Person Re-Identification with Joint-Loss
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The Guangzhou-Hongkong Strike, 1925-1926
The Guangzhou-Hongkong Strike, 1925-1926 Hongkong Workers in an Anti-Imperialist Movement Robert JamesHorrocks Submitted in accordancewith the requirementsfor the degreeof PhD The University of Leeds Departmentof East Asian Studies October 1994 The candidateconfirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where referencehas been made to the work of others. 11 Abstract In this thesis, I study the Guangzhou-Hongkong strike of 1925-1926. My analysis differs from past studies' suggestions that the strike was a libertarian eruption of mass protest against British imperialism and the Hongkong Government, which, according to these studies, exploited and oppressed Chinese in Guangdong and Hongkong. I argue that a political party, the CCP, led, organised, and nurtured the strike. It centralised political power in its hands and tried to impose its revolutionary visions on those under its control. First, I describe how foreign trade enriched many people outside the state. I go on to describe how Chinese-run institutions governed Hongkong's increasingly settled non-elite Chinese population. I reject ideas that Hongkong's mixed-class unions exploited workers and suggest that revolutionaries failed to transform Hongkong society either before or during the strike. My thesis shows that the strike bureaucracy was an authoritarian power structure; the strike's unprecedented political demands reflected the CCP's revolutionary political platform, which was sometimes incompatible with the interests of Hongkong's unions. I suggestthat the revolutionary elite's goals were not identical to those of the unions it claimed to represent: Hongkong unions preserved their autonomy in the face of revolutionaries' attempts to control Hongkong workers. -
Contemporary China: a Book List
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY: Woodrow Wilson School, Politics Department, East Asian Studies Program CONTEMPORARY CHINA: A BOOK LIST by Lubna Malik and Lynn White Winter 2007-2008 Edition This list is available on the web at: http://www.princeton.edu/~lynn/chinabib.pdf which can be viewed and printed with an Adobe Acrobat Reader. Variation of font sizes may cause pagination to differ slightly in the web and paper editions. No list of books can be totally up-to-date. Please surf to find further items. Also consult http://www.princeton.edu/~lynn/chinawebs.doc for clicable URLs. This list of items in English has several purposes: --to help advise students' course essays, junior papers, policy workshops, and senior theses about contemporary China; --to supplement the required reading lists of courses on "Chinese Development" and "Chinese Politics," for which students may find books to review in this list; --to provide graduate students with a list that may suggest books for paper topics and may slightly help their study for exams in Chinese politics; a few of the compiler's favorite books are starred on the list, but not much should be made of this because such books may be old or the subjects may not meet present interests; --to supplement a bibliography of all Asian serials in the Princeton Libraries that was compiled long ago by Frances Chen and Maureen Donovan; many of these are now available on the web,e.g., from “J-Stor”; --to suggest to book selectors in the Princeton libraries items that are suitable for acquisition; to provide a computerized list on which researchers can search for keywords of interests; and to provide a resource that many teachers at various other universities have also used. -
Resignation and Appointment of Independent Non-Executive Director
Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited and The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited take no responsibility for the contents of this announcement, make no representation as to its accuracy or completeness and expressly disclaim any liability whatsoever for any loss howsoever arising from or in reliance upon the whole or any part of the contents of this announcement. (Incorporated in the Cayman Islands with limited liability) (Stock Code: 3393) RESIGNATION AND APPOINTMENT OF INDEPENDENT NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR The Board announces that: (1) Mr. Wu Jin Ming has resigned as an independent non-executive director of the Company with effect from 18 October 2016; and (2) Mr. Huang Jing has been appointed as an independent non-executive director of the Company with effect from 18 October 2016. RESIGNATION OF INDEPENDENT NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR The board of directors (the ‘‘Board’’) of Wasion Group Holdings Limited (the ‘‘Company’’,together with its subsidiaries, the ‘‘Group’’) announces the resignation of Mr. Wu Jin Ming (‘‘Mr. Wu’’)asan independent non-executive director of the Company with effect from 18 October 2016, as he would like to devote more of his time to his academic development. The Board would like to express its highest regards and deepest gratitude to Mr. Wu for his valuable contribution to the Group during his term of office. Mr. Wu has confirmed that he has no disagreement with the Board and there is no matter relating to his resignation that needs to be brought to the attention of the shareholders of the Company. – 1 – APPOINTMENT OF INDEPENDENT NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR The Board is pleased to announce the appointment of Mr. -
Household Questionaire
China Pear Value Chain: Implication for Smallholders Zuhui HUANG Professor and Director of China Academy for Rural Development (CARD), Zhejiang University, China Email: [email protected] Tel (Fax): +86 571 86971646 Jing ZHANG PhD candidate, China Academy for Rural Development (CARD), Zhejiang University, China Email: [email protected] Tel (Fax): +86 571 86971646 Kevin CHEN China Program Leader and Senior Research Fellow International Food Policy Research Institute, Beijing Office Email: [email protected] Fax: + 86 10 62158579 Contributed Paper prepared for presentation at the International Association of Agricultural Economists Conference, Beijing, China, August 16-22, 2009 Copyright 2009 by [Zuhui HUANG et al] All rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies. 1 China Pear Value Chain: Implication for Smallholders Zuhui HUANG Jing ZHANG Kevin Z. CHEN Abstract: Abstract: The objective of this paper is to describe different types of value chain, to capture value added activities of each chain, to discuss the organizational and institutional link in each value chain and its implications for the role of small farmers. We focus on two counties in Hebei and Zhejiang of China. Taking pear for example, analysis of value chain is conducted using data of representative samples of pear value chain. For each chain, value added activities, cost composition, profit distribution, organizational and institutional linkages are illustrated, and corresponding conclusions are indicated. After a systematic analysis of organizational and institutional linkage and value adding activities of every chain as well as cost-benefit analysis of smallholders, we found that: value-added of each value chain are different, smallholders hardly benefit from value chains of Hebei case. -
Xi Jinping's Inner Circle
Xi Jinping’s Inner Circle (Part 1: The Shaanxi Gang) Cheng Li Like successful politicians elsewhere, President Xi Jinping assumed China’s top leadership role with the support of an inner circle. This group has been crucial to Xi’s efforts to consolidate power during his first year in office. Xi’s inner circle of confidants has smoothed the way for him to undertake a bold anti-corruption campaign, manage the Bo Xilai trial, and begin the process of crafting ambitious economic reforms. This series examines various power bases that make up Xi’s inner circle—individuals who serve as his hands, ears, mouth, and brain. This first article focuses on native-place associations, namely the so-called Shaanxi Gang, which includes the “Iron Triangle” grouping in the Politburo Standing Committee. Such discussion can help reveal the future trajectory of politics and policy-making during the Xi administration. The analysis of the positioning and promotion of some of Xi’s longtime friends provides an invaluable assessment of both Xi’s current power and the potential for effective policy implementation. Much of the current discussion about the consolidation of Xi Jinping’s power centers on the top leadership positions that he holds concurrently.1 Xi not only took control of all the supreme institutions in the party, state, and military during the latest political succession, but he also now chairs the newly established National Security Committee and the Central Leading Group on Comprehensive Deepening of Economic Reform—two crucial decision-making bodies in Zhongnanhai. There is now widespread recognition that the party leadership enthusiastically endorsed Xi’s comprehensive market reform agenda at the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee held in November 2013.2 These big, bold, and broad policy initiatives ostensibly reflect Xi’s growing power and influence.3 Less noticed, but equally important, is Xi’s substantial reliance on an inner circle of confidants, especially his quick moves to promote longtime associates to key leadership positions. -
New Leaders Begin the Search for Economic Reform
Signaling Change: New Leaders Begin the Search for Economic Reform Barry Naughton Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang are now the two top leaders in China. Both have moved quickly to break with the Hu-Wen Administration and signal their support for dramatic new economic reforms. The structure of the new Politburo Standing Committee appears to support their aspirations. Neither Xi nor Li has yet committed to specific reform measures, and the obstacles to reform are formidable. However, both Xi and Li have committed to a process that will lead to the creation of a reform program by late 2013. From the standpoint of economic reform policy, the outcome of the 18th Party Congress was clear and unambiguous. The two top leaders, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, emerged from the Congress with a substantial degree of room to maneuver. Both leaders quickly displayed their willingness to break with what had become business as usual under Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. Xi and Li, each in his own way, moved quickly to express their intention to support a revitalized program of economic reform. Xi Jinping has received most of the attention, which is certainly appropriate. Xi has brought a more direct and personal style to the top job, a refreshing change of pace that has generally been welcomed both in China and abroad, and has shown that he intends to keep an eye on economics. Li Keqiang has also begun to signal his intentions. Although Li’s approach is more understated—in part because he will not actually step in as Premier until the March National People’s Congress meetings—his comments merit close attention. -
Assessing the Scope of U.S. Visa Restrictions on Chinese Students
February 2021 Assessing the Scope of U.S. Visa Restrictions on Chinese Students CSET Issue Brief AUTHORS Remco Zwetsloot Emily Weinstein Ryan Fedasiuk Table of Contents Executive Summary ............................................................................................... 3 U.S. Visa Restrictions on Chinese Students and Researchers ............................. 5 Operationalizing “Military-Civil Fusion” for Visa Screening ............................. 6 Estimating the Number of Individuals Affected by the Proclamation ................ 7 Putting the Numbers of Affected Students in Context ...................................... 16 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 18 Acknowledgments .............................................................................................. 21 Appendix ............................................................................................................. 22 Endnotes .............................................................................................................. 30 Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 2 Executive Summary In May 2020, the White House issued a Proclamation barring Chinese graduate students and researchers from studying or working at U.S. universities if they previously had been affiliated with Chinese institutions that “implement or support” China’s military-civil fusion (MCF) strategy. This Brief summarizes what we know—and do not know—about the policy, and uses two -
Xi Is Facing Enormous Opposition“
stars insights: 13 March 2020 „Xi Is Facing Enormous Opposition“ Over the course of the past 40 years, as China has transformed itself from a poor country into a major player on the global stage, the West has grown increasingly wary of China’s rise and its government’s assertive behaviour. What are the drivers behind these developments? And is China a threat for the existing rules-based international order? At a stars Switzerland alumni chapter meeting, China expert Prof. Dr. HUANG Jing shared his unique view of China’s internal politics and what it means for Europe and the world. Michael SETTELEN: The rise of China has led to an increasingly wary West. Is China a threat? HUANG Jing: China is a threat if you look at the country from the perspective of rivals, especially in terms of Western values or the political system. The fundamental difference is that the Washington Consensus – the neoliberal policies propagated by the West – upholds that, first, the individual’s right is more important than the collective good, and the well-being of the individual determines the well-being of society; second, the development is driven by a capitalist market economy in a – third – liberal democratic system. The Beijing Consensus – or China’s model – on the other hand believes that, first, the collective good, i.e. national interests, trumps everything. By this logic, individual rights can be sacrificed if necessary. Second, the development is driven by the “socialist market economy”. Some call it state capitalism. Third, the system is a socialist system under one- party rule. -
Admission Information Of
22001144 University Postgraduates Program at Beihang University Sponsored by Chinese Government Scholarship About the Program Overseas students, who wish to study for Master’s Degree or Doctoral Degree at Beihang University (BUAA), are welcome to apply for the University Postgraduates Program at Beihang University sponsored by Chinese Government Scholarship. The University Postgraduates Program at Beihang University is a full time program with full scholarship, covering tuition fee, accommodation, living allowance, normal medical service, comprehensive insurance, etc., except for international travel expenses. The program will start in early September 2014 and the study period is 2 to 3 years for master program and 3 to 4 years for doctoral program. Eligibility For master program, the candidates are required to have a Bachelor Degree and should be under the age of 35; for doctoral program, the candidates should hold a Master Degree and be under the age of 40. Applicants should have a good command of English or Chinese so as to take courses in English or Chinese. Applicants should be aware the study fields sponsored by the program do not cover Chinese, English and any other language studies. Application Documents 1. Application Form for Chinese Government Scholarship; 2. Highest Education Diploma (notarized photocopy or original one) or Certificate of expected graduation date issued by the applicant’s university; 3. Notarized or original transcripts; 4. A study or research plan (no less than 500 words); 5. Two Recommendation Letters from professors or experts; 6. Photocopy of Foreigner Physical Examination Form and the Report on Blood Examination; 7. The results of TOEFL, IELTS or HSK (Chinese Proficiency Test), or other English / Chinese Proficiency Certificates; 8. -
China Research and Policy Group at Western
China Research and Policy Group at Western A Research and Policy Dialogue Group Based at the University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada and Partnered with The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Waterloo Ontario Principal Participants John Whalley UWO/CIGI (Coordinator) Manmohan Agarwal CIGI Jim Davies UWO Terry Sicular UWO Contact Details Administrator Kun Peng UWO/CIGI ([email protected]) Phone 519 661 2111 x85243 http://www.economics.uwo.ca/orf/index.asp July 2010 1 1. Overview The China Research and Policy Group at Western is a research and policy analysis/ dialogue entity based at the Economic Policy Research Institute (EPRI), Department of Economics, The University of Western Ontario (UWO), London, Ontario, Canada, and partnered with the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Waterloo, Ontario, Canada. It also has several partnering research groups in universities and research institutions in China, and other countries including the UK, Russia and India. It engages in both project supported activities and in policy commentary and dialogue on a wide range of issues related to economic policy issues involving China. It also interacts with the business community both inside and outside of China. Its central focus is on China’s ongoing integration and involvement in the global economy. This covers China’s trade and foreign investment inflows and outflows, its involvement in international bodies (G20, WTO, IMF, World Bank), exchange rate and reserve management policies, growing Southern engagement, and regional trade and monetary policies. But in addition, the group also covers Chinese domestic issues including enterprise reforms, Chinese tax policy, China’s labour markets, China’s regional polices, social policy and inequality and other issues. -
Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics
Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics JING HUANG Utah State University published by the press syndicate of the university of cambridge The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom cambridge university press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK http: //www.cup.cam.ac.uk 40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA http: //www.cup.org 10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, Melbourne 3166, Australia Ruiz de Alarcón 13, 28014 Madrid, Spain © Jing Huang 2000 This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 2000 Printed in the United States of America Typeface Times Roman 10/13 pt. System QuarkXPress [BTS] A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication data Huang, Jing. Factionalism in Chinese Communist politics / Jing Huang. p. cm. – (Cambridge modern China series) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-521-62284-0 1. Chung-kuo kung ch’an tang – History. 2. Political purges – China. 3. China – Politics and government – 1949– I. Title. II. Series. JQ1519.A5H8725 2000 324.251¢075¢09 – dc21 99-29408 CIP ISBN 0 521 62284 0 hardback Contents List of Figures and Tables page xi Preface xiii List of Abbreviations xvii Introduction 1 Factionalism in Leadership Relations and Decision Making 1 Western Analysis of Factionalism in Leadership Relations -
Universities and the Chinese Defense Technology Workforce
December 2020 Universities and the Chinese Defense Technology Workforce CSET Issue Brief AUTHORS Ryan Fedasiuk Emily Weinstein Table of Contents Executive Summary ............................................................................................... 3 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 5 Methodology and Scope ..................................................................................... 6 Part I: China’s Defense Companies Recruit from Civilian Universities ............... 9 Part II: Some U.S. Tech Companies Indirectly Support China’s Defense Industry ................................................................................................................ 13 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 17 Acknowledgments .............................................................................................. 18 Appendix I: Chinese Universities Included in This Report ............................... 19 Appendix II: Breakdown by Employer ............................................................. 20 Endnotes .............................................................................................................. 28 Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 2 Executive Summary Since the mid-2010s, U.S. lawmakers have voiced a broad range of concerns about academic collaboration with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), but the most prominent