chapter 6 On Recognition: The First Steps to Democratization and the Case of the Egyptian Revolution Deina Abdelkader In peace building literature one of the important steps in conflict resolution is ‘recognition’, it is impossible to build peace in a post-conflict situation without recognition. However, the literature also qualifies this recognition process. For example, relations of power are very important in the process of recognition and reconciliation. As Ilan Pappé notes in the context of the Israeli– Palestinian conflict, the ‘paradigm of parity’ (the Israeli view of the conflict) and the ‘para- digm of the oppressor-oppressed’ (the Palestinian view of the conflict) should be reconciled in an attempt to achieve: “fair recognition and reconciliation”. (Daniele, Giulia, 2014: 87–88). Not only is it difficult to attempt to define the bases of recognition on a theoretical level, but also on the practical level it is challenging to enact recog- nition because of the asymmetry of power that usually exists in situations of conflict. In the field of international relations and comparative politics there is a similar notion in post conflict and democratization efforts. The goal in po- litical science though is different because its main focus is on the consolida- tion of democratization. Valerie Bunce has expanded on the theory of pacting where she emphasizes the need to include the elite in the process of transition- ing to “democracy and thus pacting” with the elite, although of course there is asymmetry in power relations. Valerie Bunce’s emphasis on the inclusion of the elites in post conflict situations is based on “maintaining/sustaining” democratic transition. (Bunce, 2011: 706–715). Thus if we combine both subfields of political science: peace and conflict studies and comparative democratization, the concepts alluded to in terms of reconciliation are similar when one analyzes the term “recognition” and “pact- ing”, with a difference in goals, i.e. in peace and conflict studies “recognition” is the foundation of conflict resolution and peace building, while “pacting” in comparative literature is the foundation of political stability and democra- tization. Theoretically therefore there are more similarities than differences because even in the two paradigms, the goals are similar, if one defines peace building within the context of transitioning to democratization. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi �0.��63/9789004355804_008 Deina Abdelkader - 9789004355804 Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 08:40:17AM via free access 204209 118 Abdelkader The importance therefore of recognition is embedded in the reconciliation/ peace building literature as well as the post conflict comparative literature on pacting and democratization. This paper intends to analyze briefly the historical background of the rift between the elite and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt upon their foun- dation and then continue to focus mainly on the contemporary impasse of conflict between the liberal elites and the Muslim Brotherhood, highlighting Rab‘a as the focal atrocity committed by the military with the public support of political liberals, as a pivotal starting point in any peace building attempts in Egypt. First, one needs to mention the power relations between the two groups discussed in this chapter and how those power relations affected the outcome of the conflict between the “liberals” and the Muslim Brotherhood and their sympathizers. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring and the election of parliament and the president (in both elections the Muslim Brotherhood won), the “liber- als” were not comfortable with the results of those elections, however later in 2012 when Morsi won the presidential elections, the real power and stake holder in Egypt were dismayed: namely, the military. The military and Morsi did not “pact”/“agree” on a number of issues, especially on civilian intervention or even the right to gain access to information regarding the military budget. The military then turned to the “liberals” to utilize their disenchantment to get rid of the Muslim Brotherhood. The “liberals” are not powerful on their own, the military is the de facto power, as many militaries are in the developing world. The “liberals” were used as a pawn in 2013 to cover up and legitimize the kidnapping and jailing of an elected president without even provoking impeachment or any other legal actions against the elected president. As an institution the military in Egypt has exhibited power and economic existentialism. The military as a political player is also involved in regional pol- itics as well as politics with the u.s. The relationship between the Egyptian army and its people is an intriguing one because although the army was repeatedly defeated over the years, the im- age of gallantry and nationalism has consistently played a role in the Egyptian psyche. The army’s control over the state from 1952 till today allowed the army the political space to claim victory in each war that they lost by controlling the media, the arts, and most importantly education. Although the defeat in 1967 was announced and Abdel Nasser offered to abdicate as the head of state, nevertheless in the 1970s and specifically after the 1973 war, the army started regaining its ego as an institution. The Egyptian army had initially won the 1973 war because of the element of surprise tactic that they employed, however Deina Abdelkader - 9789004355804 Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 08:40:17AM via free access 204209 On Recognition 119 soon enough the Israeli army had re-gained its ability to respond to the attacks and a cease fire was established to end further hostilities. As of 1979 when the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was signed the Egyptian army has become an in- stitution that is extremely hierarchical but also especially in the upper eche- lons on Western luxury goods. By signing the peace treaty in 1979, the Egyptian army became a docile, highly consumerist institution, and as adequately cap- tured: Egypt became the “Officers Republic” (Sayigh, 2013). The army since their first coup in 1952 and till current times, have been pro- tective not to establish serious civilian institutions that could play a prominent political role, as Marina Ottaway indicated, during Mubarak’s time the regime was a “semi-authoritarian” regime, that allowed for a multiparty system and a relatively free media, however if any of those parties or media sources threat- ened the status-quo, they were severely dealt with. As observed in a lot of the writing about the Egyptian revolution, the army’s hold on power is so relent- less, that even Mubarak had to establish a strong police force in his attempt to hand over power to his civilian son Gamal. Although Mubarak was a military man himself, his attempt to switch power to a civilian, existentially threatened the military’s power. The military also supported a candidate in the country’s first free election in 2012 however their candidate lost to the Muslim Brother- hood’s candidate: a civilian, bringing the political tension to an all time high, when finally the military stepped in, in 2013 as will be discussed further in the chapter. Secondly, there is a strong relationship between recognition and reconcilia- tion between the “liberals”/intelligentsia and the people (Muslim Brotherhood members, their supporters, and the people who believe in democracy and hu- man rights). If one looks at the efforts of Saad Eddin Ibrahim, a left of the cen- ter nationalist, or Ayman Nour, the head of the “Tomorrow Party” (Al-Ghad), both are examples of “liberals” attempting to reconcile and normalize the Muslim Brotherhood/Military relationship. As mentioned previously earlier in the introduction, peace and progress are not attainable if recognition and rec- onciliation are not promoted and acted on. Recognition is quintessential in the case of Egypt because of the sheer horror of the Rab‘a and Nahda massacres as will be illustrated in this chapter. Recognition is instrumental in attaining the very basics of reconciliation on a very long road to normalization. Given the military in Egypt and Egypt’s geo-political position, it is extremely hard to imagine any successful reconciliation efforts. The propaganda mainly waged by the military in the media has demonized the Muslim Brotherhood and their supporters. The rift between the military supporters and the Muslim Brotherhood is huge and the attempts at reconciliation without recognition of the atrocities committed in Rab‘a, al-Nahda and the brutal violations during Deina Abdelkader - 9789004355804 Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 08:40:17AM via free access 204209 120 Abdelkader imprisonment,1 will result in a disingenuous and fake reconciliation. Real rec- ognition will entail a process of societal healing, correcting the history books/ curriculum, and restitution. Non-recognition will on the other hand, lead to further polarization, if not a full-fledged civil war. The Muslim Brothers Perceptions and Resistance to the Liberalists upon Its Inception The founding of the Brotherhood was based on two goals: one was national- istic because of British occupation; the second was a reaction to the liberal attempts to derogate the popular attachment to the faith. The awareness of Hassan al-Banna of this rift gave him the opportunity to enlist public support directly. He was well aware that his message is a national- social message; al-Banna was the first therefore to speak about social justice and religion outside of the confinement of a mosque. He gave his speeches at coffee shops, private homes, and pubic arenas. The Muslim Brotherhood created a first in religious movements by going outside the traditional bound preaching. (Mitchell, 1969). The Muslim Brotherhood’s view of the liberals was clearly expressed: “There were two kinds of Imperialism: ‘external’ (al-Isti‘mar al-khariji), the brute force of the occupying foreign power, and ‘internal’ or ‘domestic’ ( al-Isti‘mar al-dakhili), the forces which consciously or unconsciously – at best by indifference, at worst by ‘treason’ to the needs and the wills of the Muslim community- served the interests of that power.