Promoting Stability and Democracy in Pakistan Lisa Curtis
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No. 1009 Delivered March 21, 2007 April 4, 2007 Promoting Stability and Democracy in Pakistan Lisa Curtis It is an honor to testify before this Subcommittee on one of the most critical foreign policy challenges facing our country today—ensuring Pakistan sets Talking Points itself on a course of stability and prosperity that • Although Pakistan has arrested and handed emphasizes development and freedom for its own over al-Qaeda suspects to the U.S., it has people and peace with its neighbors. Achieving this not made a clean break with the Taliban goal will not only benefit the 1.5 billion people in the and other extremists. South Asia region, but it will also help ensure Ameri- • In order to ensure that Pakistan sets itself ca’s own safety by uprooting terrorist ideology and on a path of moderation and stability, the lessening the chances of future terrorist attacks against U.S. needs to find ways to use its diplomatic the West. leverage with Pakistan more effectively. The Battle Against Extremism and Terrorism • The U.S. should encourage Pakistan to pri- oritize economic and democratic develop- The recent release of the confessions of the Sep- ment and the pursuit of better relations tember 11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed with neighboring countries, namely Afghan- reminds us of the crucial role Pakistan is playing in istan and India, and encourage economic fighting the war against terrorism. On March 3, 2003, integration among Pakistan, Afghanistan, Pakistani security forces arrested Khalid Sheikh and India so that each has a vested interest Mohammed and two accomplices in an early morning in overall stability in the region. raid on a house in Rawalpindi, Pakistan. We will never • Finally, Washington should demonstrate its know how many more lives might have been lost with- interest in a strong and stable Pakistan and out the Pakistani security forces’ help in tracking and its commitment to maintaining a long-lasting successfully capturing this brutal terrorist four years and broad-based relationship with Islamabad. ago. Americans are safer today because of Pakistani assistance in this operation, as well as others that have netted key al-Qaeda operatives like Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Abu Zubaida, and Abu Faraj al-Libby, to name a few. Numerous press accounts indicate that Pakistan This paper, in its entirety, can be found at: security agencies arrested Taliban leader Mullah www.heritage.org/research/AsiaandthePacific/hl1009.cfm Obaidullah Akhund at the end of last month. If true, Produced by the Asian Studies Center Akhund would be the most senior Taliban leader ever Published by The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE arrested by the Pakistanis and his capture would mark Washington, DC 20002–4999 (202) 546-4400 • heritage.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflect- ing the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. No. 1009 Delivered March 21, 2007 a watershed in Islamabad’s efforts in the overall war eral days prior. A recent spate of attacks, including a on terrorism. Arresting such a key leader of the Tali- suicide bombing in Peshawar that killed a dozen ban movement would send a strong signal that the police officers on January 27, a suicide attack at the Taliban is no longer safe in Pakistan and would help Marriott Hotel in Islamabad on January 26, and a to improve Pakistan–Afghanistan ties, which have bomb attack on a Pakistani military convoy on Jan- deteriorated significantly over the last year due to the uary 22 demonstrate that Pakistan itself is a victim upsurge of violence in Afghanistan. Lastly, such an of terrorism. arrest would help dispel doubts in the U.S. about Even so, there remain legitimate questions about Pakistan’s commitment to denying sanctuary to the willingness and/or ability of the Pakistan gov- Taliban fighters. ernment to control the myriad extremist groups that One of the primary areas on which the U.S. will exist on its soil. There appear to be continuing links need to focus its counterterrorism efforts over the among lower-level Pakistani military and intelli- next several years will be Pakistan’s Federally gence officials with Taliban and Kashmiri militant Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which consist of leaders, who in turn have links to al-Qaeda. Paki- seven semi-autonomous tribal agencies along the stan supported the Taliban throughout the 1990s border with Afghanistan. These tribal borderlands with the strategic aim of denying India, as well as constitute one of the most dangerous terrorist safe Iran and the Central Asian countries, a strong foot- havens in the world today. Taliban members, many hold in Afghanistan and ensuring a friendly regime of whom fled to the tribal agencies following the in Kabul that would refrain from making territorial U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, now claims on Pakistan’s Pashtun areas along the Paki- launch attacks from the area against coalition forces stan–Afghanistan border.2 The Pakistan govern- in Afghanistan. Compounding the problem is the ment has cut official ties to the Taliban and reined in emergence in the region of Pashtun extremists the infiltration of militants crossing the Line of Con- (sometimes referred to as the “new” or “Pakistani” trol from Pakistan into Indian-held Kashmir. How- Taliban), who seek to implement Taliban-style rule ever, Pakistan has refused to shut down training in parts of Pakistan. The Pashtun-dominated, and camps or to detain key terrorist leaders for longer largely ungoverned, border areas also provide a than a few weeks at a time. hospitable environment for al-Qaeda elements, and there are growing indications that al-Qaeda has re- Pakistan and Terrorist Groups grouped and re-trenched in this region.1 To understand the complex links among the vari- Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and his ous terrorist groups in Pakistan, consider the kidnap- military commanders have taken effective steps ping and slaying of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel against terrorists in the border areas and have suf- Pearl in January 2002. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed has fered severe losses: Over 500 of their soldiers have confessed to murdering Daniel Pearl but members of fallen to the enemy since 2004. Terrorists targeted a the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM), a Pakistan-based ter- Pakistan Army base in the Northwest Frontier Prov- rorist group that focuses on fighting in Kashmir, kid- ince just last November, killing over 40 Pakistani napped Pearl initially. Pakistan officially banned the JEM in 2002, but never formally charged its leader, soldiers. The bombing appears to have been in 3 retaliation for a missile attack against a terrorist Masood Azhar, with a crime. Indian security forces hideout along the Pakistan–Afghanistan border sev- had captured Azhar in Kashmir in the early 1990s but 1. J. Michael McConnell, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence,” testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 27, 2007, at http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2007/February/McConnell%2002-27-07.pdf (March 30, 2007). 2. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 185–189. 3. Paul Watson and Mubashir Zaidi, “British Case Renews Focus on Pakistan,” Los Angeles Times, August 13, 2006, p. A9; and “Profile: Maulana Masood Azhar,” BBC News, December 16, 2002, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/578369.stm (March 30, 2007). page 2 No. 1009 Delivered March 21, 2007 were forced to release him in 1999 during a hostage of combating extremism and terrorism in Pakistan. swap to free 155 passengers on a hijacked Indian The Pakistani military conducted operations in the plane that flew to Kandahar, Afghanistan, where the tribal zones from early 2004 through the fall of Taliban facilitated the hostage takers. In January 2000, 2006 that helped keep Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders Azhar surfaced in Karachi, Pakistan, where he was in disarray and on the run. At the same time, the met with a hero’s welcome by thousands of support- Pakistani military operations helped to counter the ers.4 The JEM has roots in the Afghan war against the enemy, however, they also resulted in the loss of Soviets, and its cadres trained at Taliban camps in the hundreds of Pakistani soldiers; a disruption of the late 1990s. The JEM (then called the Harakat-Ul- traditional tribal form of governance in the semi- Mujahideen) reportedly suffered several casualties autonomous areas; alienation of the local popula- during U.S. strikes on terrorist training camps in tion; and flagging support among the broader Paki- Afghanistan in 1998 in retaliation for al-Qaeda bomb- stani population, who viewed them as increasingly ings of two U.S. embassies in Africa. detrimental to Pakistan’s own security interests. The links among these various terrorist groups For these reasons, President Musharraf last Sep- and the Pakistan security agencies’ ambivalent atti- tember announced a “peace deal” with tribal leaders tude toward them has emboldened these groups in in North Waziristan that called for an end to offen- their attacks against both Western and South Asian sive Pakistani military operations in exchange for targets and allowed them to enmesh themselves the tribal rulers’ cooperation in restricting Taliban deeper into Pakistani society. and al-Qaeda activities. Many observers, including Islamabad needs to adopt an uncompromising myself, were skeptical that the peace agreement policy toward all terrorist and militant groups oper- would achieve the desired result of decreasing ating on its territory. Otherwise, the country risks cross-border attacks into Afghanistan. Last October, facing a permanent state of instability on both its I wrote that “the next several months will be crucial western and eastern borders and increasing interna- in determining whether Musharraf’s Waziristan deal tional isolation for what could be perceived as offi- would advance U.S.