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The 19Th Congress of the Communist Party of China and Its Aftermath

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The 19Th Congress of the Communist Party of China and Its Aftermath JANUARY 2018 ISSUE NO. 222 The 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China and Its Aftermath KARTIK BOMMAKANTI ABSTRACT The recently concluded 19th Party Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) brought the world's attention to the future direction of the CPC. As the proceedings of the Party Congress revealed, sustaining the legitimacy of the CPC's hold on power is an overriding concern for the country's political leaders. The Party Congress addressed the corruption plaguing the CPC and the Chinese state writ large, which has deep, long-term consequences for the Party's capacity to rule. On the other hand, it also displayed the dynamism of the CPC in the form of its resilience, adaptability and discipline. INTRODUCTION As the ruling Communist Party of China (CPC) The Congress lays down the Party’s completed its 19th Party Congress in October guidelines for the conduct of governmental 2017, there is every indication that the CPC’s policy over the succeeding five years.1 In the grip on power is likely to remain steadfast in case of the 19th Party Congress, most of the the near future. The recently concluded Party crucial policy decisions—among them, the Belt Congress only cemented the power of China’s and Road Initiative (BRI), the Asian ruling elites under Xi Jinping. The CPC’s Party Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB), congresses are highly scripted events and, in and the Central Military Commission (CMC) general, do not serve as venues for making higher defence organisation reforms—had decisions; rather, the Party merely acquiesces already been taken during the preceding five to pre-determined issues during the course of years. The once-in-a-decade leadership the event. transition, and the Party Congress held twice Observer Research Foundation (ORF) is a public policy think-tank that aims to influence the formulation of policies for building a strong and prosperous India. ORF pursues these goals by providing informed analyses and in-depth research, and organising events that serve as platforms for stimulating and productive discussions. ISBN 978-93-87407-55-8 © 2018 Observer Research Foundation. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, copied, archived, retained or transmitted through print, speech or electronic media without prior written approval from ORF. The 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China and Its Aftermath in a decade, are an important event for taking led Chinese leadership is determined to stock and consolidating existing policies rather address, and for which it has taken numerous than announcing new schemes or policies. In steps. some respects, the 19th Party Congress was no In the context of the 19th Party Congress, exception to previous congresses. It was a this brief first surveys the role of economic continuation of the CPC’s brand of leadership: growth in legitimating the authority of the to demonstrate the successes of the previous CPC. It then evaluates the importance of five years and articulate a vision for the future, institutional adaptation and culture of the including an insistence on maintaining Party CPC to governing a transforming society. line discipline; and appointing officials to a Finally, it evaluates the role of the Communist new Central Committee. The latter is the basis Party’s control over the military and direction for a new Politburo and, consequently, the of the military reforms – a crucial factor for apex Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) countries neighbouring China and beyond. that will guide governance for the following five years.2 The analysis seeks to give the reader context about the core themes listed above by The following analysis addresses some core drawing on both open-source material and issues that undergird the Party Congress and Indian assessments of what meaning the 19th the extent to which it shores up the legitimacy Party Congress holds for the future of the CPC of the CPC. Legitimacy can flow from multiple and its capacity for governance for at least the sources: economic performance, institutional next five years. adaptation and innovation, ideological affinity, nationalism, an emphasis on THE 19TH CONGRESS AND THE ECONOMY indigenous cultural values and China’s place in the world. This brief situates and analyses the In his inaugural address to the 19th Party relative significance of these factors that Congress, Xi Jinping drew attention to China’s burnish the legitimacy of the CPC and how the economic performance as the basis for China’s 19th Party Congress sought to address them. emergence as a great power. Despite a sluggish Many commentators, particularly in the West global economy, China fared well and entered tend to think that the China model, which what Xi called a “new normal in economic combines political authoritarianism with development” with medium-paced growth, if economic openness, is unsustainable,3 but as not the frenetic growth rates that the People’s the succeeding analysis will reveal it is a lot Republic of China (PRC) had experienced in more complex. The outcome of the 19th the past.4 Xi expects to see China eliminate Congress only reinforced the fact that China’s poverty by 2020. 5 Indeed, economic ruling elites are capable of sustaining performance has been a legitimating governing power, despite the contradictions cornerstone of the CPC’s capacity to maintain inherent in the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ uncontested power. model and the factionalism that afflicts the CPC. Undoubtedly, several challenges remain Eudaemonic legitimacy is that which is for the CPC’s governing authority. Corruption determined by economic performance and is one such phenomenon that the Xi Jinping- necessitates the efficient delivery of economic 2 ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 222 l JANUARY 2018 The 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China and Its Aftermath goods and services to the people.6 Unlike in emerge in the CPC leadership over Bo Xilai, democracies, poor economic performance can leader of the mega-city of Chongqing. The result in the de-legitimisation of authoritarian Chongqing model of development was seen as regimes.7 The CPC-led Chinese state has been an effort to revive the Maoist pattern of particularly adept and disciplined in development. Its rival model of development maintaining high economic growth rates, was Guangdong, representing Dengism. preventing any upsurge of popular discontent Maoism and Dengism, in many respects, are among the Chinese people for most of the irreconcilable. This fundamental rupture post-Mao period. It may be said, in fact, that explains in good measure, if not completely, eudaemonic legitimacy is a uniquely post-Mao the anti-corruption drive against Bo and Party phenomenon. While the Mao era witnessed officials from Chongqing. The high-profile legitimisation of rule through the cult of officials purged during the anti-corruption Mao’s persona in combination with drive were mostly from the City of Chongqing 8 ideological and revolutionary fervour, the whose Chief until March 2012 was the neo- reform period that followed displayed the Maoist Bo Xilai. Some do conclude that Bo’s economic dynamism legitimating the Chinese elimination was as much about corruption as state under the CPC. it was the result of infighting over the Maoist China has gone through three phases of pattern of development as opposed to the 14 revolution, development and reform.9 These Dengist variant. Bo was a one-time rival and three phases roughly correspond with Harry competitor to Xi, and it remains debatable Harding’s classification of Revolutionary whether he was a Maoist ideologue or was Maoism, Restorationism and Reform.10 playing to mobilise popular support to secure Reformers have been the most dominant in a place in the PBSC and potentially reach the the post-Mao period, with restorationists only helm of the Chinese presidency.15 enjoying a brief period of dominance following Mao’s death in 1976. The Despite slower economic growth over the restorationists sought to pare down Maoism last four years, the CPC-led Chinese state has with its fixation on mass mobilisation, not experienced serious loss of support from ideological fervour and personality-based the public. This only invites the question: If leadership by restoring the party’s collective economic performance is not all that explains 11 leadership. The reformers, however, the CPC’s grip on power, what other factors substantively rejected the core of Maoism’s play in sustaining regime legitimacy? Key closed-door economic policies, while retaining determinants are the institutions, as well as the restorationist plank on collective the role of culture. Indeed, the institutionalist 12 leadership and fidelity to the Party. and the cultural school would argue that The development and reform period, eudaemonic legitimacy is also in part the starting in 1979 under Deng Xiaoping, was direct outcome of the CPC’s institutional sustained by Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and adaptation and the cultural attributes that are continues apace under Xi Jinping.13 Splits did inherent in Chinese society. ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 222 l JANUARY 2018 3 The 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China and Its Aftermath THE 19TH CONGRESS AND THE ROLE OF from a substitution of economic performance INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE to undergird its legitimacy; it is equally a function of the CPC’s institutional Regimes sustain themselves by justifying to adaptation. As Eric Li accurately observed their people that existing political institutions following the ascension of Xi Jinping,
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