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DAMAGE RESULTING from the OKLAHOMA CITY BOMB by JASON

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DAMAGE RESULTING from the OKLAHOMA CITY BOMB by JASON DAMAGE RESULTING FROM THE OKLAHOMA CITY BOMB by JASON L. SWOFFORD, B.S.C.E. A THESIS IN CIVIL ENGINEERING Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Tech University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN CIVIL ENGINEERING Approved December, 1996 5í5r3 ACKNOW^LEDGMENTS The author expresses his síncere appreciatíon to H. Scott Norville, Ph.D., P.E., Director of Glass Research and Testing Laboratory, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas, for the opportunity and guidance in the completion of this survey. The author thanks James R. McDonald, Ph.D., P.E., and Milton L. Smith, Ph.D., P.E., for their wiUingness to serve as committee members and their suggestions for improving the report. The author also thanks H. J. NorviUe, Ph.D., for editorial and critical comments. Furthermore, the author expresses genuine gratitude to his father, Duane Swofford, and brothers, Randy and Andrew Swofford, for their support in attaining his goals for higher education. Finally, the author thanks his fiancé, Lisa Blackwell, for her patience and encouragement. 11 TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. 11 ABSTRACT v LIST OF TABLES vi LIST OF FIGURES vii CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 1 Background 1 Purpose 1 Content of the Report 2 n. LITERATURE REVIEW 3 Introduction 3 Blast Waves 4 Previous Blast Damage Investigations 8 m. DAMAGE ZONES 12 Damage Investigation 12 Damage Zones 13 Significance of Zones and Design Considerations.... 15 IV. DAMAGE SURVEY 17 Introduction 17 Buildings Under Investigation 18 Organízation of the Data 20 Data for Buildings Situated in Zone 1 27 Data for Buildings Situated in Zone 2 65 Data for Buildings Situated in Zone 3 110 Discussion of the Impulse Associated With a 50% Probability of Failure 110 Significance of the Impulse Associated With a 50% Probability of Failure 113 V. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 114 Introduction 114 111 .... 114 Observations ... 116 Conclusions . 117 Significance ^^^ LIST OF REFERENCES IV ABSTRACT Early on the morning of April 19,1995, terrorists detonated a large amount of high explosives on NW 5th Street, just north of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. A rental truck contained approximately 5000 pounds of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil. Several buildings surrounding ground zero suffered structural damage, and many buildings suffered severe window breakage. The explosion killed 168 people and injured more than 600 others in proximity and away from ground zero. Flying glass shards resulting from fractured windows caused the majority of the injuries. The bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building marked the largest terrorist act experienced in the United States. This document reports on the damage to structures caused by the blast, and more specifically the performance of various window glass types and window constructions. LIST OF TABLES 1 Buildings in Proxinuty to Ground Zero 18 2 Buildings North of Ground Zero 20 3 Buildings South of Ground Zero 20 4 Buildings Not Subjected to Additional Study 24 5 Data for Buildings Not Subjected To Additional Study 25 6 Building 3, Oklahoma Resources Board 35 7 Building 5, YMCA 41 8 Building 12, Journal Record Building 55 9 Building 13, Storefronts, Offices, and Apartments 60 10 Building 14, Single Story Buildings 63 11 Building 15, Empty Stores 66 12 Building 16, Public Library 81 13 Building 19, Regency Apartments 86 14 Building 20, Southwestern Bell Telephone Building 93 15 Building24, Bankof Oklahoma 105 16 Building 25, Federal Reserve Bank 108 VI LIST OF FIGURES 1 Time History of an Idealized Blast Wave (Kinney and Graham, 1985) 5 2 Load-impulse of Blast Waves (Kinney and Graham, 1985).. 7 3 Damage Zones 14 4 Map of Buildings in Proximity to Ground Zero 19 5 Map of Buildings North of Ground Zero 21 6 Map of Buildings South of Ground Zero 22 7 Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building 28 8 Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building Photographed from Bomb Crater 29 9 Northeast Column of Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building. 30 10 East Side of Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building 31 11 View of Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building from Southeast. 33 12 View Along NW 5th. Building on Right is Oklahoma Resources Board. Building on Left is Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building 34 13 Athenian Restaurant 37 14 North Side of YMCA in Background. Storefronts on South Side of NW 6th in Foreground 38 15 Windows on South Side of YMCA 39 16 Windows on East Side of YMCA 40 17 North Wall, First United Methodist Church 43 18 West Wall, First United Methodist Church 44 19 North Wall, Federal Courthouse 45 20 Parking Lot North of Ground Zero and South Wall of Joumal Record Building 47 21 South Wall of Joumal Record Building 48 22 West Side of Joumal Record Building 49 23 Upper Floors on North Side of Joumal Record Building. ... 50 24 Entrance on North Side of Joumal Record Building 51 25 Storefront Windows on Ground Floor, North Side of Joumal Record Building 52 26 Debris on North Side of Joumal Record Building 53 vu 27 Interior Wall Damage, Joumal Record Building 56 28 Ceiling and Roof Damage, Joumal Record Building ^^ 29 West Facade, Storefronts, Offices, and Apartments 58 30 Storefronts on South Side of NW 6th 61 31 Fractured Glass, Entrance to Empty Stores 64 32 Frame Failure at Main Entrance of Durham Post Office 67 33 Glass Shards in Wall, Durham Post Office, East of Entrance. 68 34 Glass Shards in Wall, Durham Post Office, 15' Behind Entrance 69 35 East Wall, Old St. Joseph's Cathedral 71 36 Stained Glass Windows Blown Out of East Wall of Old St Joseph's Cathedral 72 37 Plexiglass from East Wall of Old St Joseph's Cathedral 73 38 Rectory Old St Joseph's Cathedral 74 39 East Wall, Unidentified Building D 76 40 Glass and Film North of Unidentified Building D 77 41 Glass Shards in Office of Unidentified Building D 78 42 Glass Shards in Office Wall, Unidentified Building D 79 43 Boarded-up Windows in the Upper Floors of Old Post Office 82 44 Glass on Dean A. McGee Avenue South of Old Post Office. 83 45 East Wall, Regency Apartments 85 46 South Facade, Southwestem Bell Telephone Building 87 47 Tempered Glass Shards from Southwestem Bell Telephone Building 89 48 IG Units in East Wall of Southwestern Bell Telephone Building 90 49 Glass in Street on East Side of Southwestem Bell Telephone Building 91 50 Bloody and Tom Shirt Found on East Side of Southwestem Bell Telephone Building 92 51 Typical Interior Damage, Southwestem Bell Telephone Building 94 52 Glass Shards in Wallboard, Southwestern Bell Telephone Building 95 Vlll 53 Glass Shards and Film, Southwestem Bell Telephone Building 96 54 Glass Shard with Film in Wallboard, Southwestem Bell Telephone Building 98 55 Storefronts on North Side of NW 6th 99 56 Fractured Windows (Dver Entrance, South Facade of Anthony's 101 57 Window Film from Anthony's 102 58 Sporadic Breakage, North Wall, Bank of Oklahoma, Oklahoma Plaza 103 59 Northeast Comer, Bank of Oklahoma, Oklahoma Plaza. 104 60 North Side, Federal Reserve Bank 107 61 Laminated Glass in Smashed Revolving Door, Oklahoma Gas & Electric 109 62 North Wall, Oklahoma Gas & Electric 111 IX CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Background Early on the morning of April 19,1995, terrorists detonated a large amount of high explosives on 5th Street, just north of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The high explosives consisted of approximately 5000 pounds of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil (ANFO) contained in a rental truck. The blast caused severe structural damage to the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building, as well as damage to several buildings surrounding ground zero. Air blast pressure fractured windows over a large area of Oklahoma City. Besides the persons the blast directly killed or injured, flying glass shards injured between 400 and 500 persons, including persons not in proximity to ground zero. In total, the blast killed 168 persons, and injured more than 600 others. Purpose Investigating window glass breakage has several purposes. Data from this investigation provides insights into the performance of different types of window glass and window glass constructions. Knowledge of the breakage patterns in areas not immediately in proximity to ground zero can aid in determining the blast impulse. Finally, breakage data can be correlated with injury data to aid in the formation of risk and lethality models associated with blasts. The ultimate objective of this study is to document data that will lead to a development of more blast resistant window constmctions, thus reducing the number of deaths and injuries in similar future events. Content of the Report This report presents an overview of the categorization of window glass damage with respect to ground zero, the point of détonation of the explosives. It includes observations of window glass survival and failure of window glass and window glass constructions. It also defines the spatial limits of window glass breakage. While the report does not contain detailed information concerning every window fractured in the explosion, it presents an overview of observed window glass breakage. CHAPTER n LITERATURE REVIEW Introduction Designers are reevaluating their philosophies about structural design due to an increase in bombings and explosions in the United States. Blast loadings on structures occur primarily from terrorist attacks or accidental explosions. The Explosives Unit-Bomb Data Center (EU-BDC) received reports of more than 1900 explosive bombing incidents in 1994, a 6% increase from 1993 (EU-BDC, 1994). The primary targets of these incidents include residences, commercial facilities, vehicles, open areas, and academic facilities. In 1994, bombings injured 308 people and kiUed 31 people (EU-BDC, 1994).
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