A Case Study from the Office Du Niger

Cah. Agric. 2017, 26, 45003 © L. Soumano and M. Traoré, Published by EDP Sciences 2017 DOI: 10.1051/cagri/2017030 Innovation Platforms and Projects to support smallholder development - Experiences from sub-Saharan Africa. Available online at: Coordonnateurs : Janice Jiggins, Jean-Yves Jamin www.cahiersagricultures.fr ARTICLE DE RECHERCHE /RESEARCH ARTICLE Contribution of an innovation platform to change the management of collective irrigation: a case study from the Office du Niger (Mali) Lassine Soumano* and Mamoudou Traoré Institut polytechnique rural de formation et de recherche appliquée (IPR/IFRA), Katibougou, Mali Abstract – In the Office du Niger large rice farming irrigation scheme in Mali, water management has been a permanent source of tension between the smallholder tenants and the administration. The transfer of tertiary canal maintenance to the tenant farmers was expected to improve water management but, in practice, that rather led to deterioration. An innovation platform, erected by the CoS-SIS (Convergence of Sciences – Strengthening Innovation Systems) Program, reached a consensual agreement to transfer the maintenance of tertiary canals to the tenant producers, and updated the Contrat Plan expropriation rules for failure to pay water fees as well as many other key dispositions ruling duties and responsibilities for all parties: farmers, Office du Niger agents and the State. Keywords: land management / water management / institutional innovation / innovation platform Résumé – Contribution d’une plateforme d’innovation au changement dans la gestion de l’irrigation collective : un exemple à l’Office du Niger (Mali). Dans les vastes rizières de l’Office du Niger au Mali, la gestion de l’eau a longtemps été une source de tension entre les petits exploitants et l’administration. Le transfert partiel de cette gestion, avec une répartition de la maintenance des canaux entre les petits exploitants, l’Office du Niger et l’État n’a pas vraiment permis d’atteindre de meilleurs résultats. Une plateforme d’innovation établie par le programme CoS-SIS (Convergence of Sciences – Strengthening Innovation Systems) a abouti à un accord consensuel conférant le nettoyage des canaux tertiaires aux petits exploitants. Elle a aussi actualisé les règles d’expulsion des exploitants en cas de non-paiement de la redevance eau et a modifié les dispositions clefs du Contrat Plan qui régit les tâches et les responsabilités des exploitants, du personnel de l’Office du Niger et de l’État. Mots clés : gestion de l’eau / innovation institutionnelle / plateforme d’innovation This paper draws on a case study in a large scale irrigation finding innovative ways to resolve or by-pass the socio- scheme, the Office du Niger, located in the central delta of technical and institutional dilemmas revealed by a prior the Niger River in Mali. The study focused both on terms diagnostic study (Nederlof and Pyburn, 2012). of the functioning of the IP (Klerkx et al., 2010; Van Paassen et al., 2013), and on terms of how purposeful changes were brought about by IP’s activities. This article discusses the 1 Context causal relation between the IP’s actions and the immediate effects. Long-term impacts and consequences were not The Office du Niger (ON) was created in 1932, in the central studied. The IP sought through iterative cycles of action delta of Niger River. The area supplies 52% of national rice researching built around institutional experiments, participa- production as well as significant amounts of vegetables. Despite fl tory inquiries, and shared re ections, to bring about institu- the ON’s important role in the national economy and its tional changes supportive of small farmers and the functioning contribution to food security, farmers’ revenue declined. In of the irrigation scheme. The institutional experiments were response, the government introduced a number of reform conceived both as a form of joint learning and as a way of measures throughout a process of privatisation and decentrali- sation with the creation of village associations, users’ organisa- tions at the tertiary canals level, and water and land attribution * Corresponding author: [email protected] at the field level. Above all, the Government launched a This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License CC-BY-NC (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. L. Soumano and M. Traoré: Cah. Agric. 2017, 26, 45003 multi-stakeholder negotiating and planning process, under the 2 Methodology Director of the ON, to elaborate a protocol, known as the Contrat Plan, regulating the governance ofthe scheme.The Contrat Plan From early 2010 to the end of 2013, an inter-university defines the relations among the three main sets of actors: the collaboration programme, the Convergence of Sciences – tenants, the ON, and the Government, with the injunction for all Strengthening Innovation Systems (CoS-SIS), provided an parties to take more account of the human and social aspects of opportunity for state actors, tenants and researchers to address irrigation management, and to encourage especially the small the situation through setting up an innovation platform (IP) scale producers to play a new role in decision-making and (Hounkonnou et al., 2012; Jiggins et al., 2016b) in the Niono management. These reforms were not up to the standard (Office and Molodo irrigation zones. At the beginning, the IP was du Niger, 2008). composed of individuals known through the diagnostic study The withdrawal of the State from the management of the to be interested in seeking a way out of the difficulties ON necessitated the revision of the relationship among the identified, drawn from three stakeholder categories: value actors responsible for water management. That was stipulated chain actors (5 small scale tenant farmers, 2 members of in the first Contrat Plan in 1994. It was assumed that the Plan farmers’ cooperatives); regulators (2 from local bureaux of expressed everyone’s interests, but performance did not the ON at Niono and Molodo), and service providers (1 from significantly improve, because of a lack of incentive measures IER [Rural Economy Institute], and 1 from a non-government to bring about the desired collective action on the part of organisation, Nyeta-Conseil). tenants (Vandersypen et al., 2007; Vandersypen et al., 2009). The IP was facilitated by a part-time member from IER, The agreed obligations of the three main parties to the who also became responsible for the CoS-SIS local project. Contrat Plan were as follows: The Research Associate (RA) periodically met the other CoS- – farmers (tenants): cultivate the land allocated to the family; SIS RAs and national coordinators from Mali, Benin and adhere to the advice given by the extension service; pay the Ghana to present and jointly analyse interim results, resolve water user fee; maintain the tertiary canals; pay their land facilitation challenges, and review any changes in various user duty; domains and in national and international affairs that affected – ON: provide water throughout the ON command area; operations in the field. The IP was also supported by a National manage the land resources; provide advisory and other Coordinator, and a National Programme Management Team, services to the tenants and ensure the provision of inputs comprising of leading individuals in the domain of water and other agricultural materials; maintain the structures of management and agriculture, who had personal and profes- the secondary canal network and roads; assure the security sional links at the highest levels of the administration and the and growth of the agricultural output of the scheme; government. Both of them, from time to time, visited the IP ‘in – the state: ensure the legal and economic protection of the the field’, discussed interim results with ON officials, and farmers, provide ON with funds for investment and to sought to spread the emergent information into national support its functions. networks of influence. The preliminary diagnostic study was carried out in three The results were as follows: sites chosen by Niono Zone ON officers and CoS-SIS – many tenants did not perform adequately, or not on time, the researchers: the villages of Kouyan-coura (Niono), Kangaba/ periodic cleaning of the tertiary canals, a task that was M3 (Molodo), and Tugan-coura (Kolongo) (Doumbia et al., previously carried out by ON. They received no instruction 2012). The process comprised: non-participant observations or equipment to help them in their new task and were mostly on irrigation and drainage practices at the tertiary level and ignorant of the fact that this was now supposed to be their below, field visits of extension agents to farmers, survey of responsibility. Although represented by leading farmers in farmers at the tertiary level, and discussions of the results with the negotiation of the Contrat Plan, which in any case was village-chiefs and other community members at assemblies written in French, the language of the elite, the majority of held in each village. small tenant farmers felt that their interests were neglected; The study had two interwoven strands: (a) experimental – ON discovered that fulfilling its own commitments activities and inquiries supported by the IP presented in this depended on the tenants’ fulfilling theirs. For instance, article (Sect. 3); and (b) a theory-guided process inquiry if the tenants did not pay in time or in full the fee charged (TGPI) (Faletti and Lynch, 2009) carried out by the part-time for the use of water, ON, in turn, experienced revenue Research Associate (RA) (Jiggins et al., 2016a). In addition to shortfalls and struggled to meet its own obligations. It often facilitating the work of the IP, the RA was responsible for failed to carry out its own responsibilities on time, or at all, recording the TGPI data and processing the information and thus provided little incentive for the tenants to carry out throughout the study period so as to provide reasonable causal their own contractual obligations; evidence for the changes documented.

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