PNEUMA and the THEORY of SOUL in DE MUNDO We

CHAPTER TEN

PNEUMA AND THE THEORY OF SOUL IN DE MUNDO

We have established that Aristotle himself attributed to pneuma (and its analogue in plants) a role by which it is more directly connected with the soul than the visible body of plants, animals, and human beings. We can now suitably mention an interesting definition of pneuma in the work De mundo, which is traditionally ascribed to Aristotle but today is usually regarded as a pseudo-Aristotelian work.1 In chapters 2 through 5 this work discusses cosmic reality as it presents itself to the interested observer. After cataloguing the five elements, discussing the celestial beings, and treating geography in the broadest sense, the author goes on in chapter 4 to consider meteorological phenomena, which he reduces to 'two kinds of exhalation' (moist and dry exhalation) familiar from Aristotle's Meteorologica. Having come to the subject of wind, he notes: It is also called pneuma. But pneuma is also used in a different sense, namely as the ensouled and life-generating substance in plants and animals which wholly permeates them. We need not deal with this here.2 Clearly, on a first reading, this passage differs markedly from the psychology traditionally attributed to Aristotle on the basis of De

1 The debate over this work has been radically affected by the conclusion of J. Barnes in his review of G. Reale, Aristotele, Trattato sul cosmo per Alessandro (Napoli 1974) in Class. Rev. 27 (1977) 440-443 that there are no intrinsic arguments left for denying Aristotle's authorship. But he believes that vocabulary and style do invali date it. Barnes considers the work's likely date to be before 250 BC. D.M. Schenke- veld, 'Language and style of the Aristotelian De mundo in relation to the question of its inauthenticity', Elenchos 12 (1991) 221-255 argued for a date between 350-200 BC. For a complete survey of the modern debate over the work, see now G. Reale; A.P. Bos, 77 trattato Sul cosmo per Alessandro attribuito ad Anstotele (Milano 1995). 2 Mu. 4, 394b9-12: όστις άμα και πνεύμα λέγεται. Λέγεται δε και έτέρως πνεύμα η τε έν φυτοίς και ζφοις (ούσα) και δια πάντων διήκουσα έμψυχος τε και γόνιμος ουσία, περί ης νύν λέγειν ουκ άναγκαΐον. The correction <ούσα> of the Greek text is proposed by D. Holwerda, Mnemosyne 46 (1993) 50. For δια πάντων διήκουσα, cf. Spir. 2, 481M9: το δε πνεύμα δι' δλου το σύμφυτον. 3, 482a33: το δε σύμφυτον πνεύμα δι' δλου. Cf. luv. 4, 469b6: πάντα δε τα μόρια και πάν το σώμα των ζώων έχει τινά σύμφυτον θερμότητα φυσικήν, and A.L. Peck, Aristotle, Generation of animals 593. PNEUMA AND THE THEORY OF SOUL IN DE MUNDO 211

anima. That work, it is assumed, views the soul as the entelechy of the visible body. De mundo seems clearly to be saying that the visible body is vitalized by another body, pneuma, which is the real vehicle of the soul. Partly on account of this conflict with the position of De anima, the passage in De mundo has often been seen as evidence of Stoic influence on the author,3 or as evidence of the work's provenance in Jewish circles.4 In my view, however, it refers briefly and without further comment to a soundly Aristotelian theory, namely the theory of pneuma as the fine-material instrument of the soul.5 In the given context it is entirely natural for the author to omit the qualification that plants do not possess real pneuma but an analogue, what is usually called 'the innate vital heat' in the Aristotelian Corpus.6 Note also that the passage does not mention a pneuma that permeates the entire cosmos but a life-supporting substance that ensures that every part in individual living creatures possesses vitality. Pneuma here is an ensouled substance and takes part in life. To use the terminology of De anima II 1, it is one of the 'natural bodies', and as such it is a 'natural body which has life', and it can also be called a 'composite substance', that is, composed of a 'natural body' and the soul as formal principle.7 But Aristotle does not designate pneumaas a living creature (ζωον). The presence of the soul with its instrumental body, i.e. pneuma is a necessary condition for being a living creature.

3 H. Strohm, Anstoteles, Meteorologie; Über die Welt (Darmstadt 1970) 304 even regards it as an anti-Stoic feature of De mundo. Cf. L. Elders, Aquinas 18 (1975) 416; C. Natali, Giornale di Metafisica 31 (1976) 161; H.G. Ingenkamp, A.G.Ph. 59 (1977) 77. 4 For this view, cf. M J. Lagrange, Rev. Thorn. 32 (1927) 205. Earlier F. Ravaisson had argued that the Jewish author Aristobulus (2nd cent. BC) may have been the author of De mundo. Unlike Lagrange, I believe that the doctrine οι pneuma in Philo and other later authors can only be understood if we recognize that it explains biblical data in the light of Aristotle's doctrine of pneuma. For Aristotle pneuma is a body that is vitalized by an immaterial soul-principle. For Philo the soul is con nected with blood, but pneuma is the actual divine and life-generating principle in man. In Philo pneuma occupies the position which the intellect has in Aristotle's system. 5 Cf. the crucial text in Gener. anim. II 3, 736b33-737al: πάντων μεν γαρ εν τω σπέρματι ενυπάρχει όπερ ποιεί γόνιμα είναι τα σπέρματα, το καλούμενον θερμόν. τούτο δ' ου πΰρ ουδέ τοιαύτη δύναμίς έστιν άλλα το έμπεριλαμβανόμενον εν τω σπέρματι και εν τω άφρώδει πνεύμα καΐ ή εν τω πνεύματι φύσις, άνάλογον ούσα τω των άστρων στοιχείω, which I discussed in detail in chap. 8 above. 6 For more commentary on the passage, cf. G. Reale, A.P. Bos, // trattato sul cosmo per Alessandro 285-288. On p. 288 the authors already hypothesized that Aris totle's definition of the soul should be interpreted as: Τ anima è l'«entelechia» del «pneuma» che è 1'organo dell' anima". 7 Cf. Anim. II l,412al5-21.