DOCSLIB.ORG

EASO COI Report Syria: Military Service

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
EASO COI Report Syria: Military Service EASO Syria Military service Country of Origin Information Report April 2021 More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu) PDF ISBN: 978-92-9465-046-7 doi: 10.2847/461371 BZ--08-21-055-EN-N © European Asylum Support Office, 2021 Cover photo: © Goran Safarek via iStock by Getty Images, 1278365191, 11 October 2020, url. Syrian army soldier with an assault rifle. Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. For any use or reproduction of photos or other material that is not under the EASO copyright, permission must be sought directly from the copyright holders. Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service Acknowledgements This report was drafted by the European Asylum Support Office COI Sector. The following departments and organisations have reviewed the report: Belgium, Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons (CGRS), Centre for Documentation and Research (Cedoca) Denmark, Danish Immigration Service (DIS) The Netherlands, Office for Country Information and Language Analysis, Ministry of Justice (OCILA) It must be noted that the review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts or organisations contributes to the overall quality of the report, but does not necessarily imply their formal endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of EASO. 3 Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service Contents Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................. 3 Contents .................................................................................................................................................. 4 Disclaimer................................................................................................................................................ 6 Glossary and abbreviations ..................................................................................................................... 7 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 9 Methodology ...................................................................................................................................... 9 Quality control .................................................................................................................................... 9 Sources ............................................................................................................................................... 9 Structure and use of the report ........................................................................................................ 10 Map ....................................................................................................................................................... 11 1. Background ....................................................................................................................................... 12 2. Military service and official conscription .......................................................................................... 13 2.1 Military and reserve service ....................................................................................................... 13 2.2 Conscientious objectors ............................................................................................................. 14 2.3 Recruitment practices of conscripts and reservists to the SAA during the reporting period .... 15 2.3.1 Recruitment in SAA-affiliated forces ................................................................................... 16 2.3.2 Conscription of Druze .......................................................................................................... 17 2.3.3 Prevalence of SAA conscription in SDF-controlled areas .................................................... 18 2.3.4 Prevalence of recruitment of males under 18 and over 42 years ....................................... 19 2.4 Methods of recruiting of conscripts and reservists to the SAA .................................................. 20 2.5 Deployment of conscripts and reservists to the front ................................................................ 23 2.5.1 Deployment of conscripts ................................................................................................... 23 2.5.2 Deployment of reservists .................................................................................................... 25 2.6 Discharge of conscripts and reservists serving in the SAA ......................................................... 26 3. Deferrals and exemptions from military service ............................................................................... 28 3.1 Only sons .................................................................................................................................... 28 3.2 Medical exemptions ................................................................................................................... 29 3.3 Students ...................................................................................................................................... 29 3.4 Exemption fee ............................................................................................................................. 30 3.4.1 Exemption fee for males residing in Syria ........................................................................... 32 4 Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service 4. Consequences of draft evasion, military desertion and defection ................................................... 33 4.1 Draft evaders .............................................................................................................................. 33 4.1.1 Amendment to Article 97 of the Military Service Law ........................................................ 34 4.1.2 Potential consequences for family members ...................................................................... 34 4.2 Military deserters and defectors ................................................................................................ 35 4.2.1 Potential consequences for family members ...................................................................... 38 4.3 Amnesties regarding draft evaders and military deserters and their implementation in practice .......................................................................................................................................................... 38 Annex I: Bibliography ............................................................................................................................ 41 Annex II: Terms of Reference ................................................................................................................ 53 5 Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service Disclaimer This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019).1 The report is based on carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced. The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place or that the person or organisation does not exist. Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particular application for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of a particular legal position. ‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal sense as applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained in this report. The drafting of this report was finalised on 22 March 2021. Any event taking place after this date is not included in this report. More information on the reference period for this report can be found in the methodology section of the Introduction. 1 The 2019 EASO COI Report Methodology can be downloaded from the EASO COI Portal https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2019_EASO_COI_Report_Methodology.pdf 6 Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service Glossary and abbreviations Abbrev. Explanation COAR Center for Operational Analysis and Research CoI Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic DIS Danish Immigration Service FIS Finnish Immigration Service GoS Government of Syria ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant; also known as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Islamic State (IS), or Daesh NDF National Defence Forces OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights SAA Syrian Arab Army SDF Syrian Democratic Forces SNHR Syrian Network for Human Rights SOHR Syrian Observatory of Human Rights SACD Syrian Association for Citizens Dignity 7 Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service Military service Military service2 is used broadly to cover both military service and reserve service in the SAA. Conscientious objection Conscientious objection to military service is
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Country of Origin Information Report Syria June 2021
    Country of origin information report Syria June 2021 Page 1 of 102 Country of origin information report Syria | June 2021 Publication details City The Hague Assembled by Country of Origin Information Reports Section (DAF/AB) Disclaimer: The Dutch version of this report is leading. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands cannot be held accountable for misinterpretations based on the English version of the report. Page 2 of 102 Country of origin information report Syria | June 2021 Table of contents Publication details ............................................................................................2 Table of contents ..........................................................................................3 Introduction ....................................................................................................5 1 Political and security situation .................................................................... 6 1.1 Political and administrative developments ...........................................................6 1.1.1 Government-held areas ....................................................................................6 1.1.2 Areas not under government control. ............................................................... 11 1.1.3 COVID-19 ..................................................................................................... 13 1.2 Armed groups ............................................................................................... 13 1.2.1 Government forces .......................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • A Textual Analysis of US Army and US Navy Recruiting Advertisements From
    Louisiana State University LSU Digital Commons LSU Master's Theses Graduate School 2009 The changing face of the U.S. military: a textual analysis of U.S. Army and U.S. Navy recruiting advertisements from pre-9-11 to six years into the Iraq War Maryann M. Rowland Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses Part of the Mass Communication Commons Recommended Citation Rowland, Maryann M., "The changing face of the U.S. military: a textual analysis of U.S. Army and U.S. Navy recruiting advertisements from pre-9-11 to six years into the Iraq War" (2009). LSU Master's Theses. 1151. https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses/1151 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Master's Theses by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE CHANGING FACE OF THE U.S. MILITARY: A TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF U.S. ARMY AND U.S. NAVY RECRUITING ADVERTISEMENTS FROM PRE-9-11 TO SIX YEARS INTO THE IRAQ WAR A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Mass Communication in The Manship School of Mass Communication by Maryann Rowland B.A., University of Central Florida, 2006 May 2009 AKNOWLEDGMENTS The completion of this thesis would not have been possible without the help and support of many people.
    [Show full text]
  • ASOR Cultural Heritage Initiatives (CHI): Planning for Safeguarding Heritage Sites in Syria and Iraq1
    ASOR Cultural Heritage Initiatives (CHI): Planning for Safeguarding Heritage Sites in Syria and Iraq1 S-JO-100-18-CA-004 Weekly Report 209-212 — October 1–31, 2018 Michael D. Danti, Marina Gabriel, Susan Penacho, Darren Ashby, Kyra Kaercher, Gwendolyn Kristy Table of Contents: Other Key Points 2 Military and Political Context 3 Incident Reports: Syria 5 Heritage Timeline 72 1 This report is based on research conducted by the “Cultural Preservation Initiative: Planning for Safeguarding Heritage Sites in Syria and Iraq.” Weekly reports reflect reporting from a variety of sources and may contain unverified material. As such, they should be treated as preliminary and subject to change. 1 Other Key Points ● Aleppo Governorate ○ Cleaning efforts have begun at the National Museum of Aleppo in Aleppo, Aleppo Governorate. ASOR CHI Heritage Response Report SHI 18-0130 ○ Illegal excavations were reported at Shash Hamdan, a Roman tomb in Manbij, Aleppo Governorate. ASOR CHI Incident Report SHI 18-0124 ○ Illegal excavation continues at the archaeological site of Cyrrhus in Aleppo Governorate. ASOR CHI Incident Report SHI 18-0090 UPDATE ● Deir ez-Zor Governorate ○ Artillery bombardment damaged al-Sayyidat Aisha Mosque in Hajin, Deir ez-Zor Governorate. ASOR CHI Incident Report SHI 18-0118 ○ Artillery bombardment damaged al-Sultan Mosque in Hajin, Deir ez-Zor Governorate. ASOR CHI Incident Report SHI 18-0119 ○ A US-led Coalition airstrike destroyed Ammar bin Yasser Mosque in Albu-Badran Neighborhood, al-Susah, Deir ez-Zor Governorate. ASOR CHI Incident Report SHI 18-0121 ○ A US-led Coalition airstrike damaged al-Aziz Mosque in al-Susah, Deir ez-Zor Governorate.
    [Show full text]
  • RECRUITING for DIFFERENCE and DIVERSITY in the U.S. MILITARY by JEREMIAH B. FAVARA a DISSERTATION Presented to the School of J
    RECRUITING FOR DIFFERENCE AND DIVERSITY IN THE U.S. MILITARY by JEREMIAH B. FAVARA A DISSERTATION Presented to the School of Journalism and Communication and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy September 2017 DISSERTATION APPROVAL PAGE Student: Jeremiah B. Favara Title: Recruiting for Difference and Diversity in the U.S. Military This dissertation has been accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in the School of Journalism and Communication by: Carol Stabile Chair Gretchen Soderlund Core Member Christopher Chávez Core Member Dan HoSang Core Member CJ Pascoe Institutional Representative and Sara D. Hodges Interim Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School Original approval signatures on file with the University of Oregon Graduate School. Degree awarded September 2017. ii © 2017 Jeremiah B. Favara iii DISSERTATION ABSTRACT Jeremiah B. Favara Doctor of Philosophy School of Journalism and Communication September 2017 Title: Recruiting for Difference and Diversity in the U.S. Military After shifting to an all-volunteer force (AVF) in 1973, the U.S. military was forced to expand recruiting efforts beyond the ideal figure of the white male soldier in order to meet personnel needs. Shaped by the economic realities of the AVF, such recruiting efforts sought to show individuals historically excluded from military service, namely women and people of color, that there was a place for them in the military. The presence of women and people of color in recruitment materials contributes to ideals of citizenship and articulates understanding of gender, race, sexuality, and class in relation to military inclusion.
    [Show full text]
  • COVID-19 May Situational Analysis Report
    Main Implementing Partner COVID-19 SITUATION ANALYSIS SYRIA CRISIS TYPE: EPIDEMIC MAY 2021 Better Data Better Decisions Better Outcomes The outbreak of disease caused by the virus known as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS-CoV-2) or COVID-19 started in China in December 2019. The virus quickly spread across the world, with the WHO Director-General declaring it as a pandemic on March 11th, 2020. The virus’s impact has been felt most acutely by countries facing humanitarian crises due to conflict and natural disasters. As humanitarian access to vulnerable communities has been restricted to basic movements only, monitoring and assessments have been interrupted. To overcome these constraints and provide the wider humanitarian community with timely and comprehensive information on the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, iMMAP initiated the COVID-19 Situational Analysis project with the support of the USAID Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance (USAID BHA), aiming to provide timely solutions to the growing global needs for assessment and analysis among humanitarian stakeholders. CONTENTS 1. COVID-19 Overview Page 4 A. COVID-19 CASES 4 B. CONTAINMENT MEASURES 9 C. PREVENTATIVE MEASURES 13 D. COVID-19 ECONOMIC IMPACTS 15 2. COVID-19 RELATED HUMANITARIAN CONSEQUENCES Page 19 Health: Overwhelmed healthcare system 19 Livelihoods: Inflation and unemployment resulting in lower purchasing power 23 Food security: Critical food insecurity levels, notably due to increase in food prices and decreasing purchasing power 27 Nutrition: Rising malnutrition due to inadequate and less diverse diets 32 Education:Unaffordability leading to high rates of school drop-out 33 Protection: Rise in protection issues and restriction of services 36 WASH: Lack of infrastructure and unaffordable WASH items contributing to the spread of COVID-19 38 Shelter: Overcrowding and harsh conditions exposing IDPs to a greater risk of COVID-19 infection 42 Logistics: Fuel crisis leading to severe shortages and skyrocketing prices 43 3.
    [Show full text]
  • American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics
    American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics Updated July 29, 2020 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov RL32492 American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics Summary This report provides U.S. war casualty statistics. It includes data tables containing the number of casualties among American military personnel who served in principal wars and combat operations from 1775 to the present. It also includes data on those wounded in action and information such as race and ethnicity, gender, branch of service, and cause of death. The tables are compiled from various Department of Defense (DOD) sources. Wars covered include the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam Conflict, and the Persian Gulf War. Military operations covered include the Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission; Lebanon Peacekeeping; Urgent Fury in Grenada; Just Cause in Panama; Desert Shield and Desert Storm; Restore Hope in Somalia; Uphold Democracy in Haiti; Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF); Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF); Operation New Dawn (OND); Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR); and Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS). Starting with the Korean War and the more recent conflicts, this report includes additional detailed information on types of casualties and, when available, demographics. It also cites a number of resources for further information, including sources of historical statistics on active duty military deaths, published lists of military personnel killed in combat actions, data on demographic indicators among U.S. military personnel, related websites, and relevant CRS reports. Congressional Research Service American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics Contents Introduction ....................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Complaint for of the Estate of MARIE COLVIN, and Extrajudicial Killing, JUSTINE ARAYA-COLVIN, Heir-At-Law and 28 U.S.C
    Case 1:16-cv-01423 Document 1 Filed 07/09/16 Page 1 of 33 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CATHLEEN COLVIN, individually and as Civil No. __________________ parent and next friend of minors C.A.C. and L.A.C., heirs-at-law and beneficiaries Complaint For of the estate of MARIE COLVIN, and Extrajudicial Killing, JUSTINE ARAYA-COLVIN, heir-at-law and 28 U.S.C. § 1605A beneficiary of the estate of MARIE COLVIN, c/o Center for Justice & Accountability, One Hallidie Plaza, Suite 406, San Francisco, CA 94102 Plaintiffs, v. SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, c/o Foreign Minister Walid al-Mualem Ministry of Foreign Affairs Kafar Soussa, Damascus, Syria Defendant. COMPLAINT Plaintiffs Cathleen Colvin and Justine Araya-Colvin allege as follows: INTRODUCTION 1. On February 22, 2012, Marie Colvin, an American reporter hailed by many of her peers as the greatest war correspondent of her generation, was assassinated by Syrian government agents as she reported on the suffering of civilians in Homs, Syria—a city beseiged by Syrian military forces. Acting in concert and with premeditation, Syrian officials deliberately killed Marie Colvin by launching a targeted rocket attack against a makeshift broadcast studio in the Baba Amr neighborhood of Case 1:16-cv-01423 Document 1 Filed 07/09/16 Page 2 of 33 Homs where Colvin and other civilian journalists were residing and reporting on the siege. 2. The rocket attack was the object of a conspiracy formed by senior members of the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (the “Assad regime”) to surveil, target, and ultimately kill civilian journalists in order to silence local and international media as part of its effort to crush political opposition.
    [Show full text]
  • Lessons from Others for Future U.S. Army Operations in and Through the Information Environment
    C O R P O R A T I O N Lessons from Others for Future U.S. Army Operations in and Through the Information Environment Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Michael Schwille, Jakub P. Hlávka, Michael A. Brown, Steven S. Davenport, Isaac R. Porche III, Joel Harding For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR1925z1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-0-8330-9815-3 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2018 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover photos (clockwise from top left): Giorgio Montersino via Flickr (CC BY-SA 2.0); U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Adawn Kelsey; U.S. Air Force photo by Tech Sgt John Gordinier; U.S. Air National Guard photo by Master Sgt Andrew J. Moseley; Russian Ministry of Defence (CC BY 4.0); North Korean national media Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous.
    [Show full text]
  • Civilians in Cyberwarfare: Conscripts
    Civilians in Cyberwarfare: Conscripts Susan W. Brenner* with Leo L. Clarke** ABSTRACT Civilian-owned and -operated entities will almost certainly be a target in cyberwarfare because cyberattackers are likely to be more focused on undermining the viability of the targeted state than on invading its territory. Cyberattackers will probably target military computer systems, at least to some extent, but in a departure from traditional warfare, they will also target companies that operate aspects of the victim nation’s infrastructure. Cyberwarfare, in other words, will penetrate the territorial borders of the attacked state and target high-value civilian businesses. Nation-states will therefore need to integrate the civilian employees of these (and perhaps other) companies into their cyberwarfare response structures if a state is to be able to respond effectively to cyberattacks. While many companies may voluntarily elect to participate in such an effort, others may decline to do so, which creates a need, in effect, to conscript companies for this purpose. This Article explores how the U.S. government can go about compelling civilian cooperation in cyberwarfare without violating constitutional guarantees and limitations on the power of the Legislature and the Executive. * NCR Distinguished Professor of Law and Technology, University of Dayton School of Law. ** Associate, Drew, Cooper & Anding, P.C., Grand Rapids, Michigan. 1011 1012 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law [Vol. 43:1011 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................
    [Show full text]
  • How State Involvement in Un Peacekeeping Reduces
    PACIFYING THE PEACEKEEPERS: HOW STATE INVOLVEMENT IN U.N. PEACEKEEPING REDUCES MILITARY THREATS TO DEMOCRACY by TIMOTHY JAMES ALEXANDER PASSMORE B.A., Lee University, 2006 M.Litt., University of St. Andrews, 2007 M.A., University of Colorado Boulder, 2015 A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Colorado in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Political Science 2019 This thesis entitled: Pacifying the Peacekeepers: How State Involvement in U.N. Peacekeeping Reduces Military Threats to Democracy written by Timothy James Alexander Passmore has been approved for the Department of Political Science ___________________________________________ Associate Professor Megan Shannon (Chair) ___________________________________________ Professor Jaroslav Tir ___________________________________________ Associate Professor Carew Boulding ___________________________________________ Professor David H. Bearce ___________________________________________ Assistant Professor Benjamin Teitelbaum (Department of Musicology) Date________________ The final copy of this thesis has been examined by the signatories, and we find that both the content and the form meet acceptable presentation standards of scholarly work in the above mentioned discipline. ii ABSTRACT Passmore, Timothy James Alexander (Ph.D., Political Science). Pacifying the Peacekeepers: How State Involvement in U.N. Peacekeeping Reduces Military Threats to Democracy. Dissertation directed by Associate Professor Megan Shannon. What explains why countries undergoing transitions to democracy are major contributors of personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations? In recent decades, the provision of such personnel has been adopted largely by weak or nascent democracies. In the same period, the world has witnessed a decline in military coup activity. I argue that new democracies use peacekeeping to reduce the threat posed by the military during the years of transition and thereby increase the likelihood of democratic consolidation.
    [Show full text]
  • Won't You Be My Neighbor
    Won’t You Be My Neighbor: Syria, Iraq and the Changing Strategic Context in the Middle East S TEVEN SIMON Council on Foreign Relations March 2009 www.usip.org Date www.usip.org UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE – WORKING PAPER Won’t You Be My Neighbor UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE 1200 17th Street NW, Suite 200 Washington, DC 20036-3011 © 2009 by the United States Institute of Peace. The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions. This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author ([email protected]) or [email protected]. This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author ([email protected]) or [email protected]. UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE – WORKING PAPER Won’t You Be My Neighbor About this Report Iraq's neighbors are playing a major role—both positive and negative—in the stabilization and reconstruction of post-Saddam Iraq. In an effort to prevent conflict across Iraq's borders and in order to promote positive international and regional engagement, USIP has initiated high-level, non-official dialogue between foreign policy and national security figures from Iraq, its neighbors and the United States. The Institute’s "Iraq and its Neighbors" project has also convened a group of leading specialists on the geopolitics of the region to assess the interests and influence of the countries surrounding Iraq and to explain the impact of these transformed relationships on U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Countering the Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria: Options for Supporting International Norms and Institutions
    EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT PAPERS Promoting the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks No. 63 June 2019 COUNTERING THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN SYRIA: OPTIONS FOR SUPPORTING INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND INSTITUTIONS una becker-jakob* INTRODUCTION SUMMARY For more than six years the people of Syria and the Chemical weapons are banned by international law. international community have had to face the fact Nonetheless, there have been numerous alleged and proven that chemical weapons have become part of the chemical attacks during the Syrian civil war. The international community has found ways to address this weapons arsenal in the Syrian civil war. By using these problem, but it has not managed to exclude the possibility weapons, those responsible—the Syrian Government of further chemical attacks once and for all. Nor has it included—have violated one of the most robust taboos created accountability for the perpetrators. The in international humanitarian law. In recent years, establishment in 2018 of the Investigation and the international community, the United Nations Identification Team within the Organisation for the and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is a step in the Weapons (OPCW) have found creative ways to address right direction, but it came at the price of increased this situation, but no strategy has so far succeeded in polarization among member states. To maintain the truly redressing
    [Show full text]