mE; YORK IIMES
16 APR 1972 The General Was a Spy. C
The Truth About General Gehlen and His Spy Ring. By Heinz Hiihne and Hermann Zolling. DECLASSIFIED Translated by Richard Barry from the German "Pullach Intern." AND R With an Introduction by Hugh Trevor-Roper and a Preface ELEASED BY to the American Edition by Andrew Tully. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Illustrated. 347 pp. New York: Coward, McCann Geoghegan. $10. SOURCES METHODS EXEM PTIONS B 2 NAZI WAR cR iMES DISCLOSURE AC1 Gehlen DATE 2001 2005 Spy of the Century. By E. H. Cookridge. Illustrated. 402 pp. New York: Random House. $10.
Hahne (author of "The Order of the By CHRISTOPHER FELIX General and his B.N.D. suffered set- bacas in the 1960 s, notably the rev- Death s Head," 1970, and "Codeword: Direktor," reviewed on P. 40 in this The Chief, Foreign Output Evaluation; elation that one of Gehlen s trusted Issue) and Zolling, on the other hand, Central Intelligence Agency, deputies, a former S.S. officer, was a while recognizing Gehlen s accom- Washington, D.C. (By safe hand to plishments (and even defending him Langley.) Christopher Felix is the pseudonym of a former American diplomat and on occasion — not without flashes Dear Chief: Intelligence officer. He is the author of national pride) are paitisan. The Lest it be supposed that my report )f "A Short Course in the Secret B.N.D. under Gehlen, they plainly violates the Agency s charter by en- War." "Three Cornered Cover" by feel, let Germany down. "The Fed- gaging in operations within the Unit- dr. relit. (with George Marton) will eral Republic," they write at the out- ed States, let me hasten to point out set, "requires an efficient secret serv- p ,hed this fall. that, except for Andrew Tully s Pref- ice if it is not to be exposed to un- ace to the Hahne and Zolling book longtime Soviet agent, and the necessary external dangers"; and (and for our reputation, of course). B.N.D. s involvement in the famous their major charge against Geh- the paper, print, and bindings are the November. 1962, Der Spiegel affair. len is that from 1958 on, he and the only things American Involved here. The latter added the enmity of Franz- B.N.D. were no longer efficient E. H. C.00kridge is a British subject: Josef Strauss, the West German De- Their opinion of the Gehlen or- his book was first published in Eng- fense Minister whose Bavarian C.S.U. ganization for most of the years be- land. Heinz HOhne and Hermann (Christian Socialist party) was an es- fore that seems revealed in their fre- Zoning are Gernians: Their book is sential prop of Christian Democratic quent use of the phrase, "the Amer- an elaboration of 15 articles pub- rule, to the existing hostility of many icans and their German minions at lished In West Germany s Der Spiegel Social Democrats. Pullach." This attitude, if understand- magazine In the spring of 1971, which In 1968 Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger, able in the middle 1950 s, carries a were highly critical of Gen.. Rein- reportedly under some pressure from different weight nearly two decades hard Gehlen s direction of the Federal his Socialist partners in the "grand later. Intelligence Service. . • coalition," did not extend Gehlen s ex- The German authors are severe Both books tell the same story: emption from mandatory retirement. about Gehlen s use of former Nazis General Gehlen, a German officer Gehlen s place, as president of the and about his organization s "inordi- since 1920, wartime head of F.H.O. B.N.D., was taken by Gen. Gerhard nate influence on government deci- (Fremde Heere Ost—Foreign Armies Wessel, a former associate of Gehlen, sions with no controlling authority" East), the intelligence section of the but no longer his friend. In 1970, to restrain it — given postwar West German General Staff concerned under the Brandt Government, a So- German history, that is a slap at with Eastern Europe, surrendered at cial Democratic party official was in- Adenauer in particular and German war s end to the Americans with the stalled In the B.N.D. as Vice Presi- Christian Democratic Governments In offer to put himself, his files, staff dent, former S.S. arta Gestapo Per general. and networks at their disposal. After -sonnel were removed, and B.N.D. de- The decline of the B.N.D. ("that some fencing, the offer was accepted, partment heads were replaced, sev- secret service which was once re- and the Gehlen organization was ul- eial by Social Democrats. garded as the best in Europe," they titnately installed in a compound at Although the story is the same in add nostalgically but inconsis- Pullach, near Munich. In 1949 Amer- both books — down to a striking tently, since they place its apogee in ican support and supervision was Identity (and abundance) of detail— the period when Adenaucr dom- transferred from the United States their approach differs. Cookridge, inated and Gehlen Co. were still Army to the recently formed C.I.A. whose 13th book on secret opera- "minions" of the Americans) they at• In 1956 the Gehlen organization be- tions this is, writes as the "expert." tribute variously to Gehlen s miscon- came the B.N.D. (Bundesnachrichten- Nevertheless, he -cannot avoid signs ceptions and uncurbed powers, to the dienst), the West German Federal in- of regret at the apparent decline in German tradition of regarding intel- telligence service, and Gehlen its later years of Gehlen s organization: ligence as falling almost exclusively "President." Long a favorite of Chan- the General is, after all, the hero of in the domain of the military (they cellor Adenauer, who referred to him his book. In fact, at his hands Creiden do have a good short essay on the as "My dear General Gehlen," the takes on the proportions of a super- historical development of the German man. Intelligence services), and, among etontinued other things, to "[snooping) in West " --""•••••vgros:. :1rtsr vzcZ7-77, 4.• German internal politics." The tatter may or may not be so. I wouldn t know, Chief. But it seems to me that if it is so, the answer to excessive partisanship of a West German intel- „•••-^-1 if eft ligence service when the Christian v. / v.. • .) Democrats were in power is not nec- ! ...; • essarily to pack it with the opposi- „,4 tion party when they come to power. atThi.4". . If the approaches of the two books are different, the books themselves nonetheless contain some remarkable •c0- ft, similarities. One is that the authors 1-, • would not last a week in any intelli- • 7,'" gence service. They are quite un- aware of the essential human element In secret operations; to them it is .all moving so many pawns around a vast board. As you once remarked, Chief, "perhaps only fiction can con- vey the reality of our work." Also, failing to understand the role of in- telligence. In larger policy, they greatly overestimate ft. "Under the Influence of [Gehlen s] daily situa- tion reports on the East which paint- ed Moscow s policy in the black- est of colors," write Hahne and Zon- ing of the period around 1950, "... . The US. secret service officers inevi- tably [sic] came to accept the political 2 "."1 (sic!) of their German partners. Senior US. secret service officers were soon pleading for an end to the Occupation regime on this side of • the Elbe and the incorporation of West Germany into the political, mil- itary, and economic alliance of the West." The role of "secret service officers" Is not to f General Gehlen in Hanover, 1958. ' plead major policies; and when they do, they often have a re- - laugh- verse effect. The authors really the Radio Waves" is otov and the heads of the Brit- they write: "The B.N.D: s new able. A better writer than the should read the memoirs of ish. American and Chinese mil- African friends gave it, almost two Germans (who may be suf- for the asking, what the ex- those men, such as Dirk Stikker itary missions . . . the British fering in translation), Cook- colonial powers such as Britain, of the Netherlands, Paul-Henri representative demanded Soviet ridge also succumbs to embroi- France and Belgium had had Speak „of Belgium, and Dean assistance in Egypt . . . offen- dery. On the Berlin telephone to employ a comprehensive net- Acheson, who, with the British sive operations In two sectors tunnel and the C.I.A. he says, and French, made and direct; of the front were decided work of agents to obtain — pic- "[Frank G.] Wisner was all for upon." As you know, Chief, I -ed Western policy in those tures of the situation.in.the.po-...... _ it, but he was at that time pre- years. Cookridge, speaking of was in Moscow in July, 1942. litically emergent continent of occupied with C.I.A. operations the East German Ministry of Foreigners never participated in Africa." Come, come. Our Ger- in Guatemala." Anyone who State Security, says flatly, "It Soviet "war councils." Soviet man friends have amiarently thinks Frank Wisner couldn t operations were never planned• was the extremely hostile • in- never heard of the French. keep an eye on two things at or discussed in the presence of telligence produced by Its "Communauté" (nor of Mon- once doesn t know how affairs Czechoslovakia section against foreigners. The Admiral com- sieur Foccart). Nor of the Ken- are conducted in a large or- the Dubcck Government which manding the British military yan request to Britain for ganization — and obviously Frompted Moscow into armed mission was not at a level to troops to put down local rebel- didn t know Wisner. intetwentIon there in 1968." "demand" anything of the Rus- lion. Cookrid r;e has one item that Moscow Is quite capable of sians. (Rather than seeking Rus- There is also their sweeping really intrigued me. He quotes, Identifying the self-interest In sian help in the Middle East, statement concerning the late. with evident admiration, and as East German Intelligence re- the British and Americans In 1940 s: "The Americans also proof of the effectiveness of ports, and, however suspicious July, 1942, were in, fact plan- urged Gehlen to do business Gehlen s penetrations into war- with the French, The U.S. se- the Russians may be, they do ning the North African inva- tune Russia, a radio message cret service had barely any not make major decisions in the sion, in part as a means of help- from an agent named "Minish- contact with the S.D.E.C.E. fashion Cookridge suggests. ing the Russians.) Finally, there kiy" stationed in "Stalin s Su- Documentation Ex- Too, all three authors are giv- was no Chinese military mis- [Service de preme Headquarters," dated terienne et de Contre-Espion- en to the kind of inaccuracies, sion in Moscow. I guess it s a July 14,•1942: "The war council French postwar secret large and smell, and to the little late to follow this up, age — in Moscow concluded its ses- service] but was most anxious sweeping generalizations that Chief. sion during the night of July to gain some Insight into the would spell quick failure for Messrs. HOhne and Zolling 13. Amongst those present were are policies of Paris." You will re- a secret intellip,ence service. simoady carried, away. On Shaposhnikov, Voroshilov, Mol- member, Chief, that this was Cookridge s chapter on "War of Gehlen s operations in Africa
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Just the moment wheli you -and I, greeted as old friends, were In and out of the Paris "pis- cine" seeing the head of the S.D.E.C.E., that ours was• but • a small part of a relationship that flourished until the advent —perhaps I should say the on- slaught—of de Gaulle 10 years later, and above all that it was neither an American need nor practice at that time on any level "to gain . . insight into the policies of Paris" via the Germans. I know these two books are the first the public has on the subject of the Federal intelli- gence service, Chief. This fact, together with the frequent di- rect and indirect allusions in the text and notes of both books to the B.N.D. sources, .suggests the possibility that the •B.N.D. s— who were certainly aware of the authors research- es — decided to get into the act for themselves, and to pro- vide a certain amount of in- formation for their own pur- poses. An easy operation. You ll have to get someone better versed in German poll; tics today to tell you whether this is an effort by the present heads of the B.N.D. to distance the organization from Gchlen. and thus from public criticism in Germany of the former "president," and perhaps to gain favor with the ruling So- cial-Democrats, or an effort to show that the Social-Democrat- lc changes since 1970 in the B.N.D. have not produced the necessary or desired reforms, or some other, more arcane, purpose. But you might want to pass this Much along. . You might also want to pass along one last Item, Chief. I learn from these books that General Gehlen has a son. Wihne and Zoning say he is named "Fellx-Christoph." Cook- ridge says he is named "Chris- topher Felix." I swear to you, Chief, I never met Gehlen in my life. You know it. les no more than a damnable coincidence. Yours, Chris. .111