Npcc Roads Policing Strategic Review

A strategic review that describes the state of roads policing in 2019.

NPCC ROADS POLICING STRATEGIC REVIEW

Review completed by: Dean Hatton Executive Business Manager NPCC Roads Policing For Chief Constable Anthony Bangham June 2019. Final revision 10th July 2019

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Contents

Aim and Limitations ...... 3 Methodology ...... 3 Introduction ...... 4 Summary of Recommendations ...... 5 NPCC 3 Year Strategy ‘Policing our roads together’ ...... 7 Breakdown of ‘Fatal 4’ Offending and Policing ...... 11 Speeding ...... 13 Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs ...... 17 Case study – Drug Driving Essex Police ...... 18 Seat belt offences ...... 21 Case Study – Seat belt non-compliance in the West Midlands Region ...... 22 Mobile phones and distracted driving ...... 23 Case Study – Operation Tramline ...... 26 Resources ...... 28 Case Study – Road Harm Reduction Team (RHRT) West Midlands Police ...... 30 Case study – Gloucestershire Police Special Constabulary Roads Policing Team ...... 32 Strategic Influences and Opportunities ...... 34 Home Office and DfT Road Safety Project ...... 34 Technology ...... 35 Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR)...... 36 Case study – Operation Tutelage ...... 36 Dashcam footage ...... 37 CRaSH ...... 37 Police Pursuits ...... 39 Specialist Capabilities Programme ...... 41 Roads Intelligence ...... 41 Forensic Collision Investigation ...... 44 Policing Our Roads as a Priority ...... 46 Conclusion ...... 48

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Aim and Limitations

1. This review was commissioned by the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) lead officer for Roads Policing, Chief Constable Anthony Bangham, to describe the current state of roads policing.

2. The review is not a Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment. However it identifies recommendations for improvements in working practices and processes, as well as recommendations to strengthen the link between the NPCC roads policing strategy and its operational delivery.

3. The most up to date published data has been used to compile this review, this includes the Government Reported Road Casualties Annual Report 2017 and Government Statistics on Police Powers and Procedures in England and Wales (year ending 31st March 2018).

4. HM Government Reported Roads Casualties Report 2018 is yet to be published.

Methodology

5. This review has been completed by drawing on a range of statistical analysis from both published government sources and National Roads Operations and Intelligence (formerly the National Roads Police Intelligence Forum – NRPIF).

6. Other sources of information and opinion are drawn from key influential thinkers in this space, such as the Parliamentary Advisory Council for Transport safety (PACTS), the Roads Policing Academic Network (RPAN) and the RAC foundation.

7. Some specialist areas have provided written updates which have been edited to ensure they provide sufficient detail without overwhelming the review.

8. Finally, case studies and feedback from front line police officers have been used to provide an operational perspective to the delivery of key policing activity within this area of business.

9. All sources are referenced throughout the review.

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Introduction

10. When we think of roads policing we tend to think of ‘specialist’ teams or officers, we often overlook how many others contribute to ‘policing our roads’ every day.

11. Denying the criminal use of our roads is a staple policing activity for many police officers, police staff and volunteers. However, police officer led enforcement activity to reduce the number of people killed and seriously injured on our roads is declining.

12. In some ways how we police our roads has not changed for decades. Of course ANPR technology and the automated speed enforcement camera have become more prevalent, but generally we rely on personal interventions to advise motorists or to issue fixed penalty notices. These interventions can often lead to the discovery of other criminal activity and are a vital policing tool.

13. The public rarely invite roads policing interventions. Therefore policing our roads is an important policing activity which brings us into contact with members of the public, many of whom may not have had dealings with the police before and who may never interact with the police again so it’s important we get it right.

14. The public want to be involved in policing our roads, they set up community speed watch schemes in their local communities, they send us dash-cam footage of inappropriate driving or behaviour and they condemn drink driving.

15. At a time when increased demand is putting significant pressure on the capacity of ‘pro-active’ policing, often associated with roads policing, we are seeing a significant reduction in these police officer led enforcements.

16. However, for the first time we are also seeing significant interest from both the Home Office and the Department for Transport in how we police our roads. The Joint Roads Safety Project, described later in this review, has an NPCC officer seconded to it, as agreed at Chief Constables Council in April 2019. This will ensure the police has a strategic voice in any changes or recommendations made by central government.

17. On average five people are killed on our roads every day. This figure has remained stubbornly high for almost a decade. There is an opportunity to think differently about this area of police business and to consider how we prioritise policing our roads together for the foreseeable future.

18. This review will describe current roads policing activity, with particular focus on roads safety and recommend areas for fresh thinking or a new approach to ensure we do as much as we can to reduce death and injury on our roads and support our partners and the public to make our roads the safest in the world.

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Summary of Recommendations

19. A summary of the recommendations made in this review are as follows:

Recommendation 1: NPCC Roads Policing to restructure the NPCC campaign calendar to a more dynamic intelligent framework, bringing absolute focus to the ‘fatal 4’.

Recommendation 2: NPCC Roads Policing to ensure participation in NPCC ‘fatal 4’ roads policing campaigns is the common minimum expectation required of all forces to support the national roads policing strategy.

Recommendation 3: NPCC Roads Policing should explore opportunities for greater strategic collaboration with other key stakeholders on ‘fatal 4’ campaigns.

Recommendation 4: NPCC Roads Policing to review new research into the relationship between road traffic law enforcement and its effect on KSIs.

Recommendation 5: NPCC Roads Policing to encourage fresh public debate by partners, such as the Road Safety Trust and Brake, over speed enforcement matters to raise awareness of consistently high offending levels.

Recommendation 6: NPCC Roads Policing to establish an agreed process to review and re-issue new NPCC speed enforcement guidance, either as a standalone strand or as part of a wider roads policing enforcement review.

Recommendation 7: NPCC Roads Policing to engage with the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) to lobby for a change in sentencing guidelines which better reflects the level of threat and risk posed to the public by drivers using alcohol and drugs together.

Recommendation 8: NPCC Roads policing to reinvigorate seat belt offences as one of the key fatal 4 offences.

Recommendation 9: NPCC Roads Policing to work with NPoCC to create a reliable method of describing and counting roads policing roles which also identifies where officers hold more than one specialism.

Recommendation 10: NPCC Roads Policing to work with the College of Policing to review role profiles for roads policing specialist skills.

Recommendation 11: NPCC Roads Policing to work with the College of Policing to ensure roads policing is properly reflected within the Policing Educational Qualifications Framework (PEQF).

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Recommendation 12: NPCC Roads Policing Operations and Intelligence working group to establish an exchange library of best practice roads policing initiatives and schemes.

Recommendation 13: NPCC Roads Policing to develop a common minimum framework for forces to translate the NPCC Roads Policing strategy into operational delivery.

Recommendation 14: NPCC Roads Policing should require all forces to collect and submit data for all police pursuits to ensure complete and effective analysis to be made.

Recommendation 15: NPCC Roads policing to engage with HMFICFRS to establish the process and appetite to include roads policing within the inspection regime.

Recommendation 16: NPCC Roads policing to consider the role of policing in educating motorists, as well as enforcing road traffic legislation, in order to contribute efficiently to the wider roads safety agenda.

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NPCC 3 Year Strategy ‘Policing our roads together’

20. In 2018 the NPCC Roads Policing lead, Chief Constable Anthony Bangham, published a refreshed NPCC strategy – ‘Policing our roads together’. The 3 year strategy adopted the ‘Safe Systems’ approach to roads policing, bringing it in line with the Government Roads safety Statement 2015.

21. The strategy was accepted by Chief Constables Council and focuses on 5 pillars of ‘Safe Systems’ to drive roads policing activity, they are:

 Safe Roads  Safe Vehicles  Safe Speeds  Safe Road Users  Post-Crash Response

22. The principal objectives of the strategy are to work together to achieve;

 Safe roads, free from harm  Secure roads free from the threat of serious crime and terrorism  Efficient roads that promote public confidence and satisfaction

23. The strategy makes clear that ‘policing the roads’ is a collective responsibility, both within policing and with partners and that marginal gains should be sought to deliver better safety outcomes and improved security from those who use the roads to facilitate crime.

24. Clearly the portfolio has no authority to mandate individual forces to take part. However focussing on illegal driving practices which can lead to the most harm on our roads and so protecting the public in its widest sense is likely to achieve high levels of participation.

25. The chart below shows force participation in ‘fatal 4’ campaigns over the last 3 years.1

1 Data provided by the National Roads Policing Intelligence Forum (NRPIF)

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Force participation in Fatal 4 campaigns

50 4444 444445 45 43 42 42

38 38 40 36 36 34 34 35 31 31 32 32 30 29 30 28 28 26 25 19 20 15 10 No. participating Forces of 5 0 0 0 0 Mobile Seatbelt Mobile Speed Summer Speed Seatbelt Mobile Winter Drink and Drink and Drug Drug

2016 2017 2018

26. As seen in the chart, the drink and drug driving campaigns are generally very well supported. However, there are varying levels of participation in the other fatal 4 offences.

27. In 2017 the law relating to mobile phone use while driving was changed. An additional NPCC campaign took place to reinforce this change which was well supported. In 2018, only 1 seat belt campaign took place.

28. The NPCC campaign calendar was restructured in 2018 to make it simpler for forces to focus on the NPCC strategy. Campaigns were separated into Tier 1 and Tier 2 campaigns.

29. The NPCC Roads Policing lead has an expectation of force participation in Tier 1 campaigns, they are:

 Speeding  Drink or drug driving  Seat belt offences  Use of mobile telephones while driving  2 wheels  Carriage of dangerous goods  No insurance week of action  Tyre safety month

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30. Tier 2 campaigns are owned by the European Traffic Police Network – TISPOL. They also include seat belts and alcohol and drugs, as well as truck and bus and Project Edward. Although they generally take place on different dates to the NPCC Tier 1 campaigns, forces do take part where they have the capacity to do so.

31. All Tier 1 campaigns now include a week of partner and public communications activity prior to enforcement. This is to raise the profile of the forthcoming campaign to the public and to ensure campaigns are different to business as usual activity. However the landscape is still somewhat cluttered and as such there is an air of ‘campaign fatigue’ being expressed by some participants.

32. Although the additional Tier 1 campaigns are acknowledged as important to overall roads safety, they also detract from the fatal 4 campaigns. For example in November 2019 there is a ‘no insurance week of action’ plus a mobile phone campaign, this also conflicts with the Brake Roads Safety Week, backed by the DfT ‘Think’ campaign.

33. In order to focus forces on the core business of the NPCC 3 year strategy, it would be appropriate to re-visit the campaign calendar again; restructure it to a performance year (2019/20), as opposed to a calendar year and place even greater emphasis on the fatal 4 campaigns.

Recommendation 1: NPCC Roads Policing to restructure the NPCC campaign calendar to a more dynamic intelligent framework, bringing absolute focus to the ‘fatal 4’.

34. The delivery plan for 2019/20 within the NPCC Roads Policing Strategy, sets out with absolute clarity the desire for all forces to consider the ‘fatal 4’ offences as essential core business for police enforcement activity during national campaign weeks.

35. NPCC campaigns are often out of step with other national campaigns, such as the Brake Road Safety week, supported by the Department for Transport (DfT). This means opportunities for a more joined up and comprehensive raising of public awareness are lost or sometimes repeated thus watering down the overall effect.

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36. Where other partners are engaged in a campaign e.g. Brake Road Safety Week, NPCC Roads Policing should work more closely with them to maximise the outputs from our collective efforts.

Recommendation 3: NPCC Roads Policing should explore opportunities for greater strategic collaboration with other key stakeholders on ‘fatal 4’ campaigns.

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Breakdown of ‘Fatal 4’ Offending and Policing

37. Despite many years of steep decline, the number of people killed on our roads has at best plateaued since 2012,2 or at worst started to increase.

38. The chart below shows the number of people killed in collisions since 2011.

Fatalaties by year 1950 1901 1900

1850

1792 1793 1800 1775 1754 1750 1730 1713 1700

1650

1600 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

39. As can be seen in the chart, the number of people killed in the last 3 reporting years has risen from 1730 in 2015 to 1793 in 2017.

40. Although it is unclear as to whether there is a link between law enforcement and a reduction in KSIs, there has been a substantial decline in police officer led enforcement for road traffic offences over the same period of time.

41. The chart below shows the number of fixed penalty notices (FPNs) issued by police forces since 20113 against common offending categories. (Excluding FPNs for speeding – see paragraph 49).

2https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/744077/ reported-road-casualties-annual-report-2017.pdf 3 https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/police-powers-and-procedures-england-and-wales-year-ending- 31-march-2018

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Issued FPNs 180.0 160.0 140.0 120.0 100.0 80.0

1,000's 60.0 40.0 20.0 -0.0

Use of Vehicle test Neglect of Obstruction, Lighting and Seat belt handheld and condition traffic signs and waiting and noise offences offences mobile phone offences directions and parking while driving of pedestrian offences rights

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

42. The chart shows that all areas have seen significant reductions over many years. Speeding matters are deliberately excluded from this chart as they have risen sharply, as shown at paragraph 49.

43. By way of example, in 2011 137,000 seat belt offences were detected and dealt with by fixed penalty notice. In 2017 that figure had fallen to 18,500. This is indicative of the overall reduction in police officer led enforcements for roads traffic offences.

44. The House of Commons Transport Committee report ‘Road traffic law enforcement’ 2015-16,4 found that: ‘as the number of traffic police has fallen, so too has the number of road traffic offences detected. However, the number of ‘causing death’ offences, which will always be recorded where they occur, has not fallen. This is significant as this suggests that the reduction in overall offences that are recorded does not represent a reduction in offences actually being committed’.

45. This leads to an anecdotal conclusion, that to some degree, there is a relationship between police enforcement activity and death and serious injury on our roads. However that relationship requires more extensive research to establish an evidence base for what is effective in improving roads safety in terms of enforcement against motoring offences.

Recommendation 4: NPCC Roads Policing to review new research into the relationship between road traffic law enforcement and its effect on KSIs.

4 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmtrans/518/518.pdf

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46. The following sections take a more detailed look at offending and enforcement activity across the fatal 4 offences.

Speeding

47. Road traffic law often polarises public opinion. Speeding offences in particular cause a significant division of public opinion on how they should be policed.

48. In January 2018, Chief Constable Bangham raised the enforcement of speeding offences at the NPCC and Police Federation Roads Policing Conference. Subsequent national reporting showed how difficult it is, particularly for the police, to discuss this offence.

49. The chart below shows how speeding detections, by fixed fixed penalty notice, have risen since 2011.

Speed limit offences 2,500.0

2,018.4 1,945.0 1,970.2 2,000.0 1,863.3 1,590.4 1,659.8 1,494.2 1,500.0

Millions 1,000.0

500.0

-0.0 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

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50. The chart below shows the number of offenders attending the National Speed Awareness Course has plateaued around 1.2 million.5 We know that many forces limit their operating periods for automated speed camera offences in order to manage the volume of offences detected.

Total number of National Speed Awareness Courses attended

1400000

1207570 1185860 1188961 1195356 1200000

926101 953432 1000000

772430 800000

1000's 600000

400000

200000

0 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

51. The number of offenders attending the National Speed Awareness Course appears to be limited to our capacity to process speeding offences. If we processed more offending, more drivers would be offered the course.

52. The chart below shows the number of fatal accidents where exceeding the speed limit was considered to be a contributory factor by the attending officer.6 Fatal accident data 1800 1543 1600 1486 1469 1445 1466 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 216 254 222 217 203 200 0 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total number of fatal accidents

Total number of fatal accidents where exceeding the speed limit was a contributory factor

5 https://www.ndors.org.uk/scheme/trends-statistics/ 6 https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/ras50-contributory-factors#contributory-factors-for- reported-road-accidents-ras50---excel-data-tables

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53. The chart shows that there appears to be a limited reduction in the number of fatal collisions where exceeding the speed limit is considered to be a contributory factor by the attending officer, however they still make up between 16% (2014) and 13.8% (2017) of the total.

54. When considered against improvements in vehicle safety standards and the overall survivability of serious collisions, it is difficult to assess how policing is contributing to these small reductions and if there is a relationship between the number of drivers caught speeding and the reduction seen in the chart.

55. It is clear though that many more drivers would be caught speeding if forces decided to process more offences. Unlike driving under the influence of drink or drugs, mobile phone and to a lesser extent seat belt offending, policing and roads safety organisations have failed to win over the court of public opinion with regards to the risk and harm caused more generally by speeding.

56. The rise in speed detections is predominantly because of automated technology. 97% of speeding offences detected in England and Wales during 2017/18 were detected by camera.7

57. Road Safety GB reported earlier this year that more than 10 million drivers have completed a retraining course since they were introduced in 2010; 90% attended a speed awareness course.

58. This is almost one in four of all drivers.8

59. In reality, the industrial scale of actual speeding offences far outstrips the current capacity for forces to deal with them. If all speeding offences were prosecuted the system would be overwhelmed.

60. As such, speeding is tolerated, excused and minimised as a risk to road users, both by the public and often within policing itself. We need to recognise that strong leadership is required in order to move this debate forward.

61. There is a need for fresh public debate with regards to speeding offences and the police approach to enforcement. As it stands the current approach seems to have had little effect on the number of people killed on our roads. In 2017, speeding as a contributory factor was still present in 203 fatal collisions.

7 https://www.racfoundation.org/wp- 8 http://roadsafetygb.org.uk/news/speed-awareness-dominates-driver-retraining-courses/

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62. Key stakeholders such as the Road Safety Trust9 or Brake10 (the road safety charity), are important but relatively silent voices in this area of roads policing and roads safety.

63. While it is important for the police to be involved, it is often less helpful for the police to lead the debate when enforcement of these offences causes such significant division of opinion and where there is a need to shift the debate to one where speeding becomes a socially unacceptable practice.

64. Where the NPCC Roads Policing portfolio does have an important role is to ensure there is a consistent, transparent and fair approach to the enforcement of speeding offences across all forces.

65. The current speed enforcement guidance was issued by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) in 2015.11 Although raised at Chief Constables Council in 2018, no real progress has been possible in this area due to such divergent views.

66. There is a need to revisit the guidance and bring it up to date and in line with the current roads policing strategy which describes how speed enforcement should be intelligence led and focussed on high harm routes or locations.

67. Speeding is identified as one of the fatal 4 offences. Although the debate is difficult, policing speeding offences more intelligently, by supporting Community Speedwatch Schemes and focussing precious resource on high harm routes for example, would allow the debate to focus on the real issue which is the collective effort required to reduce those killed and seriously injured on our roads.

9 https://roadsafetytrust.org.uk/ 10 http://www.brake.org.uk/ 11 http://library.college.police.uk/docs/appref/ACPO-Speed-Enforcement-Guidance.pdf

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Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs

68. Defining activity in this area is complex. There are a number of offences relating to drink and drug driving to consider. However, every one of them requires a police officer led intervention, unlike speeding for example.

69. Drink driving is generally reported as ‘socially unacceptable’ behaviour. Drug driving is rising, perhaps due to the introduction of roadside saliva detection devices (drug wipe tests), or perhaps due to a change in social behaviours. It is also attracting more media coverage as the scale of drug driving is being exposed and understood.12

70. The following charts show the relationship between tests for suspected drink and drug driving and offending during NPCC campaigns over the last 4 years.13

71. The chart below shows the number of breath tests conducted during NPCC drink and drug campaigns over the last 4 years, against the rise in offending.

Breath test data

200000 10.0% 170322 7.3% 7.4% 8.6% 6.2% 140207 8.0% 150000 126848 108672 6.0% 100000 4.0% 50000 2.0% 10628 10237 9455 9328 0 0.0% 2015 2016 2017 2018

Total number of breath tests administered Total number of positive, failed or refused breath tests % Positive

72. The chart demonstrates that as the number of breath tests administered continues to fall, the number of offences detected as a percentage is rising.

73. The chart below shows the number of roadside drug wipe tests conducted during NPCC drink and drug campaigns over the last 4 years, against the rise in offending.14

12 https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7039281/Drug-driving-prosecutions-DOUBLE-year-10-000.html 13 All data compiled and published by the National Roads Policing Intelligence Forum 14 Drug wipes were introduced in 2015, this meant they were used in only one campaign in that year. All other years featured two campaigns.

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Drug test data

7000 5907 70.0% 5164 6000 5230 57.7% 60.0% 49.3% 46.7% 5000 44.1% 50.0% 4000 40.0% 2762 2979 3000 2307 30.0% 1888 2000 20.0% 931 1000 10.0% 0 0.0% 2015 2016 2017 2018

Total number of DrugWipes administered Total number of positive DrugWipe tests % Positive

74. The chart shows that although the number of roadside drug wipe tests conducted fell in 2018, the number of people failing tests as a percentage rose sharply when compared to the previous 3 years.

75. There are a number of possibilities for these outcomes, the most obvious being;

i. Police are targeting suspected offenders more efficiently, or ii. The number of people drinking and drug driving is rising

Case study – Drug Driving Essex Police15

76. Essex Police undertook an analysis to examine the offending history, as recorded on Essex Athena, for a sample of people arrested during 2018 for drug driving. This was to determine if drug-drivers were likely to be involved in other criminality.

77. An Athena search was carried out for drug drivers arrested by Essex Police Officers during January, April and July 2018. The Athena record for each detained person was viewed and offences for any previous or subsequent arrests were recorded for further analysis.

78. The custody history on Athena only showed arrests in Essex in recent years. While this is a good way of identifying individuals likely to be currently offending in Essex, it may underestimate each subject’s full offending history.

79. Where an individual had no other Essex arrests but did have significant intelligence or PNC warning markers linking them to organised crime and or violence, these details were included in the analysis.

15 Drug Drivers Offence History Analysis – Safer Essex Road Partnership

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80. The records were taken for January, April and July to allow for seasonal variation. A total of 231 records, giving a pro-rata annual total of 924, were obtained. This sample size gave 90% certainty that the true values lay within ± 4.7% of those calculated from the sample.

81. The analysis revealed the following results:

 98% of offenders were male, predominately in their 20’s.  48% of offenders had previous arrest records for more serious crime such as burglary, theft, theft of/from motor vehicle, drug supply, violent crime, criminal damage, money laundering, robbery, harassment and rape.  56% of offenders had at least one previous arrest record.

82. The chart below details the full breakdown of other offending.

Breakdown of other offending

30 26 24 25 23 19 20

% 15 12

10 7 5 5 3

0 Violence Other Drugs Driving Theft Vehicle Burglary Sexual crime Offences

Offence type

83. Around half (48% ±4.7% 90%CI) of those arrested for drug drive offences have previous or subsequent arrests recorded on Athena that are indicative of a criminal lifestyle.

84. Of these, the most common offence grouping was violent crime, with over a quarter having recent arrests in Essex for violent offences. The second most common offence grouping was drug offences, mostly for drug supply with very few being only for possession. Half of the drug-supply offenders also had previous for violence.

85. With current arrest rates at an estimated 924 per year, this means drug drive enforcement is giving Essex Police the opportunity to interact with over 440 people per year involved in other criminality.

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86. The analysis shows how policing our roads is an enabling function which cuts across many other areas of policing and that by detecting drug driving, there are intelligence opportunities that could impact on serious crime issues.

87. There is a power for all persons driving, attempting to drive or in charge of a vehicle at the time of the accident to be breath tested and or drug tested. However, operational feedback tends to suggest that with the exception of the most serious collisions, officers are forming strong suspicion before testing for drugs even where there is an explicit power to do so without suspicion.

88. This could explain the higher failure rate for drug test, but is also likely to be reflective of the financial pressures on police forces. Although the saliva screening test gives a strong indication that the offence is complete, a forensic blood analysis is still required to prove the offence in court.

89. Current costs for that test range from £107.50 for a basic test to £176.67 for a more complex test, in addition to the £18.00 cost of each road side screening device. When compared to the multiple use roadside breath screening device and the proving of drink driving offences, policing drug driving is expensive and as the number of tests continue to rise so will the pressure on budgets.

90. As a result of these costs some forces report that when drivers are tested at the road side for alcohol and fail, they will not go on to test for drugs as well even if they suspect drugs to be present.

91. Forces have also stated that if they do test for both and subsequently charge with both offences, (alcohol & drugs) sentencing does not properly reflect the use of two different substances.

92. All of this results in many forces testing motorists for either drugs or alcohol, but not both. This leads to unreliable and skewed results and prevents a true reflection of the drug driving problem across the country being understood.16

16 Findings from a NRPIF examination of drug driving (2018).

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Seat belt offences

93. Seat belt legislation aimed at compulsory wearing was first introduced in 1983. Legislation was strengthened in 1991 and extended to include a requirement to wear seat belts while travelling in all seats.

94. Despite there being a legal requirement to wear a seat belt since 1983, 212 people who died in collisions in cars in 2017 were recorded as failing to wear a seat belt. This represents 27% of all people who died in cars and is a disproportionate figure, which is rising.

95. The chart below shows the percentage of car occupants killed who were found not to be wearing seat belts.17

Car occupants killed not wearing a seat belt 30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

of all% car occupants killed 0% 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Data is not available for 2011-2012

96. Seat belt compliance is therefore treated quite rightly, as a fatal 4 offence by the police. This is reflected in the NPCC Roads Policing Strategy who support seat belt campaigns each year.

97. However, seat belt detections in terms of issued FPNs have seen a dramatic decline in recent years, as shown in the chart below.18

17 https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/ras50-contributory-factors#contributory-factors-for- reported-road-accidents-ras50---excel-data-tables 18 https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/police-powers-and-procedures-england-and-wales-year-ending- 31-march-2018

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FPNs for seat belt offences

160.0

137.0 140.0 133.2

120.0

100.0 86.3

80.0

1000's 60.0 45.3 40.0 29.6 19.6 18.5 20.0

-0.0 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

98. As can be seen in the chart, detected offences by way of FPNs have reduced from 137,000 in 2011 to 18,500 in 2017.

Case Study – Seat belt non-compliance in the West Midlands Region19

99. A review of seat belt offending carried out in the West Midlands region in 2019, found that up until March 2018, an average of 207 offences per month were being detected. However, this figure was being inflated due to an increase in enforcement during NPCC seat belt campaign weeks which have traditionally occurred in March and September every year.

100. There was no NPCC seat belt campaign scheduled in September 2018 resulting in the average number of seat belt offences detected per month in the West Midlands region falling to 85.

101. The review reported that this shows the scale of seat belt offending in the West Midlands region is much greater than is reported as the number of offences detected is much higher when resources are more focused on targeted enforcement activity, such as during the national campaign weeks.

102. Furthermore, 7,360 people have been reported for seat belt offences in the West Midlands region since August 2015. Of these, 117 (1.6 per cent) have re- offended. 8 have been caught on three separate occasions across the force areas; Staffordshire, West Midlands and West Mercia.

19 Seat Belt Non-compliance in the West Midlands Region 2019 – Chris Squires

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103. Analysis of these offenders showed 7 out of the 8 top repeat offenders for seat belt offences also have convictions for other fatal four offences. Only 3 currently have clean driving licences. 5 have been found guilty of drugs possession and 4 have been convicted or cautioned for violent crimes.

104. The NPCC campaign places due regard onto seat belt offences by including it in the fatal 4 campaigns. However as shown in the West Midlands region review, running just one campaign per year has a detrimental effect on overall enforcement levels and potentially masks other offending for other fatal 4 matters.

105. A recent report by the Parliamentary Advisory Council for Transport safety (PACTS) has called for not wearing a seat belt to be made an endorsable offence, with three penalty points issued on conviction.20

106. Among other recommendations, PACTS also called for the enforcement of the seat belt law to be significantly enhanced through intelligence led, targeted measures with the profile of enforcement and the perceived likelihood of being caught raised.

Recommendation 8: NPCC Roads policing to reinvigorate seat belt offences as one of the key fatal 4 offences.

Mobile phones and distracted driving

107. The Road Vehicles (Construction and Use) (Amendment) (No 4) Regulations 2003 came into force on 1 December 2003. They amend the Road Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations 1986, by inserting Regulation 110 into the constructions and use regulations.

108. Regulation 110(1) and (2) prohibits a person from driving, or causing or permitting a person to drive, a motor vehicle on a road if the driver is using a held- hand mobile telephone or a hand-held device. Regulation 110(3) prohibits a person from using a hand-held mobile telephone or hand-held device while supervising a holder of a provisional license (learner driver), whilst the learner is driving.

109. It is an offence under Section 41D (b) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 to contravene Regulation 110. The penalty imposed will depend upon the type of vehicle driven.

20 http://www.pacts.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/Final-Full-Web-Version-10.05.2019.pdf

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110. In March 2017, penalties for using a hand-held mobile phone or device whilst driving were increased from three to six penalty points and from £100 to £200 when driver is issued with a fixed penalty notice.

111. In the event that the matter comes before a Court, a discretionary disqualification can also be imposed. If any offence under Section 41D of the Road Traffic Act 1988 is committed with a goods vehicle or a vehicle adapted to carry more than eight passengers, a maximum level 4 financial penalty can be imposed.

112. The increase in penalty followed a series of high profile fatal collisions which attracted significant national news coverage and therefore became uppermost in the mind of the public as a dangerous activity which could be avoided by a change of behaviour.

113. The chart below shows the number of FPNs issued for mobile phone offences since 2011.21

FPNs for use of handheld mobile phone while driving

180.0 162.4 160.0 133.7 140.0 120.0 113.7

97.4 100.0 86.4 79.9 80.0 1000's 53.0 60.0 40.0 20.0 -0.0 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

114. The chart shows a significant reduction in the number of offences being detected since 2011. Although some could argue that the introduction of stiffer penalties has had an impact, this trend follows the overall downward trend in road traffic legislation enforcement shown in this review.

115. Furthermore, front line officers report a shift in offender behaviour, moving away from holding the device to placing it on the seat or on the dashboard making it harder for officers to detect the offence.

21 https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/police-powers-and-procedures-england-and-wales-year-ending- 31-march-2018

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116. Vehicle manufacturers also responded to the public mood by introducing ‘hands free’ mobile phone technology as standard across a wide variety of vehicles. This will have had an impact on the number of detections.

117. However there is growing research to suggest that any distraction away from the primary one of driving, places an additional cognitive workload on the driver and as such, the adoption of voice-based systems in the vehicle may have unintended consequences that adversely impact safety.22

118. The chart below shows the number of fatal collisions where the driver using a mobile phone was considered to be a contributory factor in the collision.23

Driver using a mobile phone in a fatal collision

33 35 32 30

25 22 21 22 20

No. collisionsof 10

0 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Data is not available for 2011-2012

119. The chart shows that despite the introduction of new penalties, the incidence of mobile phone use being considered a contributory factor in fatal collisions has risen.

120. As with the other fatal 4 offences, use of a mobile phone while driving is a choice by the driver. This means it lends itself to public condemnation and the offence of using a mobile phone while driving is probably more closely aligned to driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs or seat belt offences rather than speeding in terms of public opinion.

22 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26534847 23 https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/ras50-contributory-factors#contributory-factors-for- reported-road-accidents-ras50---excel-data-tables

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121. A controlled study completed by the Transport Research Laboratory (TRL) concluded that driving behaviour is impaired more during a phone conversation than by having a blood alcohol level at the UK legal limit (80mg / 100ml).24

122. It is an interesting point to note that the government quickly supported an increase in the punishment for this offence, from 3 points to 6 and from £100 fine to £200, as a way of improving roads safety.

123. Published government statistics for 2017 shown within this review, identify use of a handheld mobile phone while driving when involved in a fatal collision, as a contributory factor, was present in 33 fatal collisions.

124. In comparison, speeding as a contributory factor was present in 203 fatal collisions (starting point 3 penalty points and £100 fine) and failing to wear a seat belt as a contributory factor was present in 212 fatal collisions (currently a non- endorsable offence), in 2017.

125. In a recent submission to the Transport Committee Road Safety Inquiry, the NPCC Roads Policing lead highlighted that given the technical capabilities a mobile phone now has and its significance in everyday life, the legislation can be difficult to enforce and feels out of step with modern technology and suggested ‘It would be helpful for the government to consider a more holistic view of distracted driving’.25

Case Study – Operation Tramline

126. Operation Tramline is a Highways England and police collaboration which uses a HGV cab to afford patrolling police officers an elevated platform from which to detect traffic offences and improve roads safety.

127. Initially trialled with one cab, three cabs are now available to be rotated around the country for use by all forces. Operation Tramline has been used by 29 police forces over the past year and officers have recorded over 3,500 offences.

128. Operation Tramline is aimed at all offending drivers, but in particular those professional haulage drivers who should be setting an example to others, not causing horrific and devastating collisions. The most recent publicity has met with positive support from the haulage industry.26

24 https://trl.co.uk/reports/TRL547 25 https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/transport- committee/inquiries/parliament-2017/road-safety-17-19/ 26 https://www.coventrytelegraph.net/news/coventry-news/hgv-drivers-motorway-dangerous-mobile- 16303337

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129. Around one in three of the drivers filmed breaking the law by using these cabs had someone in their vehicle not wearing a seatbelt, despite statistics showing that one in four people killed in car crashes in 2017 were not wearing seatbelts. Drivers illegally using a mobile phone while driving was the second most common offence captured by Operation Tramline.

130. The most common offences detected in the last year included:

 Not wearing seatbelt – 1,195  Using mobile phone – 1,062  Not in proper control of vehicle – 262  Speeding – 118

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Resources

131. There is general agreement among stakeholders that the number of police officers dedicated to roads policing has fallen over the last decade.

132. There are currently six defined roles held on record by the National Police Co- ordination Centre (NPoCC), for roads policing, they are:

 Roads Policing Unit- Constable  Roads Policing Unit- Supervisor  Advanced Motorcyclist  VIP Motorcycle Escort  Cycle Race Motorcycle Officer  Family Liaison Officer- Roads Policing Unit

133. According to the National Police Co-ordination Centre (NPoCC), there were 3499 police officers performing at least one of these roles in 2017.

134. The data quality is insufficient to separate those holding more than one role, or those who may hold another specialism, such as Authorised Firearms Officer (AFO) and therefore an accurate picture of actual roads policing officers is very difficult to establish.

135. A review of the role profiles is due this year, it would be beneficial for the portfolio to work with the college of policing to ensure the role profiles truly reflect the specialist element of roads policing but also do not over complicate the profiles.

Recommendation 10: NPCC Roads Policing to work with the College of Policing to review role profiles for roads policing specialist skills.

136. Police officer led enforcement for road traffic offences is at its lowest level since 2012. A blend of education, engineering and enforcement is key to delivering safe, secure and efficient roads for the public.

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137. Clearly, how police resources are used and deployed is a matter for individual Chief Constables, at a time where policing faces new and often hidden demands, policing our roads must become a collective responsibility like never before.

138. A report published by the RAC in 2018, (RAC Report on Motoring 2018 ‘The Frustrated Motorist’, p9) found there had been an increase in drivers who believe they will not be caught if they break most motoring laws, up from 24 % in 2017 to 28% in 2018.27

139. The same report states that more than two-thirds of motorists (68%) think there are not enough dedicated roads police officers to enforce existing laws (up from 62% in 2017).

140. The House of Commons Transport Committee report ‘Road traffic law enforcement’ 2015-16 stresses: ‘Engineering and education must be backed up by effective enforcement with road users knowing that infringements will be detected. We recommend that the Government aim to tackle the overall number of offences committed by taking measures to support police forces in maintaining the number of specialist road traffic officers. By use of specialist officers, and appropriate use of technology, enforcement can be used alongside education which can make road users aware that serious driving offences will be detected.’

141. However, the term ‘specialist officer’ can often mislead and mask the fact that all warranted police officers, as well as others with devolved powers and individual citizens (i.e. Community Speedwatch) can play a significant part in policing our roads together.

142. The NPCC Roads Policing Strategy ‘Policing our roads together’ 2018/20, is clear that everyone has a responsibility for roads policing. As such, efforts should be made to reflect roads policing as a staple policing activity within the Policing Education Qualifications Framework (PEQF).

143. This will ensure that as officers join the service they already have a good understanding of how policing our roads offers opportunities to reduce threat, risk and harm in our communities, not just from roads safety, but by exploiting intelligence opportunities and by disrupting the criminal use of our road network.

Recommendation 11: NPCC Roads Policing to work with the College of Policing to ensure roads policing is properly reflected within the Policing Educational Qualifications Framework (PEQF).

27 https://www.rac.co.uk/pdfs/report-on-motoring/rac10483_rom-2018_content_web

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Case Study – Road Harm Reduction Team (RHRT) West Midlands Police

144. In 2017 West Midlands Police introduced a small team of 7 roads policing officers with a specific mission to engage with partners and local policing colleagues to prevent road harm.

145. The team work from an evidence base provided by internal analysis, partner data, or often both, to identify an issue and tackle it using a range of interventions. Key to the intervention is the involvement of local policing neighbourhood teams (NHT).

146. A number of initiatives have have been developed by the team which focus on empowering neighbourhood policing and therefore increasing capacity for policing our roads, they include:

 MARSO (Multi Agency Road Safety Operation) – MARSO utilises an overlay of local crime and anti-social behaviour (ASB) trends with those areas identified to be at risk of use by high harm road offenders. Key partners include Driver & Vehicle Standards Agency (DVSA), Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA), HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC), Environment Agency, West Midlands Fire Service (WMFS), Court Warrants Officers, Licensing Officers and TyreSafe. This tactic is only effective because of the work done by key partners and it highlights the impact a joined up approach can have.

 Operation Top Deck – NHT police officers or PCSOs using public transport to get from their satellite stations to their patrol areas utilise body worn cameras to identify motorists using mobile phones while driving. Offences are recorded and submitted through the force third party reporting portal for a summons to be raised.

 Operation ParkSafe – NHT police officers and PCSOs are up skilled and empowered to deal with parking offences, obstruction and dangerous position offences, dealing with motorists who block pavements through inconsiderate or dangerous parking.

 Operation Close Pass – NHT police officers and PCSOs are up skilled to work with the RHRT to reduce the danger posed to vulnerable road users by offending motorists. This initiative also employs Fire and Rescue Service colleagues to deliver educational inputs. Close pass has won national accolades and has also been adapted by more rural forces to deal with motorists who ‘close pass’ horse and their riders.

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 School Seatbelt Initiatives – NHT police officers or PCSOs are up skilled and work with the team to target those who place school children at risk of harm or death following educational inputs by local authorities at selected school sites.

147. The RHRT has also developed an intelligent and evidence led approach towards speeding offences to compliment the NPCC national speed campaigns:

 Operation Zig Zag – Uses camera technology to identify speeding vehicles through vulnerable locations (such as crossings) – offending motorists are prosecuted for driving without due care and attention rather than Speeding.

 Operation Rat Run – Working in collaboration with the local Camera Enforcement Unit, officers set Pro Laser in side streets which motorists use as a cut through to evade detection of a Speed Camera Van, reducing average speed of an area rather than a single road.

 Speed Enforcement – Using camera technology at high harm locations where speed is a contributory factor to prosecute much higher numbers of motorists exceeding the speed limit.

148. The reach of this modest investment and the capacity it generates for policing our roads is significant and can be scaled up or down according to individual force requirements and resource availability.

149. The premise of the Road harm Reduction Team is to make policing our roads everyone’s responsibility, this absolutely fits with the national strategy. These principles remain relevant for the largest of current investments such as the Metropolitan Police Roads and Transport Policing Command, through to much smaller teams across policing.

150. There are many initiatives across policing that are delivering local interventions on roads policing matters. There is a need to establish a library of best practice which should be developed and co-ordinated via the Operations and Intelligence working group.

151. This would allow forces to reduce effort on finding or developing new schemes in favour of actually delivering an intervention that has an existing evidence base proving it works.

Recommendation 12: NPCC Roads Policing Operations and Intelligence working group to establish an exchange library of best practice roads policing initiatives and schemes.

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Case study – Gloucestershire Police Special Constabulary Roads Policing Team

152. In common with many forces, Gloucestershire Special Constabulary have a small group of Special Constables attached to the Roads Policing Team working alongside regular colleagues. Officers are offered training and complete a Roads Policing portfolio, some have additional training, including motorcyclist, family liaison officer and PG9 for prohibitions.

153. In addition, on 1st November 2018 Gloucestershire Special Constabulary launched a Special Constabulary team dedicated to policing the counties Strategic Road Network under the umbrella of Operation Indemnis.

154. Operation Indemnis is described as, "A proactive policing project to deny criminals the use of the road and to reduce road deaths and serious injury".

155. Op Indemnis replaced the Road Safety Education and Enforcement Team (RSEET) in its previous form, as well as incorporating the present Road Policing Special Constabulary officers. The Team operate mainly on and around the A417 and A419, both of which have high KSI rates and have been identified as favoured routes for criminals.

156. Op Indemnis incorporates its own intelligence support and utilises ANPR to target travelling criminals and uninsured vehicles, support road safety campaigns and assist neighbourhood teams to tackle the fatal 4.

157. Results from its first month, December 2018, are as follows:

 Personnel: 24 total (19 x Independent, 3 x Non-Independent, 1 x non- operational Intelligence, 1 x non-operational PR).  Hours Actually performed: 18 officers performed 6 x day-shifts and 10 x evening shifts, with the vehicle operational on 13 different days, 290 hours contributed. Distribution of patrol hours performed:

 A417/A419 Gloucester - South Cerney (i.e. predominately the dual carriageway sections): 66%  Other routes (A417 Gloucester - M50, A419 Cirencester - Stroud water and cross-border work): 33%

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Operational Results Summary:

 Drivers given education/warnings/advice: 52  Positive Breath Tests: 1  Positive Drugs Wipe: 1  Vehicles seized (s165 No Insurance): 6  Vehicles seized (No Tax): 6  Traffic Offence Reports: 7  VDRS: 1  HORT/1 for suspected Insurance offences (pending): 2  RTCs attended: 3  Drivers assisted (breakdowns): 10  Drivers assisted (other): 10  Drugs Seizure: 1  S1 Ammunition and offensive weapon seizure: 1

158. Both case studies provide evidence that investment in policing our roads does not have to involve significant cost or detract from other priorities. By using existing resource more efficiently, investing in educating existing teams (in situ) and raising the expectation of ‘policing our roads together’ a more effective, holistic approach can be achieved.

159. To assist forces identify opportunities to achieve this effect, NPCC Roads Policing should be in a position to offer advice and a common minimum framework which ties the strategic objectives of the national strategy to front line operational delivery.

Recommendation 13: NPCC Roads Policing to develop a common minimum framework for forces to translate the NPCC Roads Policing strategy into operational delivery.

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Strategic Influences and Opportunities

160. Roads policing and roads safety appears to be gaining momentum across government departments. The eagerly awaited Government Roads Safety Statement is expected to set out a clear direction of travel for roads safety and policing has a key part to play in this work. Some work has already started in this area.

Home Office and DfT Road Safety Project

161. NPCC is supporting a joint Home Office and DfT Roads Safety Project Project and following agreement from Chief Constables Council ion April 2019, an Assistant Chief Constable has been seconded to the project for 2 years to provide a strategic policing input.

162. In December 2018, the Specialist Capabilities Programme (SCP) completed a review of national capability leadership. This review noted the significant benefits that had been gained by pilot areas testing new national leadership models.

163. The review was particularly clear regarding the benefit for policing that can be gained from the allocation of dedicated national leadership resources (compared to the usual, ad hoc way national leadership is delivered). One of the main recommendations of the review, approved by chief Constables and Police and Crime Commissioners, was therefore that policing seeks to implement dedicated leadership roles for high priority capabilities.

164. Due to the scope of the project there is the opportunity to include the work of the SCP Roads Policing work streams and as identified by the SCP review, provide dedicated senior national leadership to those work streams.

165. The project has proposed that seven areas of roads policing are reviewed to establish whether the current means of providing the service is optimal and to explore whether there are alternative options for service delivery. The DfT and Home Office describe them as:

• Uniform patrol and enforcement • Roads intelligence (potential to incorporate the SCP work stream) • Forensic collision investigation (potential to incorporate the SCP work stream) • Serious and fatal collision investigation (potential to incorporate the SCP work stream) • Back office case assessment and prosecution functions including automated enforcement

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• Police driver training and police driving standards • The type approval process for enforcement technology

166. The NPCC Roads Policing portfolio will remain tied into this work as it progresses. This project has the potential to be the most fundamental shift in the approach towards roads policing for a generation and it is important the police voice is involved throughout.

Technology

167. Technological progress has always been beneficial for roads safety. The introduction of seat belts has contributed to a significant reduction in road deaths over the last 40 years. Airbags have also no doubt increased the survivability of road traffic collisions.

168. The introduction of Intelligent Speed Assistance (ISA) technology has been described by Brake's campaigns director, Joshua Harris, as: "… the biggest leap forward for road safety this century."28

169. Transport for London (TfL) completed trials of Intelligent Speed Assistance (ISA) technology fitted to buses, proving that the technology can be used to control speeds on London’s bus network. As a result all new London buses have been required to have ISA fitted.29

170. While in car (or vehicle) technology can assist in both preventing collisions and improving survival rates, the most powerful interventions are those of public attitude. The well documented notion of ‘socially unacceptable’ behaviour, such as drink driving, results in a state of social surveillance.

171. This backed up with strong enforcement and prosecution leads to a reduction in the behaviour, which in turn reduces casualty rates. This is a fine balance and the figures shown in the section on drink and drug driving (paragraphs 68-75), should be of concern to policy makers and need to be closely monitored.

28 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-47715415 29 https://etsc.eu/london-to-require-isa-on-all-new-buses-from-next-year/

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Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR)

172. ANPR is subject to a separate NPCC portfolio. Significant changes to how ANPR is administered and used are being rolled out by the introduction of the National ANPR service or NAS.

173. ANPR has been a significant part of roads policing since its inception. Many roads policing teams operate a force’s only ANPR response and as such they have developed their own initiatives to exploit the technology and improve roads safety and deny criminal use of our roads as a result.

174. The Home Office has just started work on ‘de-cluttering’ the ANPR data base. Stripping out high volume reads, such as tax evasion and dealing with them in a different way, will enable serious matters to surface more visibly to forces for action.

Case study – Operation Tutelage

175. Operation Tutelage is a police led innovation, initially developed by Thames Valley Police, to tackle the issue of uninsured driving. Integrating data from the Motor Insurance Database (MID) and roadside ANPR technology, police headed letters are sent to the registered keepers of vehicles indicated as not having a valid insurance policy in place.

176. The letters outline the known vehicle user information, requesting that the insurance status of the vehicle be reviewed to ensure compliance with relevant legislation. This approach is based on academic research into procedural justice and influencing behavioural change.

177. Proof of concept trials have resulted in around 80% of identified vehicles indicating as insured within a 30 day period of letters being sent to the vehicles registered keeper. This compares against a 30% change, seen in an equivalent control sample of vehicles not subject to the Operation Tutelage approach.

178. Vehicles continuing to indicate as non-compliant become the focus of on road enforcement activity. Operation Tutelage enforcement activity has resulted in a vehicle seizure rate of over 90% from all roadside stops.

179. Over 40% of roadside stops have resulted in the identification of secondary offences, with drink or drug driving, driver licensing and broader criminal offences making up significant proportions.

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180. The development of Operation Tutelage into a national policing capability is being considered within the Operations and Intelligence working group. A transition plan has been developed to support turning current ‘notable practice’ into a national capability. The plan is structured under 4 main headings; Consolidate and Standardise, Coordinate, Explore and Expand.

181. The plan has been socialised through extensive engagement with regulators, partner agencies, police forces and policing leads across the UK, with significant interest and support from all parties. Work continues at pace to develop supporting policy and process documents, alongside software solutions to support an anticipated ‘go live’ with a phased national solution in autumn 2019.

182. The broader opportunities to positively influence behavioural change through a ‘Tutelage’ approach have been widely recognised. Work with partner agencies including the DVSA, DVLA and Highways England is advancing to initiate further proof of concept trials in relation to compliance issues.

Dashcam footage

183. The proliferation of ‘dashcams’ has led forces to accept footage from the public via their websites. The two main operating platforms are ‘Snap’ and Single Online Home, (SOH).

184. In March this year DfT released £100k to forces who were able to establish they had no current platform to accept this footage to assist them to provide this service. Forces who were awarded funds are due to show they can accept footage by 31st July 2019.

185. This is an interesting phenomenon as it strengthens the notion of social surveillance with regards to policing our roads and unwittingly supports the NPCC strategy.

CRaSH

186. The Collison Recoding and Sharing system (CRaSH) has now been adopted by 22 forces. It has recently been upgraded to version 7.

187. DfT have authority to grant £580k to police forces to provide Forensic Collision Investigators with tablets they can use on scene. The tablets will come on condition the FCI’s issued with them use CRASH 7 so clearly this offers another incentive to move to CRASH.

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188. DfT have submitted a paper to NPCC Business Change Council recommending all forces adopt CRASH.

189. NPCC Roads Policing supports the adoption of CRaSH by all forces and will continue to encourage forces to do so.

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Police Pursuits

190. Between 1st April 2018 and 31st march 2019 there were 2749 police pursuit reports submitted to the National Roads Policing Intelligence Forum analysts.30 This figure is suspected to be a gross underestimation as only a maximum of 26 forces submitted data across the 4 reporting cycles of the year.

191. The recently published Government response to the consultation on The Law, Guidance and Training Governing Police Pursuits,31 seeks to introduce a new approach to the investigation of police pursuit or response driving collisions with the introduction of a new standard or ‘test’;

‘The Government will introduce a new test to assess the standard of driving of a police officer involved in a road traffic incident. This new test will compare the standard of driving against that of a careful, competent and suitably trained police driver in the same role rather than use the existing test which compares driving against a standard qualified driver who would not normally be involved in police action. The Government has also decided to examine how to: Make clear police officers should not be regarded as being accountable for the driving of a suspected criminal who is attempting to avoid arrest by driving in a dangerous manner, providing the pursuit is justified and proportionate; and to

Review the existing emergency service exemptions to traffic law to ensure they remain fit for purpose.’

192. AC Hewitt has written to the Home Secretary identifying the Roads Policing portfolio as the link into NPCC to progress this change. There is clearly a great deal of work to be done which will need to involve the College of Policing and the driver training working group.

193. There are potential risks of increased costs for training as we may need to provide licenced and accredited national standards, in much the same way as Armed Policing, as well as a potential perverse outcome of more, not fewer prosecutions.

30 National Police Pursuit Records April 2018- March 2019 31https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/797817 /The_Law_Guidance_and_Training_Governing_Police_Pursuits_-_Response.pdf

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194. Of the 97 independent investigations into road traffic incidents completed between 1 April 2012 and 30 September 2017, two officers were prosecuted for pursuit related incidents. A marginally higher number of officers (five) were prosecuted following investigations into emergency response driving. The latter resulted in four convictions. There were no convictions for any pursuit related incident.

195. There is clearly a need to improve our collection of data concerning police pursuits, notwithstanding the potential change in legislation. It is unacceptable and unlikely to withstand scrutiny that we are unable to properly describe the true picture of police pursuits.

Recommendation 14: NPCC Roads Policing should require all forces to collect and submit data for all police pursuits to ensure complete and effective analysis to be made.

196. The latest iteration of the non-public facing Tactical Pursuit and Containment tactics directory including pre-emptive options, was published in June 2019. It deals with TPAC involving motorcycles in more depth than before, however this remains a challenging issue for policing.

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Specialist Capabilities Programme

197. NPCC Roads Policing portfolio has 2 work streams within the Specialist Capabilities Programme (SCP), specifically they are;

 Roads Intelligence  Forensic Collision Investigation

Roads Intelligence32

198. In March 2018 the Specialist Capabilities Board reviewed a high-level strategic case for the development of a Joint National Roads Intelligence Service. It was agreed that a more detailed Business Case (OBC) should be produced to understand the strategic need in more depth, consult with relevant organisations, and develop and assess a more comprehensive set of options.

199. Following release of funds in December 2018, production of an outline business case commenced and was concluded in April 2019. The OBC will be presented to the SCP Delivery Board on 26th June 2019, with the Board being asked to consider a number of options for the Service and the proposed next steps to establish an initial capability as proof of concept.

200. The business case sets out the need for a Joint National Roads Intelligence Service within the context of increasing challenges and demand presented to policing and a wide range of partners. This includes rising serious collisions and casualties, use of vehicles to facilitate County Lines and other criminality and the effect of congestion on the national economy.

201. The main premise being that relevant data, intelligence and information is held by a multitude of organisations, all of whom have strategic objectives or a vested interest in creating safe, secure and efficient roads, but rarely is this effectively or efficiently brought together so as to produce a complete picture from which to draw inferences, make decisions and promote interoperability between partners.

202. It is proposed to develop a Joint National Roads Intelligence Service (JNRIS) which will:

 Provide proportionate and timely access to required roads-related data sources to enable more responsive and accurate query and analysis

32 Detailed information provided by the Roads Intelligence work stream

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 Provide a single, common roads intelligence understanding to enable a proactive and collaborative approach to tactical/strategic enforcement and compliance and targeted use of finite operational capacity  Coordinate the development of/investment in roads intelligence analysis tools and capabilities which support the realisation of users’ strategic objectives  Establish and manage an authoritative body of roads intelligence ‘best practice’ to help improve users’ analytical capabilities across the UK.

203. The delivery of these strategic objectives will enable improved decision making, which can contribute to delivery of strategic roads outcomes and ultimately ensure the public is safer and more secure.

204. The business case identifies a range of services which JNRIS could deliver, as shown in the diagram below. These range in complexity from centralising data sharing agreements between partners and police thus reducing the demand on individual forces, to providing access to data for individual intelligence bureaux to analyse and providing regular or specific analytical products for forces or partners.

205. Fig 1.- potential service delivered by JNRIS

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206. JNRIS will provide a set of direct benefits to improve the quality and quantity of roads intelligence which will then enable a set of secondary benefits based on the operational outcomes from using roads intelligence.

207. Figure 2 below provides a high-level view of the hierarchy benefits which are expected to be delivered by JNRIS, which are predominantly performance improvements and efficiencies rather than cashable benefits.

Fig 2- JNRIS high level benefits

208. It is intended the output from JNRIS will be configurable to meet the specific needs of different forces or organisations, such as Highways England and the Department for Transport, on the basis that no single organisation holds all the relevant data or has the ability to effectively deal with the challenges in isolation.

209. As such the business case has been developed in cooperation with a wide range of partners. The SCP Delivery Board has been clear that, if partners are to receive a service, they should contribute to funding of the JNRIS.

210. At present, although clear statements of support have been made, no definite funding stream has been secured, though discussions with Government departments and partners continue, including for provision of staff and accommodation in lieu of direct financial contributions.

211. As this is effectively a new service without a comprehensive baseline against which to measure performance, should the Board support the recommendations in the OBC and once funding is secured it is intended to establish an initial capability servicing a limited number of forces and partners as a proof of concept (PoC).

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212. This will help quantify and extrapolate benefits and costs of a full service while de-risking technical and financial issues. The business case identifies and costs the high-level technical enablers and structure/staffing of this PoC, based on the principle of re-using and enhancing the effectiveness of systems currently in place or in development, such as NLEDS and NAS, rather than designing new systems and the associated cost of this.

213. A number of options for where to host the PoC and which forces and partners could be supported are being considered, including opportunities to collaborate with DfT who have recently funded an ACC post within the Joint Roads Safety Project. (See paragraphs 161-166).

Forensic Collision Investigation33

214. Forensic Collision Investigation is fundamental in investigating road death and serious collisions. Both criminal and coronial processes rely on detailed forensic reconstructions to come to conclusions on a cause of death and criminal liability.

215. To that end it is essential that policing provides a robust and technically sound product in order to maintain confidence in policing and judicial processes. International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) accreditation through the Forensic Services Regulator is currently the most challenging aspect of this capability.

216. The current Forensic Collision Investigation service in England and Wales is in a critical state in terms of staffing, training, competence, service delivery and expertise. It is a high risk to all Forces, with many units struggling to meet current demand, are unable to recruit or retain sufficient numbers or quality of staff to meet the demand, or meet the FSR deadline for accreditation.

217. ISO method validation is being undertaken nationally, however the majority of forces have made no progress towards the October 2020 deadline for accreditation. The FCI work stream proposes to create a national ISO accreditation delivery model through the established Forensic Collision Investigation (FCI) network.

218. It requires the acceleration of the delivery of a detailed business case identifying options and cost models for a nationally co-ordinated service, managed regionally and enabling national standards to be maintained with service delivered locally.

33 Detailed information provided by the Forensic Collision Investigation work stream.

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219. The Forensic Regulator assessment of the current service delivery of Forensic Collision Investigation is that; ‘they are just about getting away with it’ in terms of expertise, competency, knowledge and scientific rigor’.

220. As a result and through her knowledge of the work ongoing within FCI for service transformation under the SCP, the Regulator has offered to support forces as follows: ‘I would like to assist forces with making good decisions on the future of FCI services, so would be prepared to set out a process such that forces which had committed to a national service probably no further away that 1st September 2019, could be assisted by a timetabled process towards accreditation that had a later end date but milestones that must be met along the way. There would also need to be a formal commitment from each such force to continue to make progress by supporting the national validation programme, supporting staff to gain objective evidence of competence using the agreed national methods being validated and so on’

221. The FCI capability is currently finalising the outline business case (OBC) for presentation to the SCP board in June 2019.

222. The OBC proposes a national network structure which will incorporate the management and single entity for accreditation held by a host force, whilst FCI’s remain locally based and locally owned.

223. Forces who partake in the networked approach will be able to benefit from an extension to the forensic regulators deadline (currently October 2020), significant cost avoidance and savings in ISO, management structures, competence and training and benefit from potentially significant levels of external funding from partner agencies supporting delivery of a networked solution -working to one set of standards and deliverables.

224. Chief Officers and PCC’s are required to sign a notice of intent should they wish to join the network, by the 1st of September 2019 in order to meet the Forensic Science Regulator milestone and be granted the extension.

OFFICIAL

Policing Our Roads as a Priority

225. This review has researched how visible roads safety and roads policing matters are within Police and Crime plans and how these plans are translated into operational delivery by police forces.

226. With assistance from the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners (APCC), all PCC and Force Policing Plans (or equivalent, such as Strategic Intention and Force Mission Statements) were examined to determine how visible roads policing is as a strategic priority, or if not whether it is mentioned to a lesser degree in plans.

227. Police and Crime Plans were examined by the APCC and results forwarded to the NPCC Roads Policing Business Manager. Individual police forces were invited to signpost their plans via e-mail. Where forces failed to respond to this request, reasonable efforts were made to interrogate force public websites for details of how roads policing and roads safety is prioritised or otherwise.

228. The research found that out of 43 PCC plans reviewed, roads policing or roads safety was shown as a priority in 36 (83%).

229. In the force policing plans (or equivalent) reviewed, roads policing or roads safety was shown as a priority in just 19 out of 43 (44%).

230. The research showed that despite some PCC plans regarding roads policing as a priority, this was not always carried forward as an explicit priority in force plans, at least at a strategic level.

231. Some forces were very clear and sharply focussed on this area of business in terms of their priority or strategic plans, others not. Obviously every force has differing strategic priorities based on a wealth of variation.

232. Of the 24 forces who do not highlight roads policing in their strategic plans, 50% (12) saw an increase in the number of people killed on their roads in 2017 when compared to 2016.

233. The review did not extend to understand local or neighbourhood plans, many of which no doubt reflect considerable activity and effort in this area.

OFFICIAL

234. Based on the most recently published government figures, 5 people die on our roads every day34. It is difficult to conceive of any other area of public service (and in particular policing) where such statistics would not attract significant government intrusion and sustained effort to achieve reductions.

235. As the PCC elections draw closer and with the apparent cross government interest in roads safety and roads policing gaining momentum, it is likely that PCCs will become more intrusive with regards to policing activity in this area for their own forces.

236. It is noted by the NPCC Lead Officer for Roads Policing that no questions or intrusion was placed on this area of business by Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS) in the most recent inspection of Police Forces.

237. It would be beneficial for NPCC Roads Policing to lead the call for greater scrutiny in this area of policing rather than wait for such intrusion to occur.

Recommendation 15: NPCC Roads policing to engage with HMFICFRS to establish the process and appetite to include roads policing within the inspection regime.

34https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/744077 /reported-road-casualties-annual-report-2017.pdf

OFFICIAL

Conclusion

238. Roads policing brings about a unique interaction between the police and the public. An interaction with the police for a road traffic matter may be the only or first time a member of the public has direct dealings with a police officer, as such policing our roads sits at the heart of legitimate policing by consent.

239. Traffic related law enforcement activity is predominantly carried out by police officers, not only within what is often referred to as specialised or dedicated roads policing, but more generally through neighbourhood and response policing.

240. This places policing our roads at the heart of both community policing and as an enabler to disrupt and detect serious crime and disorder.

241. Our roads are abused for criminal activity. As described in this review, the links between traffic law offending and criminal law offending are very quickly apparent when examined in a relatively simple way. This however should not be the raison d’etre for policing our roads.

242. The approach to roads safety as currently set out involves many stakeholders and is clearly wide ranging. It would be helpful to bring all of this collective ambition together with a single statement of intent, vision and targeted approach. The forthcoming Government Road Safety Statement 2019, may assist in raising the profile of roads policing.

243. There appears to be a case to increase police enforcement activity. Raising the status of roads safety and policing our roads, as a significant cross departmental government priority, would bring greater focus and investment in this area which should be focussed on reducing preventable death and serious injury on our roads.

244. It may be appropriate to redefine roles and responsibilities across the entire spectrum of roads safety, from pre-offence education and awareness, to engineering and enforcement responsibilities.

245. The police have become heavily involved in educational activity. While there is a place for this, there is a valid question to be asked about the appropriateness of police education activity over enforcement activity and whether the lines are unhelpfully blurred in terms of the public’s understanding of the role of policing in this area.

OFFICIAL

246. Although important, education must be backed up by enforcement. With the exception of automated speeding offences, this review has shown fewer motorists are being prosecuted for road traffic offences. This lends support to anecdotal commentary that motorists feel there is less likelihood of being caught offending and so are more inclined to take the risk.

247. This review appears to illustrate that a rise in technological enforcement has not compensated for a fall in police officer led enforcement over the same period and that there is no discernible positive impact on the number of people killed on our roads.

248. The recommendations in this review provide an opportunity to further explore how roads policing should contribute to the Policing Vision 2025. As stated within, the Policing Vision 2025 can only be delivered by the whole of policing working together collaboratively in the public interest, this is the sentiment pushed by Chief Constable Bangham in the NPCC strategy, ‘Policing our roads together’.

249. The current interest in this area of policing by government is an opportunity that should be fully explored to ensure we play our part in starting a new era in the reduction of those killed and seriously injured on our roads.