EUROPEAN y gathering 35 local scholars, experts, and civil society activists specialized in ISLAMOPHOBIA racism and human rights, the fifth edition of theEuropean Islamophobia Report addresses a still timely and politically important issue. All 32 country reports REPORT includedB in this book follow a unique structure that is convenient, first, for comparing countries and, second, for selected readings on a particular topic such as politics, em- 2019 ployment, or education with regard to Islamophobia across Europe. The present report investigates in detail the underlying dynamics that directly or indirectly ENES BAYRAKLI • FARID HAFEZ (Eds) support the rise of anti-Muslim racism in Europe. This extends from Islamophobic state- ments spread in national media to laws and policies that restrain the fundamental rights of European Muslim citizens and threaten the whole of society. As a result, the European Islamophobia Report 2019 discusses the impact of anti-Muslim racism on human rights, multiculturalism, and the state of law in Europe. This fifth edition of our report highlights how European societies are progressively over- whelmed by the Islamophobic discourse of the “Great Replacement” and other far-right conspiracy theories. The 32 country reports demonstrate how governments and main- stream media participate in reproducing such discourses that put the fundamental rights of millions of European citizens in jeopardy and how one can counteract these developments. This compendium of useful insights and data aims to provide European policy-makers, institutions, and NGOs with recommendations on how to tackle anti-Muslim racism in Europe seriously. EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019

About SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA) is a non-profit research institute based in Turkey dedicated to innovative studies on national, regional and in- ternational issues. SETA is the leading think tank in Turkey and has offices in Ankara, Istanbul, Washington D.C., Berlin and Brussels. The objective of SETA is to produce up-to-date and accurate knowledge and analyses in the fields of politics, economy, and society, and inform policy makers and the public on changing political, economic, social, and cultural conditions. Through research reports, publications, brain storming sessions, conferences and policy recommendations, SETA seeks to guide leaders in government, civil society, and business, and contributes to informed decision making mechanisms. ENES BAYRAKLI • FARID HAFEZ (E ds)

9 786257 040525 ANKARA • ISTANBUL • WASHINGTON D.C. • BERLIN • BRUSSELS EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019

ENES BAYRAKLI • FARID HAFEZ (Eds) All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, without permission in writing from the publishers.

ISBN: 978-625-7040-52-5 COPYRIGHT © 2020 by SETA First Published in 2020

Cover and Layout: Erkan Söğüt Proofreading: Dr. Eva Stamoulou Oral Printed in Turkey, İstanbul by Turkuvaz Haberleşme ve Yayıncılık A.Ş.,

SETA | FOUNDATION FOR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH Nenehatun Caddesi No: 66 GOP Çankaya 06700 Ankara TÜRKİYE Phone:+90 312.551 21 00 | Fax :+90 312.551 21 90 www.setav.org | [email protected] | @setavakfi

SETA | İstanbul Defterdar Mh. Savaklar Cd. Ayvansaray Kavşağı No: 41-43 Eyüpsultan İstanbul TÜRKİYE Phone: +90 212 315 11 00 | Fax: +90 212 315 11 11 SETA | Washington D.C. 1025 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 1106 Washington, D.C., 20036 USA Phone: 202-223-9885 | Fax: 202-223-6099 www.setadc.org | [email protected] | @setadc SETA | Berlin Französische Straße 12, 10117 Berlin Germany Phone: +49 30 20188466 SETA | Brussels Avenue des Arts 27, 1000 Bruxelles, Belgique Tel: +3226520486 ABOUT EDITORS Enes Bayraklı Mr. Bayraklı earned his BA, MA and PhD from the Department of Political Sci- ence at the University of Vienna, and conducted research for his PhD thesis at the University of Nottingham in Britain between 2009 and 2010. He took office as a deputy director at Yunus Emre Turkish Cultural Center in London in 2011-2013. Mr. Bayraklı also served as the founding director of Yunus Emre Turkish Cultural Centers in Constanta and Bucharest during the period of August-December 2012. Mr. Bayraklı has been a faculty member in the Department of Political Science at the Turkish-German University since 2013. His fields of research include the Trans- formation of Turkish Foreign Policy, Cultural Diplomacy, Foreign Policy Analysis, German Politics and Foreign Policy. [email protected] Farid Hafez Farid Hafez, PhD (Political Science, University of Vienna), is a political scientist and non-resident senior researcher at Georgetown University’s “The Bridge Initiative” at the School of Foreign Service. He defended his habilitation thesis on “Islam Politics in the Second Republic of Austria” at the University of Salzburg in 2019. In 2017, he was a Fulbright visiting professor at the University of California, Berkeley and in 2014, he was a visiting scholar at Columbia University, New York. Since 2010, he has been the editor of the Islamophobia Studies Yearbook, and since 2015 the co-editor of the European Islamophobia Report. Hafez has received the Bruno Kreisky Award for the “Political Book of the Year” for his anthology Islamophobia in Austria (co-edited with John Bunzl). He has more than 100 publications in leading journals such as Politics and Religion, Patterns of Prejudice, and German Politics and Society. His latest publications are Islamophobia in Muslim Majority Societies (Routledge, co-edited with Enes Bayrakli, 2019) and Feindbild Islam. Über die Salonfähigkeit von Rassismus (Islam- ophobia. On the Acceptance of Racism. Bohlau, 2019). Email: [email protected]

For more information about the EIR: www.islamophobiaeurope.com [email protected] ISLAMOPHOBIA IN

ISLAMOPHOBIA IN SERBIA NATIONAL REPORT 2019

IVAN EJUB KOSTIĆ

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The Author Ivan Ejub Kostić is a PhD candidate at the Faculty of Political Sciences, Uni- versity of Belgrade, Serbia. He graduated from the Department of Oriental Studies, Arabic Language and Literature at the Faculty of Philology, University of Belgrade. He holds a Master’s degree in Islamic Studies awarded by the same department. In the academic years 2011-2013, he was a lecturer at the Faculty of Media and Communications at Singidunum University, Belgrade, where he taught the courses “Middle Eastern Culture and History” and “Orientalism and Occidentalism.” He is one of the founders of the Balkan Centre for the Middle East, and became its managing director in 2013. He has co-authored the book Persecuted Islam (2013), and edited Religion, Belief and Civic Identity and the textbook Contemporary Islamic Thought (2019). He is a member of the editorial board of the academic periodical Journal for Religious Sciences – Kom and a regular contributor to the Yearbook of Muslims in Europe published by Brill. He is also a member of the board of the Eu- ropean Muslim Network seated in Brussels and chief editor of the regional online platform Algoritam - Contemporary Islamic Thought and Culture. Kostić has writ- ten numerous academic papers and articles in the field of Islamic studies, and is a regular contributor to leading media outlets in the country and the region on issues related to nationalism and religion, Balkan Muslims, and the Middle East and Islam. Email: [email protected]

Disclaimer: Statements of fact and opinion in the national reports of the European Islamophobia Report are those of the respective authors. They are not the expression of the editors or the funding institutions. No representation, either expressed or im- plied, is made of the accuracy of the material in the national reports. The editors of the European Islamophobia Report cannot accept any legal responsibility or liability for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The reader must make his or her own evaluation of the accuracy and appropriateness of the material. To cite this report: Ivan Ejub Kostić: Islamophobia in Serbia: National Report 2019, in: Enes Bayraklı & Farid Hafez, European Islamophobia Report 2019, Istanbul, SETA, 2020.

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Executive Summary During 2019, the social situation in Serbia was marked by strong political instability. The main causes for this political crisis were a rise in authoritarianism by the ruling political party, increased pressure over an independent judiciary, a lack of media freedoms, widespread presence of hate speech throughout media outlets and in the general public, and the repression of opposition parties which, because of all of the above, decided in September 2019 to boycott the forthcoming 2020 parliamentary and local elections (scheduled for April 2020, according to the latest government official statements). The existence of this political crisis has been unambiguously confirmed by the European Commission, in its annual Serbia 2019 Report on the situation in the country. Additionally, a particularly negative impact on the sociopolitical situation in Serbia, and the region, has been the stagnating negotiation process between the Re- public of Serbia and the Republic of Kosovo, concerning the normalization of re- lations between the two governments. The main cause for the current deadlock has been the 2018 decision by officials in Pristina to impose a 100% tax on all products from Serbia. This was done as a response to Serbia’s continued blocking of Kosovo from various international institutions (UN, UNESCO, Interpol). Furthermore, the October 2019 European Union (EU) decision against launch- ing membership negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia has sent a strong message to other Balkan countries working to meet EU accession conditions (Serbia, , and Montenegro) that enlargement is not likely in the fore- seeable future. This development has enabled Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic and his right-wing populist Serbian Progressive Party to continue their “parallel” policies – one tailored for the international community, where Serbia is nominally pursuing EU membership with full respect of EU values, and the other tailored for domestic consumption, where the government fully supports Russian influence and embraces expansionist nationalism that directly affects the position of Muslims and other minority religious and ethnic groups. This domestic policy has led to increased activity and influence by other Eurosceptic, (far-) right and outright fascist political parties and movements that openly promote the hatred of Muslims and violent an- ti-migrant narratives.

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Izvršni rezime Društvenu situaciju u Srbiji tokom 2019. godine obeležila je snažna politička nesta- bilnost u državi. Glavni razlozi za političku krizu jesu porast autoritarnosti vladajuće partije, pritisak na nezavisnost sudstva, nedostatak medijske slobode, sveprisutan go- vor mržnje u medijskom i javnom prostoru i snažna represija koju trpe opozicione partije koje su zbog svega navedenoga još u septembru mesecu 2019. godine odlučile da bojkotuju parlamentarne republičke i lokalne izbore koji bi po poslednjim izjava- ma vladinih zvaničnika trebalo da se održe u aprilu 2020.godine. O postojanju poli- tičke krize u Srbiji nedvosmisleno se izjasnila i Evropska komisija u svom godišnjem izveštaju za 2019. godinu o stanju u Srbiji. Osim navedenog, negativan uticaj na društveno-političku situaciju u Srbiji i regionu ima i stagnacija u pregovorima na relaciji Beograd-Priština koji se tiču nor- malizacije odnosa između Republike Srbije i Republike Kosova. I dalje glavni razlog za zastoj pregovora leži u odluci prištinskih vlasti iz 2018. godine koje su odlučile da uvedu 100% carine na proizvode iz Srbije kao odgovor na kontinuirano delovanje predstavnika srpskog političkog establišmenta da se Republici Kosovo blokira član- stvo u međunarodnim institucijama (UN, UNESKO, Interpol). Takođe, odluka Evropske unije (EU) iz oktobra meseca da se ne odobre datumi Severnoj Makedoniji i Albaniji za početak pregovora pristupanju EU, poslala je snaž- nu poruku i drugim balkanskim državama (Srbiji, Bosni i Hercegovini i Crnoj Gori) koje rade na ispunjenju uslova zarad priključenja EU da proširenja najverovatnije neće biti u skorije vreme. U takvim uslovima stvorio se dodatan prostor da predsed- nik Aleksandar Vučić i njegova desničarsko populistička Srpska napredna stranka nastave sa ”paralelnim” politikama – jednom za međunarodnu zajednicu, gde se dek- larativno zalažu za EU i poštovanja njenih vrednosti, i one na unutrašnjem planu gde se insistira na proruskom uticaju, reafirmaciji najradikalnijih oblika ultranacionalis- tičkih politika i vrednosti srpskog ekspanzionističkog nacionalizma. Upravo ovakav razvoj događaja dao je - uz prećutno odobravanje vladajućih struktura - snažan vetar u leđa evroskeptičnim, suverenističkim i (ultra) desničarskim političkim partijama i pokretima koji promovišu mržnju spram muslimana i drugih etničkih grupa, i snža- ne anti-imigrantske narative.

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Country Profile EIR 2019 Country: Serbia Type of Regime: Democratic Republic Form of Government: Parliamentary Republic Ruling Parties: Serbian Progressive Party (populist, right-wing party) Opposition Parties: See below Last Elections: 2017 Presidential Election: the leader of the Serbian Progressive Party Aleksandar Vučić won 55.08% of the vote against 16.36% of independent candidate Aleksandar Saša Janković. 2016 Parliamentary Election: populist Conser- vative Coalition around Serbian Progressive Party, 131 seats; socialist Party of Serbia (the party which was led during the nineties by Slobodan Milošević), 29 seats; far- right Serbian Radical Party, 22 seats; center-left Coalition around Democratic Party, 16 seats; neoliberal movement “Enough Is Enough. Restart,” 16 seats. Total Population: 7.03 million (in 2017) Major Languages: Serbian Official Religion: No state religion. The dominant Serbian Orthodox Church and other “traditional” religious communities (Roman Catholic Church, Slovak Evangelical Church, Reformed Christian Church, Evangelical Christian Church, Is- lamic community, and Jewish community) receive preferential status based on the “Law on Churches and Religious Communities” adopted in 2006. Statistics on Islamophobia: N/A Statistics on Racism and Discrimination: N/A Major Religions (% of Population): Orthodox Christianity (84.59%), Ca- tholicism (4.97%), Islam (3.10%), Protestantism (0.99%), No religion (1.11%), Others (5.24%) Muslim Population (% of Population): 222,829 people (3.1%) in 2011 (of- ficial census). This number is without Albanians who boycotted the census and a significant number of Bosniaks. The reason why they boycotted the census is that they didn’t have questionnaires in their mother tongues. Also, the number of Roma and Ashkali Muslims is much higher, but because of extremely poor conditions they don’t possess any documents so they remain “unrecognized citizens.” The number of Muslims living in Serbia is approximately 400,000-500,000. Main Muslim Community Organizations: Islamic Community in Serbia; Is- lamic Community of Serbia. Main NGOs Combating Islamophobia: There is no particular NGO that deals with Islamophobia. Data is collected and work is done only by certain individuals. Far-Right Parties: Serbian Radical Party (Srpska radikalna stranka), Serbian Movement “Dveri” (Srpskipokret “Dveri”), Democratic Party of Serbia (Demokratska stranka Srbije), Serbian Right (Srpska desdesnica), Serbian Patriotic Alliance (Srpski

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patriotski savez), Healthy Serbia (Zdrava Srbija) Far-Right Movements: Progressive Club (Napredni klub), National Avant-gar- de (Nacionalna avangarda), Serbian Right (Srpska desnica), Serbian Action (Srpska akcija), Otadžbinski pokret Obraz, Srpski sabor “Zavetnici”, Serbian People’s Move- ment “Naši” (Srpski narodni pokret “Naši”), Serbian People’s Movement “1389” (Srps- ki narodni pokret “1389”), National Serbian Front (Nacionalni srpski front), Organi- zation “Alternative (Organizacija “Alternativa”) Far-Right Terrorist Organizations: N/A Limitations to Islamic Practices: ű Hijab Ban: None ű Halal Slaughter Ban: None ű Minaret Ban: None (depends on local decision) ű Circumcision Ban: None ű Burka Ban: None ű Prayer Ban: None

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Introduction Since coming to power in 2012, the ruling coalition of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) have systematically reaffirmed a nationalist policy aimed at creating a “Greater Serbia,” that would include all Serbs in one territory. This national policy of “incomplete/unfinished borders” has automatically led to claims on the territories of neighboring countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Kosovo, and Montenegro. Of these countries, particular emphasis is placed on the entity of within BiH and Kosovo, territories that during the 1990s saw genocide and ethnic cleansing com- mitted against Bosniaks and Albanian Muslims. For this expansionist “Greater Serbian” policy to regain credibility a systematic historical revisionism has been necessary, as has the construction of a (nationalist) policy of remembrance that abolishes Serbs from various atrocities and horrors committed in the 20th century. This affirmation of a nationalist policy of remembrance coupled with historical revisionism concerning the Balkan Wars, World War II, and especially the wars of the 1990s, can result in the social rehabilitation and overt glorification of war crimes and convicted war criminals, which, in a post-genocidal society like Serbia, creates a “culture of triumphalism” that Hariz Halilovich defines as “the eleventh stage of genocide.”1 On a practical level, this sociopolitical atmosphere does not promote a confron- tation with the criminal past; rather, it deepens an already existing ethnic distance. As a result, according to research performed by Demostat in 2017 entitled Serbian Citizens’ Awareness of Wars in '90s, War Crimes, and War Crime Trials, the level of eth- nic distance between Serbs and ethnic groups of Islamic faith, for example Bosniak and Albanian, is alarming. Only 8% of Serbs stated that they feel close to Bosniaks, while only 2% of Serbs stated that they felt close to Albanians.2 Due to all of the aforementioned, in an atmosphere where the ideas of a “Great- er Serbia” are being revived based on a genocidal “culture of triumphalism” and given the ethnic distance present in Serbia, the sociopolitical and economic position of Muslims in quite worrying.

1. The eleventh stage of genocide represents a post-genocidal phase. According to Halilovich, this phase serves as an addendum to the ten stages of genocide previously defined by Professor Stanton in his work The Ten Stages of Genocide. For more on this phase and the “culture of triumphalism” see Halilovic, H. (2017), “Globalization and Genocide“ in A. Farazmand (eds.) Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy and Governance, Springer International Publishing, p. 7. 2. Research by Demostat (2017) Serbian Citizens’ Awareness of Wars in ᾿90s, War Crimes, and War Crime Trials.

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Discussion of Islamophobic Incidents and Discursive Events Physical and Verbal Attacks Serbia does not keep official data on crimes committed out of ethnic or religious hatred. As a result, this lack of data remains one of the biggest challenges that in- ternational institutions and researchers face when attempting to address racism and intolerance in Serbia. In October, to improve conditions, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) held a two-day training in Belgrade for civil society activists on criminal acts perpetrated out of hate and intolerance as well as hate speech in the media. One of the goals of this training was to empower local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to establish a network to deal with the collection of hate crime data. As there are no official statistics in order to compile the necessary data on pos- sible incidents of hate crime, the author of this report carried out interviews with representatives of various Islamic communities and several NGOs. Furthermore, the author wrote the 2019 Media Monitoring on the Reporting and Representation of Mus- lims across Serbian Media Outlets.3 In 2019, the incident that attracted the most media attention was undoubtedly when far-right groups took to social media to post a photo of an Albanian in central Belgrade with his hands making a “double-headed eagle,” which is found on the Alba- nian flag. The Albanian in question was subsequently identified as the brother of the owner of a bakery in the Belgrade suburb of Borca. Once this photograph was dissemi- nated across social media platforms, far-right groups organized a protest in front of the bakery calling it “Where there is No Respect, there is No Business.” The goal of these groups was to force the bakery to close. The songs chanted by the protestors were the same songs that were sung as war crimes were being perpetrated against Muslim popu- lations in the wars of the 1990s. Chants such as “Alija, I don’t like you, because you are a Balija,4 you destroyed a peaceful dream! I hope the Drina carries one hundred muja- hedeen bodies every day!” and “God I don’t know what’s wrong with me, I want to set mosques on fire, every night in my dreams I see mosques ablaze!” were heard for several days. Apart from the racist chants, these groups also brought a severed pig’s head to the bakery.5 However, even more alarming was the fact that Serbian Member of Parliament (MP) Srdjan Nogo, a former member of the “Dveri” movement, joined the protest. (Fig. 1) Additionally, the Serbian Minister of the Interior Nebojsa Stefanovic issued a

3. The monitoring will be published in the forthcoming volume of Context: Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies that is published by Centar for Advanced Studies, Sarajevo. The Journal is available at: https://www.cns.ba/v1/ context-en/ 4. Derogatory term for Muslims. 5. “Far-right protests in Borca, a pig’s head displayed in front of the bakery”, N1, 2 April 2019, http://rs.n1info. com/documents/1317516/comments/Vesti/Protest-desnicara-ispred-pekare-u-Borci-svinjske-glave-na-kolima.html, (Access date: 29 December 2019).

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Member of Parliament (MP) Srdjan Nogo, a former member of the “Dveri” movement, joined the publicprotest. statement(Fig. 1) Additionally, which minimized the Serbian the importanceMinister of theof theInterior protest. Nebojsa The Stefanovic NGO Youth issued a Initiativepublic statement for Human which Rightsminimized reacted the importanceto Minister of Stefanovic’s the protest. statementThe NGO byYouth describing Initiative for it,Human especially Rights in reacted the context to Minister of theStefanovic’s ongoing stateSerbia-Kosovoment by describing negotiations, it, especially as sounding in the context “moreof the ongoinglike a preparation Serbia-Kosovo for negotiations,war than an asattempt sounding to “morecreate likepreconditions a preparation for for peace.” war than an The NGO went on to say that the minister “as on numerous previous occasions, gave attempt to create preconditions for peace.” The NGO went on to say that the minister “as on instructions to the police on how to properly react in the interest of politics, and not numerous previous occasions, gave instructions to the police on how to properly react in the interest as representatives of the laws which they are sworn to uphold.”6 A clear connection 6 betweenof politics, the and government, not as representatives the security of service,the laws and which the theyfar-right are swornprotesters to uphold.” was made A clear byconnection investigative between journalist the government, Jovana Gligorijevic, the security service, from the and weekly the far -periodicalright protesters Vreme was. Her made by articleinvestigative goes on journalist to show Jovana that the Gligorijevic, bakery incident from the in weekly Belgrade periodical was not Vreme an isolated. Her article event, goes on butto show that that there the isbakery a systematic incident intargeting Belgrade of was Albanian-owned not an isolated event, bakeries but thatin towns there is such a systematic as Dolovo,targeting Pancevo,of Albanian and-owned Novi bakeri Sad. esIn in these towns three such cases, as Dolovo, Albanian-owned Pancevo, and bakeries Novi Sad. were In these closed while their owners were forced to leave their homes “overnight.” In all cases, the three cases, Albanian-owned bakeries were closed while their owners were forced to leave their police did nothing to stop the incidents.7 homes “overnight.” In all cases, the police did nothing to stop the incidents.7

Figure 1 1: :A A pig’s pig’s head head displayed displayed in front in front of the of bakery the bakery in Borca, in Borca, Belgrade Belgrade (left); Srđan (left); Nogo, Srđan first Nogo, on the first right, on atthe the right, at the 8 protest inin Borca,Borca, Belgrade Belgrade (pphoto (pphoto in thein the possession possession of the of theauthor) author) (right). (right).8

In 2019,In 2019,apart from apart the from bakery the attack, bakery another attack, event another which drew event a lot which of attention drew wasa lot the of organized at- tentioninterruption was on the 11 organized July of a play interruption titled Srebrenica. on 11 WhenJuly of We a Whoplay Weretitled Killed Srebrenica. Rise Up When by Zlatko WePakovic, Who whichWere dealsKilled with Rise the Up Srebrenica by Zlatko genocide. Pakovic, The which disturbance deals was with caused the bySrebrenica a larger group genocide.led by two personsThe disturbance dressed in blackwas causeduniforms by belonging a larger togroup the notoriousled by two paramilitary persons “Scorpions”dressed in black uniforms belonging to the notorious paramilitary “Scorpions” formation which committed war crimes in BiH and Kosovo. When the police were asked to 6 “Initiative: A Scandalous Statement by Stefanovic on the Bakery Protests”, Danas, 29 April 2019, intervenehttps://www.danas.rs/drustvo/inicijativa by the play’s organizers,-skandalozna they -refusedizjava-stefanovica stating- othat-skupu there-ispred -werepekare -alreadyu-borci/, un(Access- dercoverdate: 29 December members 2019 ).of the special police units at the scene. These undercover special 7 Gligorijevic, J. “The Albanian Bakery Case: Who Is Behind Organized Hate”, Vreme, 9 May 2019, policehttps://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=168 forces were indeed present, but7477&print=yes they did not (Access remove date: the20 February far-right 2020 protesters). or 8 https://www.blic.rs/vesti/beograd/protest-u-borci-zbog-dvoglavog-orla-vlasnik-pekare-se-slikao9 -sa-simbolom- invelike/h0nq4z3 any way intervene, (Access date: as 29– Decemberby their 2019own). admission – their “hands were tied.” (Fig. 2)

6. “Initiative: A Scandalous Statement by Stefanovic on the Bakery Protests”, Danas, 29 April 2019, https://www. danas.rs/drustvo/inicijativa-skandalozna-izjava-stefanovica-o-skupu-ispred-pekare-u-borci/, (Access date: 29 De- cember 2019). 7.Gligorijevic, J. “The Albanian Bakery Case: Who Is Behind Organized Hate”, Vreme, 9 May 2019, https://www. vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=1687477&print=yes (Access date: 20 February 2020). 8. https://www.blic.rs/vesti/beograd/protest-u-borci-zbog-dvoglavog-orla-vlasnik-pekare-se-slikao-sa-simbolom-ve- like/h0nq4z3, (Access date: 29 December 2019). 9. “A Far-Right Group Tries to Stop a Play about Srebrenica in Belgrade”, Al Jazeera Balkans, 12 June 2019, http:// balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/desnicari-u-beogradu-upali-na-predstavu-o-srebrenici, (Access date: 29 December 2019).

688 setav.org formation which committed war crimes in BiH and Kosovo. When the police were asked to intervene by the play’s organizers, they refused stating that there were already undercover members ISLAMOPHOBIA IN SERBIA of the special police units at the scene. These undercover special police forces were indeed present, but they did not remove the far-right protesters or in any way intervene as – by their own admission – their “hands were tied.”9 (Fig. 2)

FigureFigure 2: Far-right Far-right protesters protesters trying trying to stop to stop the playthe play10 (left);10 (left);the protesters the protesters unfurl a unfurl sign saying a sign “Alija saying your “Alija Balija killed your Balija killedyou” (right). you” 11(right).11

In 2019,In 2019,as in the as previousin the previous year, there year, were there again were protests again during protests the duringMirëdita, the dobardan Mirëdi- festival whichta, dobardan promotes festival Kosovo’s which cultural promotes scene. Kosovo’s During the cultural opening scene. ceremony, During held the in opening Belgrade at the ceremony, held in Belgrade at the Centre for Cultural Decontamination, a far-right Centre for Cultural Decontamination, a far-right group attempted to stop the event from occurring. group attempted to stop the event from occurring. That evening a group of right- That evening a group of right-wing protesters again attacked festival proceedings at Belgrade’s wing protesters again attacked festival proceedings at Belgrade’s Dorcol Platz. In this 12 Dorcolcase, police Platz. forcesIn this didcase, intervene police forces and did the intervene festival eventsand the were festival able events to continue. were able12 to continue. As theAs year the before, year before, in 2019, in there 2019, were there numerous were numerous cases of graffiti cases ofthat graffiti supports that war supportscrimes against Muslimswar crimes in BiH against and KosovoMuslims as inwell BiH as championsand Kosovo war as criminals well as champions like Radovan war Karadzic criminals and Ratko Mladic.like Radovan For this Karadzic report, we and have Ratko set aside Mladic. two ofFor the this more report, representative we have examplesset aside otwof graffiti. of One wasthe foundmore representativeon the walls of Različakexamples day of -graffiti.care center onOne 28 was September found on in the Novi walls Sad of and Različak reads “From day-care center on 28 September in Novi Sad and reads “From Kosovo to Iran there Kosovo to Iran there will be dead Muslims.” (Fig. 3, left) The second graffiti “Radovan Karadzic will be dead Muslims.” (Fig. 3, left) The second graffiti “Radovan Karadzic Hero” Hero”was found was foundon 8 Mayon 8 at May the centerat the ofcenter Belgrade of Belgra acrossde fromacross the from central, the central,Ottoman Ottoman era era Kalemegdan Kalemegdan Fortress. Fortress. (Fig. (Fig. 3, 3, right) right) 9 “A Far-Right Group Tries to Stop a Play about Srebrenica in Belgrade”, Al Jazeera Balkans, 12 June 2019, http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/desnicari-u-beogradu-upali-na-predstavu-o-srebrenici, (Access date: 29 December 2019). 10 Photo taken by the author of the Report. 11 Photo taken by the author of the Report. 12 “Hooligans Attempt to enter the ‘Mirëdita, dobardan!’ Festival”, Radio Free Europe, 2 June 2019, https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/video-huligani-mirdita-dobar-dan/29972987.html, (Access date: 30 December 2019).

FigureFigure 3:3: “From “From Kosovo Kosovo to Iran to there Iran willthere be deadwill Muslims,be dead RatkoMuslims, Mladic” Ratko13 (left); Mladic” “Radovan13 (Karadzicleft); “Radovan Hero” (right). Karadzic14 Hero” (right).14 10. Photo taken by the author of the Report. 11. Photo taken by the author of the Report. Employment 12.“Hooligans Attempt to enter the ‘Mirëdita, dobardan!’ Festival”, Radio Free Europe, 2 June 2019, https://www. Thereslobodnaevropa.org/a/video-huligani-mirdita-dobar-dan/29972987.html, are no significant changes in employment from last (Accessyear’s date: report. 30 December The most 2019). discrimination is13 still. Photo directed taken by towards representatives Roma, of IslamicAshkhal, Community and Egyptian in Serbia communities who have delivered of Islamicit to the authorfaith, forwho the suffer a purpose of this Report. twofold14. Photo form taken ofby thediscrimination: author of the Report. based on their skin color and on their religious beliefs. The highest unemployment rates and the lowest monthly income rates are still found in the Sandzak and Presevo regions of Serbia, where the majority population is comprised of Muslim Bosniaks and Albanians. islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 689 Education As in the case of employment, there are no significant changes or incidents in education that differ from last year’s report. The main problem continues to be a lack of textbooks in the Bosniak and Albanian languages. Furthermore, Bosniak and Albanian children continue to face pressure to attend schools in Serbian and not in the languages of the ethnic groups to which they belong. Additionally, the problem with history textbooks highlighted in last year’s report on Serbia remains unchanged. The main problem is the presence of historical revisionism regarding movements and organizations which committed atrocities against Muslim and Roma populations during World War II, and completely “distorted representations of the Ottoman period and in the depiction of the

13 Photo taken by representatives of Islamic Community in Serbia who have delivered it to the author for the purpose of this Report. 14 Photo taken by the author of the Report. EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019

Employment There are no significant changes in employment from last year’s report. The most discrimination is still directed towards Roma, Ashkhal, and Egyptian communities of Islamic faith, who suffer a twofold form of discrimination: based on their skin color and on their religious beliefs. The highest unemployment rates and the lowest monthly income rates are still found in the Sandzak and Presevo regions of Serbia, where the majority population is comprised of Muslim Bosniaks and Albanians. Education As in the case of employment, there are no significant changes or incidents in edu- cation that differ from last year’s report. The main problem continues to be a lack of textbooks in the Bosniak and Albanian languages. Furthermore, Bosniak and Alba- nian children continue to face pressure to attend schools in Serbian and not in the languages of the ethnic groups to which they belong. Additionally, the problem with history textbooks highlighted in last year’s re- port on Serbia remains unchanged. The main problem is the presence of historical revisionism regarding movements and organizations which committed atrocities against Muslim and Roma populations during World War II, and completely “dis- torted representations of the Ottoman period and in the depiction of the basics of Islamic faith and culture.”15 These textbooks are widely used not only among Serbian Orthodox children but among Albanian, Bosniak, and Roma children. Regarding halal food in Serbian schools, preschool institutions and primary schools do not provide such meals for Muslim children. Politics As already mentioned, the Serbian nationalist ideology continues to be reaffirmed in 2019. This process began in 2012, when a coalition of the right-wing populist SNS and SPS (which was headed by Slobodan Milošević in the 1990s) came to power. However, sociopolitical concerns were further set back in 2016 when presi- dential and parliamentary elections took place, leading to a first round victory in the presidential election for SNS’s Aleksandar Vucic16 while his party won an absolute majority in the parliament. The election was carried out in a repressive atmosphere, with numerous voting irregularities being recorded across polling stations. Shortly after the new government was sworn in, opposition parties began facing significant pressure while citizens faced intimidation and blackmailing. Meanwhile the suppres- sion of media freedom continues to this day. Due to these events, Freedom House’s

15. Ivan Ejub Kostic, “Islamophobia in Serbia: National Report 2017”, European Islamophobia Report 2017, ed. Enes Bayraklı and Farid Hafez, (SETA, Istanbul: 2018), p. 548. 16. For more information about Aleksandar Vucic’s political history, see: Ivan Ejub Kostic, “Islamophobia in Serbia National Report 2017”, European Islamophobia Report 2017, ed. Enes Bayrakli and Farid Hafez, (SETA, Istanbul: 2018), http://www.islamophobiaeurope.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Serbia.pdf, (Access date: 30 December 2019).

690 setav.org ISLAMOPHOBIA IN SERBIA

report Freedom in the World 2019 downgraded Serbia (along with Hungary) from “free” to the status of “partly free.”17 In addition to the Freedom House report, in 2019, the European Commission itself reported that nothing was done to improve election conditions in Serbia, nor were media freedoms increased, which, according to the report, “raises serious concerns.”18 The rise of authoritarianism, coupled with the collapse of democratic institu- tions and media freedoms are perfect for aggressive, nationalist, and hawkish rhetoric and hate speech that escalate regional tension and increase the vulnerability of ethnic minorities, especially Muslims. Andrej Nikolaidis’s text Dodik Truly Doesn’t Need a War: Peacefully and Sovereignly towards the Secession of Republika Srpska19 accurately presents the current secessionist policy of Republika Srpska, which in the near fu- ture looks to materialize in “peace” what was achieved during war through a policy of genocide and ethnic cleansing of Muslims.20 Such a plan has the current Serbian government’s full support for the first time, as evident by Serbia listing, in December 2019, the preservation of Republika Srpska as a key national priority in two national strategy documents: the Defence Strategy of the Republic of Serbia and the Serbian National Security Strategy.21 Furthermore, media outlets have been filled with open threats of war towards Kosovo Albanians, holding the Albanian ethnic minority in Serbia’s Presevo Valley under constant pressure and keeping them in an absolute state of ghettoization and exclusion from Serbian society. (Fig. 4) Along with these aggressive narratives, Serbia’s highest officials have repeatedly continued to deny genocide and ethnic cleansing.22 Officials have even made directly

17. “Democracy in Retreat Freedom in the World 2019”, Freedom House Report, https://freedomhouse.org/report/ freedom-world/freedom-world-2019, (Access date: 30 December 2019). 18. “European Commission Report: Serbia Has Not Taken Any Steps Forward to Secure Freedom of Expression”, Danas, https://www.danas.rs/politika/izvestaj-evropske-komisije-srbija-bez-napretka-u-slobodi-izrazavanja/, (Access date: 29 December 2019). 19. Nikolaidis A., “Dodik Truly Doesn’t Need a War: Peacefully and Sovereignly towards the Secession of Re- publika Srpska”, Zurnal, 13 May 2019, https://zurnal.info/novost/22086/mirno-i-suvereno-prema-secesiji-repub- like-srpske?fbclid=IwAR3lbUWQ3SPlCpPE-b4QKB5lYQPu4tZQj4g9v83BK6U6zFFGHlQOOcNAmGU, (Ac- cess date: 29 December 2019). 20. The dominant narrative about B&H in Serbia mainly consists of undermining its statehood and the insistence on achieving the goal of unification of the Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbia sometime in the near future. There are numerous examples of clear irredentist statements from the highest representatives of Republika Srpska and the Serbian government. In one such statement, even drew the map of a future “unified” state: “Chairman of B&H Presidency Projected His Idea on the Map – Dodik ‘United’ the Territories of Serbia and Srps- ka” (Novosti, 9 April 2019). 21. “What Is in Serbia’s Defense Strategy and National Security Strategy”, Novosti, https://www.novosti.rs/ves- ti/naslovna/politika/aktuelno.289.html:837917-Sta-sadrze-Strategija-odbrane-i-nacionalne-bezbednosti-Srbi- je-Sedam-nacionalnih-interesa-Saradnja-sa-ODKB-nema-nezavisnosti-KiM, (Access date: 24 December 2019). 22. Nine NGOs issued a statement condemning as “shameful and disgraceful” the fact that no Serbian official has characterized Srebrenica as a genocide. For more information, see: “NVO iz Srbije: Sramna i porazna čin- jenica da zvaničnici Srbije negiraju genocid u Srebrenici”, Autonomija, 9 July 2019, https://www.autonomija. info/nvo-iz-srbije-sramna-i-porazna-cinjenica-da-zvanicnici-srbije-negiraju-genocid-u-srebrenici.html, (Access date: 10 January 2020).

islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 691 SecessionEUROPEAN ofISLAMOPHOBIA Republika SrpskaREPORT19 2019 accurately presents the current secessionist policy of Republika Srpska, which in the near future looks to materialize in “peace” what was achieved during war through a policy of genocide and ethnic cleansing of Muslims.20 Such a plan has the current Serbian government’s full support for the first time, as evident by Serbia listing, in December 2019, the racist statements towards other ethnic groups, for example Serbia’s Prime Minis- preservation of Republika Srpska as a key national priority in two national strategy documents: the ter Ana Brnabic called Kosovo Albanian representatives “forest people.” Due to this 21 Defencestatement Strategy the government of the Republicin Pristina of has Serbia barred and Brnabic’s the Serbian entry into National Kosovo Security for the Strategy. Furthermore,foreseeable future. media23 outlets Similar have to Anabeen Brnabic,filled with the open Minister threats of of Defence war towards Aleksandar Kosovo Albanians, holdingVulin gave the an Albanian Islamophobic ethnic statement minority whenin Serbia’s he characterized Presevo Valley Sarajevo, under the constantcapital of pressure and 24 keepingBiH, as thema “Balkan in an Jamahiriya.”absolute state of ghettoization and exclusion from Serbian society. (Fig. 4)

25 26 FigureFigure 4: 4: “Vucic “Vucic Is Not Is Bluffing: Not Bluffing: I Will Send I Will the ArmySend to the Kosovo” Army (left); to Kosovo” “The Shqiptars22 (left); Have “The Declared Shqiptars War on Serbia”Have Declared War on (center); “The Devilish Shqiptar Plan: A Rebellion in the Presevo Valley”27 (right). Serbia”23 (center); “The Devilish Shqiptar Plan: A Rebellion in the Presevo Valley”24 (right).

In 2019, the head of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) Patriarch Irinej joined the politicians in continual genocide denying and in anti-Muslim statements such as, referring to the dispute between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Montenegrin 19 Nikolaidis A., “Dodik Truly Doesn’t Need a War: Peacefully and Sovereignly towards the Secession of Republika 28 29 Srpska”regime,, “theZurnal, Serbian 13 Maypeople 2019, rightfully https://zurnal.info/novost/22086/mirno say that poturice are worse- ithan-suvereno the- Turks.”prema-secesiji -republike- srpske?fbclid=IwAs an additionAR3lbUWQ3SPlCpPE to this statement,- b4QKB5lYQPu4tZQj4g9v83BK6U6zFFGHlQOOcNAmGUPatriarch Irinej made clear that Orthodoxy has an , (Access date: 29 December 2019). 20inseparable The dominant connection narrative about with B&H being in Serbia Serbian, mainly saying consists that of undermining“Montenegrins its statehood would andhave the insistence on achievinggone the the way goal ofof unificationour Prizren of the neighbors Republika andSrpska converted and the Republic to Islam of Serbia thus sometime losing allin the that near future. There are numerous examples of clear irredentist statements from the highest representatives of Republika Srpska and the Serbianconnects government. them to In the one Serbian such statement, people” Milorad had it Dodik not beeneven drewfor Serbian the map ofOrthodox a future “unified” Church state: “Chairman ofthat B&H helped Presidency preserve Projected them. His30 Idea on the Map – Dodik 'United' the Territories of Serbia and Srpska” (Novosti, 9 April 2019). 21 “What Is in Serbia’s Defense Strategy and National Security Strategy”, Novosti, https://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/politika/aktuelno.289.html:837917-Sta-sadrze-Strategija-odbrane-i- nacionalne23. “The Prime-bezbednosti Minister’s- Srbije“Forest- SedamPeople”- nacionalnihand More Tension-interesa between-Saradnja Belgrade-sa- ODKBand Pristina”,-nema N1,-nezavisnosti 30 May 2019,-KiM , (Access date:http://rs.n1info.com/Vesti/a487958/Premijerkino-ljudi-iz-sume-i-jos-jedan-sum-na-relaciji-Beograd-Pristina.html, 24 December 2019). 22(Access “Vucic date: Is 29Not December Bluffing: 2019). I Will Send the Army to Kosovo”, Informer, 29 May 2019. 2324 .“The “Vulin, Shqiptars While HaveDefending Declared Handke War Calls on Serbia”, Sarajevo Informera ‘Balkan, 8Jamahiriya”, March 2019. N1, http://rs.n1info.com/Vesti/ 24a551578/Vulin-nazvao-Sarajevo-dzamahirijom.html, “The Devilish Shqiptar Plan: A Rebellion in the (Access Presevo date: Valley”,11 December Informer 2019)., 1 July 2019. 25. “Vucic Is Not Bluffing: I Will Send the Army to Kosovo”, Informer, 29 May 2019. 26. “The Shqiptars Have Declared War on Serbia”, Informer, 8 March 2019. 27. “The Devilish Shqiptar Plan: A Rebellion in the Presevo Valley”, Informer, 1 July 2019. 28. Derogatory term for south Slavs who accepted Islam. 29. “Irinej poručio Đukanoviću: Ni Turci, ni komunisti nisu atakovali na imovinu crkve”, Al Jazeera Balkans, 15 June 2019, http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/irinej-porucio-dukanovicu-ni-turci-ni-komunisti-nisu-atakovali-na-imov- inu-crkve?fbclid=IwAR2Lr9r7xbmJ6fXR6lQUL_lsTMaWwv-RuODh7kJ9W3d1BwGNEgxnMumc6Pc, (Access date: 15 January 2020). 30. Ibid.

692 setav.org ISLAMOPHOBIA IN SERBIA

Additionally, something that will be discussed in more detail in the section “Cen- tral Figures in the Islamophobia Network” is that the current ruling party has con- tinuously (in)directly supported the establishment of (ultra) right-wing movements. These movements serve as a conduit to convey all those views which because of the international community and the ruling party’s declarative commitment to European values, the SNS cannot express itself. It is also important to note that many of these far-right actors are either former or current members of the fascist, ultra-right Serbian Radical Party (SRS), whose leader Vojislav Seselj was sentenced to 10 years in prison by the Hague Tribunal for inciting persecution, deportation, and the forced displacement of Croats in the Vojvodina village of Hrtkovci in 1992.31 Moreover, the ruling SNS it- self was founded by splitting from the SRS in 2008. The current president, Aleksandar Vucic, was, until then, the general secretary of the Serbian Radical Party and one of the most fervent ultra-nationalists who had spent the previous decade spreading the most radical forms of ethnic and religious hatred, especially towards Muslims.32 Media According to the 2019 European Commission Report, media freedoms in Serbia are under significant threat due to the authoritarian tendencies of the ruling coali- tion.33 Furthermore, pro-regime media continue to violate the fundamental rights of freedom of press. Thus, hate speech is pervasive on pro-regime television stations such as TV Happy and TV Pink, the tabloids Informer, Alo, Kurir, and in more prominent newspapers such as Politika and Novosti.34 The TV Happy network leads the way in hate speech and the promotion of the most radical forms of Serbian ul-

31. “Seselj Sentenced to 10 Years for Crimes in Hrtkovci”, Radio Free Europe, 11 April 2019, https://www.slobod- naevropa.org/a/pocelo-izricanje-drugostepene-presude-seselju/29159032.html, (Access date: 19 February 2020). 32. For more information about Aleksandar Vucic’s political biography and his time as spokesman for the fascist Serbian Radical Party and promoter of genocidal attacks on Muslims in BiH and Kosovo, see: “Ruler - The Political Biography of Aleksandar Vucic”, Youtube, 17 February 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qxR6hWb_uW8, (Access date: 19 February 2020). 33. For more information about The European Commission Serbia Report, see: “Commission Staff Working Doc- ument”, European Commission, 29 May 2019, https://www.danas.rs/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/20190529-ser- bia-report.pdf?x42945, (Access date: 5 February 2020). 34. There are hundreds of hate speech articles directed toward Bosniak Muslims and Kosovo Albanians that are pub- lished in Serbian newspapers. To illustrate we will mention just some of titles: “Bosniaks Erect a Monument in Honor of Turkish Conquest of Bosnia! Descendants of Turkish Slaves Celebrate the Invaders of Their Land”; “SDA President’s Diabolical Plan: Bakir Sends Afghanis to Settle into Serbian Municipalities in Order to Chase Serbs out of B&H”; ‘’Dodik Speaks for Novosti – Džaferović Watched Executions of Dozens of Serbs”, etc. Apart from the texts listed above the idea of the “Islamic threat” is most noticeable in the five-page “Topic of the Week” section featured in the daily Politika on 14 July 2019, entitled “The Green Corridor: Balkan Corridor of Instability.” “The Green Corridor” is one of the most common terms used by Serbian nationalist circles in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which was employed to pave the way for the expansionist incursions of the Serb forces and their forays into the territories of B&H and Kosovo. The notion “Green Corridor” stands for “long-term goal of Islamist ideologues, both in the Balkans and in the entire Muslim world that they create a unified territory which would include predominantly Muslim cities located along the route from Turkey in the southeast to Bosnia in the northwest.” It is of the utmost importance to note that this five-page “Topic of the Week” was published precisely in the week of the anniversary of the genocide against Bosniak Muslims in Srebrenica on 11 July 1995. Bearing in mind the sociopolitical atmosphere prevailing in Serbian society, it is really hard to believe that choosing a topic that deals with the issue of the “Green Cor- ridor” in the same calendar week when the genocide against Bosniak Muslims is commemorated is pure coincidence.

islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 693 EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019 over the Cirilica program that has for year’s hosted sentenced war criminals, intellectuals and public figures who spent the 1990s war years promoting the most ardent Islamophobia. War criminals and tra-nationalismextreme nationalists and historic also revisionism. receive The a large editor-in-chief portion ofof broadcastTV Happy, Milomir time on the Novo jutro program, airedMaric, by the presides most over watched the Cirilica network program in Serbia,that has forTV year’s Pink. hosted As for sentenced print media,war as in previous criminals, intellectuals and public figures who spent the 1990s war years promoting years, the tabloidthe most Informer ardent Islamophobia.leads the way War in criminals hate speech, and extreme continually nationalists printing also receive bombastic headlines a large portion of broadcast time on the Novo jutro program, aired by the most announcing a watchedpossible network war within Serbia, Kosovo TV Pink. Albanians. As for print However, media, as ineven previous daily years, print the media with long- standing traditionstabloid Informersuch as leads the the oldest way in newspaper hate speech, continuallyin Serbia printing Politika bombastic and the head newspaper- Novosti lines announcing a possible war with Kosovo Albanians. However, even daily print regularly printmedia articles with which long-standing serve traditionshistorical such revisionism as the oldest andnewspaper the glorifi in Serbiacation Politika of war criminals. As has been pointedand theout newspaper in the introduction, Novosti regularly this print has articles created which an serveatmosphere historical ofrevisionism a post- genocide “culture and the glorification of war criminals. As has been pointed out in the introduction, of triumphalism”this has and created the rehabilitation an atmosphere of of a post-genocidethe expansionist “culture idea of triumphalism” of a “Greater and Serbia.”the In addition, dailyrehabilitation newspapers of the expansionist in Serbi ideaa constantly of a “Greater Serbia.”securitize Muslim Bosniaks and Kosovo In addition, daily newspapers in Serbia constantly securitize Muslim Bosniaks Albanians by andlinking Kosovo them Albanians to jihadist by linking and them paramilitary to jihadist and Muslim paramilitary organizations. Muslim organi (Figs.- 5 and 6) zations. (Figs. 5 and 6)

Figure 5: “It Smells Like the Nineties! Americans Insert Jihadists into BiH and Prepare ‘Alija’s scenario’: Terrorism Expert Figure 5: “It SmellsReveals Like What Lies the behind Nineties! Muslim Invasion”Americans35 (left); “Shocking Insert JihadistsClaims of a Retired into IranianBiH General.and Prepare In BiH, I Trained ‘Alija’ s scenario’: Terrorism 35 Expert Reveals WhatMuslim Fighters”Lies behind36 (right). Muslim Invasion” (left); “Shocking Claims of a Retired Iranian General. In BiH, I Trained Muslim Fighters”36 (right).

37 FigureFigure 6: 6: “Bosnians “Bosnians Struck Struck Twin Twin Towers! Towers! Al-Qaeda Al Members-Qaeda Members in Maglaj Village in Maglaj Plotted Village an Attack Plotted on US!” an37 (left); Attack on US!” (left); “Jihadists“Jihadists from from Košara Košara Saw Saw Death Death in London in London too”38 too” (right).38 (right).

Justice35. “It SystemSmells Like the Nineties! Americans Insert Jihadists into BiH and Prepare ‘Alija’s scenario’: Terrorism Expert Reveals What Lies behind Muslim Invasion”, Informer, 14 October 2019. Like in the case of physical and verbal attacks, we don’t have any official statistics from the 36. “Shocking Claims of a Retired Iranian General. In BiH, I Trained Muslim Fighters”, Informer, 19 April 2019. Ministry37. “Bosnians of Justice Struck Twin regarding Towers! Al-Qaeda the crimes Members that in haveMaglaj beenVillage committedPlotted an Attack on on the US!”, bases Informer, of racial, 18 ethnic, September 2019. religious,38. “Jihadists or any from otherKošara expressionSaw Death in London of hatred. too”, Novosti,Also, the9 March problem 2019. is not that the legislative framework 35 “It Smells Like the Nineties! Americans Insert Jihadists into BiH and Prepare ‘Alija’s scenario’: Terrorism Expert Reveals Whatdoes Lies not behind exist butMuslim in its Invasion”,implementation. Informer On the, 14 other October hand, 2019. the European Commission, in its annual 36 “Shocking Claims of a Retired Iranian General. In BiH, I Trained Muslim Fighters”, Informer, 19 April 2019. report,694 has again stressed that Serbia has to demonstrate a much firmer commitmentsetav.org to the domestic processing of war crimes at all levels and to improve cooperation with the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT or Mechanism) and prosecutor’s offices in BiH and especially Kosovo.39 In the context of war crimes, it is important that we also emphasize that all pro-government media (Politika, Novosti, Informer, Alo, Srpskitelegraf, etc.), representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church, political parties like the Serbian Radical Party and the Serbian Movement “Dveri” as well right-wing organizations reacted once again negatively to the news that Bosnian Serb Radovan Karadzic lost the war crimes and genocide appeal to the court in The Hague.40

Internet Numerous far-right portals and YouTube channels that promote nationalist, exclusivist, and Islamophobic content can be found online. The most influential of these are the YouTube channels

37 “Bosnians Struck Twin Towers! Al-Qaeda Members in Maglaj Village Plotted an Attack on US!”, Informer, 18 September 2019. 38 “Jihadists from Košara Saw Death in London too”, Novosti, 9 March 2019. 39 “Commission Staff Working Document”. 40 “Karadzic Verdict Will Reinforce Ethnic Divisions, Analysts Predict”, Balkan Insight, 19 March 2019, https://balkaninsight.com/2019/03/19/karadzic-verdict-will-reinforce-ethnic-divisions-analysts-predict/, (Access date: 2 January 2020). ISLAMOPHOBIA IN SERBIA

Justice System Like in the case of physical and verbal attacks, we don’t have any official statistics from the Ministry of Justice regarding the crimes that have been committed on the bases of racial, ethnic, religious, or any other expression of hatred. Also, the problem is not that the legislative framework does not exist but in its implementation. On the other hand, the European Commission, in its annual report, has again stressed that Serbia has to demonstrate a much firmer commitment to the domestic processing of war crimes at all levels and to improve cooperation with the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT or Mechanism) and prosecutor’s offices in BiH and especially Kosovo.39 In the context of war crimes, it is important that we also emphasize that all pro-government media (Politika, Novosti, Informer, Alo, Srpskitelegraf, etc.), repre- sentatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church, political parties like the Serbian Radical Party and the Serbian Movement “Dveri” as well right-wing organizations reacted once again negatively to the news that Bosnian Serb Radovan Karadzic lost the war crimes and genocide appeal to the United Nations court in The Hague.40 Internet Numerous far-right portals and YouTube channels that promote nationalist, exclusiv- ist, and Islamophobic content can be found online. The most influential of these are the YouTube channels Balkan Info, Centar, Helm Cast, and the portal Srbin.info. The content of the YouTube channels BalkanInfo, Centar and Helm Cast frequently take the form of interviews, with views numbering in the hundreds of thousands. During 2019, Balkan Info hosted notorious Serbian nationalist Dragoslav Vanja Bokan, one- time leader of the paramilitary organization Beli orlovi (White Eagles), no less than five times. Bokan is known for his extreme far-right views and for propagating anti-Muslim hate speech.41 Apart from Bokan, frequent guests in 2019 (some on multiple occa- sions) were intellectuals famous for their Islamophobic and anti-Muslim stance during the 1990s such as Srdja Trifkovic (PhD), Miroljub Jevtic (PhD), and Darka Tanaskov- ic (PhD).42 Furthermore, convicted war criminal Vladimir Lazarevic was a guest twice. In 2009, Lazarevic was sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia for crimes against Kosovo Albanians. He was subsequently granted early release after serving two-thirds of his sentence.

39. “Commission Staff Working Document”. 40.“Karadzic Verdict Will Reinforce Ethnic Divisions, Analysts Predict”, Balkan Insight, 19 March 2019, https:// balkaninsight.com/2019/03/19/karadzic-verdict-will-reinforce-ethnic-divisions-analysts-predict/, (Access date: 2 January 2020). 41. For more information about Dragoslav Vanja Bokan, see: “Bokan, Dragoslav”, Pescanik, 1 October 2007, https://pescanik.net/bokan-dragoslav/, (Access date: 2 February 2020). 42. It is important to note that all the intellectuals mentioned here have been frequent guests on pro-regime net- works such as TV Happy and TV Pink, as well as numerous other television and radio stations. These interviews are then disseminated across social media platforms, primarily through Facebook or YouTube.

islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 695 EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019

Apart from web portals and YouTube channels, there are a large number of Facebook pages that spread Islamophobia and especially anti-migrant rhetoric. Two of the most followed Facebook pages are those of the far-right organizations Srpska cast (Serbian Honor) with 237,155 followers and Levijatan (Leviathan) with 229,406 followers. The latter is nominally an animal rights group but in fact regularly disseminates far-right propaganda while its representatives on a regular basis join right-wing gatherings. Central Figures in the Islamophobia Network The main generators of Islamophobia in Serbia are all the institutions, organiza- tions, political parties, and intellectuals which are guided by an exclusivist Serbian nationalism on the basis of a Serbian Christian Orthodox identity (Svetosavlje) and the “Turk,” which has, as a result of centuries of Ottoman rule, been identified with Muslims and defined as the archetypal enemy. The institution that has contributed the most in establishing and creating such a national identity is the Serbian Ortho- dox Church (SPC). In the political sphere, the Serbian nationalist discourse has been the dominant ideology from the end of the 19th century to this day. In addition to the SPC and political parties, academic organizations, such as the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Association of Writers of Serbia, as well as various influ- ential Serbian intellectuals have also played a vital role in perpetuating this national identity. These academic organizations and individuals have utilized a (quasi-) scien- tific approach to affirm and perpetuate a picture of Serbian national identity as ex- ceptional and thus to “rationalize” intolerance towards Others, especially Muslims.43 However, as mentioned above, in recent years numerous far-right and nation- alist movements have been established with the help of state structures.44 The main reason for this can be found in the fact that the current president of Serbia, Alek- sandar Vucic, and his populist political party SNS were established after a split from the fascist, ultra-nationalist SRS led by Vojislav Seselj. During the 1990s, the SRS represented the cradle of Serbian ultra-nationalist ideas and later became the source of numerous far-right movements. For example, according to the Balkan Investiga- tive Reporting Network (BIRN), most members of the far-right Generacije identiteta movement were also members of the SRS. Furthermore, Generacija identiteta was

43. Much has been written about the role of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Association of Writers of Serbia, and the role of Serbian intellectuals in the affirmation of Serbian nationalism. For more İnformation about this topic, see: Dragojevic-Soso, J. (2002), Saviours of the Nation. Serbia’s Intellectual Opposition and Revival of Nationalism, Montreal, McGill-Queen’s University Press. About the role of Serbian intellectuals in paving the way for genocide against the Muslim population in BiH and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo see: Cigar, N. (2000), The Role of Serbian Orientalists in Justifying the Genocide against the Muslims in the Balkans, Sarajevo, Institute for Research of Crimes Against Humanity and International Law. 44. Srpska desnica (Serbian Right), Zavetnici (Oath-Takers), Srpska čast (Serbian Honor), Nacionalna avangarda (National Vanguard), Obraz (Cheek), and Pokret Naši (Our Movement).

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inspired by the French Identitaires movement, one of whose leaders, Arnaud Goul- lion, received Serbian citizenship from the current government based on the work of his non-governmental organization Solidarité Kosovo. Before arriving in Serbia, Goullion was linked to Islamophobes such as “Philippom Vardonom, who is now chief-of-communications for Marine Le Pen’s National Rally party, and with mem- bers of the far-right militant group Unité Radicale.”45 One of the principal narratives of Generacija identiteta is that the “Islamic colonization of Christian countries, which began with the creation of the Republic of Kosovo, is now taking place through the onslaught of migrants” from the Middle East.46 It should be noted that the Generaci- ja identiteta Facebook page was taken down after the terrorist attack in Christchurch, New Zealand. Apart from these French far-right organizations, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the neo-Nazi National Democratic Party (NDP) are also active in Serbia. For the past six years, the youngest AfD member of the German parlia- ment and onetime chairperson of the party’s youth organization Junge Alternative fur Deutschland Markus Frohnmaier has visited Serbia at least once a year during which time he has made close contact with the conservative Narodnim slobodarskim pokretom (National Libertarian Movement) as well as the parliamentary clero-na- tionalistic Srpskim pokretom Dveri (Serbian Movement ‘Dveri’). Furthermore, the AfD has also made overtures to the Serbian Orthodox Church, because, according the Frohnmaier, the AfD would like to forge closer ties with the SPC and help the Church’s “voice be heard in Germany.”47 Furthermore, representatives of the NDP have made contacts with the ultra-nationalist extremist movement Srpska akcija (Ser- bian Action, SA) which identifies itself as a “pan-European Christian movement fighting against EU bureaucracy and Zionist-Atlantic occupation.”48 The SA also has links with the Italian neofascist movement Forza Nuova.49 The SA has spearheaded an anti-migrant campaign via posters that picture tabloid headlines about alleged crimes migrants have committed in Serbia. (Fig. 7)

45. A. Roknic, “Deal with the Devil’: Austrian Serbs Embrace Anti-Migrant Right”, Resonant Voices Initiative, https://resonantvoices.info/deal-with-the-devil-austrian-serbs-embrace-anti-migrant-right/, (Access date: 12 De- cember 2019). 46. Ibid. 47. During their joint press conference Miroslav Parovic (head of Narodni slobodarski pokret) and Markus Frohn- maier stated that their goal is to create a “Paris-Berlin-Beograd-Moskva” axis. For more on this and the relationship between the Srpskog pokreta Dveri and the SPC with the AfD see the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network article: Nenad Radicevic, “We Are Their Voice”: German Far-Right Builds Balkan Alliances”, Balkan Insight, 24 October 2019, https://balkaninsight.com/2019/10/24/we-are-their-voice-german-far-right-builds-balkan-alliances/, (Access date: 2 January 2020). 48. For more information about the ideology of Serbian Action see: Serbian Action, https://akcija.org/serbian-ac- tion/, (Access date: 2 January 2020). 49. “Student Action: Interview with our Italian Comrades / СтудентскаАкција: Интервјусаиталијанскимдруг овима”, Serbian Action, 16 March 2019, https://akcija.org/studentska-akcija-intervju-sa-italijanskim-drugovima/, (Access date: 18 September 2019).

islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 697 Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the neo-Nazi National Democratic Party (NDP) are also active in Serbia. For the past six years, the youngest AfD member of the German parliament and onetime chairperson of the party's youth organization Junge Alternative fur Deutschland Markus Frohnmaier has visited Serbia at least once a year during which time he has made close contact with the conservative Narodnim slobodarskim pokretom (National Libertarian Movement) as well as the parliamentary clero-nationalistic Srpskim pokretom Dveri (Serbian Movement ‘Dveri’). Furthermore, the AfD has also made overtures to the Serbian Orthodox Church, because, according the Frohnmaier, the AfD would like to forge closer ties with the SPC and help the Church’s “voice be heard in Germany.”47 Furthermore, representatives of the NDP have made contacts with the ultra-nationalist extremist movement Srpska akcija (Serbian Action, SA) which identifies itself as a “pan-European Christian movement fighting against EU bureaucracy and Zionist-Atlantic occupation.”48 The SA also has links with the Italian neofascist movement Forza Nuova.49 The SA EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019 has spearheaded an anti-migrant campaign via posters that picture tabloid headlines about alleged crimes migrants have committed in Serbia. (Fig. 7)

Figure 7: Anti-migrant posters distributed by Srpska akcija.50 Figure 7: Anti-migrant Farposters-right distributedmovements acrossby Srpska the world akcija have,.50 in fact, symbolically utilized Serbian nationalist ideology,Far-right the mythical movements account across of the the world “Kosovo have, Battle,” in fact, andsymbolically Serbia as utilizeda bulwark Serbian against the Ottoman nationalist ideology, the mythical account of the “Kosovo Battle,” and Serbia as a Muslim invasion of Europe. This narrative is a strong source of inspiration for these far-right bulwark against the Ottoman Muslim invasion of Europe. This narrative is a strong movementssource of inspiration as evident for by these the far-right fact that movements Brenton Tarrant as evident wrote by the factnames that Milos Brenton Obilic and Prince LazarTarrant Hrebeljanovic wrote the names on theMilos ammunition Obilic and he Prince used Lazar to perpetrate Hrebeljanovic the massacre on the ammu in Christchurch,- New 51 47 During their joint pressZealand.nition conference he51 used (Fig. to Miroslav8) perpetrate theParovic massacre (head in Christchurch, of Narodni New slobodarski Zealand. (Fig. pokret) 8) and Markus Frohnmaier stated that their goal is to create a “Paris-Berlin-Beograd-Moskva” axis. For more on this and the relationship between the Srpskog pokreta Dveri and the SPC with the AfD see the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network article: Nenad Radicevic, “We Are Their Voice”: German Far-Right Builds Balkan Alliances”, Balkan Insight, 24 October 2019, https://balkaninsight.com/2019/10/24/we-are-their-voice-german-far-right-builds-balkan-alliances/, (Access date: 2

January 2020). 48 For more information about the ideology of Serbian Action see: Serbian Action, https://akcija.org/serbian -action/, (Access date: 2 January 2020). Figure 8: Brenton Tarrant’s ammunition, with Milos Obilic52 and Stefan Lazar’s names written in Cyrillic53. 49 “Student Action: InterviewFigure 8:with Brenton our Tarrant Italian’s ammunition, Comrades with / Milos СтудентскаА Obilic52 and Stefanкција: Lazar’s Интервјусаиталијанскимдруговима” names written in Cyrillic53. ,

Serbian Action, 16 March Apart2019, for https://akcija.org/studentskathe aforementioned movements, there-akcija are -numerousintervju -additionalsa-italijanskim far- -drugovima/, (Access date: 18 September 2019).Apartright organizationsfor the aforementioned in Serbia; movements,namely, Zavetnici there (Oath-Takers),are numerous additional Srpska čast far (Serbian-right organizations in 50 “Хапшење родољубаSerbia; као видnamely, режимске Zavetnici подршке(Oath-Takers), мигрантском Srpska čast (Serbian насиљу”, Honor), Serbian Nacionalna Action avangarda, 26 February 2020, https://akcija.org/hapsenje(National50. -“rodoljubaХапшење Avant родољуба--kaogarde - каоvid), Obraz вид-rezimske режимске (Cheek), подршке-podrske and мигрантскомPokret-migrantskom Naši насиљу (Our”, Movement). Serbian-nasilju/ Action, In,26 (Access 2019,Febru- the conferencedate: 3 March 2020). ary 2020, https://akcija.org/hapsenje-rodoljuba-kao-vid-rezimske-podrske-migrantskom-nasilju/, (Access date: 3 “AMarch New 2020). Era of Friendship between and Serbia” held in Belgrade’s Hilton Hotel and organiz51. Princeed Lazar by Hrebeljanovic Nacionalna led theavangarda Serbian army is against notable. Ottoman This forces conference at the Kosovo was battle attended in 1389. Milos by representatives Obilic is celebrated in Serbian epic literature for killing the Ottoman Sultan Murat in battle. of52 . “Weaponsthe Serbian used in Newgovernment, Zealand Shooting the Had Deputy Names of MassMayor Killers Writtenof Belgrade on Them”, MetroGoran News, Vesic, 15 March and the Israeli 2019, https://metro.co.uk/2019/03/15/weapons-used-new-zealand-shooting-names-mass-killers-written-8908752/,54 Ambassador(Access date: 3 February to Serbia 2020). H.E. Alona Fisher-Kamm. The historian Gideon Greif and professor Vladimir53. “New Zealand Marinkovic Mosque Attacker also Appearedspoke toat Take the Inspiration event. fromThe Armenian,conference Georgian dealt History”, with Eurasianet, “the influence of the 18 March 2019, https://eurasianet.org/new-zealand-mosque-attacker-appeared-to-take-inspiration-from-arme- Serbiannian-georgian-history, national (Accessidea ondate: the 3 February Zionist 2020). movement,” how the “brotherhood of the Serbian and Jewish

51698 Prince Lazar Hrebeljanovic led the Serbian army against Ottoman forces at the Kosovosetav.org battle in 1389. Milos Obilic is celebrated in Serbian epic literature for killing the Ottoman Sultan Murat in battle. 52 “Weapons used in New Zealand Shooting Had Names of Mass Killers Written on Them”, Metro News, 15 March 2019, https://metro.co.uk/2019/03/15/weapons-used-new-zealand-shooting-names-mass-killers-written-8908752/, (Access date: 3 February 2020). 53 “New Zealand Mosque Attacker Appeared to Take Inspiration from Armenian, Georgian History”, Eurasianet, 18 March 2019, https://eurasianet.org/new-zealand-mosque-attacker-appeared-to-take-inspiration-from-armenian- georgian-history, (Access date: 3 February 2020). 54 What is important to emphasize about Gideon Greif is that in 2019, he was appointed by Republika Srpska to head a commission to probe crimes of during the war in BiH (1992-1995). The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia as well as the International Court of Justice and domestic courts have all characterized these killings as a genocide. There is a conviction among many that the commission is a bid to rewrite history, as the Republika Srpska's officials have repeatedly minimized the number of killed persons or denied it was a genocide. ISLAMOPHOBIA IN SERBIA

Honor), Nacionalna avangarda (National Avant-garde), Obraz (Cheek), and Pokret Naši (Our Movement). In 2019, the conference “A New Era of Friendship between Israel and Serbia” held in Belgrade’s Hilton Hotel and organized by Nacionalna avan- garda is notable. This conference was attended by representatives of the Serbian gov- ernment, the Deputy Mayor of Belgrade Goran Vesic, and the Israeli Ambassador to Serbia H.E. Alona Fisher-Kamm. The historian Gideon Greif54 and professor Vladi- mir Marinkovic also spoke at the event. The conference dealt with “the influence of the Serbian national idea on the Zionist movement,” how the “brotherhood of the Serbian and Jewish peoples is sealed by blood and martyrdom,” and finally how “to- day, the European and Judaeo-Christian civilization is being defended on the Golan peoples is sealed by blood and martyrdom,” and finally how “today, the European and Judaeo- Heights.” (Fig. 9) Christian civilization is being defended on the Golan Heights.” (Fig. 9)

FigureFigure 9: 9: Fisher-Kamm, Fisher-Kamm, “The influence “The influence of the Serbian of thenational Serbian idea on national the Zionist idea movement” on the55 (left);Zionist Greif, movement” “The 55 (left); Greif, “The brotherhoodbrotherhood of of the the Serbian Serbian and Jewishand Jewish peoples peoples is sealed byis bloodsealed and by martyrdom” blood and56 (center);martyrdom” Marinkovic,56 (center); “Today our Marinkovic, “Today our 57 EuropeanEuropean and and Judaeo-Christian Judaeo-Christian civilization civilization is being defended is being on defended the Golan Heights”on the Golan (right). Heights”57 (right).

Apart from far-right groups, an important role in the promulgation of a securi- Apart from far-right groups, an important role in the promulgation of a securitization-centric tization-centric narrative in relation to Muslims is played by international organiza- narrativetions, which in relationhave for yearsto Muslims financed is projectsplayed toby fightinternational “Islamic extremism.”organizations, In whichmedia, have for years financedof particular projects interest to is fight the regional “Islamic Facebook extremism.” page Ne In u media,mojeime of (Not part inicular My Name) interest is the regional Facebookwhich disproportionately page Ne u mojeime utilizes negative(Not in phenomenaMy Name) among which Muslims disproportionately around the utilizes negative world and other extremist movements. (Fig. 10) This page also looks to strengthen phenomena among Muslims around the world and other extremist movements. (Fig. 10) This page the position of women in Muslim communities, but in doing so frequently exploits alsoOrientalist looks to stereotypes. strengthen the position of women in Muslim communities, but in doing so frequently exploits Orientalist stereotypes.

54. What is important to emphasize about Gideon Greif is that in 2019, he was appointed by Republika Srpska to head a commission to probe crimes of Srebrenica massacre during the war in BiH (1992-1995). The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia as well as the International Court of Justice and domestic courts have all characterized these killings as a genocide. There is a conviction among many that the commission is a bid to rewrite history, as the Republika Srpska’s officials have repeatedly minimized the number of killed persons or denied it was a genocide. 55. “The influence of the Serbian national idea on the Zionist movement”, National Avant-garde, Facebook, https:// www.facebook.com/nacionalnaavangarda/, (Access date: 3 February 2020). 56. “The brotherhood of the Serbian and Jewish peoples is sealed by blood and martyrdom”, National Avant-garde, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/nacionalnaavangarda/, (Access date: 3 February 2020). 57. “Today our European and Judaeo-Christian civilization is being defended on the Golan Heights, National Avant-garde, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/nacionalnaavangarda/, (Access date: 3 February 2020). Figure 10: The front page of “Our Story” on the “Ne u mojeime” webpage, which uses a picture of Muslim girls to call for fighting “radicalism” and “extremism.”58 islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 699

55 “The influence of the Serbian national idea on the Zionist movement”, National Avant-garde, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/nacionalnaavangarda/, (Access date: 3 February 2020). 56 “The brotherhood of the Serbian and Jewish peoples is sealed by blood and martyrdom”, National Avant-garde, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/nacionalnaavangarda/, (Access date: 3 February 2020). 57 “Today our European and Judaeo-Christian civilization is being defended on the Golan Heights, National Avant- garde, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/nacionalnaavangarda/, (Access date: 3 February 2020). 58 “Ne u moje ime”, Facebook, 5 October 2019, https://www.facebook.com/RSE.NeUMojeIme/, (Access date: 3 February 2020). peoples is sealed by blood and martyrdom,” and finally how “today, the European and Judaeo- Christian civilization is being defended on the Golan Heights.” (Fig. 9)

Figure 9: Fisher-Kamm, “The influence of the Serbian national idea on the Zionist movement”55 (left); Greif, “The brotherhood of the Serbian and Jewish peoples is sealed by blood and martyrdom”56 (center); Marinkovic, “Today our European and Judaeo-Christian civilization is being defended on the Golan Heights”57 (right).

Apart from far-right groups, an important role in the promulgation of a securitization-centric narrative in relation to Muslims is played by international organizations, which have for years financed projects to fight “Islamic extremism.” In media, of particular interest is the regional Facebook page Ne u mojeime (Not in My Name) which disproportionately utilizes negative phenomena among Muslims around the world and other extremist movements. (Fig. 10) This page also looks to strengthen the position of women in Muslim communities, but in doing so frequently EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019 exploits Orientalist stereotypes.

Figure 10: The front page of “Our Story” on the “Ne u mojeime” webpage, which uses a picture of Muslim girls to call Figure 10: The front pagefor fighting of “radicalism” “Our Story” and “extremism.” on the58 “Ne u mojeime” webpage, which uses a picture of Muslim girls to call for fighting “radicalism”In 2019,and “extremism.” apart from Ne 58u mojeime, the already mentioned BIRN wrote an af- firmative report on the British government’s controversial Prevent campaign and employed a problematic analysis of the campaign, particularly regarding the issue of the covering of young Muslim girls.59 55 “The influence of Observedthe Serbian nCivilational Society idea on andthe Zionist Political movement”, Initiatives National to Avant-garde, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/nacionalnaavangarda/Counter Islamophobia, (Access date: 3 February 2020). 56 “The brotherhood ofIn the November, Serbian on and the Jewishinitiative peoples of the Belgrade-based is sealed by Balkan blood Centreand martyrdom”, for the Middle National Avant-garde, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/nacionalnaavangarda/East, one month after the ODIHR held the, (Access previously date: mentioned 3 February two-day 2020). train - ing for civil society activists on criminal acts perpetrated out of hate, intolerance, 57 “Today our Europeanand and hate Judaeo speech -inChrist the media,ian civilization the first assembly is being meeting defended was heldon thein GolanNovi Pazar Heights, to National Avant- garde, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/nacionalnaavangarda/form a new Koalicija za zaštitu manjinskih i verskih ,prava–Bedem (Access date: (Coalition 3 February for the 2020). 58 Protection of Minorities and Religious Rights – Bastion). The coalition was joined “Ne u moje ime”, byFaceboo the localk, 5Novi October Pazar organizations2019, https://www.facebook.com/RSE.NeUMojeIme/ Svetionik (Lighthouse) and Hidžab – naše , (Access date: 3 February 2020). pravo (Hijab - Our Right) as representatives of Bosniak Muslims, and Dituria from Presevo, which gathers together Albanian Muslims. Numerous noteworthy repre-

58. “Ne u moje ime”, Facebook, 5 October 2019, https://www.facebook.com/RSE.NeUMojeIme/, (Access date: 3 February 2020). 59. Ivan Ejub Kostic, “Balkanska istaživačka mreža u akciji spasavanja muslimanskih devojičica’, Islamske informa- tivne novine” Preporod, 4 July 2019, https://preporod.com/index.php/misljenja/item/10956-balkanska-istrazivac- ka-regionalna-mreza-u-akciji-spasavanja-muslimanskih-djevojcica?fbclid=IwAR2dHhUfqRXhB97PChQwTWOL- BhuIZINxcjB0aCOYRfl5CXnXNvYkD401OGM, (Access date: 3 February 2020).

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sentatives of the Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian national minorities of Islamic faith also joined the coalition. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations The current Serbian government’s strategy to strongly endorse Serbian nationalist policy which insists on the secession of Republika Srpska from BiH coupled with stagnating negotiations with Kosovo, have resulted in a significant rise in sociopo- litical tensions in the region, with even the mention of armed conflict resurfacing. If we take into account the recent past and the wars of the 1990s, it is clear that any new armed conflicts would almost certainly lead to an existential risk for the Muslim population of the region. Furthermore, evidently Serbian nationalist ideology and its mythical narrative have become an influence on far-right movements and indi- viduals fueled by anti-Muslim hatred across the world. The clearest indication of this can be found in the written materials of Anders Breivik and Brenton Tarrant. Both directly cited Serbian historical figures from the Serbian conflict with the Ottoman Empire and war criminals such as Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic as their idols. Furthermore, the activities and links between newly formed Serbian far-right and pro-fascist organizations with similar movements in France, Germany, Austria, and Italy clearly show the need to proceed with caution in the future. Due to all of these factors, Muslims in the region must strive to strengthen their links and improve their position in order to provide an adequate counter-nar- rative and to begin proactively monitoring and identifying all actors working to spread anti-Muslim hatred. To achieve this, Muslims in the Balkans need strong support from the international community and Western European Muslim orga- nizations which can assist by sharing their practical experiences and work method- ology. Additionally, Muslims in Serbia are in a far less favorable infrastructural and organizational position than Muslims in predominantly Muslim countries such as BiH, Kosovo, and Albania. Thus, assistance from regional and international actors in the case of Serbia is even more crucial because the current Serbian authorities do not intend to provide any assistance and are, in fact, the main generator of in- tolerance towards Muslims in Serbia. Chronology • 27.04.2019: First attack on Albanian bakery in the neighborhood of Borca in Belgrade that lasted for days. • 08.05.2019: Graffiti in Belgrade city center that champions war criminal Radovan Karadzic. • 29.05.2019: Right-wing organizations try to stop Mirdita Festival. • 30.05.2019: Statement by Serbian Primer Minister Ana Brnabić that polit-

islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 701 EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019

ical representatives of Kosovo Albanians “are people from the forest.” • 11.07.2019: Organized interruption of a play titled Srebrenica. When We Who Were Killed Rise Up by Zlatko Pakovic, which deals with the Srebrenica genocide. • 28.09.2019: Graffiti “From Kosovo to Iran there will be dead Muslims, Rat- ko Mladic” on the walls of Različak day-care center in the city of Novi Sad.

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