Afghanistan War 2001–2014

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Afghanistan War 2001–2014 Afghanistan War 2001–2014 Afghanistan War, international conflict in Afghanistan beginning in 2001 that was triggered by the September 11 attacks and consisted of three phases. The first phase—toppling the Taliban (the ultraconservative political and religious faction that ruled Afghanistan and provided sanctuary for al-Qaeda, perpetrators of the September 11 attacks)—was brief, lasting just two months. The second phase, from 2002 until 2008, was marked by a U.S.strategy of defeating the Taliban militarily and rebuilding core institutions of the Afghan state. The third phase, a turn to classic counterinsurgency doctrine, began in 2008 and accelerated with U.S. Pres. Barack Obama’s 2009 decision to temporarily increase the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan. The larger force was used to implement a strategy of protecting the population from Taliban attacks and supporting efforts to reintegrate insurgents into Afghan society. The strategy came coupled with a timetable for the withdrawal of the foreign forces from Afghanistan; beginning in 2011, security responsibilities would be gradually handed over to the Afghan military and police. The new approach largely failed to achieve its aims. Insurgent attacks and civilian casualties remained stubbornly high, while many of the Afghan military and police units taking over security duties appeared to be ill-prepared to hold off the Taliban. By the time the U.S. and NATO combat mission formally ended in December 2014, the 13-year Afghanistan War had become the longest war ever fought by the United States. 2 Afghanistan War U.S. Army soldiers on security duty in Paktīkā province, Afghanistan, 2010 PRELUDE TO THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS The joint U.S. and British invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001 was preceded by over two decades of war in Afghanistan. On December 24, 1979, Soviet tanks rumbled across the Amu Darya River and into Afghanistan, ostensibly to restore stability following a coup that brought to power a pair of Marxist-Leninist political groups—the People’s (Khalq) Party and the Banner (Parcham) Party. But the Soviet presence touched off a nationwide rebellion by Islamist fighters, who won extensive covert backing from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United States and who were joined in their fight by foreign volunteers. The guerrilla war against the Soviet forces led to their departure a decade later (see Afghan War). In the void, civil war reigned, with the Islamist fighters—known as the mujahideen—battling first to oust the Soviet-backed government and then turning their guns on each other. 3 A Soviet armoured vehicle rolling past a group of civilians during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, December 1979. In 1996 the Taliban seized Kabul and instituted a severe interpretation of Islamic law that, for example, forbade female education and prescribed the severing of hands, or even execution, as punishment for petty crimes. That same year, al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was welcomed to Afghanistan (having been expelled from Sudan) and established his organization’s headquarters there. With al-Qaeda’s help, the Taliban won control of over 90 percent of Afghan territory by the summer of 2001. On September 9 of that year, al-Qaeda hit men carried out the assassination of famed mujahideen leader Ahmad Shah Masoud, who at the time was leading the Northern Alliance (a loose coalition of mujahideen militias that maintained control of a small section of northern Afghanistan) as it battled the Taliban and who had unsuccessfully sought greater U.S. backing for his efforts. 4 THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS AND THE U.S.-BRITISH INVASION The hijacking and crashing of four U.S. jetliners on September 11, 2001, brought instant attention to Afghanistan. The plot had been hatched by al-Qaeda, and some of the 19 hijackers had trained in Afghanistan. In the aftermath of the attacks, the administration of U.S. Pres. George W. Bush coalesced around a strategy of first ousting the Taliban from Afghanistan and dismantling al-Qaeda, though others contemplated actions in Iraq, including long-standing plans for top- pling Pres. Saddam Hussein. Bush demanded that Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar “deliver to [the] United States authorities all the leaders of al-Qaeda who hide in your land,” and when Omar refused, U.S. officials began implementing a plan for war. Omar, MohammadMohammad Omar. 5 The campaign in Afghanistan started covertly on September 26, with a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) team known as Jawbreaker arriving in the coun- try and, working with anti-Taliban allies, initiating a strategy for overthrowing the regime. U.S. officials hoped that by partnering with the Afghans they could avoid deploying a large force to Afghanistan. Pentagon officials were especially concerned that the United States not be drawn into a protracted occupation of Afghanistan, as had occurred with the Soviets more than two decades prior. The United States relied primarily on the Northern Alliance, which had just lost Massoud but had regrouped under other commanders, including Tajik leader Mohammed Fahim and Abdul Rashid Dostum, an Uzbek. The Americans also teamed with anti-Taliban Pashtuns in southern Afghanistan, including a little-known tribal leader named Hamid Karzai. The CIA team was soon joined by U.S. and British special forces contingents, and together they provided arms, equipment, and advice to the Afghans. They also helped coordinate targeting for the air campaign, which began on October 7, 2001, with U.S. and British war planes pounding Taliban targets, thus marking the public start of Operation Enduring Freedom. In late October, Northern Alliance forces began to overtake a series of towns formerly held by the Taliban. The forces worked with U.S. assistance, but they defied U.S. wishes when, on Afghanistan: U.S. Special Forces and Northern Alliance U.S. Special Forces working with members of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, November 12, 2001. 6 Kandahar, the largest city in southern Afghanistan and the Taliban’s spiritual home, fell on December 6, marking the end of Taliban power. It had been besieged by a force led by Karzai that moved in from the north and one commanded by Gul Agha Sherzai that advanced from the south; both operated with heavy assistance from the United States. As the Taliban leadership retreated into Afghanistan’s rural areas and across the border to Pakistan, anti-Taliban figures convened at a United Nations (UN)-sponsored conference in Bonn, Germany. With behind-the-scenes maneuvering by the United States, Karzai was selected to lead the country on an interim basis. An intensive manhunt for Omar, bin Laden, and al-Qaeda deputy chief Ayman al-Zawahiri was undertaken. Prior to the killing of bin Laden by U.S. forces in 2011 (see below), the Americans were believed to have come closest to bin Laden in the December 2001 battle of Tora Bora (bin Laden’s mountain stronghold). But bin Laden was thought to have managed to have slipped into Pakistan with the help of Afghan and Pakistani forces that were supposedly helping the Americans. Critics later questioned why the U.S. military had allowed Afghan forces to lead the assault on the cave complex at Tora Bora rather than doing it themselves. (Indeed, Democratic presidential candidate.) Sen. John Kerry made this criticism repeatedly during the 2004 general election campaign.) Al-Qaeda subsequently reestablished its base of operations in the tribal areas that form Pakistan’s northwest border with Afghanistan. Omar and his top Taliban lieutenants settled in and around the Pakistani city of Quetta, in the remote southwestern province of Balochistān. One of the final major battles of the first phase of the war came in March 2002 with Operation Anaconda in the eastern province of Paktia, which involved U.S. and Afghan forces fighting some 800 al-Qaeda and Taliban militants. The operation also marked the entrance of other countries’ troops into the war: special operations forces from Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, and Norway participated. 7 IRAQ TAKES CENTRE STAGE With the ouster of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, the international focus shifted to reconstruction and nation-building efforts in Afghanistan. In April 2002 Bush announced a “Marshall Plan” for Afghanistan in a speech at the Virginia Military Institute, promising substantial financial assistance. But from the start, development efforts in Afghanistan were inadequately fund- ed, as attention had turned among U.S. officials to the looming confrontation in Iraq. Between 2001 and 2009, just over $38 billion in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan was appropriated by the U.S. Congress. More than half the money went to training and equipping Afghan security forces, and the remainder represented a fraction of the amount that experts said would be required to develop a country that had consistently ranked near the bottom of global human development indices. The aid program was also bedeviled by waste and by confusion over whether civilian or military authorities had responsibility for leading education, health, agriculture, and other development projects. Despite military commitments from dozens of U.S. allies, the United States initially argued against allowing the other foreign forces—operating as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)—to deploy beyond the Kabul area. That choice was directed by the Pentagon, which insisted on a “light foot- print” out of concern that Afghanistan would become a drag on U.S. resources as attention shifted to Iraq (see Iraq War). When ISAF did begin to venture beyond Kabul, its efforts were hampered by the “caveats” of its component countries— restrictions that kept all but a handful of the militaries from actively engaging in the fight against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The force, overseen by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the organization’s first mission outside Europe, was also hamstrung by a lack of troops as international commitments to Afghanistan flagged.
Recommended publications
  • 19 October 2020 "Generated on Refers to the Date on Which the User Accessed the List and Not the Last Date of Substantive Update to the List
    Res. 1988 (2011) List The List established and maintained pursuant to Security Council res. 1988 (2011) Generated on: 19 October 2020 "Generated on refers to the date on which the user accessed the list and not the last date of substantive update to the list. Information on the substantive list updates are provided on the Council / Committee’s website." Composition of the List The list consists of the two sections specified below: A. Individuals B. Entities and other groups Information about de-listing may be found at: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ombudsperson (for res. 1267) https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/delisting (for other Committees) https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/2231/list (for res. 2231) A. Individuals TAi.155 Name: 1: ABDUL AZIZ 2: ABBASIN 3: na 4: na ﻋﺒﺪ اﻟﻌﺰﻳﺰ ﻋﺒﺎﺳﯿﻦ :(Name (original script Title: na Designation: na DOB: 1969 POB: Sheykhan Village, Pirkowti Area, Orgun District, Paktika Province, Afghanistan Good quality a.k.a.: Abdul Aziz Mahsud Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: na Passport no: na National identification no: na Address: na Listed on: 4 Oct. 2011 (amended on 22 Apr. 2013) Other information: Key commander in the Haqqani Network (TAe.012) under Sirajuddin Jallaloudine Haqqani (TAi.144). Taliban Shadow Governor for Orgun District, Paktika Province as of early 2010. Operated a training camp for non- Afghan fighters in Paktika Province. Has been involved in the transport of weapons to Afghanistan. INTERPOL- UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/View-UN-Notices- Individuals click here TAi.121 Name: 1: AZIZIRAHMAN 2: ABDUL AHAD 3: na 4: na ﻋﺰﯾﺰ اﻟﺮﺣﻤﺎن ﻋﺒﺪ اﻻﺣﺪ :(Name (original script Title: Mr Designation: Third Secretary, Taliban Embassy, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates DOB: 1972 POB: Shega District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan Good quality a.k.a.: na Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: Afghanistan Passport no: na National identification no: Afghan national identification card (tazkira) number 44323 na Address: na Listed on: 25 Jan.
    [Show full text]
  • Appendix 12 December 2018 CL13 2018 CV2018 04596
    GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT MINISTRY OF FINANCE APPENDIX LISTING OF COURT ORDERS ISSUED BY THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO UNDER SECTION 22B (3) ANTI-TERRORISM ACT, CH. 12:07 CLAIM NO. CV 2018 - 04596: BETWEEN THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO Claimant AND 1. MOHAMMAD also known as HASSAN also known as AKHUND; 2. ABDUL KABIR also known as MOHAMMAD JAN also known as A. KABIR; 3. MOHAMMED also known as OMAR also known a GHULAM NABI; 4. MUHAMMAD also known as TAHER also known as ANWARI also known as MOHAMMAD TAHER ANWARI also known as MUHAMMAD TAHIR ANWARI also known as MOHAMMAD TAHRE ANWARI also known as HAJI MUDIR; 5. SAYYED MOHAMMED also known as HAQQANI also known as SAYYED MOHAMMAD HAQQANI; 6. ABDUL LATIF also known as MANSUR also known as ABDUL LATIF MANSOOR also known as WALI MOHAMMAD; 7. SHAMS aIso known as UR-RAHMAN also known as ABDUL ZAHIR also known as SHAMSURRAHMAN also known as SHAMS-U-RAHMAN also known as SHAMSURRAHMAN ABDURAHMAN also known as SHAMS URRAHMAN SHER ALAM; 8. ATTIQULLAH also known as AKHUND; 9. AKHTAR also known as MOHAMMAD also known as MANSOUR also known as SHAH MOHAMMED also known as SERAJUDDIN HAQANI also known as AKHTAR MOHAMMAD MANSOUR KHAN MUHAM also known as AKHTAR MUHAMMAD MANSOOR also known as AKHTAR MOHAMMAD MANSOOR also known as NAIB IMAM; 10. MOHAMMAD NAIM also known as BARICH also known as KHUDAIDAD also known as MULLAH NAEEM BARECH also known as MULLAH NAEEM BARAICH also known as MULLAH NAIMULLAH also known as MULLAH NAIM BARER also known as MOHAMMAD NAIM (previously listed as) also known as MULLAH NAIM BARICH also known as MULLAHNAIM BARECH also known as MULLAH NAIM BARECH AKHUND also known as MULLAH NAEEM BARIC also known as NAIM BARICH also known as HAJI GUL MOHAMMED NAIM BARICH also known as GUL MOHAMMAD also known as HAJI GHUL MOHAMMAD also known as GUL MOHAMMAD KAMRAN also known as MAWLAWI GUL MOHAMMAD also known as SPEN ZRAE; 11.
    [Show full text]
  • United Nations Security Council Consolidated List Generated On
    United Nations Security Council Consolidated List Generated on: 4 March 2021 "Generated on refers to the date on which the user accessed the list and not the last date of substantive update to the list. Information on the substantive list updates are provided on the Council / Committee’s website." Composition of the List The list consists of the two sections specified below: A. Individuals B. Entities and other groups Information about de-listing may be found at: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ombudsperson (for res. 1267) https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/delisting (for other Committees) https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/2231/list (for res. 2231) A. Individuals KPi.033 Name: 1: RI 2: WON HO 3: 4: na Title: na Designation: DPRK Ministry of State Security Official DOB: 17 Jul. 1964 POB: na Good quality a.k.a.: na Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: Democratic People's Republic of Korea Passport no: 381310014 National identification no: na Address: na Listed on: 30 Nov. 2016 Other information: Ri Won Ho is a DPRK Ministry of State Security Official stationed in Syria supporting KOMID. KPi.037 Name: 1: CHANG 2: CHANG HA 3: 4: na Title: na Designation: President of the Second Academy of Natural Sciences (SANS) DOB: 10 Jan. 1964 POB: na Good quality a.k.a.: Jang Chang Ha Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: Democratic People's Republic of Korea Passport no: na National identification no: na Address: na Listed on: 30 Nov. 2016 Other information: KPi.038 Name: 1: CHO 2: CHUN RYONG 3: 4: na Title: na Designation: Chairman of the Second Economic Committee (SEC) DOB: 4 Apr.
    [Show full text]
  • SRO 244 Dated 17 Feburary 2018
    EXTRAORDINARY PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY ______________________________________________________________________________ ISLAMABAD, SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 2018 ______________________________________________________________________________ Part II Statutory Notifications (S.R.O.) Government of Pakistan MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ORDER Islamabad the 17 February, 2018 S.R.O. 244 (I) /2018 dated 17 February 2018 – WHEREAS the United Nations Security Council vide its Resolutions Nos. 1267(1999), 1333 (2000), 1373 (2001), 1390 (2002), 1455 (2003), 1526 (2004), 1617 (2005), 1735 (2006), 1822 (2008), 1904 (2009), 1988 (2011), 1989 (2011), 2082 (2012), 2083 (2012), 2133 (2014), 2160 (2014), 2161 (2014) 2170(2014), 2178(2014), 2199 (2015) and 2255 (2015) has directed to apply travel restrictions, arms embargo and to freeze the funds and other financial resources of certain individuals and entities; 2. AND WHEREAS through paragraph 1 of United Nations Security Council resolution 2255 (2015) adopted on 21 December 2015 under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the United Nations Security Council has decided that all States shall take the following measures with respect to individuals and entities designated prior to the date of adoption of resolution 1988 (2011) as the Taliban, as well as other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with the Taliban in constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan as designated by the Committee established in paragraph 35 of resolution 1988 (“the Committee”), in the
    [Show full text]
  • The List of Individuals and Entities Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1988 (2011)
    1988 Sanctions List Latest updated on 27 June 2013 The List of individuals and entities established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1988 (2011) Last updated on: 27 June 2013 Composition of the List The list consists of the two sections specified below: A. Individuals associated with the Taliban B. Entities and other groups and undertakings associated with the Taliban A. Individuals associated with the Taliban TI.A.155.11. Name: 1: ABDUL AZIZ 2: ABBASIN 3: na 4: na ﻋﺒﺪ اﻟﻌﺰﻳﺰ ﻋﺒﺎﺳﻴﻦ :(Name (original script Title: na Designation: na DOB: 1969 POB: Sheykhan Village, Pirkowti Area, Orgun District, Paktika Province, Afghanistan Good quality a.k.a.: Abdul Aziz Mahsud Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: na Passport no.: na National identification no.: na Address: na Listed on: 4 Oct. 2011 (amended on 22 Apr. 2013) Other information: Key commander in the Haqqani Network (TE.H.12.12.) under Sirajuddin Jallaloudine Haqqani (TI.H.144.07.). Taliban Shadow Governor for Orgun District, Paktika Province as of early 2010. Operated a training camp for non-Afghan fighters in Paktika Province. Has been involved in the transport of weapons to Afghanistan. TI.A.121.01. Name: 1: AZIZIRAHMAN 2: ABDUL AHAD 3: na 4: na ﻋﺰﻳﺰ اﻟﺮﺣﻤﺎن ﻋﺒﺪ اﻻﺣﺪ :(Name (original script Title: Mr Designation: Third Secretary, Taliban Embassy, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates DOB: 1972 POB: Shega District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan Good quality a.k.a.: na Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: Afghan Passport no.: na National identification no.: Afghan national identification card (tazkira) number 44323 Address: na Listed on: 25 Jan.
    [Show full text]
  • The List Established and Maintained Pursuant to Security Council Res. 1988 (2011)
    The List established and maintained pursuant to Security Council res. 1988 (2011) Generated on: 17 February 2017 "Generated on refers to the date on which the user accessed the list and not the last date of substantive update to the list. Information on the substantive list updates are provided on the Council / Committee’s website." Composition of the List The list consists of the two sections specified below: A. Individuals B. Entities and other groups Information about de-listing may be found at: https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/ombudsperson (for res. 1267) https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/delisting (for other Committees) https://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/list.shtml (for res. 2231) A. Individuals TAi.155 Name: 1: ABDUL AZIZ 2: ABBASIN 3: na 4: na ﻋﺒﺪ اﻟﻌﺰﻳﺰ ﻋﺒﺎﺳﯿﻦ :(Name (original script Title: na Designation: na DOB: 1969 POB: Sheykhan Village, Pirkowti Area, Orgun District, Paktika Province, Afghanistan Good quality a.k.a.: Abdul Aziz Mahsud Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: na Passport no: na National identification no: na Address: na Listed on: 4 Oct. 2011 (amended on 22 Apr. 2013) Other information: Key commander in the Haqqani Network (TAe.012) under Sirajuddin Jallaloudine Haqqani (TAi.144). Taliban Shadow Governor for Orgun District, Paktika Province as of early 2010. Operated a training camp for non- Afghan fighters in Paktika Province. Has been involved in the transport of weapons to Afghanistan. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4639645 click here TAi.121 Name: 1: AZIZIRAHMAN 2: ABDUL AHAD 3: na 4: na ﻋﺰﯾﺰ اﻟﺮﺣﻤﺎن ﻋﺒﺪ اﻻﺣﺪ :(Name (original script Title: Mr Designation: Third Secretary, Taliban Embassy, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates DOB: 1972 POB: Shega District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan Good quality a.k.a.: na Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: Afghanistan Passport no: na National identification no: Afghan national identification card (tazkira) number 44323 na Address: na Listed on: 25 Jan.
    [Show full text]
  • Name (Original Script): ﻦﯿﺳﺎﺒﻋ ﺰﻳﺰﻌﻟا ﺪﺒﻋ ﻧﺸﻮان ﻋﺒﺪ اﻟﺮزاق ﻋﺒﺪ
    Sanctions List Last updated on: 2 October 2015 Consolidated United Nations Security Council Sanctions List Generated on: 2 October 2015 Composition of the List The list consists of the two sections specified below: A. Individuals B. Entities and other groups Information about de-listing may be found on the Committee's website at: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/dfp.shtml A. Individuals TAi.155 Name: 1: ABDUL AZIZ 2: ABBASIN 3: na 4: na ﻋﺒﺪ اﻟﻌﺰﻳﺰ ﻋﺒﺎﺳﯿﻦ :(Name (original script Title: na Designation: na DOB: 1969 POB: Sheykhan Village, Pirkowti Area, Orgun District, Paktika Province, Afghanistan Good quality a.k.a.: Abdul Aziz Mahsud Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: na Passport no: na National identification no: na Address: na Listed on: 4 Oct. 2011 (amended on 22 Apr. 2013) Other information: Key commander in the Haqqani Network (TAe.012) under Sirajuddin Jallaloudine Haqqani (TAi.144). Taliban Shadow Governor for Orgun District, Paktika Province as of early 2010. Operated a training camp for non- Afghan fighters in Paktika Province. Has been involved in the transport of weapons to Afghanistan. QDi.012 Name: 1: NASHWAN 2: ABD AL-RAZZAQ 3: ABD AL-BAQI 4: na ﻧﺸﻮان ﻋﺒﺪ اﻟﺮزاق ﻋﺒﺪ اﻟﺒﺎﻗﻲ :(Name (original script Title: na Designation: na DOB: 1961 POB: Mosul, Iraq Good quality a.k.a.: a) Abdal Al-Hadi Al-Iraqi b) Abd Al- Hadi Al-Iraqi Low quality a.k.a.: Abu Abdallah Nationality: Iraqi Passport no: na National identification no: na Address: na Listed on: 6 Oct. 2001 (amended on 14 May 2007, 27 Jul.
    [Show full text]
  • Weekly Analysis/166
    Weekly Analysis/166 www.csrskabul.com Center for Strategic & Regional Studies Kabul Weekly Analysis-Issue Number 166 (May 21-28, 2016) Weekly Analysis is one of CSRS’ publications, which significantly analyses weekly economic and political events in Afghanistan and the region. The prime motive behind this is to provide strategic insights and policy solutions to decision-making institutions and individuals in order to help them to design best policies. Weekly Analysis is published in local languages (Pashto and Dari) and international languages (English and Arabic). ـــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ In this issue: · Preface………….…..………………………………………………..……………………………….……………. 2 The leadership transition in Taliban and its impacts on current situation · Mansour’s journey from Taliban’s deputy to leadership..…...….……………. 4 · The former Taliban leader’s peace policy……..………………………….………………. 4 · Taliban's new leadership……..…………………….………………………………………..….……. 5 · The future of peace………………………………………………………………………….….…..……. 6 The Chabahar port and Kabul-Tehran-New Delhi ties · Iran-Afghanistan-India trilateral ties……………….………………..……………………..... 8 · The background of construction of Chabahar port………..………………….…... 8 · Chabahr, under influence of regional and international politics…….…... 9 · The impacts of the Chabahar agreement on the region and Afghanistan……………..….….…………………………………………………..………….………………. 10 1 Weekly Analysis/166
    [Show full text]
  • Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan
    [PEACEW RKS [ DOMESTIC BARRIERS TO DISMANTLING THE MILITANT INFRASTRUCTURE IN PAKISTAN Stephen Tankel ABOUT THE REPORT This report, sponsored by the U.S. Institute of Peace, examines several underexplored barriers to dismantling Pakistan’s militant infrastructure as a way to inform the understandable, but thus far ineffectual, calls for the coun- try to do more against militancy. It is based on interviews conducted in Pakistan and Washington, DC, as well as on primary and secondary source material collected via field and desk-based research. AUTHOR’S NOTE:This report was drafted before the May 2013 elections and updated soon after. There have been important developments since then, including actions Islamabad and Washington have taken that this report recommends. Specifically, the U.S. announced plans for a resumption of the Strategic Dialogue and the Pakistani government reportedly developed a new counterterrorism strategy. Meanwhile, the situation on the ground in Pakistan continues to evolve. It is almost inevitable that discrete ele- ments of this report of will be overtaken by events. Yet the broader trends and the significant, endogenous obstacles to countering militancy and dismantling the militant infrastruc- ture in Pakistan unfortunately are likely to remain in place for some time. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Stephen Tankel is an assistant professor at American University, nonresident scholar in the South Asia program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and author of Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar- e-Taiba. He has conducted field research on conflicts and militancy in Algeria, Bangladesh, India, Lebanon, Pakistan, and the Balkans. Professor Tankel is a frequent media commentator and adviser to U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Talking to the Taliban Hope Over History?
    Talking to the Taliban Hope over History? John Bew Ryan Evans Martyn Frampton Peter Neumann Marisa Porges Talking to the Taliban Hope over History? ABOUT THE AUTHORS Marisa Porges is a PhD student at King’s Executive Summary College London and Research Fellow at Dr John Bew is Reader in History and Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science Foreign Policy at the War Studies Department and International Affairs. She specialises in at King’s College London and Director of counterterrorism, with specific emphasis on the International Centre for the Study of radicalisation and deradicalisation, and detention så The aim of this report is to examine the evolution of the idea Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR). operations, with expertise in Afghanistan of ‘talking to the Taliban’, analyse its underlying drivers and In 2013 he was appointed to the Henry A. and the Middle East. Porges has conducted assumptions, and capture key lessons that may be of use in Kissinger Chair in Foreign Policy and extensive research in Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia future conflicts when talks with insurgents will again be on International Relations at the Library of and Yemen, interviewing government officials, the agenda. Congress in Washington, DC. His books ex-Taliban and former members of Al Qaeda. include Talking to Terrorists: Making Peace She was previously a counterterrorism policy så To date, efforts to talk to the Taliban have been a failure. in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country adviser at the US Departments of Defense and Given the short time remaining before the end of the International (2009) with Martyn Frampton and Inigo the Treasury, and served as a commissioned Security Assistance Force (ISAF) combat mission in December Gurruchaga.
    [Show full text]
  • Council Implementing Decision 2012/334/CFSP
    26.6.2012 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 165/75 COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING DECISION 2012/334/CFSP of 25 June 2012 implementing Decision 2011/486/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain individuals, groups, undertakings and entities in view of the situation in Afghanistan THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, (3) The Annex to Decision 2011/486/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly, Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 31(2) thereof, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 Having regard to Council Decision 2011/486/CFSP of 1 August 2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain The Annex to Decision 2011/486/CFSP is hereby amended as individuals, groups, undertakings and entities in view of the set out in the Annex to this Decision. situation in Afghanistan ( 1 ), and in particular Article 5 thereof, Article 2 Whereas: This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. (1) On 1 August 2011, the Council adopted Decision 2011/486/CFSP. Done at Luxembourg, 25 June 2012. (2) On 18 March 2012, the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 30 of United Nations Security Council For the Council Resolution 1988 (2011) amended the list of individuals, groups, undertakings and entities subject to restrictive The President measures. C. ASHTON ( 1 ) OJ L 199, 2.8.2011, p. 57. L 165/76 EN Official Journal of the European Union 26.6.2012 ANNEX The entries in the Annex to Decision 2011/486/CFSP for the persons below shall be replaced by the entries as set out below.
    [Show full text]
  • The Use of English-Language Internet Propaganda by the Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, 2007–2010
    University of Denver Digital Commons @ DU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Graduate Studies 6-1-2011 The Use of English-Language Internet Propaganda by the Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, 2007–2010 Matthew T. Calvin University of Denver Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd Part of the International Relations Commons Recommended Citation Calvin, Matthew T., "The Use of English-Language Internet Propaganda by the Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, 2007–2010" (2011). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 108. https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/108 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Studies at Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact [email protected],[email protected]. THE USE OF ENGLISH-LANGUAGE INTERNET PROPAGANDA BY THE TALIBAN INSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN, 2007 – 2010 __________ A Thesis Presented to the Dean and Faculty of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies University of Denver __________ In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts International Security __________ by Matthew T. Calvin June 2011 Advisor: Dr. Paul R. Viotti © Copyright by Matthew T. Calvin 2011 All Rights Reserved Author: Matthew T. Calvin Title: The Use of English-Language Internet Propaganda by the Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, 2007-2010 Advisor: Dr. Paul R. Viotti Degree Date: June 2011 Abstract After nearly a decade of war in Afghanistan, military and government officials have described the propaganda efforts of the Taliban insurgency as increasingly sophisticated and effective.
    [Show full text]