise would must recognize that some surprises will On the subject of sanctions, you will recall avoid. ‘‘The risk is that what is strange is occur and take the necessary steps to see that President Clinton recently said that thought to be ‘‘improbable,’’ and what seems that we invest so that our country is ar- sanctions legislation causes them to improbable is not taken seriously.’’ The book goes on to point out that: ‘‘Sur- ranged to deal with the risks that the inevi- ‘‘fudge.’’ It was an honest statement. How- prise, when it happens to a government, is table surprises will pose. As von Clausewitz ever, ‘‘fudging’’ can have a dangerous effect. There are several ways to ‘‘fudge’’: First, likely to be a complicated, diffuse bureau- wrote, ‘‘The unexpected is the prince of the simply don’t study or analyze a matter if the cratic thing. It includes neglect of respon- battlefield.’’ answer might put your superiors in an un- sibility, but also responsibility so poorly de- * * * * * comfortable position; delay studying or re- fined or so ambiguously delegated that ac- The second key factor relative to reduced porting up information that would be ‘‘bad tion gets lost. It includes gaps in intel- warning is the extensive and growing foreign news’’; narrowly construe an issue, so that ligence, but also intelligence that, like a assistance, technology transfer and foreign the answer will not be adverse to your boss’s string of pearls too precious to wear, is too trade in ballistic missile and weapons of views or positions; and last, select assump- sensitive to give to those who need it (and mass destruction capabilities. Foreign trade tions that assume that the answer will lead this is happening today). It includes the and foreign assistance are, in our view, not a to your desired conclusions. For example, alarm that fails to work, but also the alarm ‘‘wild card.’’ They are a fact. The contention you could study carefully whether or not the that has gone off so often it has been discon- that we will have ample warning of develop- U.S. will have adequate warning of ‘‘indige- nected. It includes the unalert watchman, ments in nations with ‘‘indigenous’’ ballistic nous’’ ballistic missile development pro- but also the one who knows he’ll be chewed missile development programs misses the grams, even though ‘‘indigenous’’ ballistic out by his superior if he gets higher author- point. I don’t know of a single nation on missile development programs don’t exist. ity out of bed. It includes the contingencies earth with an ‘‘indigenous’’ ballistic missile In short, the effect of ‘‘fudging’’ is to warp that occur to no one, but also those that ev- program. There may not have been a truly and corrupt the intelligence process. It is eryone assumes somebody else is taking care S12570 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE October 14, 1998 of. It includes straightforward procrasti- bilities, as they most surely will in the Mr. Stabile has served with great dis- nation, but also decisions protracted by in- months ahead. tinction for the past 25 years as an Op- ternal disagreement. It includes, in addition, * * * * * erations Support Technician in the the inability of individual human beings to We are in a relaxed post-Cold War environ- Boston Field Office of the Secret Serv- rise to the occasion until they are sure it is ment, with increased exchanges of scientists the occasion, which is usually too late. ice, working in support of the agency’s and students, relaxed export controls, leaks protective and investigative missions. ‘‘The results, at Pearl Harbor, were sudden, of classified information appearing in the concentrated, and dramatic. The failure, press almost daily, espionage continuing Earlier, Mr. Stabile had served for 27 however, was cumulative, widespread, and apace, an explosion of ‘‘demarches,’’ which years in the United States Marine rather drearily familiar. This is why sur- provide vital information that eventually is Corps. He served in the South Pacific prise, when it happens, is everything in- used to our disadvantage, and increased in World War II, including the Marshall volved in a government’s failure to antici- international trade of sophisticated dual-use Islands, Saipan, and Iwo Jima. He also pate effectively.’’ technology. Does that sound familiar? served in the Korean War in the 1950’s, It is increasingly clear that anti-prolifera- was part of the Dominican Republic op- tion efforts, coupled with the inevitable im- * * * * * eration in 1965, and had two tours of Our Commission’s unanimous rec- position of still more sanctions—which al- ommendation was that U.S. analyses, prac- ready cover a large majority of the people on duty in Vietnam in the 1960’s. tices and policies that depend on expecta- earth—are not stopping other nations from In the course of this extraordinary tions of extended warning of deployment of acquiring increasingly sophisticated weap- career, he became a highly decorated ballistic missile threats be reviewed and, as ons of mass destruction and missile tech- Sergeant Major and received numerous appropriate, revised to reflect the reality of nologies. commendations, including the Bronze There are two schools of thought as to how an environment in which there may be little Star, the Navy Commendation Medal, or no warning. Specifically, we believe the to deal with this obvious failure: One is to try still harder and impose still the Presidential Unit Citation, and the Department of State should review its poli- more sanctions. Navy Unit Citation. Some say, once a cies and priorities, including sanctions and The second approach is to seriously work ‘‘boot,’’ always a ‘‘boot.’’ But Sergeant non-proliferation activities, as well as our to prevent the availability of the most im- alliance activities; the intelligence commu- Major Stabile took many ‘‘boots’’ over portant technologies, try to delay the avail- the years and developed them into ef- nity should review U.S. collection capabili- ability of the next tier of information, but to ties, given their changing and increasingly recognize that we live in a world where those fective leaders. complex task; and, last, that the defense es- who don’t wish us well will inevitably gain Throughout his brilliant career, tablishment should review both U.S. offen- sophisticated weapons, and that, therefore, Bernardino Stabile has served his coun- sive and defensive capabilities as well as the answer is to invest as necessary in the try with commitment, dedication, strategies, plans, and procedures that are offensive and defense capabilities and the in- bravery, integrity, honor, and patriot- based on an assumption of extended warning. telligence assets that will enable us to live ism of the highest order. He deserves In short, we are in a new circumstance and with these increasingly dangerous threats. the policies and approaches that were appro- the gratitude of the Senate and the na- priate when we could rely on extended warn- * * * * * tion, and I am proud to take this op- ing no longer apply. We hear a lot about the defense budget and portunity to praise his outstanding the top line pressure—that we can’t afford service.∑ * * * * * more. Look, our country may not be wealthy Recently I have been asked about the re- enough to do everything in the world that f ception our report has received. I would say everyone in the world may wish, but the first THE VERY BAD DEBT BOXSCORE it has been surprisingly good. responsibility of government is to provide First, the press. The reaction was superb for the national security. And, let there be ∑ Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, at the from Bill Safire, but across the country it no doubt, our country is more than wealthy close of business yesterday, Tuesday, has been modest. But then there has been a enough to do everything important that we October 13, 1998, the federal debt stood lot of unusual news competition here in need to do. Defense expenditures at 3% of at $5,537,720,928,486.41 (Five trillion, Washington, D.C., to say nothing of the news GNP are the lowest in my adult lifetime. We five hundred thirty-seven billion, seven of: need to stop the mindless defense cuts, rear- Russia’s economic problems and protests hundred twenty million, nine hundred range our national defense to fit the post- twenty-eight thousand, four hundred and the last Soviet intelligence chief, Mr. Cold War world, and invest as necessary to Primakov, being named Prime Minister. assure our nation’s ability to contribute to eighty-six dollars and forty-one cents). The Asian financial crisis. peace and stability in our still dangerous and Five years ago, October 13, 1993, the The Chicago Cubs’ Sammy Sosa’s brilliant increasingly untidy world. federal debt stood at $4,403,485,000,000 chase for the home run title, to say nothing (Four trillion, four hundred three bil- of Mr. McGwire’s accomplishment. * * * * * And, if you can believe it, Quaddafi, of all I am optimistic that we will find our way. lion, four hundred eighty-five million). people, holding a 5-nation summit. We are not a nation with but one leader. Our Ten years ago, October 13, 1988, the As to the Department of State and the Na- strength is that we have multiple centers of federal debt stood at $2,616,702,000,000 tional Security Council, I am not aware of leadership. (Two trillion, six hundred sixteen bil- any public reaction. Our central purpose remains as compelling lion, seven hundred two million). The only reaction from the Department of as ever. Quite simply, it is to guard the ram- Fifteen years ago, October 13, 1983, Defense I am aware of was to reiterate their parts of freedom and to expand freedom at home and light its way in the world. This the federal debt stood at belief that the U.S. will have ample warning $1,383,620,000,000 (One trillion, three of ‘‘indigenous’’ ballistic missile develop- means encouraging freedom abroad and en- ment programs, with which we, of course, riching it here at home. It requires purpose- hundred eighty-three billion, six hun- would readily agree, if, in fact, any ‘‘indige- ful diplomacy underpinned by strong, flexi- dred twenty million) which reflects a nous’’ ballistic missile programs actually ex- ble military power and persuasive moral debt increase of more than $4 trillion— isted—which they don’t. As General Lee But- leadership. $4,154,100,928,486.41 (Four trillion, one ler said at one of our Commission’s Congres- As Theodore Roosevelt once said, ‘‘Aggres- hundred fifty-four billion, one hundred sional hearings, ‘‘If you are determined to do sive fighting for the right is the noblest sport that the world affords.’’ To those gath- million, nine hundred twenty-eight it, there is no body of evidence that cannot thousand, four hundred eighty-six dol- be ignored.’’ ered here this evening, who do that each day, In the Intelligence Community we see posi- you have my thanks and appreciation. lars and forty-one cents) during the tive changes already. I think it is reasonably Thank you very much.∑ past 25 years.∑ certain that the next National Intelligence f f Estimate will look quite different from the IN MEMORY AND HONOR OF LOUIS last one. The initial press report on the re- THE SECRET SERVICE’S BER- lease of the Commission’s findings quoted an NARDINO STABILE—OUTSTAND- L. REDDING ‘‘anonymous CIA source’’ as contending that ING AMERICAN ∑ Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise our report was a ‘‘worst case.’’ But that was ∑ Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I rise today to honor one of Delaware’s, in- before the North Korean three-stage TD–1 today to pay tribute to Bernardino R. deed this nation’s, legal legends. launch in August. We have not seen that Stabile on his retirement from the Se- Louis L. Redding was the first Afri- phrase used again since. Indeed, our report could prove to have been a ‘‘best case,’’ if cret Service. A military veteran and can-American admitted to the Dela- and when North Korea and/or Iran announce dedicated civil servant, Mr. Stabile has ware Bar in 1929. As one of the pre- and demonstrate still greater ballistic mis- completed 53 outstanding years in serv- eminent civil rights advocates in the sile and weapons of mass destruction capa- ice to the government. country, Redding was sought after to