American Intelligence and the Gehlen Organization, 1945-49- (S) Kevin C
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
• DECLASS IF IED AND RELEASED BY Secret CENTRAL I NTELL BENCE AGENCY Studies in Intelligence (1997) SOURCES METHODS EXEMPT I ON38211 NAZI WAR CR IMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2001 2006 A Controversial Liaison Relationship American Intelligence and the Gehlen Organization, 1945-49- (S) Kevin C. Ruffner The CIA's sponsorship of the three years later, he served as a staff nascent West German intelligence officer in an infantry division where service in mid-1949 marked an his organizational planning and staff expansion into uncharted opera- work attracted the attention of senior tional waters. 1 This new direction irrevocably linked the CIA with officers. By mid-1942, Gehlen took former members of the General Staff charge of the German Army High of the defeated Wehrrnacht and Nazi Command's Fremde Heer Ost (FHO Germany's intelligence services, or Foreign Armies East), with the 44 some of whom had notorious war- responsibility of preparing intelli- As the Soviets drew closer time reputations. 2 The Agency made gence on the Soviet Union. Gehlen's this decision after a long-running to Berlin, Gehlen dispersed debite with the US Army about the work in this position eventually his staff and transferred wisdom of supporting a resurrected incurred the wrath of Hitler, who German General Staff and a quasi- rejected Gehlen's pessimistic reports the FHOs intelligence files independent national intelligence about the strength and capabilities of to secret locations in organization. (v) the Soviet Army. Hitler summarily Bavaria. There, Gehlen dismissed Gehlen, now Genera/ma- The story behind CIA's involvement jor, in April 1945. (U) and his handpicked with the Gehlen Organization actu- ally started during the ebbing hours officers waited to Gehlen did not leave Berlin empty- of World War II. With the Soviets surrender to American fighting in the streets of Berlin and handed. He knew that the FHO had forces. the British and Americans racing some of the most important files in across the shell of the Third Reich in the Third Reich and that the posses- the spring of 1945, many German sion of these records offered the best officials realized the desperation of means of survival in the post-Hitler • their cause. Reinhard Gehlen, the period. As the Soviets drew closer to former chief of the German Army's Berlin, Gallen dispersed his staff and intelligence branch dealing with the Eastern Front and Soviet forces, transferred the FHO's intelligence files planned to survive Hitler's Gotter- to secret locations in Bavaria. There, dammerung as the 1,000-year Reich Gehlen and his handpicked officers crumbled. Like most Germans, waited to surrender to American Gehlen preferred surrender to the forces. Gehlen believed that the West- Kevin C. Ruffner, a member of the Western Allies as opposed to an ern Allies and the Soviet Union, while History Staff, is on a rotational uncertain fate at Russian hands. (U) wartime partners, would soon become assignment with the Counterintelli- peacetime rivals. With his knowledge gence Center. Born in 1902, Gehlen entered the about the Russians, combined with Reichswehr, the Weimar Republic's All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis the FHO's collective resources, expressed In Studies In Intelligence are those of small army, shortly after the end of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect the World War I. He advanced Gehlen felt he could influence rela- official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US Government through the officer ranks and joined tions between the East and West and entity, past or present. Nothing In the contents the General Staff as a captain in help shape Germany's role in postwar should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of an articles factual 1936. During the invasion of Poland Europe. 3 (U) statethents and Interpretations. 69 F6R-COOR Di Nag/WITH 1-"S. Secret Secret Gehlen Gen. Gehlen (on right) with a group of enlisted men in 1943. (FOUO) The US Army Picks Up Gehlen have an indefinite period of military conducted espionage work against occupation and a frontier contiguous the Soviets using Russian defectors Even before Nazi Germany's capitu- with them." 4 Boker quickly became and provided raw intelligence to lation, Allied forces were on the the 12th Army Group's resident Gehlen's FH0.6 Gehlen insisted that lookout for German officers and expert on the Soviet Army because of he had access to still-existent agent enlisted personnel with intelligence his interrogation of German officers networks in the Soviet Union backgrounds. Indeed, as the Ameri- who had fought on the Eastern through Baun's sources. (s) cans looked for Gehlen, he tried to Front. (S) surrender to an American unit. After Army headquarters in Washington a circuitous route, the US Army Gathering Gehlen's staff and records learned about Gehlen's activities at frii-arptildiiiiiid.Gelilen 'and hiè-men required some subterfuge on Boker's Wiesbaden and, after some debate, to the 12th Army Group Interroga- part. He was aware, from previous Boker received orders to bring the tion Center near Wiesbaden in June experience, that "there existed in German group to the United States. 1945. Interned at the "Generals' many American quarters a terrible Army G-2's primary interest, how- House," Gehlen reassembled his staff opposition to gathering any informa- ever, centered on the retrieval and and files under the overall direction tion concerning our Soviet Allies." analysis of the FHO records, not in of Army Capt. John R. Boker, Jr. (U) He did, however, gain the support of its personnel. Boker, who had Col. Russell Philp, commander of become quite attached to his project, Bolter, who had previously interro- the Interrogation Center, and Brig. resented losing control of Gehlen gaked ocher German officers, Gen. Edwin L. Sibert, G-2 for the and his staff section after their secret expressed his feelings as he started his 12th Army Group, to employ the departure for Washington on 21 interrogation of General Gehlen. "It former FHO staff members to pro- August 1945. Placed as virtual pris- was also clear to me by April 1945 duce reports on the Soviets. 5 Gehlen oners in a classified building at Fort that the military and political situa- also wanted Boker to establish con- Hunt, Virginia, (known simply as tion would not only give the tact with some of his frontline P.O. Box 1142), the Army planned Russians control over all of Eastern organizational elements, such as to use Gehlen in conjunction with a Europe and the Balkans but that, as Oberstleutnant Herman Baun, who larger project being conducted at A result of that situation, we would commanded Stab Walli I, which Camp Ritchie, Maryland, to compile 70 Secret Secret Gehlen little sole in these activities. In the ...Berlin and their activities with the throes- of disbandment during the fall Americans. The report also stated of 1945, OSS declined the Army's that Gehlen had recommended that invitation CO employ Baun in Ger- Herman Baun be contacted to pro- many. The new Strategic Services vide further information about the Unit (SSU) also expressed some Soviets while the general worked in reluctance about using the German the United States. Baun, in fact, had FHO for American intelligence pur- been arrested by the US Army as a poses.7 SSU, however, did try to "mandatory arrestee" (members of determine the exact nature of the Nazi party organizations and high- relationship between Gehlen and ranking German Army and SS offic- Army intelligence. On 25 October ers were subject to immediate 1945, Crosby Lewis, SSU's new apprehension by the Allies) in late chief of mission in Germany, asked July 1945 and interrogated at the Winston N. Scott in London for 3rd Army Interrogation Center the "Special Sources" information from following month. The announce- counterintelligence files pertaining to ment of his arrest and the Stab Walli and various German per- distribution of a Preliminary Interro- sonalities, including Baun and gation Report raised great concern at Maj. Gen. Edwin L. Siben (u) Gehlen. Writing hastily, Lewis Army G-2 because the Soviets now informed London: demanded the extradition of both Baun and Gehlen. 9 (c) a history of the German Army on the For your information only, Baun Eastern Front. (S) and a group of other members of The Army refused to accede to the Fremde Heere Oct. experts in the Soviet demand and secluded Baun Through Boker's efforts (he accom- G.I.S. on espionage against the and several other FHO personnel at panied Gehlen's group to the United Russians, are being collected by the Military Intelligence Service Cen- States) and those of officials with the two officers of the G-2 section, ter (MISC) at Oberursel on the East European Order of Battle USFET, who are responsible only outskirts of Frankfurt (also known as Branch at the Pentagon, the situa- to Gen. Sibert. It appears likely Camp King and later officially desig- tion for the Germans gradually nated as that Sibert got an OK from the 7700th European improved. The BOLERO Group, as Command Interrogation Center). Washington on this when he was •Ge-hisAls_unit. became known, served The small group, including Gerhard in the US. last month, at which undei 1-e-d-freCtioti .Of Arm-y Wessel, who had succeeded Gehlen time it appeared that OSS might Eric Waldman until its return to Ger- as the head of FHO in 1945, was up. many in June 1946. By this point, fold Von Gehlen and several quartered at the "Blue House," Gehlen's men not only prepared high-ranking staff officers who where Baun planned to develop a reports based on German records but operated for Fremde Heere Oct full-scale intelligence organization.