AustralianAustralianStudies Studies Association of Japan

Transformation of Australian Politics :

From Majoritarian to Consensus

Hiroya Sugita'

That Australian politics by and large conforms to the Westminster system appears to be the view shared by the general public, if not by political scientists and well-informed observers of Australian politics. Behind this is the conventional view that the Australian party system is basically

"twopartism", a two-cornered contest, between the Australian Labor Party and the Liberai-National

Coalition, The left-right ideological spectrum, characterised by a conflict between labour and capital,

"twopartism" is considered to form the foundation of this Australian as Labor broadly represents interests of the working class while the Coalition broadly represents interests of urban and rural

capital. In a sense, it is understandable that many have reached such an assessment. In Australia,

just as in the UK, the executive government is formed by a majority party in the lower house of

parliament. Since 1909, the Australian government has been the exclusive domain ior Labor, the Liberal Party or the Liberal-Natienal Coalition ( although the non-Labor side has experienced several name changes ).

Nevertheless, is this an accurate picture of Australian politics in 1997? After all, as Thompson

pointed out, some of Australia's constitutional arrangements, such as adaptation of federalism and

bicameral parliamentary system, are clearly distinguishable from the Westminster model ( Thompson "majoritarian" "consensus" 1980). Indeed, according to Lijphart's criteria for the and the models of

"consensus" politics, Australia has had some, if not all, of the characteristics oi the model for a

very long tirne.

"majoritarian" This paper argues that Australian politics has undergene a transformation from the "consensus" model to the model. This fundamental change to Australian politics has been brought about largely by the change to the balance oi power in the Senate, most notably the emergence,

and endurance, of the Australian Democrats. For that purpose, this paper analyses Lijphart's

"majoritarian" "consensus" and models, the chronological developmept of the Australian party system

and the Australian Democrats' parliamentary performance.

"Majoritarian" "Consensus" The Model and the Model

In 1984, after examining twenty-one democratic countries with timeframe ranging from 1945 to 198e, Arend Lijphart wrote that the democratic political system could be classified inte two

"majoritarian" "consensus" categeries: the model and the model (Lijphart 1984). The basic principle

of the majoritarian model is to make government responsible to the will of the majority by removing

"minority any possibility of veto" (Lijphart 1984, 4). The consensus. model, in contrast, is based on

"all the premise that who are affected by a decision should have the chance to participate in

making that decision, either directly or through chosen representatives" (Lijphart 1984, 21).

* Embassy of Japan, Canbera -1-

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Lijphart presents eight elements which can be used to distinguish the majoritarian model and the consensus model (Lijphart 1984, 1-36). These eight elements can be roughly categorised into

five basic components of parliamentary democracy: the executive gevernment, the legislature, the

party system, the electoral system, and the constitutional framework. First, in terms of the executive government and its relation to the legislature, government

under the majoritarian model of democracy is formed by a single party which commands majority

in the lower house of parliament. The executive establishes dominance over the parliament because

it is endorsed by the parliamentary majority which is expected to approve most of the government's

legislative programmes. In contrast, government under the consensus model of dernocracy is formed

by a coalition of parties. The separation of powers between the executive and the legislature is

established either formally or informally. This arrangement makes the relationship between the

twe more balanced and thus difficult for the executive to exert dominance over the regislature,

Second, in terms of the legislature, the majQritarian model is characterised by unicameralism "asymmetric or bicameralism", that is, one chamber whose majority forms the executive holds

most of legislative power and thus has clear dominance over the other chamber. The consensus

model is characterised by bicameral parliamentary system. In order for minority views to be

represented in the upper house, its members should be elected by a different electoral system

from the lower house and it should have legislative power almost equal to the lower house.

Third, the bipolar party system is the feature of the majoritarian model while the consensus

model is characterised by the multi-party system. This is because, according to Lijphart's analysis,

the majoritarian model tends to work well in a homogenous society and the consensus model is

suitable for a plural society, This means that the majoritarian democracy tends to have a single

social cleavage, in many cases cLass cleavage, based on the left-right ideological $pectrum. In

contrast, plural society tends to have several social cleavages such as ethnicity or religion as well

as class, which results in the multi-party system.

Fourth, as far as the electoral system is concerned, the majoritarian democracy tends to use

the single-member electoral system, especially the first-past-the-post system, which can most easily

produce a single-party majority government. In centrast, in the consensus democracy, the

proportional representation is used so that the parliamentary representation reflects voters' will

more accurately. There is little doubt that this type of eleetoral system, in turn, assists the

emergence and development of the multi-party system.

Fifth, concerning the constitutional framework, the majoritarian model is characterised by the

centralised, unitary system of government. Rather than having a written constitution, constitutional conventions play a large role in defining nation's governance. As a result, the judiciary is said to

have little role in reviewing the Acts of parliament and a party in government has almost unlimited

power. In contrast, the consensus model is characterised by the decentralised, federal system of

government and by having a written constitution which can usually be amended only by a

referendum or a special majority vote in parliament.

Australia's political system contains elements of both the majoritarian and the consensus models.

For instance, Australia has adopted federalism with a written constitution. Nevertheless, the

Australian Constitution is arguably flawed as a document which stipulates basic principle for the

nation's governance. According to the Constitution, neither the Prime Minister nor the Cabinet

exists and the Governor-General can be a dictator! As a resuit, constitutional conventions, rather

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Transformation of Australian Politics

than the written constitution, are vital for effective workings of the government and the parliament. Furthermore, Australia clearly follows the majoritarian model in terms of the executive government which is formed by a single majority party (or a near-permanent coalition of parties) in, and is dominant over, the House of Representatives. At the same time, however, Australia is distinguished

from the Westminster system by the existence of the Senate which is elected by a different

electoral system from the House of Representatives and whose legislative power is almost on a par

with that of the House of Representatives.

Pointing out the existence of both the majoritarian and the consensus elements, and thus a

potential conflict between the executive government based on the majoritarian model and the bicameral system of parliament (Lijphart 1984, 101-3), Lijphart nonetheless considerecl Australia as belonging to the majoritarian model

"two-and-a-half' party system as the party system (Lijphart 1984, 118), Considering that he reached

this conclusion as a result of analysis between 1945 and 1980, this assessment was accurate at the

time of his writing. Since 1981, however, characteristics of the consensus model have increasingly

been salient in Australia. The following section addresses two questions: why Lijphart's assessment

was correct at the time of his writing but is no longer applicable, and which force has been transforming Australian politics from the majoritarian to the consensus model since 1981.

Chronology of the Australian Party System

The Australian party system is usually viewed as a variation of the two-party system. Although

"contemporary Duverger described Australia as having a three-party system" (Duverger 1964, 235), his classification, the main criteria of which appears to be the number of parties in a system, is

less than satisfactory because of his disregard of the nature of a party system, In 1959, Lipson "a wrote that Australia displays trio in form, a duet in function" (Lipson 1959). Writing in 1968,

"theugh Blondel regarded the Australian party system as the two-party model, there is some ambiguity" (Blondel 1968), Jaensch has pointed out, however, that Blondel simply put the Liberal

and National Parties together as one entity and that, had Blendel's own methodology been applied, Australia should have been classified as the two-and-a-half party system Uaensch 1992, 200-1),

"two-and-a-half Indeed, using BIondel's argument, Lijphart classified Australia into the party system" category (Lijphart 19gn, 118). In 1976, while recognising that Australia had three relevant parties,

"twopartism" Sartori included Australia in what he termed a category (Sartori 1976, 185).

Emphasising more the characteristics of party systems rather than the number of parties in

a system, Sartori introduces the following spectrum of categories:

1. one party

2. hegemonic party 3. predominant party

4. twoparty

5. Iimited pluralism

6. extreme pluralism 7. atomized (Sartori 1976, 125)

"twopartism" "two-party Sartori's usage of the term rather than system" is particularly relevant -3-

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"two-party to Australia. The Australian party system could not satisfy conditions for systern"

because the Liberal Party, with three exceptions, has not been able to win an absolute majority

"govern of seats and thus has been unable to alone" for most of the time even if it may have been

"twopartism" "two-party willing to do so.[i] Sartori thus uses the term instead of the system", that

is, one of the two sides of politics consists of two parties (Sartori 1976, 188).

In terms of the number of parties contesting elections, the Australian party system might be

seen as a multi-party system of extreme degree. For example, at the 1996 Federal election, twenty-

six parties contested the half Senate election. What is required here, then, is a distinction between

"coalition "blackmait relevant and irrelevant parties. Sartori set two conditions, potential" and

potential", for the relevance of minor parties Rule 1 : A minor party can be discounted as irretevant whenever it remains over time

superfluous, in the sense that it is never needed or put to use for any feasible coalition

majority. Conversely, a minor party rnust be counted, no matter how small it is, if it finds itself in a position to determine over time, and at some point in time, at least one of the possible governmental majorities (Sartori 1976, 122. Emphasis in original), Rute 2 : A party quatutes for retevance whenever its existence, or appearance, affects the tactics of party competition and particularly when it alters the direction of the

competition-by determining a switch from centripetal to centrifugal competition either leftward, rightward, or in both directions-of the governing-oriented parties (Sartori 1976,

123. Emphasis in original).

Jaensch argues that two more conditions are necessary for the Australian party system so that the Democratic Labor Party (by Rule 3) and the Australian Democrats (by Rule 4) can be qualified

as reievant :

Rule 3 : A minor party can be discounted as irrelevant whenever its preferences remain

over time superfluous, in the sense that there is no real expectatien that such preferences may have the potential to decide which party (or coalitien) will govern. Conversely, a minor

party will be considered as relevant when through the number of its available preferences

and the direction of the preferences it is in a position to determine over time at least one of the possible government majorities Uaensch 1992, 200). Ruee 4 : A minor party will be considered as relevant when it holds sufficient seats in

a house of parliament to have a balance of power, and is able to exercise a balance of power Uaensch 1992, 201),

Nonetheless, are Rule 3 and Rule 4 necessary? Through directing preferences or exercising a

"the balance of power in parliament, a party can influence tactics of the party competition... and the direction ef the competition" at election or in parliament. For example, since 1983, the Hawke

and the Keating Labor governments have occasienally had to modify their programmes to make

them acceptable to either the Australian Democrats or the Coalition because of Labor's minority

position in the Senate. In other words, by exercising the balance of power in the Senate, the

"either Democrats may have forced on the Labor government a switch leftward, rightward, or in

"preference both directions". Likewise, the Democratic Labor Party's blackmail potential" might

have influenced the Menzies government's decision to grant state funding to non-government -4-

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Transformation of Australian Politics

Table 1 Relevant parties in Australia

1901-1909: Labor,Protectionists, Freetraders. 1909-1919: Labor,LiberallNationalists.

1919-1931: Labor,Nationalists, Country.

1931-1936: Labor,United Australia, Country, Lang Labor. 1936-1955: Labor, United AustralialLiberal, Country,

1955-1974: Labor,Liberal, Country, Democratic Labor. 1974-1977: Labor,Liberal, (National) Country. 1977-1993: Labor,Liberal, National (Country), Democrats.

1993- : Labor,LiberaL National, Democrats, Greens, (and Independents)

"blackmail schools. Thus it is possible to argue that Sartori's Rule 2, potential", broadly includes Jaensch's Rule 3 and Rule 4.

Taking these rules into account, it is possible to draw up the following table of relevant parties

in Australia.

"pluraiism" Australia certainly experienced from 1901 to 1909 with its three relevant parties:

the Protectionists, the Freetraders, and the Labor Party. Protectionist Prime Minister Deakin "three described the situation as elevens instead of two, with one playing sometimes with one

side, sometimes with the Qther, and sometimes for itself" (Ward 1985, 43). Using Sartori's

"limited categorisation, the Australian party system during this period clearly fails into pluralism". During this period, none of the three parties could win a parliamentary majority. Since each party opted to form a minority government rather than to form a coalition government, one of the

"Iimited "a conditions ef pluralisrn", that is, bipolar coalitional configuration", in a formal sense,

was not satisfied. Nevertheless, while each party formed a minority government, the Protectionists were in office with Labor's support most of the time (six years and eight months), They laid the

foundation of the Australian welfare state by providing old age and invalid pensions, by establishing

the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, and by increasing tariffs in order to

protect the manufacturing industry as well as to enhance wages and conditions of Australian

workers (Ward 1992, 226-7>.{2) In short, the Protectionists and the Labor Party were in de facto coalition.

"Limited pluralism" came to an end in 1909 when the Liberal Party was formed as a result of "Fusion" a between the Protectionists and the Freetraders. The Australian party system then

became an archetypical two-party system with Labor and Liberal ferming a single majority

government alternately through the next decade. The first Labor split in 1917 over the conscription

issue did not change the configuration of the party system. Dissident Labor members including

Prime Minister Hughes were invited by the Liberal Party to form the Nationalist Party with

Hughes as its leader. Although the Labor Party was weakened, the political scene was still

derninated by twe parties.

"two-party" However, the system did not last very iong. In 1919, the Country Party (now renamed the National Party) won eleven House ef Representatives seats in the Federal election.

In a subsequent Federal election in 1922, the Country Party obtained the balance of power in the

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House of Representatives and, in return tor agreeing to form a coalition government, successfully

dernanded that the Nationalist Party remove Hughes from the party leadership. The Leader of the

Country Party, Earle Page, indicated his readiness to support anyone under whom rural interests

would best be enhanced (Ward 1992, 245). Had the Country Party been prepared to bargain with between Labor and the Nationalists afterwards, the Australian party system would have returned

"limited to pluralism". In reality, however, the CountryfNational Party has had littie roorn to move because its electoral support comes mainly from conservative rural interests such as graziers,

pastoralists and the mining industry. Twice during the 1940s, the Country Party formed a State- level cealition government with Labor in Victoria. In the sphere of the Federai politics, the Countryf National Party has been in coalition with the Liberal Party except for three short periods.(3) In

short, as a result oi the formation of the Country Party, the Australian party system became

"twopartism" "two-party" rather than a system.

In 1931, the Labor Party experienced its second split. Former Labor Premier of Tasmania and Federal Treasurer Lyons defected and became the Leader ef the Nationalist Party, which was

renamed as the United Australia Party. Former Labor Premier of New South Wales Lang formed

the splinter Lang Labor Party in New South Wales. At its height, this party held nine seats in the

HDuse of Representatives. Although Lang Labor could be regarded as relevant to the extent that

it seriously weakened the Labor Party during the 193es, it could not obtain the balance of power in either house of the Federal Parliament. The Australian party system remained characterised by

" .Jt twopartlsm .

Lang Labor rejoined Federal Labor in 1936 and, as a result, the number of relevant parties in

Federal politics was reduced to three. On the non-Labor side, the United Australia Party was

"fractionalised" during the early 1940s. The modern Liberal Party was formed in 1944 but the

Country Party did not participate in this deveiopment. Like the period between 1919 and 1931,

"twopartism" Australia's between 1936 and 1955 consisted of Labor and two non-Labor parties, one

mainly based in urban middle ciass and the other mainly representing rural interests. In 1955, as a result of the third Labor split, the Anti-Communist Labor Party (later the

Democratic Labor Party) was formed. The Democratic Labor Party's relevance in the Australian

party system derived from its effective use of directed preferences, more than 80 per cent of

which, according to Mackerras, went te the Coalition parties (Mackerras 1979). Without Democratic

Labor's preferences, the Coalitien ceuld have lest the 1961 and the 1969 Federal elections, The

Dernocratic Labor Party held the numerical balance of power in the Senate from 1956 to 1959 and from 1962 to 1974. However, as the party voted with the Cealition most of the time qaensch 1992, 130i Fraser 1993), its balance of power in the Senate was never a substantial one. In short, the

Democratic Labor Party firmly entrenched itself on one side, the non-Labor side, of Australia's

"twopartism". In fact, it has been widely argued that the Democratic Labor Party's sole raison d'etre was to keep Labor out of office aaensch 1992, 200). At the 1974 double dissolution, the Democratic Labor Party was wiped out, with all five Senators

losing seats, and disappeared from the Australian political scene almost without trace. The

"twopartism" Australian party system briefly returned to three-party with the Labor, Liberal and

Country Parties. Australia then underwent perhaps its most polarised political era, culminating

"constitutional with the crisis" and the dismissal of the Whitiam Labor Government in 1975. During

this brief period, three Federal elections, two of them double dissolutions, were held. -6-

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In short, from 1919 until 1977, notwithstanding the emergence ef the Country Party, the rises

and the falls of Lang Labor and Democratic Labor and the renaming of the two non-Labor Coalition

parties, the Australian party system remained, in Sartori's terminology, characterised by

lt t )I twopartlsm .

The advent of the Australian Democrats in 1977 and their achievement of winning the balance of power in the Senate at the 1980 Federal election (effective from July 1981) changed Australia's

"twopartism" to some extent. The Democrat Senators shared the balance of power with Senator

Harradine until March 1983, held it by themselves between March 1983 and June 1993, and have shared it with two Green Senators and Senator Harradine since July 1993 (plus Senator Coiston

"third from August 1996). The Democrats were founded as a party" whieh would provide an

alternative to Labor and the Coalition. They have associated themselves neither with the Labor

side nor with the non-Labor side of politics, have refused to direct preferences exclusively to

Labor or the Coalition most of the time, have rejected any coalition arrangement outright and

have claimed that they would exercise the balance of power in the Senate based on the merits of

an issue rather than on any partisan attitude. In other words, unlike the National Party and unlike

the Democratic Labor Party, the Australian Democrats cannot readily be accommodated within a

"twopartism" model.

"limited In summary, the Australian party system can usefuily be divided into three periodsl

"twepartism" pluralism" from 1901 to 1909, from 1909 to 1981, and since 1981 a re-emergence of "pluralism", at least in the Senate, as a result of the Democrats obtaining the balance of power.

It can be argued that, applying Lijphart's majoritarian and consensus models, Australia had

experienced the consensus model from 1901 to 1909, become the majoritarian model of politics in 1909 and remained so until 1981. Since 1981, Australian politics has been transformed from the

majoritarian model to the consensus medel not by any change in institutional arrangement but by

the advent of the Australian Democrats and their successful winning of the Senate balance of

power. In order to prove this point, the Australian Democrats' parliamentary performance is analysed

in the next section.

The Australian Democrats' Performance in the Senate

The Australian Democrats would claim numerous victories in the Senate, achieved beth on the floor of the Senate and through behind-the-scene negotiation with government. There are four

"landmarks", cases of the Democrats' performances in the Senate which stand out as coincidentally one each from the Fraser, Hawke, Keating and Heward governments. The case of the 1981-82

"marked Budget could be considered as a turning point for the Democrats which the end of the

Australian Democrats as an anti-political crusade and the beginning of the Democrats as a political party in the traditional mould" (Lucy 1993, 84). The case of the Australia Card Bill helped the

Democrats to overcome post-Chipp trauma and promoted Senator Haines as a party leader of stature. The case of the 1993-94 Budget revived the Democrats fertune which had been precarious

"a after the disastrous 1993 Federal eiection and established Senater Kernot as politician not only for substance and discipline but one of great common-sense and generosity of spirit" (Ramsey 1993). The case of the Workplace Relations Bill proved that the Democrats could work not only

with the Labor government but also with the Coalition government.

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Case Study 1: The t981-82 Budget

For the 1981-82 Budget, at the first parliamentary session after the Democrats won the Senate balance of power (to be shared with Senator Harradine), the Fraser Coalition government introduced three sets of legislation to increase and extend sales tax. The Labor Party urged the Democrat Senators to join its opposition to ali three sets of the legislation (AlilR 2018/81). As a result of this Labor strategy, the Democrat Senators faced a dilemma, On the one hand, the party membership had voted for a party policy of opposing the extension of indirect tax to

"basic necessities of life" such as food, clothing and footwear, housing materials, books, magazines

and newspapers (Chipp and Larkin 1987, 121). On the other hand, prior te the 1980 Federal

election, the Democrats' number one Senate candidates had signed statutory declarations not to

"in block Supply or money bills a manner which would prevent the majority party in the House of Representatives from governing" (Parltamentary Debates: Senate 2618/81). Chipp recalls: I had an old fashioned view that the Budget was sacrosanct, [therefore] we should never amend the Budget... So by supporting the Budget, I was supporting matter of principle that the Budget should not be interfered with, but voting against the policy of the Democrats that said the necessities of life should never be taxed. It was a dilemma. Whichever way we went, we would have been right and we would have been wrong (Chipp 1994).

To make matters worse, Senator Chipp had a heart attack during the first week of the Budget

session and was prevented from attending the Senate for the next three months, leaving the

Democrats without their sole experienced member during an extremely difficult Senate session.

The Democrat Senators' initial response to the Budget was to move a motion requesting the

"basic House of Representatives to amend the legislation in a way to exempt the necessities ef

life" from sales tax. If the government refused the request, however, the Democrat Senators decided not to oppose the legislation (Paretamentarg Debates: Senate 26/8f81). The Democrat

Senators, joined by the Labor Senators, Senator Harradine, as well as National Party Senator Flo

Bjelke-Petersen, successfully moved a request to exempt books, newspapers, wrapping materials,

building materials used in private dwellings, clothing and footwear from sales tax.

A cross section of government Senators (such as Senators Bjelke-Petersen, Jessop, Martin,

Missen, Rae and Townley) were not very happy with the Budget. Nevertheless, the House of

Representatives, with its Coalition majority, immediately sent the legislation back to the Senate

without amendment. The Labor and Democrat Senators, with Senator Harradine, combined to

defeat the legislation again. While doing so, the Democrat Senators indicated that they were not

bLocking but delaying the passage of the legislation for three months so that the matter would remain under public consideration (Partiamentary Debates:Senaee 20110181). As a result, the Fraser

government decided to postpone the date of cemmencement for the imposition of sales tax on previously exempted goods until late March 1982.

On 16 February 1982, however, Senator Chipp announeed that the Democrat Senators, reversing

their previous commitment to ultimately pass all three sets of legislation, had decided to oppose

one set of legislation which was to extend sales tax to goods previously exempted from indirect

tax. At the press conference, Senator Chipp conceded that the Democrat Senators, by undertaking

"an to pass the legislation, had made error of judgement" (Age 17!2f82). While expressing deep

"have concern for the implication for future budgets, Senator Chipp argued that people been savaged by a government for too long and want the Senate to take action" (Parliamentarz( Debates: -8-

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Senate 2412/82).

"lost Journalist Paul Kelly claimed that the Democrats had their political innocence" at the

1981-82 Budget (Kelly 1982). Although the Democrat Senators could be excused for their inexperience

and the effects of Chipp's absence, their performance was indecisive and inconsistent. It seems that the fundamental mistake of the Democrat Senators in the 1981-l982 Budget debate was their

attempt to induce the government to accept a significant amendment to the Budget without any

adequate rneans to enforce it. In that sense, the Democrat Senators' original strategy for the 1981-

82 Budget was based on a naive assumption that, during the three-months delay, government backbenchers would compel the government to abandon the sales tax measure, The Democrat

"basic Senators perhaps should have made it clear that, for them, exempting the necessities of life" was non-negotiable and instead proposed alternative measures for raising revenue. The

government, then, might have had no alternative but to neg6tiate with the Democrat Senators and

modify the Budget to offset lost revenue by, for instance, inereasing the rates of sales tax for

some luxury goods. In this way, the Democrat Senators could have gained a major compromise

from the government without damaging the total integrity of the Budget,

Case Study 2: The Australia Card Bill 1986

In 1986, the Hawke Labor government presented the Australia Card Bill to the Parliament. The

"an government argued the proposal as integral part of this Labor government's tax refbrm package",

to be used against tax evasion, tax avoidance and social security fraud as well as an indirect deterrence to illegal immigration CPartiamentary Debates: House of Ropresentatives 22/10/86, 2544-50).

Initial reactions from the Opposition and the Demoerats were cautious but not hostile. A Joint

Select Committee was set up to examine the proposal. While agreeing on some issues, the eight-

member cornmittee clivided into a five-person majority (consisting of the Liberal, National, and

Democrat members of the committee plus one Labor member), who rejected the Australia Card

proposal and instead recommended upgrading the integrity of the tax file number, and a three-

member minority, who recommended the introduction of the Australia Card. Criticism oi the

Australia Card was centred on concerns for possible intrusion into civil liberties and privacy CParliament of the Commonweatth ofAustratta 1986, 114-24). The government ignored the majority report and introduced the Australia Card Bill to the

House of Representatives in October 1986. The Opposition and the Democrats combined to defeat

the legiSlation in the Senate in December. Three months later, the government reintroduced identical

legislation with the implicit intention, if the Senate again rejected it, of using it as a trigger for

calling a double dissolution of both Houses of Parliament. The Senate rejected it again. Accordingly

Prime Minister Hawke advised the Governor-General to dissolve both Houses of Parliament in the

late May for election to be held on ll July 1987. Notwithstanding that it had triggered the double dissolution, the Australia Card failed to become one of the major issues during the campaign (Warhurst 1988, 53i Jaensch 1988, 68). The Democrats worked hard to make it an issue but failed to do so (SMH, 5110187). Although Labor suffered a

small swing against it in terms of aggregate national vote and failed to gain control of the Senate,

the Hawke Government was returned with its majority in the House of Representatives increased

from 16 to 25. As a consequence, even if the Senate again defeated it, the legislation was expected -9-

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to be enacted at the joint sitting ef the House of Representatives and the Senate. Despite the re-election of the Hawke Government, the Opposition and the Democrats rejuvenated

and intensified their campaign against the Australia Card inside and outside the Senate. When the

double dissolution had been called, opinion polls suggested that the Card was supported by two-

"quality" thirds of population CBultettn, 29/9187). The editorials in the print media, particularly

newspapers, supported the legislation. Public support for the Australia Card collapsed, however, from 69 per cent to 39 per cent between March and September

editorialists changed their attitudes in accordance with the change in public opinion: by early "quality" September every paper bar The Canberra Times urged the government to rethink on the Card.

In Iate September, a retired senior official of the Attorney-General's Department gave an opinion

that the legislation had been drafted in such a manner that, even if it was passed at the joint sitting, it could be made unworkable by disallowing a couple of regulations (CT, 24f9/87). Since

either House of Parliament can disallow regulations, the government's defeat on the Australia

Card became unavoidable when the Coalition and the Democrat Senators declared that they would

move to disallow these regulations. The government, belatedly, decided to opt for the tax file number alternative which had been recommended by the majority of the Joint Seleet Committee seventeen months before.

Some sections of the media considered that the Senate had overstepped the mark by defeating the legislation which the government would have enacted in constitutionally legitimate way (CZ 25/9/87lMalone 1987; Kelly 1987; Ramsey 1987). However, it is also possible to argue that the

Senate's rejection of the legislation was within the boundary of its proper role. A majority of the

Senate, comprising the Coalition and the Democrats, while agreeing with the basie objectives (to minimise tax avoidance, tax evasion and social security fraud), opposed the government's preferred

means to achieve that goal. They presented, and argued for, an alternative which might contribute

less revenue to the government but would cost less time and money to implement. Importantly,

a majority of the Joint Select Committee, including one government member, supported the

alternative. The gevernment had to endure the embarrassing defeat caused by the Senate precisely

because it ignored the majority recommendation.

The blocking of the Australia Card Bill was a major triumph for the Democrats in general and

for the party leader, Senator Janine Haines, in particular. Senator Haines played a significant part

in forging the extra-parliamentary alliance against the legislation and achieved what she had

aimed for as an alternative to the Card: the upgraded tax file number systern (SMH, 2519/87). She

raised her profile and laid the foundation for an upsurge of the Democrats' popularity which would reach its peak at the 1990 Federal election.{4}

Case Study 3: The 1993-94 Budget

The Keating Labor government, in the 1993-94 Budget, attempted to solve its budgetary dilemma, caused by apparently inconsistent promises made at the 1993 Federal election, such as personal

income tax cuts, more public spending, no GST and a reduction of the budget deficit, by financing personal income tax cuts through increase in indirect taxes (such as the petrol excise particularly for leaded petrol, the tobacco excise and the wholesale sales tax in general and on wine in particular). In order to fulfil spending commitments, sueh as some dental care services, spending

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cuts in other areas, such as the removal of optometry services from Medicare, were proposed,

Tertiary students were hit hard by proposed changes to the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS).

The Budget was perceived to be regressive because low income earners who would have to

bear a disproportionate burden of the increase in indirect taxes were to be given a tax relief of a mere $100 per year while personal income tax cuts were aimed at middle to higher income earners. As the Opposition decided to vote against most of the proposed revenue-raising measures CParliamentary Debates: Hbuse of Rqpresentatives 19/8/93), the Democrats' response became

crucial for the passage of the Budget threugh the Senate. Senator Kernot, Parliamentary Leader

of the Democrats, presented a revenue neutral alternative which would have capped personaL

income tax cuts for higher income earners and spent the resultant savings by increasing the tax

rebate for low income earners. While the government rejected this Democrats' proposal, strong

pressure from the labour movement and Labor backbenchers forced the government to respond to

Senator Kernot that the tax rebate for low income earners would be increased, that the price

differential between leaded and unleaded petrol would be cut, that retrospectivity would be removed

from changes to lump-sum payments of long service leave, and that optemetry would be restored to Medicare

"wine announced that, while they would still vote against the tax" and the proposed changes to

the HECS, the Democrat Senators would accept the compromise because, even if the Budget was "far "injected from perfect", the Democrats had at least haif a billion dollars of fairness" (Kernot 1993b>.

Notwithstanding the Democrats' swift and decisive actions to win significant concession from

the government within a fortnight, the impasse lasted another 50 days due to inexperience, lack

of resources and naivety of the two Western AustraLian Green Senators. During this nine weeks

of the Budget stalemate, the Democrat Senators managed to function as a coherent and disciplined

group most of the time. Public opinion, media editorialists and commentators appeared to be favourable to the Democrat Senators' actions. According to the Saulwick Poll, 74 per cent of those surveyed considered that the Democrat Senators had properly exercised their balance of power over the Budget (tlge 7191

"made 93). The Age, in its editorial, praised Senator Kernot and the Democrats as having a worthwhile contribution to keeping the bastards honest" C4ge 1/9f93). 71he Sydnegy Mbrning HeTald

"the named the revised budget as Kernot Budget" (SMH 119/93). Journalist Tim Colebatch described

"the Senator Kernot as mest normal person we have ever had leading a political party" (Colebatch

1993). Even commentators who had previously not been known for their generosity to the Democrats, such as Padraic McGuinness and Gerard Henderson, were favourably impressed (McGuinness 1993,

Henderson 1993).Prior to the 1993-94 Budget, because of the disastrous performance at the 1993 Federal election,{5} the Democrats' future within the Australian party system appeared to be in

doubt. The Democrat Senators had to share the balance of power with two WA Green Senators

and Senator Harradine from July 1993. Although the Democrats did not immediately convert the

aehievement of the 1993-94 Budget into increased support for the party, their handling of the 1993-94 Budget perhaps ensured the Democrats' survival by raising Senator Kernot's public profile

and enhancing the party's image.

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Case Study 4: The Workplace Relations Bill 1996

The election of the Howard Coalition government at the 1996 Federal election has presented a new parliamentary challenge for the Democrats. The Democrat Senators' professed preparedness to oppose some of the Howard government's legislation, such as the partial sale of Telstra and part of the budgetary measures, was criticised not only by the government (Howard 1996b) but also by the party's first leader, Don Chipp (Baker 1996i Milne 1996 ] Chipp 1997). Senator Colston's defection from Labor to the cross bench on Budget day was described by some sections of the

"irrelevant" "the media as having made the Democrats and real losers" ( Austratian, 22/8196 ;

AER, 2318196). The Democrats won considerabLe compromise from the government over the

Workplace Relations Bill under such a circumstance. Reforming Australia's industrial relations system was probably the number one priority for the new Coalition government. The legislation was aimed at simplifying awards, reducing the role of the Industrial Relations Commission (IRC) and weakening the union movement through changes to the unfair dismissal provisions, introduction of individual contract system, abolition of compulsory

"competitive unionism, introduction of unionism" and strengthening the secondary boycott provisions CttlER, 13/8/96). In order to pre-empt Labor's scare campaign tactic, the Coalition, prior to the

"rock "employees 1996 Federal election, made a solid guarantee" that cannot be worse off" under

its industrial relations regime (Howard 1996a).

As the Labor, Green and independent Senators declared their opposition to the legislation, the Democrats' position became vital

would pass the legislation with amendments so as to enforce the government's pre-e!ection promise that no workers would be worse off (SMff, 1716196i AEI{l, 2616/96). Specifically, the Democrats

were concerned with the secrecy of the proposed individual contract system, the potential for

"cornpetitive increase in demarcation disputes as a result of unionisrn", the abolition of paid rates

awards, continuation of junior rates wages, and the proposed provisions under which trainees

"actual could be paid only for time spent in productlve work" (Beli 1996). The Democrats also demanded that the secondary boycott provisions not be applied to consumer and environmental boycotts.

The government chose negotiation with the Democrats rather than confrontation with the

Senate. After more than fifty hours of negotiation stretching over two months, Minister for

Industrial Relations Reith and Senator Kernot announced on 27 October that the two parties had

agreed to pass the iegislation with 171 jointly-sponsored amendments. Minister Reith argued that,

"some as a result of the consultation with the Democrats, good things... are now incorporated in

"set the legislation" and that the process a standard for sensible, censtructive dealings with the Democrats in the future on other matters" (Reith and Kernot 1996). Senator Kernot said that the

"infinitely "a outcome was better" than the original legislation and that she was happy because

"the "safeguards right balance" had been found between thrust of the legislation" and for the most vulnerable" (Reith and Kernot 1996).

The union movement and the welfare organisation considered that the Democrats won significant

"a concessions from the government and made bad bill much better"

Major employer organisatiens, while urging the government for further reform, considered that

the amended legislation was reasonable and practical because the main thrust of the original legislation re.mained intact C4ustralianl Age, 28110/96). The media coverage was generally favourable

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to the Democrats (Gordon 1996; Wilcox 1996; Grattan 1996), The Age's editorialist wrote:

Senator Kernot has shown herself to be a skilful and able negotiator, capable of negotiating

sensible solutions to inter-party disputes. She has used her party's Senate numbers to exercise

a responsible and effective balance-of-power role, enhancing her party's credibility and countering claims that the Dernocrats would exercise an intransigent role in the Senate,

wiifully spoiling or blocking Government legisiation. This will enhance her party's position on other Government legislation, such as the sale of Telstra Q4ge, 29/10!96).

"at Padraic McGuinness wrote that Senator Kernot had repositioned the Democrats the centre

"the of politics" and had become real leader of the Opposition" (McGuinness 1996b).In the Senate,

"a the Democrats were criticised by the Labor and the Green Senators. Labelling the outcome as

tawdry little agreement" Ct4ustratian, 28!10!96), the Labor Senators accused the Demoerats of

"selling "hypocritical out young people" and breaches of pre-election commitments" CMurphy 1996).

"the Green Senator Brown alleged that the legislation would enable law of the jungle" to prevail

"Kernot and that was fooled" (Parliamentary Debates: Senate, 31fl096). Painting a grim picture

for Aboriginal land tights campaign, human rights and environmental protests by unions, Senator

Brown accused the Democrats of breaking a pre-election commitment on the secondary boycott

provisions (t4ge, 9111196). Notwithstanding considerable pressure from the Labor and Green Senators, the Dernocrat

Senators did net waver from the agreement. Perhaps, more remarkable is the fact that they

"split maintained cohesion throughout the course of debate despite their liberal attitude towards

voting". The Democrat Senators proved that they are tough but trustworthy negotiators who

honour the agreement once it is reached. And this agreement should dispel any allegation from

the Coalition ranks that the Democrats are bloody-minded obstructionists who are in a de facto

coalition with Labor.

This section has examined four cases where the Democrat Senators exercised the balance of

power in substantial way towards government's essential legislation. In the cases of the 1981-82

Budget and the Australia Card Bill, the Democrat Senators, combined with the Opposition, defeated

the legislation. In the cases of the 1993-94 Budget and the Workplace Relations Bill, the Democrats

won considerable cempromise from government. These case studies indicate that, regardless of the Coalition government or the Labor government, the Democrat Senators have been consistent

with pursuing executive accountability and with injecting what they believe as fairness and equity

into governrnent's legislation.

Coming of the Consensus Politics

In June 1996, Prime Minister Howard made a following observation on the Democrats'

parliamentary activityl [T]he Hawke and Keating governments and the Australian Democrats... enjoyed what

amounted to a de facto coalition, with the Australian Democrats supporting Labor on most

crucial issues over its 13 year period of office. The Australia Card legislation and the 1993 budget were notable exceptions to this proposition (Howard 1996b>.

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That the Democrats formed a de facto alliance with Labor is, however, an inaccurate observation by a perhaps somewhat frustrated Prime Minister Howard. During thirteen years in government,

"socially Labor was supported by the Democrats on progressive" issues such as the introduction of Medicare, capital gains tax and fringe benefits tax and the Native Title Act. At the same time,

"economic Labor had been able to obtain support from the Coalition on fundamentalist" issues

such as financial deregulation, tariff reduction, privatisation, the implementation of the Hilmer competition policy and the financially disastrous One Nation (L-A-W law) tax cuts. Particularly between 1986 and 1993, the Coalition Senators habitually voted with the Labor government for

legislation of which their colleagues in the House of Representatives were highly critical, on the

basis that budget bills should not be voted down in the Senate (Sugita 1995, 208-9), In other words, issues which Prime Minister Howard noted as exceptions to his rule (the Australia Card

Bill and the 1993-94 Budget) are exceptional precisely because the Coalition had supported the

Labor government on most crucial issues on the economy.

In a nutshell, because the Senate, with its legislative power almost identical to that of the

"twopartism" House of Representatives, has no longer functioned in the rnode since 1981, Australian

"majoritarian" "consensus" politics has been transformed from the model to the model. Government,

either Laber or the Coalition, has to form an issue-by-issue based alliance in the Senate to enact

its legislative programmes. The Howard Coalition government, notwithstanding initial protestation,

is no exception. It has to negotiate with, and make certain concession to, the Dernocrats en the

Workplace Relations Bill and some of the budgetary measures. It also has to deal with independent

Senators on the partial sale of Telstra and other budgetary measures. It seems that such a reality has forced the Labor Opposition to indicate its preparedness to amend and pass, rather than

block, the government's legislation in the Senate.

This transformation of Australian politics means that two different elections are held on the

day of the Federal election. The House of Representatlves election decides which party, Labor or

the Coalition, is to form government and who is to become Prime Minister. The Senate election determines the extent to which the government, formed by the House of Representatives majority,

can implement its legislative programmes. It appears that voters in general understand, and indeed

appreciate, the fact that they are voting for two different elections on the same election day.

Tabie 2 clearly indicates that, in comparison with the 1993 Federal election, Labor suffered a

Table 2 Re$ult of the 1996 Federal election House Senate seat votes(swing) seat votes(swing) LaborCoalition 49 38.8(-6.1) 1420 36.2(-7.3) 44.0(+1,O) Liberal 7618oo5 39.0(+L9) National 8.2(+1.0) Denocrats 6.8(+3.0) 51o 10.8(+5.5) GreensOthers 2.9(+LO) 3.2(-O.1) 4.4<-O.8) 5.9(+1.0)

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"Top-up" Table 3 rate forthe Senate

197719801983198419871990 19931996

HollseSenateTop-upvotevoterate(%)(%)(%)9.411.1186,69,3415.09.6925.57.6386.011.3 3.85.3406.810.859 8.512.6 42 12

masslve swing against it, both in the House of Representatives and the Senate. While Labor's Ioss appeared to be evenly shared between the Coalition and the Democrats in the House of Representatives, three in four voters who deserted Labor in the Senate were in fact picked up by the Democrats. As a result, the Democrats' aggregated natienal share of votes for the Senate was

considerably higher than that for the House of Representatives while the reverse was the case for

the Coalition as well as for Labor. In short, in addition to different electoral systems between the

two Houses, difference in voting behaviour of large number of voters has made corisiderable

contribution to different compositions of the House of Representatives and the Senate.

"top-ups" This argument can be further strengthened by analysing which the Democrats have received for their Senate votes. While the Democrats have always received mere votes for the

Senate than for the House of Representatives, it is possible to hypothesise, from Table 3, that the

"top-up" Democrats' usual Senate rate is around 40 per cent and that it deviates from the usual

"Top-up" rate under certain conditions. rate has been substantially lower if the party receives a

larger than usual share of votes in the House of Representatives due to higher than usual attention

to the party's House of Representatives contest. In 1977, as the Democrats contested the Federal

"Senate election for the first time, the Democrats' reputation as a party" was yet to be established. In 1990, the Democrats' campaign for the House of Representatives received considerable attention

due to Senator Haines' attempt to win the House of Representatives seat of Kingston.

"top-up" In contrast, rate was substantially higher in 1983 and 1996. Common to these two

elections is that change of government took place, It may then be possible to theorise that, when

government changes, a considerable number of people who vote in a way to ensure an election of

new government in the House of Representatives deliberately cast their votes to the Democrats

in the Senate so that strong presence of the Democrats in the Senate could work as a deterrent

to a new, untested government. Both in 1983 and 1996, the Democrats' leadership conducted a

strong campaign primarily focused on their role in the Senate to tap into this sentiment. Judging from the direction of preferences (45.3 per cent for the Coalition, with majority flowing to the

Coalition in 51 out of 144 seats, compared with 36.5 per cent in I990 and 39.4 per cent in 1993), the Democrats in 1996 were supported by Liberal-inclined voters more than was previously the case. Therefore, it seems possible to argue that a significant number of voters who voted for the

Coalition in the House of Representatives deliberately cast their votes for the Democrats in the

Senate to ensure adequate check and balance against an inexperienced and untested government

bringing about radical and swift change.

The fact that voters appear to have different expectations for the House ef Representatives "mandate" and the Senate and vote differently means that the concept of is all but redundant. The

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concept of mandate interprets that a party which has just won an election by virtue of a House of Representatives majority is granted by the public an authority to fully implement its election

programmes and that, therefore, the non-government parties should not obstruct the government.

Aecording to this argument, if a certain government policy turns out to be bad, the public will

have an opportunity to punish the government in the ballot box at the next election.

Apart from the fact that the concept of mandate is based on the one hollow assumption that

every voter is fully aware of every detail of every party's programmes, makes his or her choice

solely on the merits of those programmes and agrees with every detail of the preferred party's programmes, the concept of mandate is arguably arrogant and indeed undemocratic because, in

essence, it renders the legislature subservient to the executive. Why bother to have parliamentary debates if the government has been given full autherity by the public to implement its programmes?

The concept of mandate is very much a majoritarian idea because it is based on an assumption

that one party will form a single-party majority government and ether parties will be condemned

to opposlUon.

The reality in Australia in 1997 is that, as many people vQte differently for the House of Representatives'and the Senate, there emerges a conflict of two mandatesl one given to the House

of Representatives and the other to the Senate. Richard Mulgan observes that the Senate has

"a "an played roles of house of scrutiny and review (keeping the bastards honest)" as well as active

partner in policy-making" through pursuing their preferred policy against government's and that both functions are endorsed not only by the Constitution but also by the voters (Mulgan 1996). Commentators such as McGuinness and Henderson have expressed a similar view (McGuinness

1996al 1996bi Henderson 1996), Carty argues that because of the Democrats' presence in the

"two Senate, Australia now has parallel, overlapping, but distinct party systems" one for the House of Representatives and the other for the Senate (Carty 1997, 99).

"twopartism" "pluralism" In summary, as a result of this transformation from to in the Senate,

government now has to form an issue-by-issue based coaiition in the Senate in order to have its

iegislative programmes enacted. The Democrats have facilitated this change in the nature of

"majoritarian" "consensus" Australian politics from the to the model, Nine months after accusing

the Democrats of having formed a de facto cealition with Labor, Prime Minister Howard appears

to have conceded that Australia's political system no longer functions in accordance with the

majoritarian model. In April 1997, he said in a television interview:

Well, that's what people said at the last election. They gave us a huge majority in the

House of Representatives but they didn't in the Senate, and the way the Senate is structured,

it is impossible, without a change, for either party, Labor or Liberal, in power to have the

numbers in their own right. So what you have to do, you have to work on each piece of

legislation. We've done quite well up to now (Howard 1997).

Conclusion

For more than 70 years, from 1909 to 1981, the Australian party system had been characterised

"twopartism". as The ernergence of the Country Party or the rise and the fall of the Democratic "twopartism" Labor Party did not alter the Australian because both party had (and still has, as far as the National Party is concerned) formally or informally formed a part of the non-Labor coalition. -16-

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"majoritarian". During these seventy-odd years, the nature of Australian politics had been This is

despite the fact that Australia has been endowed with some elements of the consensus model,

most notably the existence of the Senate which is as powerful as the House of Representatives

and the introduction of the proportional representation system for the Senate election since 1949. Since 1981, however, Australian politics has undergone a fundamental change. The majoritarian model has been replaced by the consensus mQdel. The Senate, once derogatorily described as a

"House of the Living Dead" (Kernot 1993a), has become the centre ef legislative action. The

Australian Democrats have made an invaluable contribution to this development. Since 1981, the

Democrats have held the Senate balance of power and have been willing to use it indepenclently.

As a result, the Democrat Senators have been able to exercise considerable influence on those

issues where the government and the Opposition cannot agree with each other. It is clear that,

from the very early stage, as evident from the 1981-82 Budget, an important part of the Democrats' parliamentary agenda is to use their strategic position in the Senate to influence government's legislation to be more to their liking. The Democrat Senators have critically examined every piece of legislation proposed by both the Coalition and the Labor governments with the same vigour and have judged each legislation on its merits. Judging from their record on the 1981-82 Budget, the Australia Card Bill, the 1993-94 Budget

and the Workplace Relations Bill, it is possible to argue that the Democrat Senators have prevented

the government of the day from implementing harsh, unfair, unpopular and even draconian

programmes. In other words, the government, whether under Labor or the Coalition, has had to

modify its legislative programmes because the Democrat Senators have exercised the balance of power. As a consequence of the restraints imposed by the Democrat Senators' presence, Labor and the Coalition have probably been saved from massive voter backlash which could have occurred had they controlled the whole legislative process.

The advent of the proportional representation system for the Senate and the emergence of relevant minor parties, first the Democratic Labor Party and second the Australian Democrats,

have made it very difficult, ii not impossible, for a government to secure the majority in the

Senate. With the independently-minded Democrats holding the balance of power since 1981, any government, Labor or Cealition, has had to form an issue-by-issue based coalition in the Senate.

Such a coalition could be formed by Labor and the CQalition, Labor and the Democrats, or the

Coalition and the Democrats. Since the 1993 Federal election, the Green Senators and Senator Harradine (and Senator Colston from 20 August 1996) have come into the equation. Under such a

parliamentary reality, conventional interpretation of the concept of mandate has become increasingly

redundant. We are living in the age of conflicting mandates.

Perhaps due to the lesson of the Whitlam government, whose reformist agenda had been

frustrated by the Senate, it appeared that, generally speaking, the Hawke and Keating Labor

governments sought an alliance with the Coalition on economic policy while seeking an alliance

with the Democrats on social issues. The agreement between the Democrats and the Howard

government over the Workplace Relations Bill indicates that the Coalition government has also

come to terms with the reality that the majoritarian model of politics is no longer applicable to

Australia. Demonstrating the Democrats' ability and willingness to work cooperatively with the

Coalition government, the industrial relations agreement indicates that the Democrats will keep playing the role as the facilitator of the transformation of Australian politics from the majoritarian

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t-X F7 iJ 7ff fi ag 9e 1997. 12

to the consensus model under the Coalition government as wetl.

For students of Australian politics, the important lesson to be learned from this transformation

of Australian politics is that at least the sarne level of attention, if not more, should be paid to

the Senate election as to the House of Representatives election. In terms of the legislative processes,

those in the House of Representatives are almost irrelevant, except perhaps for the theatrical value of the Question Time, because the numbers in the House of Representatives are always in

favour of the government unless, of course, minor parties or independent members hoLd the balance

of pQwer there. The real legislative actions, and therefore the real legislative outcomes, take place

in the Senate.

RefeFences

"The Barker, Geeffrey, 1996, Politics of Innecence", 7VzeAustralian Ft7zanciat Review, 7 August.

Bell, Robert, 1996, interview with author, 29 May.

"Party Blondel, Jean, 1968, Systems and Patterns of Government in Western Democracies'', Canadtan JOurnal ofPotittcal Science, Vol. I, No. 2, June.

"Australian Carty, R. K., 1997, Democrats in Comparative Perspective", in John Warhurst (edJ. Keepi7zg the Bastaras Hbnest .' flhe Australian Democrats' thrst 7zventy }'ears, Allen & Unwin Australia, St Leonards.

Chipp, Don, 1994, interview with author, 15 February,

"Founder

, 1997,quoted inD.D.McNicoll, 1997, Chippparties alone", T7zevaeeicenctAustratian, 18-19January.

, (editedby JohnLarkin),1987,Chipp, MethuenHaynes,NorthRyde. "Taxes, Colebatch, Tim, 1993, the Senate, fairness-keys to the Budget's failure", The Age, 4 September.

Duverger, Maurice, 1964, Politicat Parties/ f7ietr Organixatton ana Activtty in the Modem State, third edition,

translated by Barbara and Robert North, Methuen, London.

"Senate Fraser, Malcolm, 1993, risks overstepping the mark", f7ze Australian, 29 September.

"Democrats Gerdon, Michael, 1996, put Labor on sideline", The Aztstralian, 28 October.

"IR Grattan, Michelle, 1996, deal a triumph in trade-offs", The Austratian Fiuanciae Revieev, 29 October.

"Oh Henderson, Gerard, 1993, what strange feather-down bedfellows does politics make", The Sydney Momaing Heratd,

5October,

`'Govt rock and a very ,1996, (sic> hard place",7VzeSydney Morni7zg Heratd, 9 July.

Howard, John, 1996a, address to the Young Liberal Movement Convention, 8 January.

, I996b, address tethe AustralianNationalUniversity,27 June.

, 1997, transcript frorn interview, Midday Show, Nine Network, 11 April.

"The Jaensch, Dean, 1988, Liberal Campaign", in Ian McAllister and John Warhurst

Eederal Etection, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne.

, 1992,711LePoliticsofAustralia,MacmillanEducationAustralia,SouthMelbourne,

"Hew Kelly, Paul, 1982, Don Chipp's party lost its innocence", 71he Sydney Momtng Herald, 19 February, "Howard's

, 1987, coup and the Government'$secret relief',71eieWeekendAustralian,26-27September.

"Power, Kernot, Cheryl, 1993a, Passion and Balance", Speech to the National Press CIub, Canberra, 5 May.

, 1993b,PressRelease,3 September.

Lijphart, Arend, 1984,Democracies: Pattems ofMtijoritarian and Consensus Gover7zment in Ttventy-One Countries,

Yale University Press, New Haven,

"Party Lipson, Leslie, 1959, Systems in the United Kingdom and the Older Commonwealth: Causes, Resemblances, and

Variations", Potiticat Stndies, Vel. VII, No. 1.

Lucy, Richard, 1993, The Australian foma of Government, secend edition, Macmillan, South Melbourne. "A McGuinness, Padraic, 1993, war that Keating cannot win", IVee Australian, 26 August.

"True revenge", , 1996a, believersmust reappraise fundamentals,net seek 71heSydney MOmimp Herald, 16 March.

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Transformation of Australian Politics

"Now 1996b, , compromise hasbecome the art of politics",71heAge, 30 October.

Mackerras, Malcolm, 1979, DLP Proprence Dtstrtbutton 1958-1969, Department of Government and Public

Administration, University of Sydney, 1979.

"Fate Malene, Paul, 1987, of Australia Card Bill has wide ramifications", 77ie Canberra 7Zi?nes, 26 September.

"A Milne, Glenn, 1996, Chipp quits the new bloc", 7VzeAttstralian, 12 August.

Mulgan, Richard, 1996, A letter to the editor, 111Le Aztstratian, 23 April.

"ALP Murphy, Katharine, 1996, gunning for Democrats over youth pay", The Athstratinn FTincemiat Rev tezv, 11 November. Parliatnent ef the Commonwealth of Australia, 1986, Report of the JOtnt Select Committee on an Australia Card, Australian Governrnent Publishing Service, Canberra.

Ramsey, Alan, 1987, ℃ ounting the cost as the smoke clears", 71he Sydney Mbmtng Herald, 26 September.

"Big , 1993, pictures have sharp cerners", The Sydnezt Mbming Heratd, 4 December.

Reith, Peter, and Cheryl Kernot, 1996, transcript from interview, Sunday programme, Nine Network, 27 October. Sartori,Giovanni,1976,PartiesandPartySystems:AFramezvorkforAmatgsis,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge.

"7iwoparttsm".' Sugita, Hiroya, 1995, Chaetenging 7LFLeAustratian Democrats' Contribution to the Australian Party

System, Ph.D thesis submitted to Flinders University.

"Parliamentary

, 1997, performance inthe Senate",inJohnWarhurst(ed),Kbeptng the Bastaras Honest.'7?ie

Austratian Democrats' First fiu)enty lears, Allen C Unwin, St Leonards,

"The Thompson, Elaine, 1980, Washminster Mutation", in Patrick Weller and Dean Jaensch (edsJ, Responsible

Govemament in AttstraMa, Drummond and APSA, Melbourne.

Ward, Russel, 1985,A IVtztionfor a Continent: The History ofAzcstralia 1901-I975, Heinemann Educational Australia, Richmond.

, 1992,Concise Historp ofAustralta,Universityof QueenslandPress,St Lucia.

"The Warhurst, John, 1988, ALP Campaign", in Ian McAllister and John Warhurst (eds.),AustraMa VOtes ,' 71he 1987

FederalElection, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne.

"A Wilcox, Innes, 1996, faircompromise that will change how we werk", fhe Age, 28 October,

(1) With an absolute rnajority in the Fecleral Parliament, the United Australia Party governed alone from 1931 to 1934,

The Liberal Party could have governed alone from 1975 to 1980 and since !9os but chose to form a coalition with the National Party (then the National Country Party). (2) Another important enactment, the White Australia policy, received tri-partisan support with only one dissenting voice from a conservative Freetrader Arthur Bruce Smith.

(3) These three occasions are: between 1932 and 1934 when the United Australia Party was able to form a majority

government alone; between 1939 and 1940 when the Country Party pulled out and the United Australia Party formed

a minority government; and during 1987 when the National Party pulled out of an Opposition coalition arrangement

"Joh-for-Canberra" as a result of its internal disunity caused by so-called campaign, a failed attempt by the then Premier of Queensland Joh Bjelke-Petersen to take over the national leadership of the Coalition.

(4) Furthermore, the blocking of the Australia Card Bill enabled the Hawke government to call the double dissolution

and thus ensured the Democrats' survival. Since all the sitting Democrat Senators were to faee the half Senate

election, the Democrats' Senate representation would have been reduced between one to three, instead of seven,

had there not been the double dissolution in 1987.

(5) At the 1993 Federal election, the Democrats' share of votes in the Senate declined massively frem 12.6% to 5.3 %

and that for the House of Representatives from 11.3% to 3.8%. [1997fi8n30Hfimp]

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ー オ ス トラ リ ア 研 究 第 9 号 ユ997．12

オ ー ス トラ リ ア 政 治 の 変 容

多数 決 型 か ら コ ン セ ン サ ス 型 へ

杉 田 弘也 ー 匚在 オ ス トラ リ ア 日本 大 使館］

一 ー ス の は の の い 般 に オ ト ラ リ ア 政 治 、 「労働 党対 保 守連 合」 2 大勢力 対立 図式 と し て と らえ られ て

コ ン ン ス ー る 。 す な わ ち、民 主政 治 を 「多数決型 」 と 「 セ サ 型 」に分 けた ラ イ パ トの 理 論 に よ れ ば、オ

ース い パ ー ト ラ リ ア は 「多数決 型」 に 分類 され る と う考 え方 で あ り、 ラ イ トも こ の よ うな結論 を出 して

い る 。

ー つ 1901年 の 連邦 形成以 降、 オ ス トラ リア の 政治は 3 の 時代 に分 ける こ とが で きる 。 1901年か ら1909 年 ま で は 、 3 大勢 力 （労働党 、保護貿易派、 自由貿易派 ）が 鼎立 し て お り、「コ ン セ ン サ ス 型 」 の 政 治 が

わ い こ 行 れ て た 。保 護貿易派 と自由貿易派が 合同 し た 1909年か ら ユ981年 まで は 、 の 間 に 結成 され た地

方党 （現 国民 党）や民 主 労働党 も反 労働党 勢力 に含む こ と が で き 、 した が っ て 労働 党 と反労働 党 の 2 大

い い パ ー 勢力 が 対 立 す る 「多数決 型 」 の 政 治 が 70 年以 上 続 て た 。 ラ イ トの 研 究 は 、1945 年 か ら 1980年 ・ ー ま で を対 象 と した もの で あ り、 こ の タイ ム フ レ イ ム の 中 で は 、オ ス トラ リア の 政治 は 「多数決 型」

パ ー い い で あ る と した ラ イ トの 結 論 は誤 っ て な 。 ー しか しな が ら1981年 以 降 は、 2 大 勢力 の どち らに も色 分 けす る こ との で きな い オ ス トラ リ ア民 主党

つ バ ン ス ・ ・パ ー こ ー が 、下 院 と同等の 権 限 を持 上 院の ラ オ ブ ワ を得 た と に よ り、 オ ス トラ リ ア 政 治 の − ー ー − 性格 は大 き く変化 した。1981 82年度予算、オ ス トラ リ ア カ ド法案、1993 94 予算、労使 関係改 革法 案 な どに お け る民 主党 の 上 院に お ける 活動 は 、民 主 党が 労働党 政 権下 で あ ろ う と保 守連 合政権 下 で 一 一 ー あろ う と、 2 大 勢力 の どち らか 方 に 与す る の で は な く、 貫 し て 政府 の ア カ ウ ン タ ビ リ テ ィ を追 求 ・ ・ ー し、民主 党が 公 正 で あ る と考 える 政 策 を 実現 す る た め に 、上 院 の バ ラ ン ス オ ブ パ ワ を行使 し て い

こ い る と を示 し て る 。 ー 政 府 が 上 院 の 過半数 を獲得 で きず、民 主党 な ど少 数政党 や 無所属 議員 が バ ラ ン ス ・オ ブ ・パ ワ を握

っ て い る こ と は い ご か ら、政 府 上 院 に お て法案 とに 非公 式な 連合を結ばな けれ ば 、 選挙公 約 や 政 策 を実

行 に 移せ な くな っ た 。 こ の 非公式 な連合 は 、「労働党 ＋ 保 守連 合」、「労働党 ＋ 民 主 党」、「保 守連合 ＋ 民 主 ー 党」 の 組 み 合 わせ を基 本と し、近年で は グ リ ン 政 党 や 無所属 議員 も非公式 な連合 に 含 まれ る 可 能性 が

生 じ て い る 。 一 こ の 結果 、才 ス トラ リア 政 治 の 性格 は 、そ れ ま で の 「多数決 型」か ら 「コ ン セ ン サ ス 型」 へ 移行 し、

の っ へ 上 院が 立 法活動 中心 と な た 。 民 主 党 な ど 2 大勢 力以 外 の 政党 の 支持率 が下 院選挙 よ り上 院 選 挙 で

っ い こ ー 高 くな て る とか ら 、 政 府が上 院 の 過 半 数 を獲 得 で きず 、オ ス トラ リ ア の 政 治が 「コ ン セ ン サ ス

に た こ と は の の で こ 型」 移行 し 、有権 者 積極 的な意思 反 映 あ る と考え る とが で きる 。 これ に よ り、下 院

で の い 選挙 過 半数 議席 を得て成立 した 政府が 、 選挙 時 に 掲げ た 政策 をそ の ま ま実行す る権利 を得る と う

の マ ン ー 従 来 「 デ イ ト」 の 理 論 は 、今 日 の オ ス トラ リ ア で は 通用 しな くな っ た 。

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